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Constructing the world: Active causal learning in cognition
by Neil Robert Bramley
Humans are adept at constructing causal models of the world that can support pre-
diction, explanation, simulation-based reasoning, planning and control. In this thesis I
explore how people learn about the causal world interacting with it, and how they rep-
resent and modify their causal knowledge as they gather evidence. Over 10 experiments
and modelling, I show that interventional and temporal cues, along with top-down hi-
erarchical constraints, inform the gradual evolution and adaptation of increasingly rich
causal representations.
Chapters 1 and 2 develop a rational analysis of the problems of learning and represent-
ing causal structure, and choosing interventions, that perturb the world in ways that
reveal its structure. Chapters 3–5 focus on structure learning over sequences of discrete
trials, in which learners can intervene by setting variables within a causal system and
observe the consequences. The second half of the thesis generalises beyond the discrete
trial learning case, exploring interventional causal learning in situations where events
occur in continuous time (Chapters 6 and 7); and in spatiotemporally rich physical “mi-
croworlds” (Chapter 8). Throughout the experiments, I find that both children and
adults are robust active causal learners, able to deal with noise and complexity even as
normative judgment and intervention selection become radically intractable. To explain
their success, I develop scalable process level accounts of both causal structure learning
and intervention selection inspired by approximation algorithms in machine learning. I
show that my models can better explain patterns of behaviour than a range of alterna-
tives as well as shedding light on the source of common biases including confirmatory
testing, anchoring effects and probability matching. Finally, I propose a close relation-
ship between active learning and active aspects of cognition including thinking, decision
making and executive control.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation
of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the
evidence of our memory and senses.”
— DAVID HUME
The story of model-based cognition begins with the discovery of causality. Born into
a “blooming, buzzing confusion” (James, 1890, p462), we discover our first causal re-
lationship in our ability to affect this sensory barrage. Opening our eyes brings light.
Crying brings food. Motor actions affect sensations. A control loop of action and effect
is established that drives subsequent learning. As we learn, we generalise from our own
ability to affect things, populating our model of the world with multiple entities and
causal relationships. By adulthood, this control loop has produced a rich model of a
causal world filled with objects and forces, relata and relationships, with ourselves as
the original and most important player. This is a “just so” story (Kipling, 1902), but it
illustrates an intuitive idea. Causality and action are closely related, together providing
the building blocks and tools needed to build a rich and productive ontology. Causal
models are valuable to us because they let us venture, virtually, away from the here-and-
now while maintaining a relationship with reality. We can travel forwards — predicting
what will happen in the upcoming seconds, days and years; backwards — generating
explanations for encountered phenomena; and sideways — imagining how things would
play out if circumstances were different (Woodward, 2003). By simulating potential ac-
tions before taking them, causal knowledge lets us act flexibly and intelligently, choosing
actions likely to get us where we want to go first try, even as our circumstances and
goals shift. This metaphysical mobility is so embedded in higher-level cognition it is
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easy to take for granted, but its success as a cognitive strategy depends on the match
between the model in the head and the causality in the world. Therefore, in this thesis,
I explore two closely related questions: (1) How do people learn causal models through
their interactions with the world? And: (2) How do people interact with the world in
order to learn about its causal structure?
I approach both problems from the perspective of rational analysis (Anderson, 1990).
This means I work from the top down; first laying out a computational level perspective
on causal structure induction and interventional learning (Marr, 1982), using this along-
side behavioural data to develop models of psychological representations and processes.
Learning a causal model likely to have produced the evidence of one’s senses is a classic
reverse-engineering problem. Like many of the problems faced by cognition, it is one of
induction — any causal hypothesis could be falsified by new evidence (Hume, 1740) —
and fundamentally ill-posed — the data massively under-determines the correct solu-
tion. As we will see in Chapter 2, this means that normative inference can be understood
through the mathematics of subjective probability theory and Bayesian inference over a
large hypothesis space of possible structural models. I will show that learning a causal
model is harder than learning a descriptive or associative one, largely possible only be-
cause we are active participants in the world we seek to understand. Choosing how to
intervene on the world to learn its structure is a problem of active learning where the
goal is to choose actions expected to reduce one’s uncertainty (Settles, 2012). Thus, I
will analyse people’s active causal learning from an information theoretic perspective,
where normative active learning can be defined as taking actions expected to reduce
uncertainty about the true causal model as quickly as possible (Miller, 1984; Shannon,
1951).
In general, rational analysis will serve to reveal the prohibitive complexity of optimal
causal learning and action selection in the real world. Thus, throughout the thesis, I
will develop a “resource rational” (Griffiths, Lieder, & Goodman, 2015; Simon, 1982)
perspective on how people refine their causal models and intervene effectively on the
world despite their processing and representational limitations.
In addition to being under-determined by the evidence, the brain is just a small part of
the world it seeks to understand. This puts hard constraints on causal representation
in terms of storage and efficiency. People’s causal models must be useful for making
causal inferences under uncertainty in real time, meaning that representations must
provide a compact and efficient abstraction that keeps what is predictively useful while
discarding the rest. As we will see, one way to do this is by learning a probabilistic
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map of causal relationships between variables that can accommodate noisy and imper-
fect relationships, and that we can model using a graphical model formalism called a
causal Bayesian network. Another aspect is hierarchical structure, through which cog-
nisers capture commonalities between domains that bootstrap inference (Griffiths &
Tenenbaum, 2009; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011), allowing for strong
causal judgments in familiar domains after even a single data point.However, causal
knowledge also extends beyond contingency relationships between variables. We expe-
rience the world as extended in space and time. So to attribute causes to effects and
to act effectively, we must relate our abstract beliefs to these dimensions. Thus, in the
later chapters of the thesis I will explore the role of time and mechanism knowledge in
learning and representation.
Over the thesis as a whole, a consistent perspective will emerge. Human causal learning is
a stochastic and gradual process, shaped as much by people’s current causal model when
considering alternatives as by the ground truth they hope to approach. In particular, in
Chapter 5, I develop a scalable model of incremental structure learning, named after the
Neurath’s ship metaphor in philosophy of science (Neurath, 1932; Quine, 1969). The
metaphor relates the challenges of theory change to those of fixing a ship while at sea,
and the model embodies this process by showing how a learner can gradually refine a
global structural model through small incremental changes (as they think and gather
evidence). The model has a close formal relationship with sample-based algorithms
for approximation in machine learning, specifically particle filters and Markov Chain
Monte Carlo. Thus, it captures the idea of resource rationality (Griffiths et al., 2015;
Simon, 1982), showing how learners trade accuracy against computational cost in ways
that allows them to learn as well as possible even in highly complex domains. I show
that Neurath’s ship outperforms a number of alternative proposals in the literature
in describing behavioural patterns in discrete-trial interventional causal learning. In
Chapters 6 and 7, I show that we see similar patterns of incremental construction in
learning continuous time settings. In the General Discussion (Chapter 9), I will propose
that this approach is not limited to learning structure, but that variants of this approach
can explain human success at learning complex representations in general.
In parallel to the insights into learning and representation, the thesis will develop a
novel perspective on interventional active learning, as a process of optimal self-teaching
rather than optimal information gathering. From this perspective, the learner’s goal is
to find actions that optimally support their own bounded and limited ability to learn,
rather than maximising information per se. In Chapter 5, we will see that people choose
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interventions in complex causal systems to learn about manageable subspaces of the
problem, such as a single relationship at a time, the effects of a single variable, or whether
their current favoured hypothesis is correct. When intervening on causal systems in time
(Chapter 7), we will see that people space out their interventions in a way that structures
their learning experience as a whole, creating approximately independent “trials”. And,
learning by intervention in simulated causal worlds, we will find that people use their
actions creatively to construct informal “experiments”, that test properties of interest
one at a time while minimising “causal noise”. The local uncertainty schema I develop
captures formally why human learners behave in the ways they do, explaining a range
of common behaviours in the active learning literature that appear inefficient on first
analysis, including preference for confirmatory testing; and repetition (Schwartzman,
2012) and failure to control for confounds (Chen & Klahr, 1999).
More broadly, this thesis will contribute to open questions in philosophy, computer
science and psychology. In philosophy, my Neurath’s ship model of incremental causal
theory change puts formal flesh on anti-foundationalist ideas about the progression of
scientific theories (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1976; Thagard, 1992) providing a plausible
picture of how complex theories grow and change through the combination of evidence
and thought. In computer science, the data I present provide rich evidence about how
humans solve the problems associated with learning generative causal models of the
world. This has potential to guide the development of human-like artificial intelligence.
In psychology, this thesis contributes to debates about Bayesian rationality, heuristics
and approximation. My models of psychological processes underlying causal learning
not only explain how humans can learn in ways that respect uncertainty yet scale up to
problems of real-world complexity (Griffiths et al., 2015; van Rooij, Wright, Kwisthout, &
Wareham, 2014), but also predict common behavioural phenomena including probability
matching, anchoring and confirmation bias.
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 develops the computational level
picture of causal inference and intervention selection, introducing rational analysis, prob-
abilistic graphical models, exact and approximate Bayesian inference and active learning.
Chapter 3 explores interventional causal learning from contingency information in exper-
iments and modelling. It compares three measures of intervention choice, and compares
an idealised Bayesian learning model to bounded variants, finding that learners are both
conservative in their judgments and forgetful about evidence relative to Bayesian norms.
At the start of Chapter 3, I provide mathematical details of the CBN formalism in a
text box for reference in reading this and subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 explores the
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developmental trajectory of interventional causal learning in 5- to 8-year-olds. It shows
that all but the youngest children choose interventions that are more useful than chance
and that the quality of their intervention choices predict judgment accuracy. But, as
with adults, judgments are indicative of forgetting and neglect of older evidence and
intervention choices are repetitive and confirmation-biased.
Chapter 5 explores how people scale up to learn in harder problems with complex causal
structures and substantial noise. In this chapter I develop and test my Neurath’s ship
process model of bounded structure inference and locally focused intervention choice,
showing that it describes participants’ behaviour better than a number of alternatives.
Chapter 6 focuses on the role of time in interventional structure learning, finding that
participants make systematic use of event order and inter-event intervals, and that we can
again describe their behaviour as based on entertaining and adapting a single candidate
structural hypothesis. Chapter 7 explores how people make interventions in dynamic
causal systems in real time, showing that they are good at using interventions to break
a continuous learning period into separate approximate “trials”, and make structure
judgments that, again, reflect the incremental construction of a single causal model
hypothesis. Chapter 8 looks at active learning in rich simulated physics worlds with the
goal of identifying their latent causally relevant properties of objects like their masses
and forces of attraction and repulsion. I show that learners use their actions to construct
“natural experiments” that use the laws of physics to strongly reveal target properties of
objects while minimising confounding information. In Chapter 9, I bring all these results
together and construct a cohesive picture of active causal learning and representation in





“Our grasp of the world — the way we mirror its causal structure — is at
the mercy of the inferential tools we have in the brain.”
— JAKOB HOHWY
Studying active causal learning is difficult because it is so deeply embedded in cognition,
cross-cutting core cognitive competencies such as perception, probabilistic and approx-
imate inference, abduction and abstraction. Indeed, this thesis is itself an exercise in
active causal learning: it will involve constructing models of how people construct causal
models, and testing people to see how they test the world. Similar to how I will argue
people learn causal structure, I will build on rich prior knowledge (existing research),
gather new evidence, and integrate the two via Bayesian statistics with the goal of re-
fining a picture of human active causal cognition. The complexity of the topic means it
is important to be clear about the methods of analyses, and to delineate the theoretical
and empirical questions. Accordingly, in this first chapter I introduce necessary appa-
ratus for studying causality and active learning, and survey the relevant literature. In
particular, I introduce computationalism, rational analysis, probabilistic graphical mod-
els, exact and approximate Bayesian inference and active learning. Using these tools, I
then set up the problem of interacting with the world and learning a model of its causal
structure.
2.1 Computationalism
The 20th century saw the invention of the computer, and along with it the rise of
computationalism in psychology. Computationalism is the thesis that the mind/brain is
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fundamentally an information processing device, meaning that psychological processes
like learning, thinking and decision making are explicable in computational terms. The
success of this approach is evident in the rapid co-evolution of the cognitive and computer
sciences in the last 50 years. Many algorithms in contemporary machine learning and
artificial intelligence — e.g. image and voice recognition systems, self driving cars,
recommendation engines — make use of insights about how analogous computations are
achieved in the brain. In parallel, as computational power and know-how has increased,
so too has the strength of the computationalist perspective; as better cognitive models
have enriched our understanding of cognition.
One reason for the success of computationalism in psychology is the clarity it lends to
the formation and refinement of theories. In studying vision, Marr (1982) described
three levels at which one can describe information processing systems: (1) At the com-
putational level, explanation focuses on the abstract problem being solved by a system.
What is the system designed or evolved to do? What inputs should it map to what out-
puts? (2) At the process level, explanation focuses on how a system solves the problem.
What does it do with the inputs to come up with its outputs? What representations and
algorithms are involved? (3) Finally, at the implementational level, explanation focuses
on how a system is physically implemented. What is it made from: gears and levers;
electrical circuits; neurons? How are the parts arranged and connected such that they
realise the representations and algorithms?
Marr’s scheme has since become central to computational analysis. It captures how un-
derstanding of cognition on one level informs and constrains inference about the other
levels. Only certain algorithms can solve a given computational problem, and only cer-
tain physical architectures are appropriate for realising a given algorithm. As cognitive
scientists, we are interested in understanding the problems solved by cognitive agents
(the computational level), but even more interested in how they solve them (the process
level). One project is to build up our understanding of cognitive processing via close
analysis of neuroanatomical implementation. However, we often want to keep our par-
ticipants alive, and the complexity of the brain means that higher level cognition is still
largely beyond the reach of this bottom up explanation. Thus, a parallel project is to
work from the top down, first refining understanding of the problems the brain solves,
then theorizing about the representations and algorithms it uses to solve them. In this
thesis I take this top-down approach.
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2.2 Rational analysis
Related to Marr, Anderson (1990) laid out a method for rational analysis of cognition
that has been widely adopted in cognitive science. It rests on the assumption that the
pressures of evolution and development have rendered cognition close to optimal given
its constraints. Anderson proposes we should start with a first-principles description of
the problem being solved by the agent at the computational level, in terms of its goals
and environment, making minimal assumptions about its computational limitations.
We work out the optimal solution to this problem, then compare this to participants’
behaviour in experiments. Where there are discrepancies, we use these to refine our
understanding of the problem being solved either by: (1) incorporating more plausible
characterisation of the computational constraints; (2) reconsidering the agents’ goals, or
(3) refining our model of the environment. By iterating this process, Anderson argues
we can get closer to understanding cognitive processing. Building on these ideas and
Marr’s hierarchy, Chater and Oaksford (1999) emphasise that there are often a number
of “deep local optima” — i.e. multiple plausible algorithms that approximately solve
a refined computational problem. This means that interpreting deviations from model
predictions involves striking a balance between refining one’s idealisation of the problem
being solved, and considering candidate process level models that can explain deviations
from these optima. As we will see, optimal inference in many cognitive domains, not least
causal inference and active learning, is radically intractable, requiring practically infinite
storage and processing power (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2012). This means there can be
a large gulf between rational models and what could plausibly be implemented by the
brain. Thus, in recent years, there has been an increased emphasis on consideration of
the representational and algorithmic implications of ostensibly “rational” models (Jones
& Love, 2011) and focus on identifying rational approximations that can account for
human successes without positing inhuman computations (Griffiths et al., 2015).
2.3 Bayesian inference
In the last few decades, rational analysis has shed light on the character of the compu-
tational problems faced by cognition. Where early computationalist ideas about mind
treated it as fundamentally engaged in logical symbol manipulation (McCulloch & Pitts,
1943; Newell & Simon, 1972; Whitehead & Russell, 1912), there has since been a “prob-
abilistic turn” (Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006). The anecdote goes that in the
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1960’s, MIT’s Marvin Minksy assigned a graduate student the problem of solving com-
puter vision as a summer project (Blackmore, 2000). By the end of the summer, all they
had established was that the problem was much harder than initially thought. Everyday
problems faced by cognitive agents — like recognising objects, and understanding natu-
ral language, and motor control — long resisted the grasp of what, following Haugeland
(1989), is now often termed “good old fashioned AI”. The world is complex, noisy and
under-constrained by the evidence of the senses. This means it is rational to be uncer-
tain, and to respect this uncertainty in one’s representations and inferences (Chater &
Oaksford, 1993; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). In general the inferences required of cogni-
tion have turned out not to be deductive, but rather inductive in the sense that beliefs
about the world are always uncertain and falsifiable (Goodman, 1955; Hume, 1740), and
abductive in the sense that a central goal is to learn parsimonious generative models
that can explain lots of encountered evidence (Peirce, 1955). The problem of induction,
and to some extent abduction, have turned out to be problems of probabilistic inference,
addressable via probability theory (Carnap, 1962).1
Probability theory allows us to treat uncertain quantities as random variables, meaning
that while we do not know their true value, we can maintain a probability distribution
over their possible values that can change as we gather more evidence. Bayes’ theorem
(Bayes & Price, 1763) is a consequence of the axioms of probability and provides a
calculus for rational inference under uncertainty. From a Bayesian perspective, learning
is the process of updating one’s subjective probabilistic beliefs about the true state of
some part of the world, where the ground truth is treated as a random variable X.
Its possible values x ∈ X cover all possible hypotheses about about how things might
be. A Bayesian learner, having observed evidence d, updates their prior probability
distribution P (X) into a posterior distribution P (X|d) , by multiplying prior P (X) and
likelihood P (d|X) and normalising by the average likelihood of the data across all the
possible values of x:
P (X|d) = P (d|X)P (X)∑
xi∈X P (d|xi)P (xi)
. (2.1)
The posterior from one learning instance becomes the prior for the next (e.g. Pt(X) =
Pt−1(X|dt−1)), and this process continues as more evidence is received.
1Although probability theory does not solve the strongest forms of the philosophical problem of
induction. Probabilistic inference still rests on the assumption that the future will resemble the past,
an assumption that itself can only be justified inductively. Thus, the attempt to justify induction is
circular.
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We can motivate this idea with a simple example. What is the prior probability that a
randomly chosen person plays in a rock band? Suppose you think it is quite low, say
P (xband) =
1
200 . Suppose you now learn that this person likes rock music d =“likes rock
music”. The chance that someone who is actually in a rock band likes rock music is
probably very high, say P (d|xband) = 99100 . But then liking rock music is not uncommon.
Suppose among those who don’t play in rock bands, the chance of liking rock music is
still around P (d|xnot) = 15 . Now we can use Bayes’ theorem to update our belief that the
person in question is in a rock band, given that we now know their music preferences.
Bayes’ theorem tells us that we should rationally increase our belief that this person is
in a rock band from 1200 to around
1
40 . With sufficient evidence, an idealised Bayesian
learner’s subjective beliefs eventually approximate the ground truth, in this case with
P (xband) approaching 1 if the person actually is in a rock band and 0 if they are not.
2
In general, the problem of updating one’s probabilistic beliefs about the world is what
is known as an “inverse problem” (Ambartsumian, 1929; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). This
means one must work backward from evidence to infer the probability of the causal
factors that produced it. Inference about the state of a single variable is a fairly minimal
example of this. However, once we begin to consider Bayesian inference about the causal
model relating multiple variables, our “X” of interest covers an increasingly large space
of possible generative models. I depict this in Figure 2.1, where causality flows both
around, in the world, and outwards from the world to the data it produces. In contrast,
inference inverts this process, flowing “inward” from the data to refine one’s internal
causal beliefs (which, in turn, contain virtual causality, hopefully mirroring the causality
in the world).3
In order to understand how people learn a causal model and use it to guide action,
we must think about the form that their causal models take. It is clear that the goal
of causal learning is to come up with a model of the world that makes it predictable
and, ultimately, exploitable. I depict this idea in Figure 2.1. We can affect the world
with our actions (hand symbol) and want to do so in ways that reap rewards (find
food, minimise pain etc). However, we need to know something about the world in
order to choose actions likely to bring rewards. Some of this is “model free”, in the
sense that reinforcing actions that were rewarding in the past is often a good start.
Indeed, a large portion of the human and animal learning literature focuses on model
2Provided, of course, that the hypotheses are distinguishable and the hypothesis space contains the
ground truth.
3While I depict this as a single causal model, from a Bayesian perspective this should be a probability
distribution over all possible causal models.








Figure 2.1: Schematic of active causal learning. The world produces data and reward.
Data are used to refine a model of the world. One’s model and utilities drive action
that affects the world, producing future data and rewards. Note that I assume utilities
are indirectly related to rewards via the model (dashed line).
free forms of learning capturing many behaviours as direct responses to stimuli (e.g.
Mackintosh, 1983; Skinner, 1990; Sutton & Barto, 1998). Unfortunately, one can only
get so far without a model (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011). When
rewards move or deplete, or actively try to outmanoeuvre you, reinforced behaviours
become useless or maladaptive. Furthermore, it is hard to know what will be valuable
in the future, so reward dependent learning can easily fail to equip one for the future.
Intuitively then, a causal model provides flexibility, enabling the bearer to navigate
the world successfully wherever they end up wanting to go. This flexibility depends
on learning a representation that mirrors the way the world actually works (Hohwy,
2013); one that — setting aside metaphysical claims about causation — captures the
true causal relationships. However, the model must also be compact both because it
must fit inside a brain much smaller than the world it imitates, and because it must
support online inference about the current state of the world.
2.4 Probabilistic graphical models
Before considering causal representations, it is helpful to consider how we can represent
relationships between variables in general. As we have seen, probabilistic inference is
straightforward to demonstrate in toy problems. However, even my simple example
above presupposed knowledge about the relationships between the variable of interest
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and the evidence (e.g. between liking rock music and being in a rock band). In general,
a probabilistic brain needs a representation that supports these kinds of conditional
probability judgments relating arbitrary variables, so that learning about one thing can
have the right knock-on implications on the probabilities of whatever else it is related
to.
A na¨ıve way to do probabilistic inference about lots of variables is to keep track of the
probabilities of all the combinations of all the states of all the variables, averaging over
all the unobserved variables when making inferences. Unfortunately, as the space we
are interested in doing inference over gets more complex, the amount of work and stor-
age needed to track and calculate probabilities increases much faster, rapidly becoming
infeasible. Even if, implausibly, one’s entire understanding of the world could be cap-
tured by 100 binary variables, one would would need to keep track of 2100 (which is
about 1030) probabilities to make basic inferences. Figure 2.2b illustrates this idea with
just 10 variables. Worse, when using one’s knowledge to make inferences, one would
often have to average over very large numbers of possibilities. For instance, suppose
the two variables from the toy example above feature in our 100 variable representa-
tion. Concretely, let X1 be “a person likes rock music” and X2 be “a person is in
a rock band”. To get the marginal (i.e. average) probability of someone being in a









P (X1, X3 . . . X100). To get the updated probability that
a person is in a rock band having learned that they like music, one would have to
condition on X1 = 1 and marginalise over all combinations of the other 98 variables






, P (X2, . . . , X100|X1 = 1), and so on. Clearly this is not
feasible for complex beliefs involving many variables that might take many or a con-
tinuum of states. This combinatorial explosion is a serious and pervasive problem for
probabilistic inference. Luckily, this complexity can be managed through finding struc-
ture that simplifies the problem, representing only those relationships that are essential
for retaining the probabilistic information (Bishop, 2006).
Computer scientists model structure in large probability distributions using probabilistic
graphical models. Graphical models encode the relationships between variables in a
lightweight way by storing probabilities only between those variables that are directly
related. If there are still too many relationships to store, graphical models can trade
off veracity for efficiency by only representing some of the direct relationships (e.g. the
strongest ones). In general, the less densely connected the variables in the graphical
model, the easier it is to make probabilistic inferences (Barber, 2012).








































c) Inference from observation
b) A Causal Bayesian network
d) Inference from intervention
Nodes
Edges
Figure 2.2: Graphical model examples. a) Visualisation of a joint distribution over
10 variables. Node shading denotes marginal probability that each variable is “on”
(i.e. takes the value 1). Lines indicate na¨ıve assumption that every variable depends
on every other variable. b) A (causal) Bayesian network for the same 10 variables. c)
The marginal probability of all unobserved variables X1, X3–X10 after observing X2
being “on” (taking the value 1). In this example, all variables have a small base-rate
probability of being “on” and causal relationships have a positive strength (e.g. they
raise the probability of their effects). Children and parents of X2 are more likely to
be on too. Note X2 node is enlarged for readability. d) An example of the marginal
probability of all unobserved variables after an intervention that turns X2 “on”. Only
children of X2 are more likely to turn “on”. Grey arrow and scissors indicates that the
intervention overrides the normal connection from X1 to X2.
A common class of probabilistic graphical model is the Bayesian network. Bayesian
networks capture probabilistic structure in terms of conditional probabilities and repre-
sent these using an acyclic graph. Variables are represented by nodes and conditional
probabilities are represented by arrows (called “edges”, see Figure 2.2b). For a given
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node, other nodes that can be reached by travelling forward along edges are its “descen-
dants”, and any node that can be reached by travelling backward along edges are its
“ancestors”. Immediate descendants are called “children” and immediate ancestors are
called “parents”. Bayesian networks are defined by the Markov condition, which states
that each node is independent of all of its non-descendants given its parents. Crucially,
this reduces the number of variables that must be considered when doing inference.
We can illustrate this by introducing a few more binary variables to our example. Sup-
pose X3 is “a person has tinnitus” and X4 “a person spends a lot of time travelling”.
Suppose that X2 (a person is in a band) is probabilistically related to both X3 and X4.
That is, people in rock bands are both more likely to get tinnitus (e.g. because they
are exposed to lots of noise) and to spend a lot of time travelling (e.g. on the road
between gigs).4 Suppose also, that there is no direct relationship between X3 and X4 —
e.g. between whether someone has tinnitus and how much time they spend travelling,
once we have accounted for any effects due to playing in a band. This means X3 is
“conditionally independent” of X4 given X2 (we can write this as X3 ⊥ X4|X2). This
means that we can construct a Bayesian network relating these variables by replacing
the joint distribution over all 8 combinations of P (X2, X3, X4) with a product of simpler
conditional distributions that omit the (non)relationship between X3 and X4. How-
ever, there are actually several ways of doing this. We can define the probabilities of
X3 and X4 as conditional on X2, giving P (X2)P (X3|X2)P (X4|X2) corresponding to a
Forking structure X3 ← X2 → X4. Alternatively, we could start from X3 defining X2
conditional on X3 but keeping X4 conditional on X3, giving P (X2)P (X3|X2)P (X4|X3)
corresponding to a Chain X2 → X3 → X4 structure. Finally, we could go the other way,
defining X2 conditional on X4, giving P (X4)P (X3|X4)P (X2|X3), also corresponding to
a Chain structure but running in the opposite direction X2 ← X3 ← X4. Formally,
these alternatives are known as Markov equivalent (Glymour, 2001; Pearl, 1988).
Figure 2.3 gives a worked example of this idea. 2.3a provides some fictional data: fre-
quencies of all combinations of the X2, X3 and X4 ∈ [0=absent, 1=present] for 10,000
people. 2.3b gives a measure of the degree of probabilistic dependence between the vari-
ables, based on these data.5 This reveals that all three variables are (unconditionally)
dependent but that, when conditioning on X2, X3 becomes conditionally independent
4In general the relationships need not be positive, all that matters is that the probability distribution
for one variable differs depending on the state of the other, for at least one setting all the other variables
in the network.
5I use Mutual information (Cover & Thomas, 1991) to measure dependence here. Mutual information
captures how much information one variable provides about another and goes to zero if two variables
are independent.
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of X4, capturing the idea that tinnitus is unrelated to travelling after accounting for
whether someone plays in a band. Figure 2.3c shows how we can parametrise a causal
network from these data, and how this depends on how we choose to break up the dis-
tribution. The probability of each variable is a function of its parents, and in this binary
case we can estimate these by simply counting the proportion of times variables took
each state conditional on their parents’ states.6 Variables with no parents, called “root
nodes”, are simply defined by their marginal probability. Focusing on Figure 2.3c i.,
X2 has no parents, so we set it to 0.2 reflecting that, in the data, it takes the value 1
20% of the time. X3 and X4 both have X2 as parent. Thus, they get separate values
for cases where X2 is 0 or 1. If a variable has more than one parent in the graph, we
do this for all combinations of the values of the parents. The result is a parametrised
Bayesian network, where every variable has a probability given the state of its parent(s).
With these set up, the network can be used to reason forward from parents to children
(by simply reading off the conditional probabilities) or backwards (by using Bayes rule)
from children to parents. For larger networks there are a range of efficient algorithms
for performing inference (Barber, 2012). These typically have a computational cost that
scales with the density of the connections between the nodes rather than the total num-
ber of nodes.7 It is important to note that even though different possible structures
have different root nodes, and different links with different strengths running in differ-
ent directions (e.g. Figure 2.3c ii. and iii.), they all have the exact same dependency
structure, licensing the same marginal and conditional inferences.
Figure 2.4 shows the various Markov equivalence classes for three variable networks. In
general, Bayesian and statistical techniques for learning causal Bayesian networks are
indifferent about the direction of some of the edges in a model. Rather they identify
a Markov equivalence class of possible models, with the orientation of some edges cho-
sen based on prior knowledge about plausible causal direction, or set at random. The
Bayesian approach is to treat the true structure as a random variable and update a
probability distribution over all possible structures as data is encountered (Cooper &
Herskovits, 1992), the difficulty with this being that the hypothesis space of models
tends to be very large. There are also algorithms that learn Bayesian network struc-
ture by performing statistical independence tests between pairs of variables conditioning
on others (e.g. Heckerman, Geiger, & Chickering, 1995; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines,
6This bases the estimate on the empirical distribution, which is the best maximum likelihood esti-
mator for Bayesian network conditional probability tables (Barber, 2012).
7Technically, they scale with the largest fully-connected sub-graph once the network has been con-
verted to a Markov (undirected) network through moralisation (Lauritzen, Dawid, Larsen, & Leimer,
1990), a procedure whereby Collider subgraphs become fully connected.
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a) Contingency c) Three Markov equivalent networks
X2 X3 X4 Count
0 0 0 71207
1 0 0 1919
0 1 0 714
1 1 0 71
0 0 1 7899
1 0 1 17378
0 1 1 73




P (X4|X2 = 0) = .1
P (X4|X2 = 1) = .9
P (X3|X2 = 0) = .001
P (X3|X2 = 1) = .04




P (X2|X3 = 0) = .008
P (X2|X3 = 1) = .5
P (X3) = .02
P (X4|X2 = 0) = .1










X2 P (X2|X4 = 0) = .11P (X2|X4 = 1) = .69
P (X3|X2 = 0) = .001
P (X3|X2 = 1) = .04
P (X4) = .26
Figure 2.3: An example of Markov equivalence. a) Fictional data showing the fre-
quency of different combinations of X2 (being in a band), X3 (having tinnitus) and
X4 (spending lots of time travelling). b) The Mutual information (Cover & Thomas,
1991) between all pairs of variables. c) Three parametrised Bayesian networks consis-
tent with the data. Each probability is for the variable in question taking the value 1.
Grey indicates the root nodes.
1993), using the patterns of dependence to orientate some edges. For example, direc-
tionality in Collider sub-graphs can be identified because they imply a unique set of
(in)dependencies (Figure 2.4).
2.5 Causal Bayesian networks
Bayesian networks, with their directed connections and close relationship with norma-
tive inference under uncertainty, are a promising formalism for modelling people’s beliefs
about the causal structure of the world. However, the directed edges merely represent
epistemic relationships and need not run from cause to effect. This means that they do
not provide the “guide to life” (Cartwright, 2001, p242) we need from a causal repre-
sentation. For example, interpreted causally, Figure 2.3c ii. and iii. licence worrying
inferences, such as that exposing yourself to loud noises until you develop tinnitus, or
travelling a lot, might make you want to join a rock band. In the 80’s and 90’s, Judea
Pearl and others applied the Bayesian network formalism to causal representation by





Figure 2.4: All 25 directed acyclic graphs on three variables. Black boxes indicate
Markov equivalence classes, i.e. types of model that cannot be distinguished from
covariational information alone. Blue dashed boxes denote types of structure and the
labels I adopt throughout the thesis.
interpreting the directed edges ontologically, as probabilistic cause–effect relationships
(Pearl, 1988, 2000; Spirtes et al., 1993).8 Bayesian networks in which the directed edges
are interpreted as causal relationships are known as causal Bayesian networks (hereafter
CBNs). By their nature, the ancestral order of the variables in a CBN must correspond
to their temporal order. This means the variables that have no parents must be things
that come first in time, with their children coming later and so on.
As a core part of the CBN project, Pearl developed an interventional “Do calculus”, that
formalises the concept of intervening on a causal system (Pearl, 2000). Interventions are
situations where one or more of the variables in the model are fixed, exogenously, to
one of their possible values. This is a natural way of capturing the idea of reaching
into a causal system and manipulating it. Interventions differ from observations in that
they affect causally downstream variables, but have no effect on the normal causes of
the fixed variable(s). For instance, in our example, if we orientate the edges in the
natural causal direction, the model captures what would happen if you intervened, e.g.
that joining a a rock band affects someone’s probability of developing tinnitus, but that
8Pearl actually provides two largely equivalent formalisms. In the first, the relationships themselves
are probabilistic. In the second, the relationships are deterministic but indeterminacy is introduced
through the inclusion of unknown exogenous influences. I adopt the former formalism but the theory
and modelling in this paper is generally compatible with either.
Chapter 2. Causal cognition 45
giving someone tinnitus does not affect their probability of joining a rock band. As we
will see, this means interventions can be used to break the deadlock between Markov
equivalent structures.
CBNs have been widely adopted by psychologists interested in how people learn and
reason about causality (e.g. Coenen, Rehder, & Gureckis, 2015; Gopnik et al., 2004;
Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Lagnado & Sloman, 2002,
2004, 2006; Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007; Lee & Holyoak, 2008;
Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2011; Meder, Mayrhofer, & Waldmann, 2014; Oppenheimer,
2004; Oppenheimer, Tenenbaum, & Krynski, 2013; Rehder, 2003; Rehder & Hastie,
2001; Sloman, 2005; Sloman & Lagnado, 2005; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers,
& Blum, 2003; Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2006). They have also entered into
philosophical debate, providing an interventionist perspective on how one might formally
ground causal claims (e.g. Danks, 2014; Woodward, 2011). In psychology, the CBN
approach has been successful in capturing simple everyday examples of reasoning that
seem inherently causal yet are hard to capture with a purely associative model (Holyoak
& Cheng, 2011). In particular, the CBN framework captures the ways in which people’s
judgments exhibit “explaining away” — where multiple potential causes of a common
effect compete as explanations. For example, suppose you learn that someone suffers
from tinnitus. Other things being equal, this should increase your belief that they play
in a rock band. However, if you now learn that they work in an extremely noisy factory,
your suspicion that they play in a rock band will be reduced. CBNs also capture another
phenomenon called “screening off”, in which the information one variable provides about
another is reduced to the extent that one already knows the values of any causally
intervening variables. This is like saying that, if you already know someone is in a rock
band, learning that they also like rock music will have less influence on your expectation
that they have tinnitus, removing it completely if you believe the association between
liking rock music and having tinnitus is entirely mediated by playing in a rock band.
CBNs have also helped make sense of people’s judgments of causal strength from co-
variation information. Before the development of the CBN there was a long-running
debate about how people go from contingency information to judgments of the strength
of a causal relationship between binary variables. An early proposal was that causal
strength judgments reflect the change in probability of an effect given a cause — known
as ∆P (Allan, 1980; Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Lopez, Cobos, Can˜o, & Shanks, 1998). After
finding systematic judgments that ∆P could not capture, Cheng (1997) proposed that
causal strength estimates were better understood through the concept of causal power,
46 Chapter 2. Causal cognition
which captures the probability that a cause brought about its effect, after accounting
for the chance it was caused by other, background, factors. Griffiths and Tenenbaum
(2005) found that putative strength judgments across a number of experiments could
often be better explained by the idea that learners are actually making structure judg-
ments within the CBN framework. So, rather than assuming a relationship and judging
its strength, participants’ estimates reflected the rational judgments of the probability of
a causal relationship given the evidence they had been shown. Causal power turns out
to embody a natural way of parametrising CBNs on binary variables, known as noisy-
OR (Pearl, 1988). Noisy-OR considers the probability of an effect to be the probability
that at least one of its causes was effective. Subsequent work on causal cognition has
frequently assumed both the CBN framework and the noisy-OR parametrisation (e.g.
Coenen et al., 2015; Lagnado & Sloman, 2006; Lu, Yuille, Liljeholm, Cheng, & Holyoak,
2008; Yeung & Griffiths, 2015). The example in Figure 2.2b is, in fact, a noisy-OR
parametrised causal Bayesian network, in which variables activate by chance with prob-
ability 0.1, and active causes have a strength of 0.8. Thus those with many ancestors
(e.g. X10) are more likely to be activated either by chance or by a parent, than those
with fewer ancestors (e.g. X1).
Despite its successes, it should be noted that CBN theory also overestimates people’s
sensitivity to contingency information. A number of papers have shown that people
often make systematic deviations from normativity from the perspective of CBN theory
(Mayrhofer, Goodman, Waldmann, & Tenenbaum, 2008; Park & Sloman, 2013; Rehder,
2014; Walsh & Sloman, 2008). CBNs are also poor choices for representing certain
probabilistic inferences such as inference about mutually exclusive causes (see Fenton et
al., 2016).
2.5.1 Intervention
As well as CBNs capturing judgment patterns, Pearl’s “Do calculus” has proven to be
an effective way of capturing the distinctions in the inferences people make from ob-
servations and interventions (Sloman & Lagnado, 2005; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005),
and more-generally, how they reason counterfactually (Lagnado, Gerstenberg, & Zultan,
2013; Rips, 2010; Rips & Edwards, 2013). The broad idea is that observations license
backward inferences while interventions do not. Figure 2.5c gives an example of an
inference based on an observation that X2 = 1 (e.g. someone is in a rock band) and
Figure 2.5d for inference from an intervention (e.g. making someone join a rock band)
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which we write as Do[X1 = 1]. The greyed arrow and scissors symbol between X1 and X2
indicates that the intervention overrides the normal causal relationship. In both cases
the probability of X2’s direct and indirect descendants are affected as can be seen by
their higher probabilities (green shading) relative to their marginal probabilities shown
in Figure 2.2a and b. However, only the observation affects the probability of X2’s nor-
mal cause X1 (e.g. liking rock music), or a knock-on effect on X1’s other effect(s) (e.g.
X9 owning many rock records). The idea that people can imagine virtual interventions
helps explain important aspects of thinking. For example, counterfactual “What if...”
inferences are often consistent with the idea that people imagine an intervention that
makes the counterfactual true with minimal revision of its causal history (Gerstenberg,
Bechlivanidis, & Lagnado, 2013; Lagnado et al., 2013; Rips, 2010). Perhaps the most
important property of interventions though, is that they allow learners to infer causal
rather than correlational structure.
2.6 Active learning
Intervening is a form of active learning. Active learning is the study of situations in
which learners exert control over the evidence they see (Gureckis & Markant, 2012;
Settles, 2012). Controlling incoming information flow is clearly crucial to cognition.
There is a massive amount of information available in the world (and in the head)
and attention is a limited resource (Lavie, 2005), meaning the cognitive system must
be adept at focusing on what is liable to be useful and ignoring the rest. At a low
level we constantly exert active control over informational inputs by moving our eyes
and our bodies to focus on sources of information relevant to what we are wondering.
We see this in striking demonstrations of change blindness, in which focusing on one
aspect of a scene leads us to miss other major events (Simons & Levin, 1997, and see
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGQmdoK ZfY for an example). However, active
learning is also key to higher level cognition, in which asking questions, exploring and
testing the world play large roles in shaping what evidence human learners receive.
Accordingly, developmental research has shown that even young children are adept at
asking useful questions (Lucas, Bridgers, Griffiths, & Gopnik, 2014; Nelson, Divjak,
Gudmundsdottir, Martignon, & Meder, 2014; Ruggeri & Lombrozo, 2014). Research
with adults has shown that people learn rules (Oaksford & Chater, 1994), categories
(Markant & Gureckis, 2010) and spatial concepts (Gureckis & Markant, 2009; Markant
& Gureckis, 2012) quicker, and make more accurate classifications (Nelson, McKenzie,
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Cottrell, & Sejnowski, 2010) when actively selecting their own samples, as well as being
adept at generating informative natural language questions (Rothe, Lake, & Gureckis,
2016). Accordingly, a number of studies have also looked at how people balance ex-
ploring an uncertain environment against exploiting what they already know about it.
This problem is often tested with multi-armed bandit problems, in which participants
repeatedly sample from a set of options with unknown, differing and stochastic payoffs,
with the goal of maximising long term reward (Macready & Wolpert, 1998; Schulz, Kon-
stantinidis, & Speekenbrink, 2016; Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002; Steyvers, Lee,
& Wagenmakers, 2009). In this setting, research has found that people explore more
than they normatively should (Christian & Griffiths, 2016; Tversky & Edwards, 1966),
although recent accounts have suggested this could be a rational response to uncertainty
about whether payoffs change over time (Speekenbrink & Konstantinidis, 2014). While
selecting the right question to ask, place to look, or sample to draw is clearly an es-
sential part of active learning in the world, active learning is particularly important for
identifying causal structure.
Because interventions affect things that are causally downstream but not those that
are causally upstream, perturbing the world allows causal learners to get data that
is otherwise unavailable – information about causal rather than merely correlational
relationships. As an example, suppose you are a medical researcher interested in learning
if there is a relationship between X1 — the presence of some bacterium in the stomach
— and X2 — developing a stomach ulcer. Identifying that patients typically exhibit
both or neither of X1 and X2 tells you that the two are likely to be causally related but
does not tell you in what way. Perhaps the bacterium causes stomach ulcers; perhaps
stomach ulcers provide a breeding ground for the bacteria to grow; or perhaps the two
phenomena share some other common cause. In the absence of a time cue or pre-existing
mechanism knowledge, the direction of causal connections can only be established by
performing active interventions (experimental manipulations) of the variables. In this
example, one might manipulate X1 by ingesting the bacteria and waiting to see if one
develops an ulcer9, or manipulating X2 by making cuts in a sample of stomach lining
tissue to see if this results in growth of the bacterium. If manipulating X1 changes X2
then this is evidence that X1 is a cause of X2.
The importance of interventional active learning is well established in education, and
9This is, in fact, how Barry Marshall won the 2005 Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine for the
discovery that H pylori causes stomach ulcers (see Marshall, Armstrong, McGechie, & Glancy, 1985).
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developmental psychology, where self-directed “play” is seen as vital to healthy develop-
ment (e.g. Bruner, Jolly, & Sylva, 1976; Piaget & Valsiner, 1930). Accordingly, a number
of developmental psychologists have adopted a “child as scientist” analogy, which sees
children as fundamentally engaged in causal hypothesis testing (Gopnik et al., 2004;
Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Sobel & Kushnir, 2006). In adults, a number of studies have
found that people benefit from the ability to perform (or watch others performing) in-
terventions during causal learning (Lagnado & Sloman, 2002, 2004, 2006; Schulz, 2001;
Sobel & Kushnir, 2006). However fewer have looked at how people select what inter-
ventions to perform, and these only focus on the case of a single intervention on a single
variable in semi-deterministic context (Coenen et al., 2015; Steyvers et al., 2003). In
contrast, real world causal learning is generally less constrained, with many variables
and probabilistic relationships, requiring extended interactions to reveal the exact pat-
terns of relationships. As I discuss later in the Chapter, spatiotemporal information
often provides additional cues to causality, and pre-existing knowledge (or “priors”) and
mechanism knowledge constrain the space of plausible relationships. However, in the
worst case, these other cues are uninformative or unavailable. Many systems propagate
too fast to permit observation of time ordering of component activations (e.g. electrical
systems); or have hidden mechanisms (e.g. biological systems, psychological processes);
or noisy/delayed presentation of variable values (Lagnado & Sloman, 2006); while in
others (e.g. crime scene investigation) observations come after the relevant causal pro-
cess has finished. Furthermore, expectations about causal delays and mechanisms for
different causal domains must themselves be learned.
I illustrate this “pure contingency” interventional data in Figure 2.5a. Here a learner
intervenes in the 10 variable “world” introduced in Figure 2.2. The learner fixes com-
ponent X1 “on” and leaves everything else free to vary.
10 As a result, they observe four
of the other nine variables turn “on”. Intuitively, this provides some information about
the underlying relationships. Assuming we know that this is a generative setting (causes
raise the probability of their effects) this intuitively makes X2 more likely to be a cause
of X4,X7, X8 and X10, but less likely to be a cause of X1, X3, X5, X6, or X9. However,
there is clearly a lot of residual uncertainty. For example it may be that some of the
observed activations are indirect or coincidental. Indeed, looking back to Figure 2.2b, we
see that only X4 was directly caused by X2 in this example. X7, X8 were indirect effects
10Throughout the thesis I will refer informally to causal systems as being made up of components.
Where the causal system is described by a CBN, read “components” as equivalent to “variables”. Addi-
tionally, since I generally focus on binary variables I use “on”, active or present as shorthand for “take
the value 1”, and “off’, “inactive”, or “absent” as shorthand for “take the value 0”, as appropriate.
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and X10 must have occurred by chance (in the language of noisy-OR causal models, we
can think of it as being caused by factors outside the model).
Fortunately, one can get less ambiguous information about particular edges by con-
trolling variables. The importance of controlled testing is emphasised in education,
where “scientific thinking” is taught as a methodology whereby one holds all but the
variables related to the relationship of interest constant (Chen & Klahr, 1999; Klahr &
Nigam, 2004; Kuhn & Dean, 2005). This is also the basis for randomised controlled trials
(Cartwright, 1989), where random allocation to conditions averages out the confound-
ing effects of causal influences related to allocation procedure. In the binary-variable,
generative-relationship setting, we can “control” by fixing some variables “off” so that
they cannot exert confounding causal influences. Figure 2.5b gives an example of a
highly controlled test where all but one of the variables are fixed. Intuitively, the fact
that X7 does not turn “on” now is evidence against a direct relationship from X2 to X7,
which was not apparent from the intervention in Figure 2.5a. Unfortunately, in reality it
is not generally possible to control for every conceivable confound at once, nor would it
be feasible to test every pair of variables in isolation. Indeed, in this simple case it would
take 1024 interventions just to check every direct relationship once. Furthermore, it is
clear that by fixing lots of variables, one misses a chance to gather information about
relationships between those variables. Thus, the intuition is that the most informative
interventions often lie somewhere between maximal open-endedness and maximal con-
trol, with the perfect choice dependent on prior expectations and knowledge about the
potential structures. This implies that it can take a careful selection of multiple inter-
ventions to narrow in on the right causal structure. Fortunately, given a well-defined
goal, hypothesis space and prior there is a mathematical answer to which interventions
are most useful.
2.6.1 Optimal intervening
In general, we want our interventions to improve our knowledge about the underlying
relationships. Thus, we need a way of evaluating possible future knowledge states so
we can try to approach those that are more desirable. Choosing queries or experiments
that will, in expectancy, maximize some sensible value of one’s posterior beliefs is a
cornerstone of Bayesian optimal experimental design and decision theory (Good, 1950;
Lindley, 1956). Accordingly, there are various proposals in both the mathematical and
psychological literature about what is the most appropriate objective function for driving




















Figure 2.5: Interventional learning from covariational evidence; i.e. cases where
relationships are probabilistic and outcomes of interventions are all revealed together,
green denotes components that turned “on”, white denotes those that stayed “off’, thick
black borders denote variables that are fixed by the learner a) A “simple” intervention
b) A “controlled” intervention (extra arms from the learner to the fixed “off” variables
omitted for clarity).
active learning in different domains (Butko & Movellan, 2008; Markant & Gureckis, 2012;
Meder, Gerstenberg, Hagmayer, & Waldmann, 2010; Nelson, 2005; Nielsen & Nock,
2011; Renyi, 1961; Shannon, 1951; Tsallis, 1988) and I will consider several possibilities
in Chapter 3. However, the different objectives generally embody a similar intuition:
posteriors that imply greater certainty about the true structure are more desirable.
Having settled on an objective, one can go about evaluating different potential inter-
ventions through a preposterior (Raiffa, 1974) analysis of their possible outcomes and
resultant values. To do this, we imagine all the things that could happen if we perform
an intervention. For the intervention in Figure 2.5a there are 29 = 512 possible outcomes
(all combinations of the 9 free-to-vary variables occurring or not), while for the inter-
vention in Figure 2.5b there are 21 = 2 (X3 will either turn on or not). In principle, we
can calculate what our posterior beliefs would be after each of these potential outcomes.
Using our objective function, we could then calculate the value of each of these possible
future posteriors. By weighting each value by the marginal likelihood of observing that
outcome and averaging, we end up with an expected value for the intervention. By doing
this for all possible interventions (i.e. each possible setting of variables “on”, “off” or
“free to vary”) we can choose whichever setting has the maximum expected value. As
if this were not intensive enough, strictly we should also plan ahead, assuming we will
also choose all future interventions optimally, and choose the intervention that gets us
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to the greatest rewards on average by the end of learning (Puterman, 2009). Returning
to Figure 2.1, I depict this process as a loop, where intervention choices are guided by
a combination of preposterior analysis given current state of knowledge about the true
causal model (prior), and the “utilities” that determine how valuable potential future
knowledge states are to the learner. Each chosen intervention affects the data produced
by the world (e.g. the learner now gets to see the actual outcome) allowing them to
improve their model and repeat the process. I look in detail at the utilities guiding
intervention selection in Chapter 3.
The few papers that have analysed intervention choice have generally shown that human
interveners select tests that are informative, generally more so than behaving randomly,
yet display systematic suboptimalities and biases. I describe this behavioural evidence
in more detail in motivating my account of bounded intervention selection below.
2.7 Intractability
I have now introduced CBNs as a useful framework for modelling people’s causal struc-
ture representations, Bayesian inference as a framework for modelling optimal inference,
and preposterior analysis for modelling optimal active learning. However, the number
of possible CBNs grows very rapidly with the number of variables (Table 2.1). So too
does the number of potential interventions and the number of outcomes to be averaged
across for each intervention. In principle, all combinations of potential model, interven-
tion and outcome should be considered in order to select the most valuable intervention
in expectation. This means that inference and choosing interventions scale so poorly in
the number of variables, they are fundamentally intractable for any plausibly bounded
learner (Cooper, 1990; van Rooij et al., 2014).
2.7.1 Heuristics
One response to the divergence between the impossible demands of optimal calculation
and limited cognition is to step away from the desiderata of relating cognitive processes
to rationality. Herbert Simon (1956) famously argued that, in situations where the opti-
mal solution is intractable, one should satisfice rather than optimise. A portmanteau of
“satisfy” and “suffice”, satisficing means searching through options until finding one that
exceeds some prechosen acceptability threshold. Building on this idea, Simon formal-
ized the idea of bounded rationality, as behaviour that is rational given one’s limitations
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Table 2.1: The Number of Possible Structures, Interventions and Outcomes For 1–10
Binary Variables
Variables Structures Interventions Outcomes
1 1 3 1
2 3 9 2
3 25 27 4
4 543 81 8
5 29281 243 16
6 3781503 729 32
7 1138779265 2187 64
8 783702329343 6561 128
9 ∼1213442000000000 19683 256
10 ∼4175099000000000000 59049 512
Note: “Structures” gives the number of directed acyclic graphs. “Interventions” gives the number of
combinations of fixed “on” fixed “off” and free variables. “Outcomes” gives the maximum number of
outcomes i.e. all combinations of “on” and “off” assuming a single variable is intervened upon.
(e.g. in processing power, storage and or time), arguing that it is very hard to deter-
mine optimal bounded behaviour. Indeed, calculating the optimal amount of cognitive
resources to devote to a problem, can be a lot harder than devoting those resources to
the problem itself (Chow, Robbins, & Siegmund, 1971). Simon argues that this means
cognition simply finds or evolves, approaches that are “good enough” for purpose, and
sticks with them unless their performance declines or a better strategy is discovered.
Building on Simon’s ideas, cognitive and computational modelling has identified a wealth
of heuristics, or “computational shortcuts”, that describe how people behave, often
surprisingly well, in circumstances where shooting for optimality seems unachievable
(Gigerenzer, 2001; Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999; Kahneman, Slovic,
& Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). In the context of causal learning, pro-
posed heuristics have included treating causal relationships as independent so as to learn
at the level of individual relationships rather than overall models (Fernbach & Sloman,
2009; Waldmann, Cheng, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2008), and making simplifying as-
sumptions about the functional form of model, e.g. treating them as deterministic or
near-deterministic (Lu et al., 2008; Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2016).
By design, proposed heuristics tend to do well in particular environments, and provide
good descriptions of human behaviour in specific tasks. Unfortunately, there are no free
lunches when it comes to computation (Wolpert & Macready, 1997). The effectiveness
of a computational shortcut always depends on its fit to the environment. Heuristics can
be highly effective when they pick up on useful stable properties of an environment that
make more complex computations unnecessary, but can be worse than chance when
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applied in inverted or antagonistic environments. As cases in point, we will see in
Chapter 3 that a simple heuristic ignoring dependencies between causal relationships
can be near-optimal for problems where the causal relationships are in fact quite sparse
(most variables are unrelated). However, as Figure 2.5a suggests, doing this na¨ıvely in
situations with many relationships can lead to unacceptably many false positives, such
as inferring spurious direct connections from X2 to X7 and X8. Likewise, simplifying
assumptions about functional form are effective when they are not far off the mark — e.g.
if the true relationships (or those worth storing) are actually near enough deterministic
— but misleading if the causal relationships are actually functionally very different.
In general, people often seem to behave consistently with heuristics when conditions
favour them, yet, when sufficiently pushed, often reveal that they are capable of greater
sophistication (e.g. Newell & Shanks, 2003, 2004; Shanks & Lagnado, 2000). Thus, a
looming meta-problem for a heuristic theory of cognition is how people choose which
heuristics to apply when, a problem that threatens to reinstate the complexity that
heuristics are supposed to avoid (Cooper, 2000; Newell & Shanks, 2007; Parpart, Jones,
& Love, in revision).
2.7.2 Rational process models
Despite lacking a formal relationship with optimality, there is a powerful idea at the heart
of the heuristics research program. There are often much cheaper ways of interacting
effectively with natural environments than the use of maximally complex probabilistic
models, and bounded agents must strike a balance between internal computation costs
and the costs of suboptimal behaviour. A recent movement is to treat heuristics as com-
ponents of potentially rational approximations (Griffiths et al., 2015; Lieder & Griffiths,
2015; Lieder, Griffiths, Huys, & Goodman, under review; Parpart et al., in revision).
This approach uses the mathematics and algorithms of principled approximation to ex-
plore frugal strategies while keeping track of their formal relationship with optimality
(Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010).
Machine learning is a field that has had to take approximating probabilistic inference
very seriously (Bishop, 2006). Accordingly, it has seen the development of a range of
approaches for approximating intractable computations. In general these approaches
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provide ways of trading off accuracy against computational efficiency and storage re-
quirements, providing a space of algorithms within which the ideal trade-off exists.11
Accordingly, a recent approach is to treat the approximation methods developed in ma-
chine learning as (in strong form) candidate process level models, or (weaker) inspiration
for process level models. In this thesis I take inspiration from rational sampling approx-
imations in developing my model of bounded causal inference, and explore a range of
approximations and heuristics for modelling intervention selection.
Sampling approximations to inference
Sampling approaches are a common family of approximate algorithms. These use
stochastically generated samples to represent intractable distributions, with methods
for generating and weighting these samples asymptotically approximating Bayesian in-
ferences. Sampling methods have levels of accuracy that typically depend on the number
of samples, while different sampling schemes are more efficient for different types of prob-
lem.
There have been a number of proposals that the brain uses sampling to approximate
probabilistic inference (e.g. Hamrick, Smith, Griffiths, & Vul, 2015; Sanborn, 2015; Stew-
art, Chater, & Brown, 2006). A strong version of this proposal is that the brain never
calculates probabilities explicitly, but conforms approximately to probability theory in
virtue of being a powerful general purpose Bayesian sampler (Sanborn & Chater, 2016).
To make sense of the relevance of sampling approximations for causal cognition, and the
types of behavioural phenomena they predict, I briefly review three common sampling
schemes.
Simple Monte Carlo sampling A common problem is comparing models without
exact knowledge of their parameters. To be Bayesian, we should treat uncertain model
parameters as random variables. As a minimal case, suppose we are simply interested
in determining whether X1 causes X2, so our hypothesis space is simply M = {m1 =
[X1 = X2],m2 = [X1 → X2]} (see Figure 2.7a). Suppose also that we have intervened
on X1 three times, switching it on twice and off once. Each time X2 did the same
thing as X1. This is our data d. Intuitively, this favours m2 over m1, but to what
extent? How sure should we be, based on these three tests? In the figure, I assume
11Although, of course some approximation strategies are more efficient than others, meaning that a
different approach might always offer a better trade-off.
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Figure 2.6: Using Simple Monte Carlo sampling to estimate the probability of a
connection between X1 and X2. a) Hypothesis space M and data d. b) One-hundred
uniformly distributed random causal strength and spontaneous activation base rate
samples. c) The sample likelihoods and resulting posterior in which m2 : [X1 → X2] is
now more likely than m1 : [X1 = X2].
the true model has a noisy-OR parametrisation, but we do not know the exact strength
wS of the putative connection or the base-rate wB with which X2 turns “on” by itself.
I also assume we start from complete ignorance about the true model, strength and
base rate (our priors P (M) and P (wS , wB) are uniform). To approximate the model
posterior P (M |d) = ∫ P (M |d, wS , wB) dwS dwB, we can draw (paired) samples from
our parameter prior P (wB, wS) (Figure 2.7b), calculate the likelihood of the data with
each, then average. For samples where the expected relationship is strong and base rate
is low (e.g. near the top left of Figure 2.6b) these data are much more likely under m2
because the connection is needed to explain X2’s activations. For samples of low strength
and high base rate (e.g. near the bottom right of Figure 2.6b) the data is similarly likely
under both models, since both predict X2 will occur frequently by chance with little
influence from X1. Thus, by averaging we are performing an approximate “numerical
integration” over our parameter uncertainty, finding that we should update our beliefs
a moderate amount toward m2 as shown in Figure 2.7c.
This strategy is natural for simple cases, however more sophisticated schemes are needed
for maintaining probabilistic beliefs as evidence arrives sequentially, and for drawing
samples from intractable distributions, such as a distribution over possible causal models.
Particle filtering One common approximation for situations where evidence arrives
sequentially, is to maintain a manageable number of individual sample hypotheses, or
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“particles” (Liu & Chen, 1998), with weights corresponding to their relative likelihoods.
The ensemble of particles then acts as an approximation to the desired distribution.
Sophisticated reweighting and resampling schemes can then filter the ensemble as data
are observed, approximating Bayesian inference. In our example, a histogram over our
wB and wS samples approximates the probability distribution over their possible values.
This histogram would be approximately flat in the case of the uniform prior we assumed
above, but must change shape if it is to represent accumulating knowledge about the
parameters. In Figure 2.7a, I extend 2.6 to give a basic example of this idea. To keep
track of our evolving beliefs about wS and wB as we observe more data, we can resam-
ple with replacement from our set of “particles” with probabilities determined by the
likelihood they assign to the latest datum. Thus the particles pile up in regions of high
probability, with the histogram approximating the Bayesian posterior. In the Figure, we
see the filtering reflects a rational increase in preference for high strength parameter and
low base rate parameter as a learner tests a (known) X1 → X2 relationship five times
and finds it quite reliable. The filtering procedure reduces the diversity of the samples
over time because each resampling step will tend to clone some existing particles while
letting others go extinct. Thus, there are various techniques for “rejuvenating” the set of
particles — i.e. generating new ones without affecting the distribution (Chopin, 2002).
Reliance on filtering a limited number of samples has been proposed as an explanation
for a number of human biases in behavioural tasks. For example, under certain types of
filtering, samples consistent with early observations can dominate and lead to a failure to
generate any samples in regions more consistent with later samples, leading to primacy
(Abbott & Griffiths, 2011; Levy, Reali, & Griffiths, 2009; Sanborn et al., 2010).
Additionally, particle filtering has been used as an explanation for individual variabil-
ity. A pervasive phenomenon in human decision making tasks is probability matching
(Myers, 2014; Shanks et al., 2002; Vulkan, 2000) where, rather than always choosing the
best option, responses appear to be chosen in proportion to their probability of being the
best. This behaviour seems strange at first glance, but is more intelligible if we suppose
that people make decisions based on very limited number of posterior samples (Brown &
Steyvers, 2009). In fact, in associative learning (Courville & Daw, 2007), categorization
(Sanborn et al., 2010) and binary decision making (Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenen-
baum, 2009), it has been proposed that people’s beliefs actually behave most like a single
particle. Thus one plausible approximation for structure learning is to consider just a
few or even a single structural hypotheses at a time, in place of the full distribution.
One proposal for the problem of causal structure learning, which I review extensively




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.7: Two examples of sample based approximate causal inference. a) Particle




B samples, approximating an evolving posterior on
p(wS , wB). After each datum, particles are resampled (with replacement) with sample
weights proportional to P (d|w(i)S , w(i)B ,m). b) Gibbs sampling in causal model space. i.
Histogram shows locations visited, blue overlay shows true posterior probability of these
models. ii. Matrix shows probability of transitioning from the model corresponding to
the row, to the model corresponding to the column. All transitions resample one edge
at a time conditional on the current state of the others. White line shows the sampled
path that generated the histogram.
in Chapter 5, is win-stay, lose-sample (Bonawitz, Denison, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2014),
which is the idea that learners generate a single sample hypothesis which they keep as
their candidate until they observe strongly refuting evidence whereupon they resample
a new candidate from the posterior.
Reliance on a limited number of candidate model “particles”, or even a single candidate,
seems like an important idea for understanding bounded structure inference. However,
as the number of particles reduces, the degree of approximation increases. For a single
particle, the filtering approach is degenerate (the distribution is represented by a 1
bar histogram). Thus, it becomes very important to have a method for resampling
hypotheses from the posterior.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo Another class of useful machine learning methods,
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling, involves generating sequences of hy-
potheses, each linked to the next via a stochastic transition mechanism which asymp-
totically approximates the posterior distribution. Under various conditions, this implies
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that the sequences of autocorrelated sample hypotheses form a Markov chain with a
stationary distribution that is the full, intended, posterior distribution (Metropolis,
Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, & Teller, 1953). The samples will appear to “walk”
randomly around space of possibilities, tending to visit more probable hypotheses more
frequently. If samples are extracted from the sequence after a sufficiently long initial,
so-called burn-in, period, and sufficiently far apart (to reduce the effect of dependence),
they can provide a good approximation to the true posterior distribution.
MCMC sampling has been proposed as an explanation for several behavioural phenom-
ena. For example Lieder, Griffiths, and Goodman (2012) propose that MCMC sampling
can explain anchoring effects, in which judgments are dependent on an in-principle-
irrelevant initially provided value. This is based on the assumption that processing
constraints limit the length of the sampling chains so that they retain dependence on
their starting point. Limited MCMC chains have also been proposed as an explanation
for unpacking effects (Dasgupta, Schulz, & Gershman, 2016), where conjunctive cate-
gories are judged as more or less likely than the union of their “unpacked” members,
as well as predicting transition times between percepts (Gershman, Vul, & Tenenbaum,
2012). Thus, another potential aspect of rational approximation in causal learning could
be stochastic search in causal model space.
There are typically many different classes of Markov chain transitions that share the
same stationary distribution, but differ in the properties of burn-in and subsampling.
A simple form of MCMC, that is naturally applicable to structure inference is Gibbs
sampling (Geman & Geman, 1984). Informally, Gibbs sampling works by resampling one
part of a large multivariate distribution at a time. In the current context, these might
mean resampling individual edges in a causal model. Figure 2.7b gives an example of
this. The blue shaded region in Figure 2.7b i. shows a desired posterior distribution
over 10 models. Figure 2.7b ii. shows the transition probabilities for the sampling chain.
The shading in each cell shows the probability of an MCMC move from the model in
the row to the model in the column, and the white line gives an example search path of
length 50. For example, the top row of the matrix shows the probability of transitioning
from the unconnected model to any of the other models. The only models that are
accessible are those that can be reached by changing a single edge. Returning to the
histogram above, we see that the number of times the path visits each model is indeed
approximately proportional to its posterior probability. I will develop a process model
of the generation of candidate hypotheses based on such a “local” Gibbs-style search in
Chapter 5.
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2.7.3 Bounded intervention selection
In situations where a posterior is already hard to evaluate, calculating the globally
most informative intervention will almost always be infeasible. Fortunately, a variety of
methods have been developed that allow tests to be selected that are more useful than
random selection, but do not require the full expected information gain be computed
(Settles, 2012). In general, these approaches are heuristic in that they generally have
limited guarantees about the circumstances in which they will be effective.
Many of the active machine learning heuristics rely on the current, rather than expected
uncertainty (e.g. uncertainty sampling which chooses based on outcome uncertainty un-
der the prior). However others use the predictions under just a few favoured hypotheses
(e.g. query by committee) as a substitute for the full expectancy calculation. The former
strategy relies on maintaining a complete prior distribution, which I have already sug-
gested is implausible in the case of causal structure inference. Therefore in this thesis,
I focus on developing a general purpose approach based on the latter idea, that people
consider only a small set of hypotheses when choosing interventions.
We see this idea in Markant, Settles, and Gureckis (2015), who propose that self directed
learning is better understood as favouring local rather than global uncertainty, e.g. un-
certainty pertaining to a single dimension of the problem at a time. However, this raises
the metaproblem of which of the large set of possible local partitions of the hypothesis
space people focus on when choosing tests. In this thesis I develop the proposal by con-
sidering a variety of forms of local focus, in the process re-framing commonly proposed
heuristics for query selection. In particular, I propose that constraint seeking (Nelson
et al., 2014; Ruggeri & Lombrozo, 2014), and confirmatory testing (Klayman & Ha,
1989; Nickerson, 1998) are complementary types of “local focus” which learners switch
between.
Constraint seeking or local testing?
A commonly proposed heuristic for efficient search in deterministic domains is to ask
about the dimension that best divides the hypothesis space, eliminating the greatest
possible number of options on average. This has been called “constraint-seeking” (Rug-
geri & Lombrozo, 2014) and the “split-half heuristic” (Nelson et al., 2014). For example,
in the children’s game “Guess who” one player chooses one of a set of cards with dif-
ferent faces on the back. Their opponent then asks binary questions with the goal of
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identifying the chosen card. In this setting intuitively good questions are those that
split the remaining options in half. For instance if the cards are gender balanced, ask-
ing “is the person female?”, will eliminate about half of the options on average. Bad
questions will pick out features that are very unbalanced, eliminating fewer cards on
average. Constraint seeking corresponds to the most valuable question for a wide range
deterministic environments and greedy objectives. The case of using interventions to
reveal causal structure is rather more complex but similar principles apply if one makes
simplifying assumptions. One source of complexity is that I have assumed causal models
are not necessarily deterministic, meaning that the outcome of an intervention does not
rule structures out but rather renders them more or less likely. However, as already
mentioned, people may adopt a presumption of (near) determinism when reasoning in
complex causal models (e.g. Lu et al., 2008; Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2016), suggesting
that they might do the same when selecting tests. Another complexity comes from the
fact that in general interventions are not binary questions. This is evident in Figure 2.8a,
where there are 22 = 4 possible outcomes of turning X1 “on”. In principle, an inter-
vention with 4 possible outcomes could split the hypothesis space into 4 equal parts,
leaving you with only 6 or 7 possibilities after your first intervention. However, the
split is not that even, with the most likely outcome being Option 1 (nothing happens)
leaving you with 12 remaining possibilities. Thus by performing this intervention you
can expect to rule out all but ≈ 8 models on average. It turns out that the best split
in deterministic settings is achieved by querying the effects of a single randomly chosen
variable, essentially asking: which other variables (if any) are descendants of variable
Xi in the true model?
For comparison, Figure 2.8b shows a more controlled test that fixes X3 “off” so focusing
on the putative X1 → X2 relationship. While this rules out fewer hypotheses on average
(leaving ≈ 14 in expectation), it is intuitively much easier to interpret as there are only
two outcomes and both provide unambiguous “local” information about this relationship
(indeed it is necessary to perform such an intervention to distinguish certain models). I
will consider this trade-off in detail in Chapter 5, and revisit it throughout the thesis.
Confirmatory testing
Another commonly proposed strategy is confirmatory evidence gathering, in which learn-
ers choose tests that attempt to confirm or dis-confirm their current hypothesis rather









































































































































































































a) What does X1 do?
X1=1
X2?X3?


















b) Does X1 cause X2?
Figure 2.8: What can you learn from interventions in deterministic three variable
problems? a) An intervention that just fixes X1 has four possible outcomes, each
eliminating all but the subset of the models corresponding to the colour. b) An inter-
vention that fixes X1 “on” and X3 “off” has two possible outcomes, depending whether
X1 → X2.
than to reduce uncertainty over the whole set of options. Confirmatory evidence gather-
ing appears to be a ubiquitous psychological phenomenon (Nickerson, 1998). Although
confirmation seeking is widely touted as a bias, it can also be shown to be optimal, for
example under deterministic or sparse hypotheses spaces or peaked priors (Austerweil
& Griffiths, 2011; Klayman & Ha, 1989; Navarro & Perfors, 2011).
In the context of causal structure learning, we see this in Steyvers et al (2003) who pro-
pose a related rational test model that selects interventions with a goal of distinguishing
the current most probable hypothesis from a null hypothesis that there are no causal
connections, ignoring the possibility of the true structure being something else entirely.
2.8 Beyond Bayesian networks
I have so far discussed causal learning within CBN framework, treating the problem as
directly analogous to learning CBNs by variable-setting. While this gets at the heart of
the problems of interventional causal learning, it is also certainly a major simplification.
The CBN framework alone is not an adequate model of causal representation, largely
because it is a very limited representation of physical causality. CBNs say nothing about
how causal relationships play out in time and space. Furthermore, variable setting is a
very limited characterisation of intervening in the causal world. The human experience
of causality is much richer, with relationships embedded in a spatially and temporally
continuous natural world, meaning that we often have rich knowledge about what causal
relationships are plausible for familiar entities, how long different causal processes take
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and even “mechanistic” knowledge about how causal relationships play out in space.
An adequate conception of human causal representation and active learning must have
space for these richer representations as well as explaining how they can constrain and
enrich causal inference.
2.8.1 Richer functional forms
The obvious way to enrich the CBN framework is to define relationships in terms of
more than just probabilistic dependence. For instance, we can imagine imbuing causal
relationships with parametric form in terms of their spatiotemporal extension as well as
their probabilistic strength. For instance a rich representation of the relationship be-
tween playing in a rock band and developing tinnitus might encode both the probability
of the relationship obtaining at all in a given case, but also the expected timeline of
tinnitus onset in both non-rock-band-members and rock-band-members. In this way,
the time of tinnitus onset can be informative about whether the rock-band playing was
a likely cause. We might go even further and consider the form of causal relationships
in space. For example, a doctor might have a mechanistic understanding of how sound
waves cause damage to ears and how this impacts on auditory signals in the brain.
Again, we can imagine encoding this in our causal model so that we can reason about
potential interventions (e.g. that might reduce symptoms). So how can we represent
these rich spatiotemporal details? We are often capable of reasoning at different levels of
abstraction. For instance, we can talk about a loose causal relationship between playing
in a rock band and developing tinnitus, without worrying about the fine-grained mecha-
nistic details of this relationship. Yet, at the same time we are also capable of reasoning
downwards (e.g. explaining the high level causal relationship in terms of fine-grained
mechanistic details) and upwards (e.g. abstracting high level causal relationships from
fine-grained mechanistic details). Thus, a full account of causal cognition must account
for how we are able to perform inferences spanning levels of abstraction and generality.
2.8.2 Intuitive theories, and hierarchical representations
One approach that tries to account for people’s situational and mechanistic knowledge
within the probabilistic inference framework is the idea that people form intuitive the-
ories about how different domains in the world work (Gerstenberg & Tenenbaum, to
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appear; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Tenen-
baum, Griffiths, & Niyogi, 2007). These are modelled as hierarchical priors (or proba-
bilistic programs)12 that can be used to rapidly generate and evaluate hypotheses during
future encounters with a domain. The thought is that people organise their causal gen-
eral knowledge hierarchically, with the core abstract features of causation at the top
and increasingly domain- and context-specific features below. Each level of the theory
defines a probability distribution at the level below. As a simple example, we have high-
level general knowledge about the kinds of causal relationships that obtain in medical
domains. For instance we might know that behaviours can cause diseases, and diseases
can cause symptoms but that causality cannot run the other way (e.g. from diseases to
symptoms or symptoms to behaviours). We can represent this high level knowledge with
a class graph (see Figure 2.9a) constraining the plausible causal relationships to be those
that run in the right direction between these classes of variables. This theory can be
used to constrain inference to domain-consistent hypotheses (e.g. Figure 2.9b) . In this
way, a learner can make use of their domain knowledge to learn quicker in subsequent
encounters with medical domains. In the theory-based causal inference framework, a
learner’s world knowledge gets richer, their causal judgments can rely more strongly on
identification of the current domain and application of the appropriate domain-specific
knowledge, meaning they need not start from scratch each time. This framework makes
space for domain representations with rich spatiotemporal functional forms that further
constrain the space of plausible models. If we know how long different symptoms take
to present, how close contact needs to be for a virus to transfer between people and so
on, we can use this information to further accelerate inference.
Another idea about the vertical structure of causal representation appears in philosophy
of science where recursive Bayesian networks have been proposed as models of reduc-
tive and mechanistic explanation (Casini, Illari, Russo, & Williamson, 2011; Clarke,
Leuridan, & Williamson, 2013; Williamson & Gabbay, 2005). In a recursive Bayesian
network, nodes and edges can contain their own, smaller, Bayesian networks made up of
smaller parts, which can in turn contain networks of still-smaller parts (see Figure 2.9b
for an example). The behaviour of the level below defines the functional form of the
level above. In this way we might explain the probabilistic causal relationship between
rock-band-playing and tinnitus by referring to a more detailed and mechanistic account
of the relationship in terms of smaller internal parts like sound waves and ear drums,
12Probabilistic programs use stochastic functions to generate distributional outcomes (Goodman,
2013). For example, a probabilistic program might stochastically generate nodes and connections be-
tween nodes to generate causal model hypotheses on the fly, where on average this is equivalent to
sampling these causal models from a desired distribution over all possibilities.






Class graph Possible models
Figure 2.9: a) A graph at the level classes of event (Behaviours, Diseases and Symp-
toms) constrains the hypothesis space of models at the level of particular events. Re-
produced with permission from Tenenbaum et al. (2007) b) An element of a recursive
Bayesian network. At a high level phenomenon S plays a role in a high level causal
representation. Within S there is a low level mechanism made up of parts X1:4, that
explains the behaviour of S. Reproduced with permission from Clarke et al. (2013).
that overall give rise to the higher level relationship. Equally, we might abstract from
the complex dynamics of sound waves, ear drums and neural signals a simple com-
pound concept of tinnitus. Both approaches to formalising layered beliefs highlight the
“blessing of abstraction” (Gershman, 2016; Goodman, Ullman, & Tenenbaum, 2011) —
which is the idea that abstraction from the particular to the general is an important and
early-appearing aspect of the successful development of complex cognition.
While neither hierarchical organisation nor reductive explanation are core topics of this
thesis, it is important to keep in mind the ways in which human causal representations,
and correspondingly interventional causal learning, is richer and more multilayered than
can be fully captured within the CBN (or any single) framework. Thus, in the later
chapters of the thesis I focus on the role of elements of richer representations, and
correspondingly richer notions of intervention and evidence on causal learning.
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2.8.3 The role of time
Prima facie, time is very important to both causal learning and representation. Since,
by definition, causes precede their effects (Hume, 1740), the order of events are an
obvious cue to causal directionality. Furthermore, if people have expectations about
how long causal relationships take to work, or how reliable cause–effect delays will be
(e.g. in a familiar domain), this can provide rich additional information. People have
been shown to make systematic use of temporal information in inferences about a single
putative relationship (Buehner & May, 2003, 2004; Buehner & McGregor, 2006), and
causal beliefs also influence time perception (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013; Buehner &
Humphreys, 2009; Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Indeed, when temporal cues have
been pitted against statistical cues experimentally, causal judgments have tended to be
dominated by temporal information (Burns & McCormack, 2009; Frosch, McCormack,
Lagnado, & Burns, 2012; Lagnado & Sloman, 2004, 2006; Schlottmann, 1999). However
the role of time in causal learning over multiple variables has not been investigated
systematically, and I do this in Chapter 6 and 7.
CBNs are very limited in their representation of time. The interventional calculus em-
bodies the minimal assumption that causes precede their effects, but it says nothing
about the relative delays of competing causal pathways. Worse, by being based on fac-
torisation of a joint probability distribution, CBNs cannot represent relationships that
form loops or cycles. In contrast, such dynamic relationships seem common in the world
— e.g. that liking rock music might make you join a rock band which might further
increase your enjoyment of rock music. All sorts of real world processes, from population
change (Malthus, 1888) to economic, biological and physical processes are characterised
in terms of reciprocal and dynamical causal processes. In experiments, people frequently
report causal beliefs that include cyclic relationships when allowed to do so (Kim & Ahn,
2002; Nikolic & Lagnado, 2015; Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 1998). While there are ways of
adapting the CBN formalism to capture cycles — (e.g. Dean & Kanazawa, 1989; Lau-
ritzen & Richardson, 2002) and see Rehder (2016) for a recent review — none of these
proposals capture how cause–effect relationships unfold in continuous time, where some
relationships might occur much faster or slower than others.13
In Chapter 6, I will develop a time-extensive representational framework that supports
cyclic relationships and encodes expectations about causal delays. The basic idea is
that we can represent causal relationships in terms of delay distributions as well as
13Although see Pacer and Griffiths (2011, 2015) for a model that covers related, rate-based, cases.
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contingencies, so that representations support predictions about when future events will
occur, have occurred, or would occur following interventions, as well as allowing observed
event timings to provide additional data about the true causal model.
Time is also intimately related to the idea of intervention. Lagnado and Sloman (2004)
propose that interventions (in real time) act like a strong order cue, with events hap-
pening shortly thereafter liable to be associated causally with the action. This also has
a relationship with the idea of operant conditioning (Skinner, 1963). However the focus
on contingency data in the causal learning literature, and on non-causal learning in the
conditioning literature has led to the question of how people select interventions and
interpret their outcomes in continuous time to remain relatively unexplored. I look at
this in Chapter 7.
2.8.4 The role of space
Stepping further beyond the covariation-based accounts of causal inference embodied
by the CBN approach, a number of psychologists and philosophers have emphasised
the role of mechanism knowledge in causal judgments (Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman,
1995; Craver, 2006; Illari & Williamson, 2012; Salmon, 1994; Shultz, 1982; Waskan,
2006; White, 1995; Williamson, 2004). Here, the idea is that people’s causal judgments
are often grounded in understanding of the mechanisms and processes involved. For
example, Ahn et al. (1995) find that participants tend to provide mechanistic causal
explanations and are more convinced by evidence that includes mechanism information.
One area in which causal judgments often seem strongly based in mechanistic knowl-
edge is the domain of physical causality. Psychologists have long been interested in how
people make judgments about the physical world, such as how objects will move when
thrown or dropped (e.g. McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980), what will happen when
they collide and exert forces on one another (Michotte, 1946/1963; White, 2009; Wolff
& Barbey, 2015; Wolff & Shepard, 2013). In general, early work on intuitive physics
emphasised people’s failures, finding systematic deviations between the dictates of New-
ton’s laws of motion and people’s judgments about the trajectories of objects in simple
scenes. For instance, many people predict that an object dropped from a moving source
will fall straight downward — it will actually continue forward and accelerate downward
in a parabola. However, more recent work in the probabilistic inference tradition, has
suggested that human successes in predicting physical scenes are more impressive than
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their failures. A key finding is that even young children seem to have strong expec-
tations about object permanence and contiguity (Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman,
1985). Battaglia, Hamrick, and Tenenbaum (2013) show that people can make accurate
judgments about stability of stacks of objects and Smith and Vul (2014) show they can
make accurate forward and backward predictions about object motion. They have suc-
cess modelling judgments under the assumption that the participants have rich enough
intuitive theories of physics to mentally simulate simple physical scenes, much like a com-
puter game graphics engine (e.g. Tenenbaum et al., 2011). From this perspective, some
of the biases observed by McCloskey et al might result from rational uncertainty about
the physical quantities involved — i.e. masses of the objects, friction, air resistance
etc (Hamrick, Battaglia, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2016; Hamrick et al., 2015; Sanborn,
Mansinghka, & Griffiths, 2013). In line with this, Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado,
and Tenenbaum (2015) show that people’s causal and counterfactual judgments reflect
the robustness of physical causal processes. For instance, an expert striker who scores
convincingly in a football game is judged as more responsible for the outcome than an
amateur who trips over and accidentally kicks the ball in the goal (Lagnado et al., 2013).
These findings are consistent with the idea that people make judgments of causal re-
sponsibility using internal simulations, and are more uncertain when these simulations
are not robust to perturbations (e.g. in starting conditions).
When learning about causal relationships in the physical world, observations combined
with an intuitive theory of physical causality can already provide rich scope for inference.
For example, if we observe two objects colliding, the paths of the two objects in com-
bination with Newton’s laws of motion, provide lots of information about whether one
or other object is heavier, or more elastic. Thus, in principle, one can work back from
known physical laws to infer the latent, causally relevant properties of physical relata.
However, it is clear that these properties need to be revealed through dynamics, that the
right, revealing, dynamics might rarely occur by chance, or close or clear enough to be
perceived reliably. As a simple example, it is hard to tell how heavy something will be
until you try picking it up, although observing how it fares when other objects interact
with it can help. Thus, a richer notion of intervention captures the idea that we often
prod and poke at the physical world in ways that we hope make these latent proper-
ties reveal themselves. This means creating situations that provide a lot of information
about properties of interest while minimising confounding information. I explore this
form of rich spatiotemporally continuous active causal learning in the final empirical
chapter.
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2.8.5 Even more approximation
It is hard enough to do exact inference and intervention selection with CBNs. Once
richer functional forms come into play the hypothesis, action and outcome spaces be-
come even more formidable. Fortunately, richer data means the potential for stronger
evidence about relationships, and principles of sample-based approximation still apply.
Samples can be drawn from a prior and filtered, or the hypothesis space can be explored
stochastically, as in MCMC sampling. While I will not model this process in as much
detail for these richer active learning cases, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will demonstrate that
behavioural patterns are consistent with similar forms of approximation to those I model
in the pure-contingency CBN cases I consider in the first half of the thesis.
2.9 Summary
In this chapter I set out a rational analysis of the related problems of causal struc-
ture learning, and intervention selection. I first developed the Causal Bayesian network
framework, and the idea of learning through the contingency data produced by “vari-
able fixing” interventions. I introduced a number of heuristic proposals and principled
approximations that give insight into how bounded brains might approach this complex
problem. I then generalised beyond the CBN case by introducing temporal and mecha-
nistic statistics and correspondingly richer representations of causal structure. I provide
the mathematical details of the CBN framework in a text box at the start of Chapter 3,
for reference in the empirical chapters to follow, providing additional mathematical de-
tails relating to my treatment of time and physical causality in the last three chapters
as and when they are needed.

Chapter 3
Learning causal structure through
intervention
“The scientific mind does not so much provide the right answers as ask the
right questions.”
— CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS
A number of studies have shown that people benefit from the ability to perform interven-
tions during causal learning (Coenen et al., 2015; Lagnado & Sloman, 2002, 2004, 2006;
Schulz, 2001; Sobel & Kushnir, 2006; Steyvers et al., 2003). However, only Steyvers et al.
and Coenen et al.’s studies explored how people select what interventions to perform, and
both only for the case of a single intervention on a single variable in a semi-deterministic
context. In contrast, much real world causal learning is probabilistic and incremental,
taking place gradually over many instances. It has not yet been explored in what ways
sequential active causal learning might be shaped by cognitive constraints on memory
and processing, or whether learners can plan ahead when choosing interventions.
Additionally, it has been shown that single-variable interventions are not sufficient to
discriminate all possible causal structures (Eberhardt, Glymour, & Scheines, 2012). In-
terventions that simultaneously “control for” potential confounds to isolate a particular
putative cause are cornerstones of scientific testing (Cartwright, 1989) and key to sci-
entific thinking (Kuhn & Dean, 2005). However, the only interventional learning study
that allowed participants to perform multi-hold interventions was Sobel and Kushnir
(2006), and this study did not analyse whether participants used these interventions
effectively.
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A final point is that no previous studies have explicitly incentivised causal learners.
There is ambiguity in any assessment of intervention choices based on comparison to a
correct or optimal behaviour according to a single criterion value. This is because one
cannot assume that the participants’ goal was to maximize the quantity used to drive
the analyses. In other areas of active learning research, researchers have run experiments
to discriminate between potential objective functions that might underpin human active
learning (e.g. Baron, Beattie, & Hershey, 1988; Gureckis & Markant, 2009; Meder &
Nelson, 2012; Nelson, 2005; Nelson et al., 2010) but this is yet to be explored in the
domain of causal learning.
Clearly, there are many aspects of active causal learning that call out for further explo-
ration. Therefore, this chapter presents two experiments and modelling that extend the
existing work along several dimensions. In particular, we explore:
1. Whether people can choose and learn from interventions effectively in a fully prob-
abilistic, abstract and unconstrained environment.
2. To what extent people make effective use of complex “controlling” interventions
as well as simple single variable fixes.
3. What objective function best explains participants’ intervention choices: do they
act to maximize their expected utility, probability of being correct, or to minimize
their uncertainty?
4. Whether people choose interventions to learn in a step-wise, “greedy” way or
whether there is evidence they can plan further ahead.
5. How people’s causal beliefs evolve over a sequence of interventions. Is sequential
causal learning biased by cognitive constraints such as forgetting or conservatism?
6. Whether people’s interventions and causal judgments can be captured by simple
heuristics.
The first two points can be addressed through standard analyses of participants’ per-
formances in various causal learning conditions. However, the latter questions lend
themselves to more focused analyses of the dynamics of participants’ intervention se-
lections. Therefore, in the second half of the chapter we will explore these questions
by fitting a range of intervention and causal-judgment models directly to the actions
and structure judgments made by participants in the experiments. We compare differ-
ent learning functions (utility gain, probability gain and information gain) and compare
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greedy learning models to models that plan ahead; and assess the influence of potential
cognitive constraints (forgetting and conservatism). We also explore the extent to which
participants’ behaviour can be similarly captured by simple heuristic models as by more
computationally complex Bayesian models.
Throughout this thesis, but particularly in this chapter and Chapters 4 and 5, causal
Bayesian networks (CBNs) are used as a framework for causal representation (Pearl,
2000; Spirtes et al., 1993). Thus, the adopted formalism is provided in the text box
below for easy reference.
3.1 The Causal Bayesian network framework
3.1.1 Representation
In a CBN, nodes represent variables (i.e. the component parts of a causal system);
arrows represent causal connections; and parameters encode the combined influence
of parents (the source of an arrow) on children (the arrow’s target). Following
standard graph nomenclature, we refer to the space between a pair of nodes in a
model as an “edge”, so that an acyclic causal model defines each edge as taking
one of three states: forward→, backward←, or unconnected ∅. Bayesian networks
are defined by the Markov condition, which states that each node is independent of
all of its non-descendants given its parents. Such graphs can represent continuous
variables and any form of causal relationship; but here we focus on systems of binary
{0 = absent, 1 = present} variables and assume generative connections — meaning
we assume that the presence of a cause will always raise the probability that the
effect is also present. It is worth noting that these graphs cannot naturally represent
cyclic or reciprocal relationships. However, there are various ways to extend the
formalism as discussed later in the thesis.
To parametrise causal models, we assume Cheng’s Power PC (1997) convention,
which provides a simple way of capturing how probabilistic causal influences com-
bine. This assumes that causes have independent chances of producing their effects,
meaning the probability that a variable takes the value 1 is a noisy-OR combination
of the power or strength wS of any active causes of it in the model, together with
that of an omnipresent background strength wB encapsulating the influence of any
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causes exogenous to the model (Glymour, 1998). We write w = {wS , wB}. The
probability that variable Xi takes the value 1 is thus
P (Xi = 1| pa(Xi),w) = 1− (1− wB)(1− wS)
∑
Xj∈pa(Xi) Xj (3.1)
where pa(Xi) denotes the parents of variable x in the causal model (see Figure 3.1a
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p(d|m) = p(X1) p(X2|X1) p(X3|X2) p(d|m; c) = p(X1)  p(X3|X2 = 1)
Figure 3.1: Causal model representation. a) An example CBN, parametrized
with strength wS and base rate wB . The tables give the probability of each variable
taking the value 1 conditional on its parents in the model and the omnipresent
background noise rate wB . b) Visualisation of intervention Do[X2 = 1]. Setting
X2 to 1 renders it independent of its normal causes as indicated by the scissors
symbols.
3.1.2 Inference
Each causal model m over variables X = {X1, . . . , Xn} with strength and back-
ground parameters w, assigns a probability to each datum d = {X1 = x1, . . . , Xn =
xn}, propagating information from the variables that are fixed through intervention
c, to the others (see Figure 3.1b). The space of all possible interventions C is made
up of all possible combinations of fixed and unfixed variables, and for each inter-
vention c the possible data Dc is made up of all combinations of absent/present on
the unfixed variables. We use Pearl’s Do[.] operator (Pearl, 2000) to denote what
is fixed on a given test. For instance, Do[X1 = 1, X2 = 0] means a variable X1 has
been fixed “on” and variable X2 has been fixed “off”, with all other variables free to
vary.b Interventions allow a learner to override the normal flow of causal influence in
a system, initiating activity at some components and blocking potential influences
between others. This means they can provide information about the presence and
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direction of influences between variables that is typically unavailable from purely
observational data, without additional cues such as temporal information. For in-
stance, in Figure 3.1.1b, we fix X2 to 1 and leave X1 and X3 free (c = Do[X2 =1]).
Under the X1 → X2 → X3 model we would then expect X1 to activate with prob-
ability wB and X3 with a probability of 1− (1− wB)(1− wS).
In total, the probability of datum d, given intervention c, is just the product of the
probability of each variable that was not intervened upon, given the states of its
parents in the model
P (d|m,w, c) =
∏
x∈(X/∈c) P (x|{d, c}pa(x),w), (3.2)
where {d, c}pa(x) indicates that those parents might either be observed (part of d)
or fixed by the intervention (part of c).
In fully Bayesian inference, the true model is considered to be a random variable
M . Our prior belief P (M) is then an assignment of probabilities, adding up to 1
across possible models m ∈M whereM is the set of all possible models. When we
observe some data D = {di}, associated with interventions C = {ci}, we can update
these beliefs with Bayes theorem by multiplying our prior by the probability of the
observed data under each model and dividing by the weighted average probability
of those data across all the possible models. We can condition on wS and wB if
known
P (m|D,w;C) = P (D|m,w;C)P (m)∑
m′∈M P (D|m′,w;C)P (m′)
, (3.3)
or else marginalise over their possible values (see Appendix A).
We will typically treat the data as being independent and identically distributed,
so P (D|m,w;C) = ∏i P (di|m,w; ci).
If the data arrive sequentially (as Dt = {d1, . . . ,dt}; and similarly for the inter-
ventions), we can either store them and update at the end, or update our beliefs
sequentially, taking the posterior P (M |Dt−1,w;Ct−1) at timestep t− 1 as the new
“prior” P t(M) for datum dt (or P t(M,w) if parameters w are also unknown).
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3.1.3 Choosing interventions
It is clear that different interventions yield different outcomes, which in turn have
different probabilities under different models. This means that which interventions
are valuable for identifying the true model depends strongly on the hypothesis space
and prior. For instance fixing X2 to 1 (Do[X2 =1]) is (probabilistically) diagnostic
if you are primarily unsure whether X1 causes X3 because p(X3|Do[X2 =1]) differs
depending whether pa(X3) includes X1 (see Figure 3.1.1b). However, it is not
diagnostic if you are primarily unsure whether X1 causes X2 because X2 will take
the value 1 regardless of whether pa(X1) includes X2.
The value of an intervention can be quantified relative to a notion of uncertainty.
We can define the value of an intervention as the expected reduction in uncertainty
about the true model after seeing its outcome.c To calculate this expectation,
we must average, prospectively, over the different possible outcomes d′ ∈ Dc (re-
calling Dc is the space of possible outcomes of intervention c) weighted by their
marginal likelihoods under the prior. For a greedily optimal sequence of interven-
tions c1, . . . , ct, we take P (M |Dt−1,w;Ct−1) as our prior each time. The most






V (M |d′, Dt−1,w;Ct−1, c)] , (3.4)
where E[.]d′∈Dc denotes the average over outcomes d′ and V (.) denotes the learner’s
objective function. The corresponding form for the case of unknown parameters w
is also given in Appendix A.
We can generalise this greedy strategy to the case of an arbitrary prior belief P t(M),




V t(M |d′,w; c)] . (3.5)
Objectives
Three commonly used objectives in the active learning literature are (expected)
utility gain (Gureckis & Markant, 2009; Meder & Nelson, 2012), probability gain
(Baron, 2005) and information gain (Shannon, 1951; Steyvers et al., 2003).
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Utility gain
If you know how valuable correctly identifying all or part of the true causal system
is, then the goal of your interventions is to get you to a state of knowledge about
the true graph that is worth more to you than the one you were in before. Math-
ematically, this means maximisation of expected post-outcome, post-classification
expected utility Ed′∈Dc
[
U t(M |d′,w; c)].
If each potential structure judgment b has a utility given that the true graph is m′,
we can capture the value of any judgment by some reward function R. Assuming one
will always choose the causal structure with the highest expected reward, the utility
gain Ug(M) of an intervention’s outcome is the maximum over expected utilities of
the possible judgments given the posterior P t(m|d; c) minus the maximum for the
prior P t(m):
t









An optimal intervention is defined as the intervention that maximizes the expected
utility gain (i.e. replacing V by Ug in Equation 3.5).
Probability gain
While maximising expected utility can be seen as the ultimate goal of intervening,
often a useful proxy is to maximize your expected probability of being correct. Un-
der many normal circumstances choosing the most probable option will correspond
to choosing the option that maximises your expected utility (Baron et al., 1988),
however in terms of favouring one potential posterior distribution over another (as
in planning interventions), the two values are more likely to differ depending on
the reward function. Assuming you will choose the causal structure that is most
probable, the probability gain Pg(M) can be written as:
t
Pg(M |d; c) = max
m∈M
P t(m|d; c)− max
m∈M
P t(m). (3.7)
An optimal intervention is defined as the intervention that maximizes the expected
probability gain (i.e. replacing V by Pg in Equation 3.5)
78 Chapter 3. Learning causal networks through intervention
Information gain
Another possible option for evaluating interventions comes from information entropy
measures, which provide a way of measuring the overall uncertainty implied by a
probability distribution. While there are a range of entropy measures (Nielsen &





P (mi) log2 P (mi). (3.8)
Shannon entropy is largest for a uniform distribution and drops toward zero as
that distribution becomes more peaked. We can call reduction in Shannon entropy
information gain (Lindley, 1956) and use this as a way to measure the extent to
which a posterior implies a greater degree of certainty across all hypotheses, rather
than just improvement in one’s post-decision utility or probability of making a
correct classification. Information gain Ig(M) is given by
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An information gain optimal intervention is defined as the intervention that maxi-









aI also restrict myself to cases without any latent variable, although we note that imputing the
presence of hidden variables is another important and computationally challenging component of
causal inference (Buchanan, Tenenbaum, & Sobel, 2010; Kushnir, Gopnik, Lucas, & Schulz, 2010).
bWe include the pure observation Do[∅] in C.
cStrictly, this is greedy rather than optimal strategy because planning several steps ahead can
result in a different intervention being favoured. The optimal choice, planning multiple steps steps
ahead can be computed through dynamic programming (Puterman, 2009).
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3.2 Comparing intervention objectives
Above, we introduced three commonly used objectives for driving active learning: ex-
pected utility gain (Ug, Equation 3.6), probability gain (Pg, Equation 3.7) and infor-
mation gain (Ig, Equation 3.9). The extent to which these measures predict different
intervention choices is one topic of investigation in this chapter. However, as a starting
point we can consider what types of posterior distribution are high in utility, probability
and information. To illustrate these differences, Figure 3.2 gives an example of three
posterior distributions about which the three measures disagree. In the tasks we investi-
gate here, people are rewarded according to how accurate their causal judgment is (e.g.,
how many of the causal connections and absences they correctly identify). This means
that, according to expected utility, being nearly right is better than being completely
wrong. Accordingly, we can expect that utility gain will prioritise interventions that di-
vide the space of likely models into subsets of similar models rather than subsets of more
diverse ones so that one is left with probable options that are all relatively rewarding.
For example, in Figure 3.2, we see that a utility driven learner would want to prioritise
discriminating m3 from m2 and m1, because, whatever the outcome, they stand to make
the same or more points if asked immediately after. If their intervention leaves them
with m1 and m2 as candidates, they will still make 2.5 points on average by guessing
between them (corresponding to a position halfway along the left face of the ternary
plot), while if the outcome favours m3 they can already make 3 points (corresponding
to the bottom right corner of the ternary plot). Probability gain is only concerned with
interventions likely to raise the probability of the most likely hypothesis, and does not
care about similarity or overlap between hypotheses, or whether uncertainty between
the various less-probable options is reduced. We see this in the ternary plot with the
value of a location depending purely on its distance from one of the corners. Thus, we
expect probability gain to favour interventions that are targeted toward confirming or
dis-confirming the current leading hypothesis. In contrast, information gain concerns
the reduction in uncertainty over all hypotheses. It will favour interventions that are
expected to make a large difference to the spread of probability across the less probable
networks, even when this will not pay off immediately for the learner in terms of increas-
ing utility or probability of a correct classification. We see this in the curved contours
in the ternary plot, showing a preference for distributions that are not only close to a
corner but also to one side, indicating a second-place preference.
In support of the idea that probability gain might drive human active information search,
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Figure 3.2: An example of differences in evaluation of posterior distributions with
expected (U)tility, (P)robability correct and (I)nformation. a) A hypothesis space of
three possible models. b) Payoff matrix assuming the learner is paid one point per
correctly identified connection. c) Ternary plot visualisation of V (M) for different
objectives. d) An example three-way disagreement. Utility gain favours the top option,
Probability the middle and Information the bottom.
Nelson (2010) has found participants’ queries in a one-shot active classification task to
be a closer match to probability gain than information gain. On the other hand, Baron,
Beattie and Hershey’s (1988) studies suggest that people will often select the question
which has the higher information gain even if, for all possible answers, it will not change
their resulting decision. There is also some recent evidence that people pick queries that
are efficient in terms of information gain rather than probability gain in other areas of
active learning (Gureckis & Markant, 2009; Meier & Blair, 2012). Steyvers et al (2003)
used information gain to quantify the intervention chosen by participants in their task,
but they did not compare this with other measures. For these reasons, when analysing
our tasks we will consider utility gain, probability gain and information gain alongside
one another, asking to what extent the measures imply distinct patterns of interventions,
and to what extent people’s active causal learning choices appear to be driven by one
or other measure.
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Greedy, or global optimisation?
Another issue here is that, when learning continues over multiple instances, greedily
choosing interventions which are expected to obtain the best results at the next time
point (whether in terms of information, highest posterior probability, or expected utility)
is not guaranteed to be optimal in the long run. There may be interventions which are
not expected to give good results immediately, but which provide the best results later
on when paired with other interventions. To be truly optimal, a learner should treat
intervention planning as a Markov decision process (Puterman, 2009), and look many
steps ahead, always selecting the intervention which is the first step in the sequence of
interventions which leads to the greatest expected final or total utility (assuming they
will maximize on all future interventions). However, computing expectancies over mul-
tiple hypotheses and interventions when each intervention has many possible outcomes
is computationally intractable (Hyafil & Rivest, 1976) for all but the smallest number
of variables and most constrained hypothesis spaces, prohibiting optimal computation
in the general case. It is an open question, which we will explore here, whether people
can think more than one step ahead when planning interventions.
3.3 Experiment 1: Learning structure by intervention
In this first experiment, we test people’s ability to learn causal structure through in-
tervention. To do this we designed an interactive computer-based active learning task
in Flash (see http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/nbt for a demo). In the task,
participants had to use interventions to find and mark the causal connections in several
probabilistic causal systems.
Participants
Seventy-nine adults were recruited from Mechanical Turk for Experiment 1.1 They were
paid between $1 and $4 (M=$2.80) depending on performance.2
1Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com/) is a web based platform for crowd-sourcing short tasks
widely used in psychology research. It offers a well validated subject pool, diverse in age and background,
suitable for high-level cognition tasks (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Crump, McDonnell, &
Gureckis, 2013; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Hauser & Schwarz, 2015; Mason & Suri,
2012).
2The number of participants was determined by our experimental budget of £200. Unfortunately
participants’ ages and genders were not stored in this Experiment.
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Design and Procedure
For each problem, participants were faced with three filled grey circles, set against a
white background. They were trained that these were nodes, and that they made up a
causal system of binary variables but were not given any further cover story. Initially,
all of the nodes were inactive, but when participants performed a test then some or all
of the nodes could temporarily activate. An active node glowed green and wobbled from
side to side, while an inactive one remained grey. For each structure participants would
perform multiple tests before endorsing a causal structure and moving on to the next
problem. The running score, test number and problem number were displayed across
the top of the screen during testing. The locations of the three nodes (hereafter X1, X2
and X3) were randomized and the nodes were not labelled.
Participants completed one practice problem and five test problems. The practice prob-
lem was randomly chosen from the five test problems. The test problems were presented
once each, in a randomized order. Participants performed 12 tests per problem as de-
scribed below before finalising their structure judgment and receiving a score.
Each test had three main stages (Figure 3.3):
1. First participants would select what intervention to perform. They could fix be-
tween 0 and 3 of the nodes either to active or inactive. Clicking once on a node
fixed it to active (depicted with a ‘+’ symbol), clicking again fixed it to inactive
(depicted with a ‘−’ symbol). Clicking a third time unfixed the node again. A
pointing hand appeared next to fixed nodes to make it clear that they had been
fixed by the participant.
2. Once the participant was happy with the intervention they had selected, they would
press “Test” and observe the outcome of their test. The outcome would consist of
0-3 of the nodes activating. Whether a node activated on a given trial depended
on the hidden causal connections and the choice of intervention. Participants were
trained that nodes activated by themselves with a probability of .1 (unless they
had been fixed, in which case they would always take the state they had been fixed
in). They were also trained that causal links worked 80% of the time.3 Therefore,
fixing a node to active tended to cause any children of that node to activate and
this would tend to propagate to (unfixed) descendants. The noise in the system
3Concretely, they had a causal power of .8. Combining causal power with the spontaneous activation
rate, a node with one active cause had a 1− (1− .1)(1− .8) = .82 probability of activating.
Chapter 3. Learning causal networks through intervention 83
meant that sometimes there were false positives where nodes activated without
being caused by any of the other nodes, and false negatives where causal links
failed to work. The pattern of data seen by a participant over the task was thus a
partly random function of their intervention choices.
3. After each test there was a drawing phase in which participants registered their
best guess thus far as to the causal connections between the nodes. Initially there
was a question mark between each pair of nodes indicating that no causal link had
been marked there yet. Clicking on these question marks during the drawing phase
would remove them and cycle through the options no link, clockwise link, anti-
clockwise link, back to no link. The initial direction of each link (clockwise or anti-
clockwise) was randomized. Participants were not forced to mark or update links
until after the final test but invited to mark as they went along as a memory aid.
This approach was used to avoid forcing participants to make specific judgments
before they had seen enough information to make an informed judgment, but to
maximize our record of their evolving judgment during the task.
4. Participants performed 12 tests on each problem. After their last test, they were
prompted to finalise their choice for the causal structure, i.e. they had to choose
no link, clockwise link or anti-clockwise link for all three pairs of nodes, leaving
no question marks. Once they had done this they were given feedback as to the
correct causal structure and received one point for each correctly identified link
(Figure 3.3). There were three node-pairs per problem (X1-X2,X1-X3 and X2-X3)
and three options (no-link, clockwise link, anticlockwise link) per node-pair. This
means that chance level performance was 1 correct link per problem, or ≈5 points
over the five problems, while an ideal learner could approach 15 points. At the end
of the task, participants received $1 plus 20c per correctly identified link leading
to a maximum payment of $4.
Before starting the practice round, participants completed a comprehensive and inter-
active instructions section designed to familiarize them with the spontaneous activation
rate; the causal power of the nodes; the role of the different interventions and the aim of
the task. To train participants on the causal power of these connections, we presented
them with a page with five pairs of nodes. The left node of each pair was fixed on and it
was revealed that there was a causal connection from each left node to each right hand
(unfixed) node. Participants were made to test these networks at least 4 times finding
that an average of 4/5 of the unfixed nodes would activate. The outcomes of their first



















Figure 3.3: Experiments 1 and 2 procedure: 1. Choosing an intervention, 2. Observ-
ing the result. 3. Updating causal links. And, after 12 trials, 4. Getting feedback and
a score for the chosen graph.
three tests were fixed to reflect this probability and thereafter the outcomes were gen-
erated probabilistically. Similarly, for the rate of spontaneous activations, participants
were made to perform at least four tests on a page full of ten unfixed and unconnected
nodes, where an average of 1/10 of these would activate on each test. In addition to
this experience-based training, participants were told the probabilities explicitly. Before
starting the task they had to answer four multiple choice questions checking they had
understood: 1. The goal of the task (e.g., how to win money), 2. The role of fixing vari-
ables on and 3. fixing them off, and 4. The probabilistic nature of the networks. If the
participant got less than 3 of 4 questions correct they were sent back to the beginning
of the instructions.
Results
Participants identified an average of 9.0 out of 15 (SD = 4.1) causal links, and got 34%
of the models completely right. This is well above the chance level of 5 out of 15 correct
links (and 3.7% models correct), t(78) = 8.60, p < .001. However, the distribution of
performance appears bimodal with one mode at chance and the other near ceiling (see
Figure 3.4), suggesting that some participants were not able to solve the task while others











































Exp 2a − Info button
N participants (of 30)

















Exp 2b − Info button + summary
N participants (of 30)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Chance
Figure 3.4: Histograms of scores in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2a and 2b. There
were 15 points available in total (identifying all 15 connection-spaces correctly) and you
could expect to get an average of 5 of these right by guessing (blue line).
Table 3.1: Three Most Frequent Judgment Errors in Experiments 1, 2a and 2b.
Exp True structure N correct Mistaken for N error
1 Chain [X1 → X2 → X3] 20 (25%) FC [X1 → X2 → X3, X1 → X3] 18 (23%)
1 Chain [X1 → X2 → X3] 20 (25%) Fork [X2 ← X1 → X3] 7 (9%)
1 FC [X1 → X2 → X3, X1 → X3] 26 (35%) Chain [X1 → X2 → X3] 7 (9%)
2a Chain [X1 → X2 → X3] 12 (40%) FC [X1 → X2 → X3, X1 → X3] 12 (40%)
2a Collider [X1 → X2 ← X3] 17 (56%) FC [X3 → X1 → X2, X3 → X2] 3 (9%)
2a Fork [X2 ← X1 → X3] 15 (50%) FC [X3 → X2 → X1, X3 → X1] 3 (9%)
2b Chain [X1 → X2 → X3] 18 (60%) FC [X1 → X2 → X3, X1 → X3] 8 (26%)
2b FC [X1 → X2 → X3, X1 → X3] 17 (56%) Chain [X1 → X2 → X3] 4 (13%)
2b Collider [X1 → X2 ← X3] 21 (70%) FC [X3 → X1 → X2, X3 → X2] 3 (9%)
Note: “N correct” is the number of participants who identified this structure correctly and “N error”
is the number of participants to make this particular error. FC is short for “Fully-connected”
did very well. This bimodality is confirmed by a dip test (Hartigan & Hartigan, 1985)
D = 0.09, p < .001. There was no effect of problem order on performance F (1, 394) =
0.06, η2 = 0, p = 0.81, nor did participants perform better on the problem they faced as
their practice trial, and when they faced it again as a test problem t(110) = −1.12, p =
0.26. Participants did not over-connect or under-connect their final causal structures,
on average opting for no-link for 30% of node-pairs, which was very close to the true
percentage of 33%.
Participants were about equally accurate on the different structures, with slightly lower
scores for the Chain, Fork and Fully-connected structures, than for the Collider or singly
connected but there was no main effect of problem on score F (4, 390) = 0.87, η2 =
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.01, p = 0.48. However, looking at modal structure judgment errors, one error stands
out dramatically: eighteen participants mistook the Chain [X1 → X2, X2 → X3] for
the [X1 → X2, X1 → X3, X2 → X3] Fully-connected structure, almost as many as
participants who correctly identified the structure (Table 3.1).
3.4 Experiment 2: Information button and summary
Before analysing Experiment 1 further, an immediate question is why there was so
much variance in participants’ performance. One explanation for this could be that
there are important individual differences between participants that strongly affected
their ability to learn successfully. Steyvers et al.’s modelling suggested that people’s
ability to remember evidence from multiple past trials may be a critical psychological
bottleneck for active causal learning. One way to check if poor performance stems
from an inability to remember past tests is to provide participants with a history of
their past interventions and their outcomes and assess whether this leads to better and
more consistent causal learning. However, another perhaps simpler explanation for the
variance is that some participants were confused about what to do and so responded
randomly for all or much of the experiment.
To test both of these explanations, we ran another experiment using the same task as
in Experiment 1 but with two additions. In Experiment 2a we provided an information
button which would bring up a text box reminding them about what they were supposed
to do at that stage of the task. In Experiment 2b, participants were still provided with
this information button, but in addition they also were provided with a summary of
all their past tests and their outcomes for the current problem. These were shown in
a 4×3 grid to the left of the screen. After each test a new cell would be filled with
a picture showing the causal system, the interventions selected (marked with “+” and
“−” symbols as in the main task) and the nodes that activated (shown in green as in
the main task, Figure 3.5).
Participants
Sixty additional Mechanical Turk participants aged 18 to 64 (M = 31.4, SD=11.2) com-
pleted Experiment 2. Once again, participants were paid between $1 and $4 (M=$3.32,
SD=.65).
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Figure 3.5: Interface in Experiment 2. Note the info button on the right (2a and 2b)
and the summary information provided on the left (2b only: Nodes with a + symbol
were fixed on, - symbol were fixed off, nodes with no symbol were unfixed. Green nodes
activated and grey ones did not.)
Design and procedure
The procedure was exactly as in Experiment 1 except that now half of the participants
were randomly assigned to Experiment 2a (info button only) and the other to Experiment
2b (info button + summary).
Results
On average, judgment accuracy in Experiment 2 was considerably higher than in Ex-
periment 1 t(138) = 4.2608, p < .001. Participants in condition 2a (info button only)
scored significantly higher at 11.1 (out of 15) correct links (SD = 3.5) than those in
Experiment 1 t(108) = 2.7, p = 0.009 while participants in 2b (info button + summary)
were slightly higher at 12.13 (SD = 2.9), again significantly higher than in Experiment
1 t(108) = 4.5, p < .001. However, the improvement from 2a to 2b was not significant
t(59) = 1.238, p = 0.22. Inspecting Figure 3.4, we see that the number of participants
performing close to chance is greatly reduced in both Experiment 2 conditions compared
to Experiment 1 accounting for this difference in average performance.
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These differences suggest that many of the poorer performers in Experiment 1 were
simply confused about the task rather than being particularly poor at remembering
evidence from past trials. However, scores were so high in Experiment 2 that failure to
detect a performance level difference between conditions may be partly due to a ceiling
effect. In line with this, we see that participants in the Experiment 2b info + summary
were significantly faster at completing the task 18.4 (SD = 8.1) minutes than those in
the Experiment 2a info only condition at 24.3 (SD = 12.1), t(59) = 2.26, p = 0.03. This
suggests that the summary made a difference in terms of the effort or difficulty of at
least some aspects of the task.
As with Experiment 1, there was no main effect of causal structure on performance
in Experiment 2 F (4, 295) = 0.64, η2 = .008, p = 0.63, nor were there any significant
interactions between performance on the different structures and whether participants
saw summary information (all p’s> .05). However, as in Experiment 1, we found that
participants were very likely to add a direct X1 → X3 connection in for the Chain
structure (Figure 3.8, Table 3.1).
We now move on to analyse the interventions selected by participants in the two exper-
iments. Because the task in Experiments 1 and 2 was fundamentally the same, we will
predominantly report analyses for all 139 participants together, but where relevant also
explore differences between Experiment 1 and the two conditions of Experiment 2.
3.4.1 Intervention choices
Benchmarking the interventions
Participants’ ultimate goal was to maximize their payout at the end of each problem
(after their twelfth test). However, as mentioned in the introduction, there are vari-
ous approaches to choosing interventions expected to help achieve this goal. Here we
use three “greedy” (one-step ahead) value functions: expected utility, probability and
information gain to assess how effectively participants selected different interventions.
To get a picture of the sequences of interventions favoured by efficient utility, probability
or information seeking learners, we simulated the task 100 times using one-step ahead
expected utility, probability and information gain (as defined in the introduction) to
select each intervention. The prior at each time point was based on Bayesian updating
from a flat prior using the outcomes of all previous interventions. All three measures
always favoured “simple” interventions Do[X1 =1], Do[X2 =1] or Do[X3 =1] (Figure 3.7)
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for the first few tests for which the prior was relatively flat. Then, as they become
more certain about the underlying structure, they increasingly selected “controlled”
interventions with one node fixed on and another fixed off (e.g. Do[X1 = 1, X2 = 0]).
After six tests, the probability that the models would select one of these controlled
interventions was: .41 for the probability gain model, .37 for probability gain model
and .51 for information gain model. For the later tests, if expected utility of the prior
was already very close to 3 (full marks) and probability of correct classification was
very close to 1, probability and probability gain were unable to distinguish between
interventions, assigning them all expected gains of zero. Whenever this happened, these
models would select interventions randomly. Information gain meanwhile continued to
favour a mixture of simple, and controlled interventions. The information gain model
would occasionally select an intervention with two nodes fixed on (4.5% of the time on
tests 9 to 12). Other interventions (e.g., fixing two nodes off or fixing everything) did
not provide any information about the causal structure so had expected gains of zero.
These were only selected by the utility and probability gain models, and only on the
last few trials when they could not distinguish between the interventions, so selected at
random. The three approaches averaged scores of 14.1 (utility), 14.2 (probability), and
14.6 (information) correct links (Figure 3.6). Thus, within 12 trials it was possible for
an efficient one-step ahead intervener to approach a perfect performance, averaging at
least 14/15 depending on the choice of value function driving intervention choices.
Looking two steps ahead, the efficient active learners using one of these measures average
almost identical average final scores (14.6, 14.4, and 14.6 points respectively) despite
still using somewhat different sequences on interventions. The two-step-ahead models
selected a higher proportion of controlled interventions than the greedy models (38%
/ 30% for information gain), and two-step ahead probability and probability gain were
always able to distinguish between the interventions meaning they would no longer select
interventions randomly on later tests.
For comparison, merely observing the system without fixing any variables would have
provided very little information, capping a learner’s ideal score at an average of 1.87
points per problem (9.35 overall, or a .26 probability of identifying the correct graph).
Participant’s intervention choices
Efficiency of intervention sequences On average, participants selected highly ef-
ficient interventions in terms of utility, probability and information gain. Participants
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Table 3.2: Comparison of the Proportion of Interventions of Different Types Selected
by Participants and Simulated Learners.
Proportion selected
Experiment Simulation
Intervention type 1 2a 2b Random UG PG IG
Observation .01 .01 .02 .04 .08 .16 .00
Simple (e.g. Do[X1=1]) .73 .73 .77 .11 .34 .38 .68
Controlled (e.g. Do[X1=1, X2=0]) .06 .09 .10 .22 .41 .30 .30
Strange 1 (e.g. Do[X1=1, X2=1]) .11 .08 .05 .11 .07 .08 .02
Strange 2 (e.g. Do[X1=0]) .02 .02 .01 .11 .05 .05 .00
Strange 3 (e.g. Do[X1=0, X2=0]) .00 .00 .00 .11 .05 .05 .00
Over-controlled (e.g. Do[X1=1, X2=0, X3=0]) .08 .07 .05 .30 .00 .00 .00
Note: Simulations selected interventions at (R)andom, and by maximising expected (U)tility,
(P)robability, and (I)nformation gain.
learned much more than they would by picking interventions at random and they selected
interventions that put their achievable score much closer on average to the benchmark
models than to a random intervener in terms of their final expected utilities (see Fig-
ure 3.6).
Participants finished problems having learned enough that they could optimally score
an average of 13.4 (SD=3.0) points per problem (M=13.1, SD=1.9 in Experiment 1,
M=13.5, SD=.35 in Experiment 2) and have a .72 (SD=.25) probability of getting
each graph completely right (M=.70, SD=.25 in Experiment 1, M=.75 SD=.23 in Ex-
periment 2). This was significantly higher than selecting interventions at random,
which would permit an average of only 11.6 points, or a .47 probability of getting
each graph completely correct, t(694) = 24, p < .001. However, it was still signif-
icantly lower than what could be achieved by consistently intervening to maximize
utility t(694) = −12.7, p < .001, probability t(694) = −12.7, p < .001 or information
gain t(694) = −18.3, p < .001. The quality of participants’ interventions was strongly
positively associated with their ultimate performance. This is true for all measures of
intervention quality tested here: utility gain: F (1, 137) = 63, η2 = 0.31, p < .001, prob-
ability gain: F (1, 137) = 81, η2 = 0.37, p < .001, and information gain: F (1, 137) =
87, η2 = 0.39, p < .001.
Simple interventions As with the efficient learning models, “simple” interventions
Do[X1 = 1], Do[X2 = 1] and Do[X3 = 1] were by far the most frequently selected, ac-
counting for 74% of all interventions despite constituting only 3 of the 27 selectable in-
terventions (Table 3.2). Propensity to use simple interventions was positively associated
with performance across participants, F (1, 137) = 41, η2 = .23, p < .001. As with the
efficient learner models, the probability a participant would select a simple intervention
















































































































































Figure 3.6: Participants’ expected scores given the interventions they had selected
thus far. Boxplot shows the best a participant could expect to score given the inter-
ventions and outcomes they had experienced up until that time point, averaged over
the five problems. For comparison the other lines denote the mean expected scores
of expected utility, probability or information maximising active learners (shades of
green) and a passive learner who selects interventions at random (red), based on the
simulations detailed in the text.
was highest at the start and then decreased over tests, β− .03± .007, Z = −4.1, p < .001
(Figure 3.7).
Controlled interventions “Controlled” interventions (e.g. Do[X1 =1, X2 =0]) were
selected only 7.4% of the time overall. This is not nearly as often they were selected by
the efficient learner models. However, in line with these models, participants’ probability
of selecting a controlled intervention increased over tests, β = .06±.01, Z = 5.2, p < .001.
Propensity to use controlled interventions was also positively associated with perfor-
mance, F (1, 137) = 14.1, η2 = .09, p < .001. For each additional informative controlled
intervention performed, participants scored .18 additional points in a task. The Chain
and fully-connected structures are the two that cannot easily be distinguished without
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Figure 3.7: a) Proportion of “simple” (e.g. Do[X1 = 1]) versus “controlled”
(Do[X1 = 1, X2 = 0]) intervention choices for the three efficient learning models av-
eraged over 100 simulations of the task. For later tests, based on increasingly peaked
priors, expected utility gain and probability gain no longer distinguish between interven-
tions and start to choose randomly while information gain continues to distinguish. b)
Participants’ proportion “simple” and “controlled” interventions over both experiments
with a median split by performance.
a controlled intervention (see Figure 3.9), and accordingly we find use of controlled in-
terventions is higher when the generating causal structure is a Chain or Fully-connected
structure, β = 0.50 ± .08, Z = 6.0, p < .001. In line with this, the use of controlled
interventions also significantly predicts participants’ probability of correctly omitting
the X1 → X3 connection in the Chain structure, β = 1.7± .4, Z = 4.6, p < .001. In ad-
dition, a higher proportion of participants used controlled interventions at least once in
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, χ2(60) = 9.3, p = .002 (41/60 compared to 44/79).
The fact that participants performed fewer “controlled” interventions in later tests than
the benchmark efficient learner models is consistent with the idea that they were slower
to learn. This would mean they would require more of the simple interventions to reach a
level of certainty under which controlled interventions become the most valuable choice.
The modelling in the next section will allow us to explore this possibility.
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Figure 3.8: a) i.–v. Test structures used in Experiments 1 and 2. b)–d) Averaged
final judgment for Experiments 1, 2a info only and 2b info + summary. Note that the
direct link was often marked for the Chain (iii.).
Other interventions Participants sometimes selected interventions with two nodes
fixed on (e.g. Do[X1 =1, X2 =1]), doing so 10% of the time. While the information gain
model would select these interventions occasionally in later trials, participants were just
as likely to select them early on β = 0.009± 0.01, Z = 0.77, p = .4 and their propensity
to select them was negatively associated with their performance, F (1, 137) = 50, η2 =
.27, p < .001. This suggests that participants typically did not use these interventions
efficiently, or did not learn from them appropriately. Frequency of fixing everything
(e.g. X1 = 1, X2 = 0, X3 = 0) was strongly negatively correlated with performance,
F (1, 137) = 50, η2 = .27, p < .001. Participants who selected this type of intervention
averaged final scores of only 8. Observing with no nodes fixed and fixing one or two
nodes off were rarely selected and were not significantly associated with performance


















Figure 3.9: A controlled intervention. a) To distinguish i. X1 → X2 → X3 from ii.
X1 → X2 → X3, X1 → X3, one can manipulate X1 while simultaneously holding X2
constant. b) In the current context, this is achieved by fixing X1 on and fixing X2 off.
c) If X3 still turns on this is evidence for the ii., the fully-connected structure.
(p’s of .14, .06 and .91 respectively).4
3.5 Modelling intervention selection and causal judgments
So far, we have analysed peoples’ intervention selections at a relatively high level, looking
only at how often particular types of intervention are chosen on average, either by
good or bad participants, early or late during learning, or depending on the underlying
causal structure. These high-level analyses have addressed the first two of our research
questions, answering both in the positive:
1. The majority of people are able to choose informative interventions and learn
causal structure effectively even when the environment is fully probabilistic, ab-
stract and there is a large space of causal structures.
2. Most people can make use of complex “controlling” interventions to disambiguate
between otherwise hard-to-distinguish structures. Ability to do this is a strong
predictor of correctly identifying the causal structure, especially when the true
structure is a Chain.
4Fixing two nodes off provides no information about the causal connections. Arguably, it still provides
information about the spontaneous activation rate of variables but participants had already been trained
on this in the instructions.
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So far we have not touched upon the clear differences between interventions that fall
within the same category (e.g. selecting Do[X1 =1] will provide very different informa-
tion to Do[X2 =1] or Do[X3 =]1). Additionally, we have not yet tried to distinguish which
intervention selection measure is more closely in line with participants’ choices. Looking
across all three experiments, the three value functions favour different intervention(s)
to one another on many of the participants’ tests. Utility and probability gain disagree
about what intervention should have been chosen on 19% of participants’ tests. Utility
and information gain disagree on 36% of participants’ tests, and probability gain and
information gain disagree on 39% of participants’ tests. However, simply counting the
frequency of agreement between participants’ interventions and those considered most
valuable by one or other measure is a blunt instrument for understanding participants’
actions. The measures do not just give a single favoured intervention but a distinct
value for each of the 27 possible interventions. Furthermore, the benchmark models as-
sume perfect Bayesian updating after each intervention while a richer model comparison
should allow us to compare the different measures while relaxing the assumption that
participants are perfect Bayesians.
Thus, to progress further we will now fit and compare a range of models to participants’
sequences of interventions and structure judgments. This will allow us to address our
other research questions: 3. What objective function best explains people’s choices, 4.
Whether people can plan more than one intervention ahead, 5. Whether their belief
update process is biased or constrained, and 6. Whether we can capture their active
learning with simple heuristics.
On each test, a participant chooses an intervention but also can update their causal judg-
ment by marking the presence or absence of possible causal links. The models discussed
below will describe the intervention selections and causal judgments simultaneously, by
assigning a probability to each intervention choice (from the 27 legal interventions) and
to each combination of marked and unspecified links (out of the 27 possible combina-
tions of causal connections). Free parameters are fitted to individual data since it is
reasonable to assume that properties like memory and learning strategy are fairly sta-
ble within subjects but likely to differ between subjects in ways which may help us
understand what drives the large differences in individual performance.
We fit a total of 21 models (Figure 3.10) separately to each participant’s data. The mod-
els can be classified as either “expectancy-based” or “heuristic” models. The expectancy-
based models assume that people choose interventions according to the expected value
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Figure 3.10: Schematic of the relationships between the models. Each model is nested
within its parents and lists its fitted parameters. Blue rectangles indicate “bounded”
models, green rectangles indicate “ideal” models, red rectangles indicate “null” models
and yellow rectangles indicate “heuristic” models. Arcs representing the nesting of the
conservative null models in the non-conservative null models are omitted for clarity
of each intervention, maximising either utility, probability, or information gain (see sec-
tion 1.3 Quantifying Interventions). The models assume that the expectancies, as well
as causal judgments, are based on Bayesian updating of probability distributions over
the causal structures and the models are rational in the sense that they are optimal
with respect to people’s goals, although we also allow for the possibility of cognitive
constraints such as forgetting and conservatism.
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In Steyvers et al.’s (2003) study, many participants chose models that suggested they
remembered only the result of their final intervention (having apparently forgotten or
discounted the evidence from their previous observations) while others seemed to re-
member a little more. This is in line with what we know about the limited capacity
of working memory (Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1956) and its close relationship with learning
(Baddeley, 1992). Thus it seems likely that people are somewhat “forgetful”, or exhibit
recency with respect to integrating the evidence they have seen. We expect that in
Experiment 2b, where a summary of past outcomes is provided, memory load should be
reduced and participants should display less recency.
With regards to conservatism, research suggests that people interpret new data within
their existing causal structure beliefs wherever possible (e.g. Krynski, Tenenbaum, et al.,
2007). Anecdotally, people are typically slow or reluctant to change their causal beliefs.
This suggests that people may also be conservative (Edwards, 1968) when updating
their causal beliefs, even during learning. An additional motivation for this idea is
the consideration that appropriate conservatism could actually complement forgetting;
people may mitigate their forgetfulness about old evidence by remembering just what
causal structural conclusions they have previously drawn from it (Harman, 1986). For
example, suppose a participant registers an X1 → X2 causal link after their first three
interventions. We can take this as a (noisy) indication they are fairly confident at this
stage that, whatever the full causal structure is, it is likely to be one with a link from
X1 to X2. By the time the participant comes to their sixth intervention, they might
not remember why they had concluded three trials earlier that there is an X1 → X2
link, but they would still be sensible to assume that they had a good reason for doing so
at the time. This means that it may be wise to be conservative, preferring to consider
models consistent with links you have already marked, than those that are inconsistent
even when you cannot remember why you marked the links in the first place.
In the heuristic models, intervention selections are not based on Bayesian belief updating
and the expected value of interventions, but are derived from simple “rules-of-thumb”.
Although these models are not optimal with respect to any criterion, they can approxi-
mate the behaviour of the “rational” models reasonably well.
3.5.1 Expectancy-based models
We will call a model that assumes participants are pure pragmatists, choosing each
intervention with the goal of increasing their expected score, a utilitarian model. A








Figure 3.11: A flowchart of the expectancy based models. White nodes are observed
quantities, grey nodes are unobserved quantities. Clockwise from the top right: The
causal judgment reported at the previous time point and the prior distribution over
causal structures combine to form a conservative prior. This is used to choose the
next intervention. The outcome of the intervention is observed and this is integrated
with the (partially forgotten) prior to arrive at the posterior distribution over causal
structures. The posterior and the previously reported judgment are mixed to form a
conservative posterior which influences the new judgment. The posterior becomes the
new prior, then the process repeats.
utilitarian model assumes that participants choose interventions that are expected to
maximize their payment at the next time point, or utility gain (see 3.1.3).5 We will call a
model that assumes people are just concerned with maximising their probability of being
completely right (disregarding all other possible outcomes, or their payouts) a gambler
model. A gambler model assumes participants choose actions which are expected to
maximize the posterior probability of the most likely structure, or probability gain. We
will call a model that assumes people try to minimize their uncertainty (without worrying
about their probability of being right, or how much they will get paid) a scholar model.
A scholar model assumes that participants choose actions to maximize their expected
information gain, about the true structure at the next time point.
Updating causal beliefs and forgetting
All expectancy-based models assume that the learner’s causal beliefs are represented by
a probability distribution over all possible causal structures. At each time point, this
probability distribution is based on Bayesian updating of their prior from the previous
5For each judgment the expected payout was calculated as the points received for that judgment
summed over every possible graph, each multiplied by the posterior probability of the graph. As an
example, endorsing Fork [X1 → X2;X1 → X3] given the true structure is the Chain [X1 → X2;X2 → X3]
was worth 1 point because one of the three link-spaces (X1-X2) is correct while the other two are wrong.
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time point to incorporate the evidence provided by the outcome of their latest interven-
tion. However, rather than a complete Bayesian updating (Equation 3.3), we allow for
the possibility that evidence from past trials may be partly discounted or forgotten.
There are various ways to model forgetting (Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010; Wixted,
2004). A reasonable (high-level) approach is to assume that people will forget random
aspects of the evidence they have received, leading to a net “flattening” of participants’
subjective priors going into each new intervention. We can formalise this by altering the
Bayesian update equation, such that a uniform distribution is mixed with the partici-
pants’ prior on each update to an extent controlled by a forgetting parameter γ ∈ [0, 1].
So instead of
P t(m|dt; ct) ∝ P (dt|m; ct)P t(m)
as in Equation 3.3, we have:
P t(m|dt; ct) ∝ P (dt|m; ct)
[
(1− γ)P t(m) + γ 1|m|
]
(3.11)
where |m| is the total number of structures in M, and distributions are computed
recursively as P t(m) = P t−1(m|dt−1; ct−1). By setting γ to 0 we get a model with no
forgetting and by setting it to 1 we get a model in which everything is forgotten after
every test.
Choosing interventions
The expectancy-based models assume that intervention choices are based on the expected
values of interventions. Let v1t, . . . , vnt denote the expected values vct = Ed[V
t(M |c,d)],
where the generic function V is identical to Ug (Equation 3.6) in the utilitarian models,
the probability gain (Equation 3.7) in the gambler models, and the information gain
(Equation 3.9) in the scholar models. Note that these quantities are computed from the
distributions P t(m|d; c) and P t(m) = P t−1(m|dt−1; ct−1) as defined in Equation 3.11.
We assume that chosen interventions are based upon these values through a variant of
Luce’s choice rule (Luce, 1959), such that the probability a learner selects intervention





The parameter α controls how consistent the learner is in picking the intervention with
the maximum expected value. As α → ∞ the probability that the learner picks the
intervention with the highest expected value approaches 1 and the probability of picking
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any other intervention drops toward 0. If α = 0, then the learner picks any intervention
with an equal probability, i.e. P (ct) = 1n , for all c
t ∈ C.
Marking causal beliefs and conservatism
All expectancy-based models assume that learners’ marked causal links are a noisy reflec-
tion of their current belief regarding the true causal models, as reflected by the posterior
distribution P t(m|dt; ct). However, rather than using P t(m|dt; ct) directly, we allow for
the possibility that the marking of causal beliefs may be subject to conservatism.
To allow for conservatism, we assume marked causal beliefs reflect a conservative proba-
bility distribution P t∗(m|dt; ct), which is a distorted version of the current distribution
P t(m|dt; ct) in which the probability of causal structures consistent with the already
marked causal links is relatively increased. Technically, this is implemented by mul-
tiplying the probability of consistent causal graphs by a factor η ∈ (0,∞] and then
renormalising the distribution.6 The conservative probability distribution is given by:
P t∗(m|dt; ct) = η
I(m)P t(m|dt; ct)∑
m′∈M ηI(m)P t(m′|ct; dt)
(3.13)
Where I[m] is an indicator function with value 1 if the structure m is consistent with
the currently marked links, and 0 otherwise. Marked links are assumed to be selected
based on this conservative distribution. Then, this distribution is used to compute
the values of the subsequent intervention options. For η > 1, sticking with already
specified links is more likely than changing them all, other things being equal, while if
0 ≤ η < 1, this would lead to anti-conservatism. Unlike forgetting, which has an effect
that accumulates over trials, the conservative distortion is applied “temporarily” on each
trial when marking beliefs and choosing the next intervention, but discarded thereafter,
such that the prior on trial t + 1 is Pt+1(m) = P
t(m|dt; ct) and not P t∗(m|dt; ct). By
setting η = 1 we get a model which assumes participants are neither conservative nor
anti-conservative.
6This parameter only does work once participants have registered their beliefs about at least some of
the links, but this is the case on 91% of trials. On 76% of these trials participants had registered a belief
for all three links, meaning that the conservativeness parameter up-weights the subjective probability
of this one structure while they are selecting their new belief state and choosing the next intervention.
This means that even if this learner’s posterior is relatively flat due to forgetting, structures consistent
with their marked links still stand out, leading them to behave as if they have selectively remembered
information confirming these hypotheses. On the 24% of trials in which some but not all links remained
unspecified, the conservativeness parameter led to the structures consistent with the established links
being up-weighted, leading the learner to favour interventions likely to distinguish between these options
- concretely there would be 9 structures consistent with one specified link, and 3 consistent with two
specified links.
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As for interventions, we assume that a learner marks causal links through a variant of
Luce’s choice rule. The marking of links on each trial was optional, and initially all links
were unspecified. As a result, links were often left unspecified, in which case a set of
models S, rather than a single causal model, is consistent with the marked links.7 To








where bt is the stated belief after trial t. For example, if the participant has marked
X1 → X2, but has so far left X1−X3 and X2−X3 unspecified, then the model sums over
the probabilities of all the graphs that are consistent with this link. If a participant has
not marked any links then their belief state for that time point trivially has a probability
of 1.8 By setting β to zero we get a model which assumes that participants are unable
to identify causal links above chance regardless of what evidence they have seen.
Null, ideal and bounded expectancy models
In summary, the expectancy-based models have four free parameters: α controls the
degree to which the learner maximizes over the intervention values, β controls the degree
to which the learner maximizes over their posterior with their link selections at each time
point, γ controls the extent to which participants discount or forget about past evidence
and η controls the extent to which participants are conservative about the causal links
they mark. See Figure 3.11 for a flow chart of how the full expectancy based models
work. By constraining the models such that combinations of these parameters are fixed,
a nested set of expectancy-based models is obtained (Figure 3.10). Fixing parameters to
a priori sensible values can be important. For instance, we can assess whether a learner
is forgetful by comparing a model in which the γ parameter is estimated to one in which
the parameter is fixed to γ = 0.
A useful way to break down these models is divide them into “null” models, “ideal”
models and psychologically “bounded” models. We will call models with one or both
of α and β fixed to zero “null” models. These models either assume that no active
7A side effect of this aspect of the design is that we have more data on some participants than others.
Those who rarely marked links before the end of the task reveal less information about how their belief
at one time point influences their belief at subsequent time points.
8Cyclic Bayesian networks cannot be defined within the Bayesian network framework and participants
were instructed that they were impossible during the instructions. Therefore, on the 4.3% of trials in
which participants marked a cyclic structure ([X1 → X2, X2 → X3, X3 → X1], or [X1 → X3, X3 →
X2, X2 → X1]) their belief state was treated as unspecified so that the model did not return a likelihood
of zero for that participant.
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intervention selection takes place (α = 0, interventions are selected randomly) and/or
that no successful causal learning takes place (β = 0). We will call the models in which γ
is fixed to 0 and η to 1 “ideal” models. These models are ideal in the sense that they set
aside potential psychological constraints and so are at the computational level according
to Marr’s hierarchy (Marr, 1982). Comparing just these models addresses the question
of which computational level problem participants’ actions and judgments suggest they
are (approximately) solving. Finally, we will call the full models in which one or both
of γ and η are fit to the data “bounded” models. These models are bounded in the
sense that they attempt to capture how psychological processing constraints potentially
distort or change the computational problem, allowing us to explore how people might
mitigate this in their intervention strategies.
Sensible evaluation of the bounded models requires different null models. For example,
it may often be the case that someone is conservative about their beliefs despite those
beliefs being completely random (β = 0). Alternatively people might be conservative
passive learners yet unable to select sensible interventions, choosing interventions which
are not more useful than chance (α = 0). In these cases, we would have no reason to
ascribe scholarly, gamblerly or utilitarian behaviour despite our models capturing some
systematicity in participants’ data.
Far-sighted scholars, gamblers and utilitarians
As mentioned in Greedy or global optimisation?, the values of different actions depend
to some extent on how far the learner looks into the future. Computing expected values
looking more than two steps ahead quickly becomes intractable even in the three-variable
case, but we were able to compute the “ideal” two-step-ahead models for the three mea-
sures.9 This allows us to check if there is evidence that people are able to look more than
one step ahead when choosing interventions. Accordingly, we fit additional farsighted
utilitarian, gambler and scholar models in which the intervention values for looking one
step ahead were replaced with those looking two steps ahead. We can compare these
to the one-step ahead “ideal” models to see if there is evidence that participants were
planning more than one step ahead. We did not include freely estimated forgetting
(γ) or conservatism (η) parameters in these models because recomputing the two-step
ahead intervention values on the fly for different γ and η increments was prohibitively
computationally expensive.
9These expectancies are computed recursively, taking the maximum over the second set of interven-
tions and passing these values back to the first set of interventions.
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3.5.2 Heuristic models
In addition to the various expectancy based models described above, we explored whether
people’s intervention patterns can be well described by heuristic active learning models.
By heuristic models, we mean models in which probabilities are not explicitly repre-
sented and values are not calculated for different interventions. Instead, these models
assume that learners follow simple rules of thumb in order to choose their interventions,
and update their causal models, without performing computationally demanding prob-
abilistic information integration (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Here we fit two models, the
first nested in the second.
The simple endorser
One way to significantly simplify the causal learning problem is to ignore the dependen-
cies between the causal connections in the possible graphs (Fernbach & Sloman, 2009).
Thus, if intervention Do[X1 = 1] is performed and both X2 and X3 activate this can
be seen as evidence for an X1 → X2 connection and, independently, evidence for an
X1 → X3 connection. In contrast a full Bayesian treatment would also raise the prob-
ability of other hypotheses (the Chains and Fully-connected structures). Another way
to simplify the problem is to ignore the Bayesian accumulation of probabilistic evidence
and rather update belief directly to be consistent with the latest evidence. Concretely,
in this task these assumptions would lead to people simply fixing variables on, one at a
time, and adding links to any other nodes that activate as a result (removing any links
to other nodes which do not activate as a result). We can operationalise this with a
three parameter model (Figure 3.12) which selects one of the simple interventions with
probability θ ∈ [0, 1] or else selects anything else with probability 1− θ. With a proba-
bility σ ∈ [0, 1] the belief state is updated such that it becomes the prior belief state B
plus links L from the current fixed node to any activated nodes (and minus those not
in L but in B), while with probability 1− σ it either: stays the same (with probability
% ∈ [0, 1]) or takes any other state (with probability 1 − %). A potential strength of
this model in fitting the data is that it leads to systematic misattribution of a Fully-
connected structure when the true structure is a Chain, a behaviour exhibited by many
participants. This happens because when the true structure is a Chain, intervening on
the root node will tend to lead to both other nodes activating, leading to the addition
of direct links from the root node. When the middle node is intervened on this will tend
to activate the last node, leading to the addition of the third link. To the extent that
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X1=1 or X2=1 or X3=1
Figure 3.12: Process trees for the simple endorser. The learner follows an arrow with
the probability written under the arrow and takes the action in the end node.
participants frequently act in this way, θ and σ will be high and the model fit will be
good, and to the extent that they act in other ways the model will approach the fit of
the null model in which beliefs and actions are selected at random.
The disambiguator
As we show earlier in the chapter, controlling variables is a hallmark of scientific thinking,
and a necessary part of successfully disambiguating causal structures (Cartwright, 1989;
Kuhn & Dean, 2005). In this task this takes the form of a controlled intervention
in which one node is fixed on and another fixed off (e.g. Do[X1 = 1, X2 = 0]), normally
performed after observing some confounding evidence (i.e. when you fix one node on and
both other nodes activate). This action tests whether the node that remains unfixed
is a direct effect of the node which is fixed on (Figure 3.9), and thus disambiguates
between the structures which could explain why both unfixed nodes activated on the
previous trial. In the general case, the putative cause node would remain fixed on, a
single putative effect node would be left unfixed and the other N − 2 nodes would be
fixed off.
The model is operationalised as selecting Do[X1 = 1], Do[X2 = 1] or Do[X3 = 1] or a
disambiguation step (e.g. Do[X1 = 1, X2 = 0], etc) with probability θ and something
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(1 − θ ) / (n − 9)
Figure 3.13: Process tree for the intervention selection step for the disambiguator.
Belief update step is the same as for the simple endorser.
else with probability 1 − θ (Figure 3.13). Propensity to select a simple endorsement
step rather than a disambiguation step is governed by a fourth parameter κ ∈ [0, 1]. If
a disambiguation step is performed and the unfixed node does not activate, then any
connection from the activated node to the unfixed node is removed with probability σ.
The belief update step is otherwise the same as for the simple endorser.
3.5.3 Model estimation and comparison
All models were fitted to individual’s data by maximum likelihood estimation.10 These
consist of four nested sets, one for each of the three expectancy measures (probability
gain, probability gain and information gain) and one for heuristic models. Each nested
model has between zero and four parameters.
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is computed for each model to give an idea of its goodness of fit.11
This measure does not penalize model complexity so models are compared throughout
using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) which can be used to
compare both nested and non-nested models (Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010).
3.5.4 Model fit results
Full results of the model fits are contained in Table 3.3. Overall, the best fitting model
was the fully bounded scholar model based on maximising information gain with both
conservatism and forgetting (hereafter CF scholar). This model had a pseudo-R2 of
.47 indicating a very good fit to the data12 and was the best fitting model for 103 out
10We used the Nelder-Mead algorithm to numerically maximize the likelihood, as implemented in R’s
optim function. Optimisation was validated by repetition with different starting parameter values.
11McFadden’s pseudo-R2 = 1− logL(Mfull)
logL(Mminimal)
, where L(M) denotes the likelihood of model M . The
minimal model Mminimal is random (no learning) in Table 3.3, where both actions and endorsements are
completely random.
12Values between .2 and .4 are considered a good fit (Dobson, 2010).
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a)
Probability selected
Participant 5 in Experiment 2a identifying the Chain
Conservative Forgetful
Scholar
(α=7.2, β=18.2, γ=.44, η=6.6)
Figure 3.14: Visualisation of models. a) First 6 trials for participant 5 in Experiment
2a, identifying the Chain (X1 → X2, X2 → X3) structure. “+” and “−” symbols
indicate interventions setting variables to 1 and 0. Grey nodes indicate the resultant
activations, and the arrows replicate those marked by the participant at each time
point. b) the probability that the participant registers each causal structure according
to the Scholar, Forgetful scholar and Conservative forgetful scholar models (their actual
choice is the full red circle) and c) the probability of selecting each of the “simple” and
”controlled” interventions on the next test (actual choice is the dashed red circle).
of the 139 participants over Experiment 1, 2a and 2b according to the BIC. Of the 36
participants that were not best described as CF scholars, 24 were in Experiment 1 and
many of these were best fit by the conservative random null model. See Figure 3.14 for a
visual comparison of the scholar model with either or both of forgetting and conservatism
as fit to a participant in Experiment 2a. Looking at their average scores, we see that
those best described as CF scholars perform much better than those who are not CF
scholar mean = 11.3, non-CF scholar mean = 6.6, t(137) = 7.1, p < .001.






















































Figure 3.15: Mean correlation between intervention values according to these models
for all participants’ tests, as a function of forgetting.
Inspection of the forgetful models suggests that participants forgot a large amount of
the evidence they received with median forgetting rates (γs) of .68, .79 and .47 for the
utilitarian, gambler and scholar models respectively. When paired with conservatism in
the conservative models, forgetting rates become even higher. This makes intuitive sense
since high conservatism can result in a high probability for already marked links which
would otherwise have to be due to participants maintaining more of the true posterior
(see Figure 3.14). Looking at the parameter estimates of the CF scholar model, more
forgetful people were also more conservative, with a significant rank-order correlation
between γ and η (% = .43, p < .001). In addition both forgetting and conservatism
are negatively correlated with participants’ overall scores, % = −.70, p < .001 for γ and
% = .53, p < .001 for η.
Looking across experiments, we see that median forgetting (γ) in the forgetful scholar
model drops considerably going from .71 in Experiment 1 to .30 in Experiment 2a and
slightly further again to .25 in Experiment 2b. Naively we might expect that participants
in Experiment 2b should not need a forgetting parameter, since they could see all of their
past actions and outcomes. However, only one participant in Experiment 2b, and none
in Experiment 2a or 1 was better fit by a model without a forgetting parameter meaning
that the parameter still did work even for participants in Experiment 2b.13 Rather
we conclude that “forgetting” in our models does not just capture people’s inability to
recall past evidence. More generally, we think it captures a recency bias or tendency to
13This participant identified every connection correctly and was best described as an “ideal” scholar.
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Table 3.3: Model Fitting Results.
Model α β γ log(η) N best N ideal N heuristic R2 BIC
Random 0 5 1 0 98396
Passive 5 0 9 0 .15 84487
U 6.1 4.9 0 1 .20 79905
G 11 4.9 0 1 .19 80718
S 6 4.9 1 117 .25 75236
2-step U 9.3 4.9 0 0 .21 78576
2-step G 13 4.9 0 1 .21 78715
2-step S 4.1 4.9 0 5 .24 76229
C Random 4.5 9 0 28 .23 76574
C Passive 5.7 6.7 0 0 0 .25 75453
CU 7.1 5.8 3.1 0 .28 72635
CG 12 5.5 2.8 0 .27 73739
CS 6.7 5.8 3.3 0 .33 68190
FU 11 14 .68 4 .33 67694
FG 32 12 .79 1 .31 70027
FS 7.7 11 .47 2 .37 64039
CFU 15 16 .93 2 5 .43 58413
CFG 53 17 .97 1.3 6 .40 61680
CFS 8.3 13 0.81 2.3 103 .47 54757
θ ρ σ κ
Simple .85 .22 .63 5 61 .36 64985
Disambiguator .95 .22 .63 .96 3 49 .37 64100
Note: Median parameter estimates, pseudo-R2s and total BICs for all models. (C)onservative and/or
(F)orgetful (U)ilitarian (based on Ug), (G)ambler (based on Pg) and (S)cholar (based on Ig) models .
Additionally “N best” gives the number of participants best fit by each model according to BIC. “N
ideal” gives the same statistics as “N best”, but only includes the ideal learner models and appropriate
null models, “N heuristic” does the same for the heuristic models.
attend disproportionately toward newer over older evidence regardless of whether the
older evidence is still accessible.
“Ideal” models
Although the CF scholar model performed best overall, the scholar, gambler and util-
itarian model predictions were often relatively similar when all four parameters were
included. This could be because for flatter posteriors, the intervention values according
to these models do not differ as much as they do when the posteriors are more peaked.
Comparing predictions of the models with increasing forgetting rates confirms this (Fig-
ure 3.15), with the level of agreement about the best intervention(s) becoming close to 1
as forgetting rate increases toward 1. For a clearer assessment whether learners are best
described as scholars, gamblers or utilitarians, we turn to a comparison of the “ideal”
versions of these models (without forgetting or conservatism).
Considering only the “ideal” models and the relevant “null” models (Figure 3.10 and the
“Best ideal” column in Table 3.3), the scholar model clearly outperforms the utilitarian
and gambler models. In this set of models, the scholar best captures 117 out of the
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139 participants, including almost all high scoring participants (scholar mean = 10.8,
non-scholar mean 6.4). Nine of the poorest participants (average score 5.5) were also
better described as achieving some learning, despite failing to select interventions more
useful than chance (passive learner), but none were best fit by the completely chance
level model random in which both α and β were set to zero.
Looking across experiments, we see that median αs for the ideal scholar model, control-
ling maximisation over intervention values, increase from 5.2 (SD=2.7) in Experiment 1
to 6.6 (SD=3.0) in Experiment 2a and 7.1 (SD=3.0) in Experiment 2b. Likewise, me-
dian βs, controlling maximisation over the posterior under the scholar model, increase
from 3.5 (SD=26) in Experiment 1 to 5.9 (SD=3.5) in Experiment 2a and 6.5 (SD=2.9)
in Experiment 2b. This suggests that when the task was clarified and especially when
summary information was provided, participants’ interventions judgments were closer
to those arising from expected information maximisation and Bayesian inference.
There is no evidence that people were able to look more than one step ahead in this task
though, with across-the-board worse fits for the farsighted scholar, gambler and utilitar-
ian models and only 6/139 participants best fit by one of these models rather than the
one-step ahead or null models. These were not the most successful participants, scoring
an average of only 7.5, suggesting that the resemblance between their interventions and
to those favoured by the two-step ahead expectancies was accidental.
In summary, comparing the “ideal” learner models shows that successful causal learners’
actions and causal judgments are more closely related to the computational level problem
of reducing uncertainty than those of maximising probability or utility.
Heuristic models
When comparing the full set of models, few of the participants were best described
by either of the heuristic models. Nevertheless, these models fit relatively well despite
their algorithmic simplicity, with BIC values in the range of the forgetful Bayesian
models. Ignoring the expectancy based models, we can, similarly as previously for the
“ideal” models, compare the heuristic models against the relevant null models (Table
3.3, last column). From this we can see that the better fitting heuristic overall is the
disambiguator. However, more individual participants are better described as simple
endorsers (61) than disambiguators (49), with the remainder being described by the
conservative random null model. The majority (18/28) of those better described as
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conservative random are in Experiment 1 and had average scores of only 6.4. Over
Experiment 1, 2a and 2b, those described as disambiguators do slightly better than
those described as simple endorsers t(101.6) = −2.0, p = 0.04. Disambiguators used
complex interventions on 8.8% of trials (14.8% for Chain and fully-connected models)
while simple endorsers rarely or never used complex interventions (1.3% of the time; 2%
of the time for the Chain and Fully-connected models).
3.6 Discussion
Overall, our analyses suggest that the majority of people are highly capable active causal
learners, both in terms of selecting useful interventions and in terms of learning from
them. Having identified task confusion as the cause for many of the poorer performances
in Experiment 1, we found that with an in-task reminder of the instructions in Exper-
iment 2, almost all participants performed very well. Allowing participants to see the
results of their past tests did not make a significant difference to performance but did
significantly reduce task completion time. Since performance was already near ceiling
in Experiment 2, we can see the quicker completion times suggesting that the history of
past trials did make the task somewhat less demanding.
Simulations of efficient utility-, probability- and information-maximising active learn-
ing showed that starting with simple interventions and gradually switching to more
focused “controlled” interventions made for an efficient interventional strategy. We
see participants exhibiting this same pattern, starting with almost exclusively “sim-
ple” interventions and gradually using more “controlled” ones as they narrow down the
space of possible structures. Participants’ interventions were also somewhat sensitive to
the structure being learned, with more “controlled” interventions being selected on the
Chain and Fully-connected structures, where it was very hard to identify the correct
causal structure without at least one controlled intervention. While participants were
generally less inclined to select “controlled” interventions than the benchmark models,
this is consistent with their learning being slower and more imperfect, as is reflected by
our fitted models.
We can think of “simple” interventions as open-ended tests. They do not test any
one hypothesis in particular and have multiple possible outcomes, each of which can
be consistent with several different causal interpretations (e.g., if there are two acti-
vations following a simple intervention, these could result from a Chain, Collider, or
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Fully-connected structure). However, simple interventions are powerful at first because
they quickly reduce the space of likely models. In contrast, controlled interventions
can be seen as more focused tests. They have only two possible outcomes and lend
themselves to distinguishing unambiguously between two or three causal structures that
perhaps differ by only one causal connection. This progression from open-ended to more
focused testing gels with a picture of people as natural scientists, first exploring the
space and identifying a candidate causal model, then progressively refining this with
focused experiments. We found that the propensity to select controlled tests was closely
linked to high performance, suggesting that only more sophisticated causal learners
would progress from the exploratory stage to the stage of performing specific controlled
hypothesis tests. The idea that controlled interventions are more cognitively demanding
than simple ones is supported by research on complex control (e.g. Osman, 2011), where
ability to recognize that one must simultaneously manipulate two variables to control a
system is difficult for many people.
We found that participants had a strong tendency to mistake Chains for Fully-connected
structures across both experiments. One reductive explanation for this is that some
participants may have misunderstood the task demands, interpreting links as meaning
that the parent node is a direct or indirect cause of the child node. However, the
instructions were clear on this point, demonstrating the way in which fixing an in-
between node “off” would block activation passing along a Chain. Instead, we conclude
that this mistake is a marker for many participants’ heuristic causal learning strategies.
This is confirmed by the large number of participants whose actions and judgments are
better described by the simple endorsement heuristic that systematically overconnects
Chains rather than the disambiguation heuristic.
We compared computational models of efficient causal learning, driven by three plausible
measures of intervention values: expected utility gain, probability gain, and information
gain. Overall, the models driven by information gain (scholars) better fit the large ma-
jority of participants’ interventions than models driven by probability gain (gamblers)
or utility gain (utilitarians). This was particularly clear looking at the “ideal” mod-
els (without forgetting or conservatism). This means that, however participants were
choosing their interventions and updating their beliefs, they were managing to do so in
a way which broadly approximated the solution to the computational level problem of
maximising information rather than that of minimising error or maximising utility.
Venturing one rung down the ladder from the computational level toward psychological
process (Jones & Love, 2011; Marr, 1982), we explored “bounded” versions of our models.
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We included forgetting and conservatism parameters capturing the idea that people
might be biased in their learning by plausible memory and processing constraints. The fit
of our models was greatly improved by inclusion of these parameters and including both
parameters led to much better overall fits than including only one. The two parameters
were correlated, supporting the idea that they complemented one another: e.g., the more
forgetful a learner is about past evidence, the more conservative they need to be in their
beliefs in order to be an effective learner. Therefore, these models provide an account
of how moderate forgetting of old evidence paired with appropriate conservatism about
existing causal beliefs can lead to effective active causal learning.
Allowing participants to draw and update models as they went along may have affected
their learning, perhaps distracting them, or leading them to place more emphasis on
earlier marked links. Furthermore, while we accept that the beliefs reported by partici-
pants at each time point are at best noisy markers of their actual beliefs about the true
structure, we feel that these are largely unavoidable aspects of tracing beliefs throughout
learning. We tried to minimize the extent to which eliciting beliefs distracted partici-
pants by making the step optional and hoping that participants would voluntarily record
their beliefs as an aid to memory. It seems this was what most participants did, as links
were drawn on 91% of tests, and neither varied wildly nor remained static from trial to
trial. As a result we have been able to explore patterns of sequential causal learning in
an unprecedented level of detail.
Taking another step toward the process level, we also looked at whether participants’ ac-
tions could be reasonably captured by simple heuristics. We noted that simple endorse-
ment (Fernbach & Sloman, 2009), based on local computation, could capture much of
the behaviour of many participants. This may explain why so many participants judged
the Fully-connected structure when the true structure was the Chain. However, some
participants also performed the crucial controlling disambiguation steps which cannot
be easily captured in a local computation framework. We operationalised this here as an
alternative step occasionally performed at random. However, we note that a disambigua-
tor type model has the potential to be refined by incorporating sequential dependence.
For instance, a natural hypothesis is that disambiguation steps are most likely to be
performed following ambiguous evidence (i.e. multiple activations). Another possibility
is that learners are likely to perform disambiguation steps with the same node fixed
on as they had fixed on for the step that generated the ambiguity. However, further
refining the heuristic models in the current context is likely to make them increasingly
indistinguishable from our expectancy based models. To confidently identify people’s
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heuristic strategies we will need to look at learning problems with a larger number of
variables and the potential for larger divergences between heuristics and computational
level models.
With these experiments and analyses we have begun the process of studying active causal
learning behaviour, starting with a “simple” open ended experiment (Experiment 1), and
more “controlled” follow up (Experiment 2). Having motivated and constructed models
of participants’ actions and judgments at computational and process levels, the next
steps will be to come up with controlled tests that allow us to rigorously test some of
these predictions. For example, an avenue of future work will be to look at the range
of environments within which heuristic strategies are effective. We hypothesize that
the extent to which one must disambiguate (or control for other variables) depends on
how noisy, complex or densely causally connected the environment is. For more than
around 5 or 6 variables, explicit calculation of expectancies becomes intractable while
the calculations required by the active causal learning heuristics remain computationally
trivial. In everyday life people have to deal with causal systems with many variables, far
more than would plausibly allow explicit expectancies to be computed. One way people
might achieve this is by performing an appropriate mixture of these “connecting” simple
endorsement and “pruning” disambiguation steps.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we asked how people learn about causal structure through sequences of
interventions. We found that many participants were highly effective active causal learn-
ers, able to select informative interventions from a large range of options and use these to
improve their causal models incrementally over a sequence of tests. Successful learners
were able to make effective use of “controlling” double interventions as well as “simple”
single interventions, doing so increasingly as they narrowed down the hypothesis space.
The large majority of participants behaved in line with our scholar model, choosing
interventions likely to reduce their overall uncertainty about the true causal structure,
rather than to increase their expected utility or probability of being correct. We found
no evidence that people were able to plan ahead when choosing interventions. We also
formulated bounded models allowing for forgetting and conservatism. These reveal that
people exhibit recency when integrating evidence, but suggest that they may mitigate in
part by conservative updating, preferring causal structures consistent or similar to their
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previously stated beliefs. Finally, we identified simple endorsement and disambiguation
as candidate heuristics for active causal learning.
Chapter 4
Children’s active causal learning
“Play is the answer to how anything new comes about.”
— JEAN PIAGET
At the start of this thesis, I proposed that active causal learning is at the heart of
cognitive development, implying that the rich causal theories we have as adults have their
origins in discoveries we make through interventions as children. On this perspective,
children must be able to intervene effectively and to interpret the causal implications
of their actions. The modelling in Chapter 3 suggested that coming from a position of
high uncertainty, it is valuable to perform simple interventions that perturb the world
and make things happen, while more precisely targeted controlled interventions became
more important as one narrows in on the true connections. Thus, we might expect
a similar trajectory over development, with younger children focused more on making
things happen, and older children gradually becoming more focused hypothesis testers.
This chapter explores the development of intervention skills and structure judgments in
five- to eight-year-olds, asking how choices and learning change and develop with age.
While there is a large developmental literature on self-directed learning, scientific and
casual thinking, much of it is not grounded in the rational analysis nor tied to the CBN
framework. Thus, this chapter begins by reviewing some of this developmental literature,
linking it to my broader project. It then reports on an experiment in which five- to
eight-year-olds learn through interventions in a simplified version of the adult tasks in
Chapter 3, modelling intervention choices and structure judgments. Accordingly, this
chapter represents the first formal model of children’s intervention selection in learning
structure relating multiple variables.
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Developmental studies of causal learning (e.g. Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982;
Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 2001; Shultz, 1982) have typically focused on de-
termining the conditions under which children judge an event as causally efficacious.
However, in learning about the world, what is at issue is often not just whether two
specific variables are related, but the structure of the causal relations between a broader
set of variables.
A number of studies have tasked adults with inferring the relations between sets of
variables within the CBN framework (Fernbach & Sloman, 2009; Kushnir et al., 2010;
Lagnado & Sloman, 2004, 2006; Sobel & Kushnir, 2006; Steyvers et al., 2003) with a
smaller number having looked at intervention selection and learning from interventions
(e.g. Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015; Lagnado & Sloman, 2004, 2006; Sobel
& Kushnir, 2006; Steyvers et al., 2003). The CBN approach has also been adopted by
developmental psychologists interested in explaining children’s learning about causation
(Gopnik, 2012; Gopnik et al., 2004). The majority of studies in this tradition have
involved children learning whether an object possesses a particular causal power, usually
on the basis of observing the experimenter’s actions, such as whether an object makes
a box light up and play a tune (e.g. Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Schulz, Kushnir, & Gopnik,
2007; Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004). Relatively few studies have used tasks in
which children themselves decide which interventions to carry out in order to discover
the causal structure of a system (e.g., whether three variables are related in a Chain
or a Fork structure). Such studies are particularly important because they can be
used to assess young children’s effectiveness in generating and testing hypotheses about
the causal relations between sets of variables. Moreover, a key advantage of the CBN
approach over other accounts of causal learning is that it captures this more complex
type of learning, distinguishing between different causal paths as well as identifying
variables’ ultimate effects.
One study that did examine children’s ability to learn causal structure through interven-
tion is Schulz, Gopnik, and Glymour (2007, Exp 3), in which 4-to-5-year-olds intervened
on a causal system involving a box with two gears. Children had to decide whether
each gear moved by itself or was caused by the other. Children could remove each gear
in turn from the box to test whether the other gear worked on its own when the box
was switched on. They gave their answers about the relations between the gears by
selecting from a set of anthropomorphised pictures of the gears depicting their possible
relationships. Performance on this task was mixed. Children did not all reliably gen-
erate the right interventions to distinguish between the different possible relations that
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might hold between the gears. Even those who did make appropriate interventions were
not necessarily successful at identifying instances in which one of the gears caused the
other one to move.
This study provides limited support for the claim that children can generate informative
interventions and use the resultant information to distinguish between different causal
structures. Not only was performance relatively weak, but children were only required
to make judgments about the dependencies between pairs of variables, rather than to
distinguish between multi-variable causal structures. Children gave their responses by
pointing to pictures of the two gears that showed whether they turned themselves or
one turned the other. There was a third variable that was important in the system (a
switch) but children did not need to represent how its relation to the gears varied for the
different causal systems and it did not feature in the pictures depicting causal relations
between the gears. Thus, this study does not allow us to draw firm conclusions about
whether children can use interventions to distinguish between, for example, Fork and
Chain structures.
However, the findings of some other studies suggest that we should expect even very
young children to be good at choosing appropriate interventions and using them to learn
about causal systems (Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, & Schulz, 2012; Cook, Goodman, &
Schulz, 2011; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007). Indeed, Schulz (2012) argues that the ability to
select appropriate interventions and use the evidence generated from such interventions
may be developmentally basic. In various studies, she has shown that young children
will appropriately explore a causal scenario when given ambiguous information (Cook
et al., 2011; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007). In these scenarios, children’s behaviour did
suggest that they were trying to establish whether an object possessed a certain causal
property. However, again children did not have to make interventions to disambiguate
the structure of the relations between different variables, and then use this information
to decide, for example, whether a system was a Fork or Chain.
A further study by Sobel and Sommerville (2010) tried to address this specific issue.
Children viewed a box with four coloured lights, A,B,C, and D, and were told that
some of the lights could make other lights turn on. The box was configured so that the
relations between the lights took the form of either a Fork (B ← A → C,D) or Chain
(A→ B → C,D) structure. Children could interact freely with the box by switching on
lights and observing their effects. They were then asked a series of questions about the
relations between pairs of lights. Sobel and Sommerville found that children performed
above chance on these questions, which could be interpreted as indicating they were able
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to use the information generated from their interventions to decide on the structure of
the causal relations. There are two difficulties, however, with this interpretation. First,
before children answered the questions, the experimenter pressed each of the buttons in
turn and narrated what it did; arguably, this provided children with the answers to the
test questions (indeed, children performed above chance, although less accurately, when
just given this narration). Second, it was not clear that to answer correctly children
needed to have an integrated representation of how the three variables in the system
were related to each other, rather than just knowledge of pairwise relations. Indeed,
Sobel and Sommerville do not analyse the answers that children give to the question of
whether A makes C go in the case of the Chain, arguing that answers to this question
are hard to interpret. However, by questioning children only about the other pairwise
relations between A and B and B and C it is impossible to know whether children
actually understood the nature of the overall causal structure.
The general point here is that we can distinguish between learning structurally local
pairwise links and integrating such links to form a representation of causal structure.
This distinction is important, because as we have seen, the complexity of causal learning
scales rapidly as the number of variables increases. Learning localized pairwise relations
is much easier than learning global structure (Fernbach & Sloman, 2009). However, if
the other variables are ignored, this can lead to systematic mistakes about the global
model. For example, when one connection “explains away” the dependence between two
others, a local learning strategy, like the Simple endorser seen in the previous chapter, or
Fernbach and Sloman’s (2009) local computations approach, still attribute a connection
between these two variables while a global strategy does not. A number of the studies of
children’s causal learning can be interpreted as studying children’s learning of pairwise
relations rather than global causal structure (Schulz, Goodman, Tenenbaum, & Jenkins,
2008; Sobel & Sommerville, 2009), meaning that we still have limited evidence about
children’s ability to learn causal structure.
Uncertainty as to whether children are adept at appropriately generating interventions
and using them to learn causal structure comes from two sources. First, research on
children’s scientific learning has for many years suggested that younger children may
have great difficulty generating appropriately informative interventions and learning the
nature of relations between variables from the evidence generated by these interventions
(e.g. Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Klahr, Fay, & Dunbar, 1993; Kuhn, 1989; Schauble, 1996;
Zimmerman, 2000). On the face of it, this body of findings seems at odds with recent
findings from the CBN tradition. One possible explanation of the differing findings lies
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in the role of the established causal theories (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009), particularly
in scientific learning studies (Tenenbaum et al., 2011). For example, pre-existing, and
sometimes erroneous, beliefs can hamper children’s ability to generate appropriate in-
terventions and interpret statistical data (e.g. Amsel & Brock, 1996; Kuhn et al., 1988).
Indeed, Schulz suggests that this type of factor, along with task complexity, may mask
children’s basic learning skills (Bonawitz et al., 2012; Cook et al., 2011), which may be
better demonstrated in the tasks used in the CBN tradition in which domain-specific
knowledge is of limited importance and the statistical evidence is simple.
4.1 Black box paradigm
However, the findings of a previous study by McCormack, Frosch, Patrick, and Lagnado
(2015) provide a second reason for being unsure about children’s ability to learn from
interventions on a causal system. This study, like most of those in the CBN tradition,
involved children learning about a novel mechanical system. The only relevant data
for causal structure inference were statistical information provided through observing
the experimenters’ interventions on the system, and the temporal patterns of event
occurrence. Children had to learn the causal structure of the system that was hidden
inside a black box which had three separate shapes protruding from its top surface, that
rotated (components corresponding to variables X1, X2, and X3, see Figure 4.1). Across
two experiments, children watched while an experimenter intervened on components in
the system. In one experiment, the experimenter carried out interventions in which she
disabled one of the shapes by preventing it from moving before moving each of the other
shapes in turn. Children did not find it straightforward to use the patterns of evidence
provided by these interventions to discriminate between causal structures, even when the
system operated deterministically. Six-to-seven-year-olds were able to use the evidence
from the more complex interventions to accurately infer when the system was one of the
Chains. However, children younger than this could not do so, and even 7-to-8-year-olds
were unable to use information from these interventions to accurately judge when the
system was a Fork. McCormack et al. argue that children’s difficulties may stem from
integrating pieces of evidence provided across a number of separate observations of the
causal system.
At first sight, McCormack et al.’s findings seem to be more consistent with the con-
clusions stemming from research on children’s scientific learning that emphasized its
limitations. However, this study did not provide children with an optimal opportunity




Figure 4.1: Schematic of the black box paradigm used for developmental experiment.
to demonstrate their abilities. Children watched while the experimenter made a series
of interventions, rather than making the interventions themselves. Sobel and Kushnir
(2006) argued that participants find it easier to learn causal structure when they decide
what interventions to conduct, largely because this provides an opportunity for them
to engage in more active hypothesis-testing (although see Lagnado & Sloman, 2004).
A number of proposals in the literature (e.g. Markant & Gureckis, 2014; Markant et
al., 2015) suggest an algorithmic basis for this effect — learners’ choices are relevant to
the hypotheses they are considering at the time of testing. If someone else chooses the
interventions, there is no guarantee that they will be pertinent to what the participant is
wondering about at the time. Moreover, children might be particularly likely to benefit
from being allowed to explore how a system operates, in that hands-on interventions
may ensure they stay engaged with the task.
In this study, we used a task very similar to that of McCormack et al. (2015), in which
children had to decide whether a three-element causal system was a Fork (X2 ← X1 →
X3), a 1-2-3 Chain (X1 → X2 → X3) or a 1-3-2 Chain (X1 → X3 → X2). Children
intervened themselves in order to learn the box’s hidden structure. Shapes on top of a
box rotated either when children moved them by hand or they could be moved by rotating
another shape that was causally connected to them (e.g., for the 1-2-3 Chain, spinning
X1 initiated the rotation of both X2 and X3, and spinning X2 rotated X3; all the shapes
always moved simultaneously in the tasks to minimize temporal cues). Children had to
select and carry out a series of interventions; these could be simple interventions in which
they made one of the three shapes spin, or they could be more complex interventions
in which children prevented one of the three shapes from moving by disabling it, and
then spun one of the other two shapes. Note that we were not attempting to faithfully
recreate a free-play situation because it was important for our analyses that we were
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able to exhaustively categorize children’s actions on the system. Although they were
completely free to choose their interventions, the only actions children could carry out
were interventions on the system. Furthermore, it was made clear to children that their
job was to learn the causal structure of the system, and that they could not make an
unlimited number of interventions. This allowed us to look in our modelling work at the
efficiency with which children produced informative interventions.
We examined two aspects of performance: the nature of the interventions that children
selected and their causal structure choices. Not all interventions provided useful infor-
mation to discriminate between the three possible causal structures, which allowed us
to examine whether the tendency to choose informative interventions changes with age.
We also examined whether there was any relation between the quality of children’s inter-
ventions and the likelihood that children chose the correct causal structure at test. It is
possible to try to examine these issues without formal modelling (see Sobel & Kushnir,
2006), by, for example, simply distinguishing between two broad classes of informative
and non-informative interventions. However, we chose to model children’s learning in a
Bayesian framework. Doing so has two key advantages: First, it allows us to properly
assess whether there are developmental changes in the extent to which children resemble
an idealized Bayesian learner. This is important because, within the currently domi-
nant CBN tradition, young children’s learning is often characterized as approximating
such an ideal, particularly with regard to causal learning from statistical information
(e.g. Gopnik, 2012; Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). Formal modelling allows us to assess the
extent to which this characterization is appropriate by assessing children’s performance
against the standards set by the Bayesian tradition itself. Second, although in this
study we can (and do) classify interventions broadly as informative or non-informative,
the learning task itself is sequential. This means that how informative an intervention
is depends on what children have already observed, and what they can remember about
such observations. However, figuring out the informativeness of each intervention that a
participant makes on a trial-by-trial basis would be a formidable task without a formal
model. Indeed, without such a model it is hard to see how one would operationalise
the notion of informativeness under such circumstances. Our Bayesian model allowed
us to capture the sequential nature of the learning task, by assuming that the most
informative interventions were those that maximally reduced uncertainty about which
was the correct hypothesis at any particular point in the learning sequence, given some
level of forgetting.
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4.2 Experiment 3: Children’s interventional learning
4.2.1 Method
Participants
Seventy-seven children participated, from three different school years: 21 5-to-6-year-olds
(M = 72 months, Range = 64-80 months), 31 6-to-7-year-olds (M = 86 months, Range
= 80-93 months) and 25 7-to-8-year-olds (M = 98 months, Range = 93-103 months).
Children were tested individually in their schools.
Materials
The study used a wooden box, 41 cm (long) x 32 cm (wide) x 20 cm (high), which had
an on/off switch at the front. There were three different coloured lids for the box. Two
of these had three coloured/patterned shapes (e.g., circle, rectangle, star) inserted on
its surface that rotated independently on the horizontal plane; a separate lid was used
in pretraining and had only two shapes (see Figure 4.2).
The colour and shapes of the components were varied across participants and causal
structures. On each of the two lids used in testing, the three shapes formed an equilateral
triangle of sides 24 cm. Each shape had a small hole that aligned with a hole in the
lid of the box. There was a miniature red-and-white “Stop” sign affixed to a metal rod
that could be inserted through the hole on any shape into the corresponding hole in
the box, preventing it from moving. Each of the shapes could be rotated by hand; the
rotation of the other shapes was controlled by a laptop hidden inside the apparatus that
participants were unaware of. A set of photographs was used during the learning phase
that participants used to indicate which intervention they were going to make; these
photographs depicted each shape on the box and in addition there were photographs
of each of the shapes alongside the stop sign. Photographs of the whole box with
its shapes depicting three possible causal structures were used at test for children to
indicate their judgment of the causal structure: one Fork and two Chains (i.e. depicting
X2 ← X1 → X3, X1 → X2 → X3, or X1 → X3 → X2). The photographs for use at
test were overlaid with pictures of hands to indicate causal links (following Frosch et al.,
2012).
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Figure 4.2: a) The box lid used in training; b) The two box lids used during testing
(counterbalanced between common-cause and Chain trials). Procedure: c) i. Partici-
pants indicate (optionally) which shape to block with the stop sign and which shape
to spin; ii. Perform the action(s) they chose; iii. Observe which shapes spin as a result
of their test; iv. After 12 ( or 18) tests, they point to the card showing how they think
the machine works. Green arrows and highlighting show participants’ actions on an
example trial.
Procedure
Children completed two test trials, one Fork and one Chain (order counterbalanced).
There was a pretraining phase that ensured children knew what their task was and how
to give their answer at test. The pretraining procedure used a lid on the box that had
only two coloured shapes inserted on its surface; its purpose was to demonstrate that
some shapes caused others to move but that the stop sign could be used to prevent a
shape from moving. Children were initially asked to name the colours of the shapes to
ensure that they would know to which shapes the experimenter was referring, and the
experimenter drew children’s attention to the on/off switch at the front, set at the “off”
position. She then switched the box on and manually rotated one of the two shapes
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(X1). This had no effect on the other shape (X2), which remained stationary, and the
experimenter pointed this out to children. She then rotated the other shape (X2), which
resulted in the first shape (X1) simultaneously rotating. She explained to children that
“Some shapes are made to move by others”. The experimenter then switched the box
off and introduced children to the stop sign, which she inserted into X1 to stop it from
moving, saying “See this stop sign, it can be used to stop a shape from moving, see the
[colour X1] one cannot move now”. She then switched the box on again and rotated X2,
which this time had no impact on the movement of X1 because it was prevented from
moving by the stop sign. Following this, the lid was removed from the box, and replaced
by a different coloured lid with three different shapes for the first test trial.
Children were asked to name the colours of the three shapes and were told that their
job was to figure out how the box worked. They were introduced to the three test
pictures depicting the three different causal structures with the experimenter saying:
“In a moment I will ask you to figure out how the box works, but first I want to
show you some pictures of the box which show different ways in which the box may be
working. Only one of them is right and you’ve got to work out which is the right one.
It won’t change half way through, and it is definitely only one of the pictures. You’ll
have to use your detective skills to work out which picture shows what the box does.”
The experimenter described each of the three pictures (e.g., “In this picture, the red
one makes the blue one go, and the blue one makes the white one go, and the hands
show that”). Following these three descriptions, children were then asked a set of three
comprehension questions. For each Chain picture, the experimenter asked “Can you
show me the picture where the [colour X1] one makes the [colour X2/3] one go and the
[colour X2/3] one makes the [colour X3/2] one go?”, and for the Fork picture “Can you
show me the picture where the [colour X1] one makes both the [colour X2] one and the
[colour X3] one go?). The majority of children answered these questions correctly first
time, but if they did not answer all three questions correctly, the experimenter repeated
the initial descriptions and asked the comprehension questions again. This procedure
was repeated again if necessary.
Following this pre-training, the experimenter said: “I am going to switch the box on now
and I want you to figure out how the box works.” Children were told that they could
do one of two things (order counterbalanced): either “You can move a shape to see if it
makes other shapes move” or “You can stop a shape from moving by putting the stop
sign in and then see what happens when you move another shape”. It was explained
to children that, before they carried out each intervention, they had to point to a card
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indicating what they intended to do. The experimenter said: “Before you try anything
on the box I want you to point to one of these cards. This card means you want to spin
the [colour] one, and you point to this card if you want to stop the [colour] one. See we
also have the cards for spinning and stopping the [colour and colour] ones. So each time
you want to do something, you point to one of these cards first.” Children were told that
they had 12 goes “to start with” and that each time they moved a shape counted as one
go. It was made clear that using the stop sign did not count as a go by itself; children
had to then in addition move one of the other shapes. The procedure with cards was
used to ensure children interacted with the box in a controlled way and to make clear
that they could not make an unlimited number of interventions. It also ensured that all
children made a fixed minimum number of interactions before attempting to answer the
test question. Children were told that they did not need to keep track of the number of
goes that they had with the box, as the experimenter would count this for them.
Before children began, the experimenter said “Remember, you’ve got to figure out which
picture shows how this box really works.” She then demonstrated what happened when
shape X1 was moved, which was that the other two shapes also moved simultaneously,
and pointed out that they didn’t know yet “which ones make other ones go”. Partici-
pants were subsequently allowed to make interventions on the box by first selecting the
appropriate card and then making the intervention. So, for example, if they wanted to
see what happened when X3 was moved if X2 was disabled, they had to point to the
card depicting X2 with the stop sign in it, and then to the card depicting X3. They
then carried out their intervention.
After the participants had completed 12 interventions, the experimenter said “You have
had your 12 goes now — do you want to choose which picture you think shows what the
box did, or do you want to have another 6 goes?” The majority of participants opted to
choose after 12 interventions. Children completed a short filler task (a paper-and-pencil
maze) in between the Fork/Chain trials. It was made clear that the second box might
work in the same way as the first box or it might work in a different way. The second
box always had a lid of a different colour and different shapes.
4.2.2 Results
In both trials, 69/77 participants stopped after 12 interventions. The remaining 8 opted
for an additional six interventions in one or other trial. Of these, 4 participants opted
for the additional six interventions on both trial types. Initial data analyses examined






























Figure 4.3: Percentage of responses for each causal structure as a function of age
group and trial type. Correct responses to the Chain are denoted as 123-Chain
participants’ responses for each of the two trial types. Figure 4.3 shows the percent-
age of participants who chose each response type for each trial type. The majority of
participants in each group, except for the youngest group, chose the correct answer for
the Chain trial. The majority of participants in all groups chose the Fork response
for the Fork trial. χ2 tests showed that each group of participants chose the correct
response more often than chance, all ps < .01, except for the 5-to-6-year-olds, who did
not select the Chain more often than chance. This group tended to select the Fork
response for both structures. Performance on the Chain structure was associated with
age, χ2(2) = 6.91, p < .05, with the number of correct responses improving with age.
Performance on the Fork structure was marginally significantly associated with age,
χ2(2) = 5.66, p = .056, although in this case the 6-to-7-year-olds gave more correct
responses than each of the other groups.
Analysis of interventions
Subsequent analyses examined the nature of participants’ interventions on the system.
We initially discriminated between whether an intervention was informative or not,
given the three possible causal structures. There were three interventions that were
never informative: Do[X1 = 1],Do[X2 = 1, X3 = 0], and Do[X2 = 0, X3 = 1]. Potentially
informative interventions were Do[X1 = 1, X2 = 0], Do[X1 = 1, X3 = 0], Do[X2 = 1],
Do[X3 = 1], Do[X1 = 0, X2 = 1] and Do[X1 = 0, X3 = 1]. We also classified interventions
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as simple or complex: Do[X1 = 1], Do[X2 = 1] and Do[X3 = 1] were classified as simple
and those involving initially disabling one of the components before moving another
component as complex. Table 1 shows the percentage of times that participants in each
age group chose each of these interventions. The most popular intervention tended to
be to be Do[X1 = 1], which, although it was uninformative, did make all of the three
shapes spin. Propensity to select a complex intervention increased significantly with age
F (2, 74) = 7.22, p < .002, η2 = 0.16, with 7-to-8-year-olds the most likely to pick the
complex interventions (65% of the time, compared to 46% for 5-to-6-year-olds and 45%
for 6-to-7-year-olds).
Table 4.1: Percentage of Time Participants Chose Each Intervention
Informative Uninformative
X2 =1 X1 =0 X3 =1 X1 =0 X1 =1 X1 =1 X1 =1 X2 =0 X2 =1
X2 =1 X3 =1 X3 =0 X2 =0 X3 =1 X3 =0
5-6 years 17.9 9.5 12.9 5.1 9.6 8.3 23.3 8.2 5.4
6-7 years 17.5 9.2 14.2 8.2 8.2 9 21.8 6.4 5.6
7-8 years 10.8 11.3 9.4 11.1 14.8 13.5 14.2 6.9 8
Note: Collapsed across common cause and causal chain trials.
We examined whether participants chose informative interventions more often than
chance by conducting a one-sample t-test with a test value of 0.67, given that 23 of
the 9 possible interventions were informative. Only the 7-to-8-year-olds were signifi-
cantly more likely than chance to select informative interventions, t(24) = 2.83, p < .01,
both ps > .10 for the younger groups. A logistic regression showed that the proportion
of informative interventions significantly predicted the probability of a participant get-
ting the Chain trial correct z = 2.73, p < .01 (see Table 4.2), but this was not the case
for the Fork trial z = −0.62, p > .5. One potential explanation for the latter finding is
that the children were overall more likely to select the Fork, doing so 56% of the time.
Thus, some of the correct responses on the Fork test trial are likely to have been made
by the weaker participants purely in virtue of their favouring the Fork structure.
4.2.3 Modelling Interventions
So far, we have looked at proportion of informative intervention choices without consid-
ering the sequential nature of the task or whether and how efficiently children produced
a set of informative interventions sufficient to discriminate between causal structures.
A child who did not produce such a set but repeatedly produced a single informative
intervention would score 100% on this measure. Moreover, how useful an intervention is
128 Chapter 4. Children’s active causal learning
depends on what the learner already knows (in this case what they have already learned
from their previous interventions). For example, Do[X1 = 1, X2 = 0] and Do[X3 = 1] are
both informative interventions in this task provided you do not know anything yet. But
suppose you have already performed Do[X1 =1, X3 =0] and observed that this made X2
spin. This evidence effectively rules out the 1-3-2 Chain leaving only the 1-2-3 Chain
and the Fork as possibilities. Now, on subsequent trials, performing X3 =1, or repeating
Do[X1 =1, X3 =0] will not tell you anything new, as both of these interventions simply
distinguish the 1-3-2 Chain from the other two. To capture how efficiently children’s
intervention choices allow them to home in on the true structure we can analyse the
interventions sequentially by looking at how effectively these interventions reduce un-
certainty, assuming initially children are perfectly able to remember past outcomes and
integrate new information.
Table 4.2: Experiment 3: Regression analyses
Dependent Parameter Estimate SE Odds ratio Z P (> z)
Pcorrect(Chain) Intercept -4.77 1.8 -2.65 .008**
% Informative 7.37 2.7 1587 2.73 .006**
Pcorrect(Fork) Intercept 1.87 1.48 1.27 .21
% Informative -1.32 2.15 0.267 -0.62 .54
Pcorrect(Chain) Intercept -0.81 0.75 -1.09 .278
Efficiency 1.22 0.92 3.39 1.32 0.186
Pcorrect(Fork) Intercept 3.39 0.99 3.39 < .001***
Efficiency -3.31 1.27 0.037 -2.62 0.009**
Pcorrect(Chain) Intercept -4.43 1.74 2.53 .012*
Quality 7.98 3.06 2921 2.61 .009**
Pcorrect(Fork) Intercept 1.46 1.4 1.04 .3
Quality -0.78 2.24 0.46 -0.35 .73
Note: * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001. Three separate analyses of predictors of performance on the
causal chain and common cause trials: Percentage Informative Interventions, Efficiency, and
Intervention Quality.
To do this, we defined a participant’s subjective uncertainty about the true structure at
a given time point as the information entropy H(M) (Shannon, 1951) of their posterior
distribution P (M) over the three possible structures, given the data they had seen so
far (Equation 3.9). Every time the child observed new evidence dt associated with their
chosen intervention ct, this distribution was updated using Bayes rule and the likelihoods
P (dt|M ; ct) for observing that outcome out of the possible outcomes dt ∈ Dc for each
structure m ∈M giving posterior probabilities P t(M |dt; ct) (see Equation 3.3). Because
the box worked in a deterministic way, the likelihoods were always 0 (if the outcome
was impossible given that structure and intervention) or 1 (if that outcome was to be
expected given that structure and intervention). If an outcome had zero likelihood
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under one structure, then that structure’s posterior probability would go to zero once
a participant saw that outcome. By doing this we were able to compute the expected
information gain Eigt(c|m) for each intervention chosen by participants (see Equation
3.10), and rescale this by the maximum achievable expected increase in information over
the different interventions at that time point. This gave a measure of the overall efficiency






Because of the deterministic nature of the task, in fact all of the children generated
enough information with their interventions for their uncertainty to go to zero before
the end of the trial so intervention efficiency was simply calculated for the interventions
up until the point that their posterior uncertainty reached zero. Figure 4.4 shows an
example of how the model worked using a real set of interventions; it also depicts how
these interventions were categorized. We established chance level interventional effi-
ciency by simulating the task 1000 times with randomly selected interventions, finding
average chance efficiency levels of .48 for the Chain structure and .43 for the Fork.1
For all age groups, for both structures, children’s interventions were significantly much
more efficient than the chance level (mean efficiencies for Chain and Fork respectively: 5-
to-6-year-olds = 0.71 and 0.66, 6-to-7-year-olds = 0.79 and 0.63, 7- to-8-year-olds = 0.82
and 0.80; all ts > 6, ps < .001). Children’s efficiency for the Fork changed significantly
with age, F (2, 74) = 4.47, p =< .02, η2 = 0.11, but there was no effect of age on efficiency
on the Chain trials, F (2, 74) = 1.14, p = 0.32, η2 = 0.03. Unlike proportion informative
interventions, efficiency did not predict accuracy on the Chain (see Table 4.2), and was
in fact negatively related to accuracy on the Fork (z = −2.62, p < .01).
While proportion informative interventions did not take into account the sequential
nature of the task, arguably interventional efficiency has the opposite shortcoming. By
assuming, implausibly, that children have a perfect memory for the outcomes of their
previous interventions and perfect ability to make inferences from this information, it
ignores what they do on subsequent interventions once they have, in principle, enough
1This corresponds to getting enough information to identify the true structure after an average of 3
random interventions when the true structure is a chain and 4.5 random tests when the true structure
is the common cause. The chain is somewhat quicker to be identifiable by chance because sometimes it
can be identified from a single intervention (e.g. Do[X2 = 1] allows identification of the 1-2-3 Chain),
while the common cause always requires a minimum of two interventions.






















































































F   123 132 F   123 132
Prior
Figure 4.4: Interventions selected by a 6- to 7-year-old, in the Fork trial. From left
to right, columns show: 1. Test order. 2. Selected intervention. 3. Which, if any,
shapes spun as a result. 4. Whether the intervention was generally informative. 5. A
learner’s prior given perfect memory and integration of previous tests (Bars are (F)ork,
(123) Chain and (132) Chain). 6. The corresponding efficiency of the intervention in
allowing identification of the Fork. 7. A learner’s prior given 25% forgetting. 8. The
corresponding quality of each intervention.
information to potentially identify the correct structure. An inspection of the modelled
data found that children obtained sufficient information for certainty after an average
of only 2.75 interventions; this means that our measure of efficiency ignores a large
proportion of the data and makes no allowances for noise, forgetting, or uncertainty
in learning. A more balanced way to assess the quality of participants’ interventions
is achieved by adding some noise, encapsulating the idea that learning is likely to be
somewhat leaky or error prone.
We augmented our Bayesian learning model so that, after each test, some proportion of
what was learned previously was “forgotten”.2 This was achieved by mixing a uniform
2There are numerous ways to model forgetting (e.g. Wixted, 2004) but a reasonable high-level ap-
proach is to assume children forget random aspects of their priors, leading to a net “flattening” of
their subjective priors going into each new intervention. We remain agnostic about whether this pa-
rameter captures cognitive forgetting, or more generalized sources of error and uncertainty in children’s
integration of information.
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distribution in with the posteriors, with the proportion determined by a forgetting rate
γ ∈ [0, 1]
P t(M |c,d) ∝ P (dt|ct,M)
[




(similar to Equation 3.11), and using this as the prior for next intervention. This pro-
cedure was carried out for each of the learner’s 12 (or 18) tests. This means that
previously-ruled-out alternatives gradually regained some probability mass, while more
likely options became a little less favoured. The quality of each intervention was then
calculated based on the extent that it reduced uncertainty across these distributions,
compared to an intervention that would have maximally reduced uncertainty. This
method captures the idea that continually repeating a particular intervention is less use-
ful than selecting a complementary mixture of different interventions while also allowing
that real world learners are likely to forget, ignore, or make mistakes about the evidence
they have seen previously, meaning that revisiting previous interventions is not useless.
The exact level of “forgetting” in the model turned out not to be particularly important.
We found qualitatively the same results setting it to 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 90%
although the results were clearer for the lower levels of forgetting. Here we report results
assuming 25% “forgetting” after each test. We established chance levels of intervention
quality, again through simulation over 1000 trials. The 5-to-6-year-olds’ intervention
quality was not significantly above chance on either the Chain or Fork, 6-to-7-year-olds
were above chance on the Chain, t(30) = 2.88, p < 0.01, and marginal on the Fork t(30) =
1.73, p = 0.09, while the 7- to-8-year olds’ intervention quality was above chance for
both trials (Chain: t(24) = 2.46, p < 0.02, Fork: t(24) = 4.87, p < .001). Averaged over
trial types, we found that intervention quality improved with age, F (2, 74) = 4.03, p <
.03, η2 = .10, with 7-to-8-year-olds significantly more efficient that 5-6-year-olds, p < .01,
but no significant difference between 5-to-6-year-olds and 6-to-7-year-olds. Breaking this
into responses for the two structures, regardless of forgetting rate, intervention quality
was a significant predictor for correct identification of the Chain structure, z = 2.61, p <
.01, but not for the Fork structure (see Table 4.2).
4.2.4 Discussion
Our findings provide important information about developmental changes in children’s
ability to learn causal structure through intervention. Children’s ability to learn a
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Chain structure improved with age, with the youngest children unable to identify this
structure above chance. However, we need to consider why the 5-to-6-year-olds identified
the Fork structure as accurately as the 7-to-8-year-olds. Our view is that the good
performance on this second trial type is due to a tendency even amongst the youngest
children to assume that, when events happen simultaneously, the underlying structure
is a Fork. Previous studies have found that both children and adults make use of this
simple temporal heuristic when they observe a three-variable system with this sort of
temporal schedule (Burns & McCormack, 2009; Fernbach & Sloman, 2009; Lagnado &
Sloman, 2006). Indeed, McCormack et al. (2015) demonstrated that children will use this
type of temporal heuristic even when faced with contradictory statistical information
provided either through observing the operation of a probabilistic causal system or
through observing the effects of interventions on a deterministic system. Thus, the good
performance of the younger children on the Fork structure is likely to reflect use of this
temporal heuristic rather than use of statistical information derived from interventions
on the system. This would also straightforwardly explain the lack of a relation between
intervention quality and performance on the Fork structure.
The analyses of children’s intervention choices provide insights into why performance
improved developmentally on the Chain trial. Interventions could be initially classified
as informative or non-informative, given the three possible causal structures. Over all
trials, unlike the oldest group, younger groups of children did not choose informative
interventions more often than chance. It proved fruitful, though, to further examine
intervention choices and how these related to performance by modelling intervention
selection. The initial analysis of how efficient participants were at producing a set
of interventions that could, in principle, discriminate between the different hypotheses
showed that all groups of children produced such a set more quickly than would be
expected if they were simply choosing between interventions at random. This means that
even the youngest children had the evidence available to them to make the appropriate
causal inferences. However, intervention efficiency was not a predictor of performance.
This demonstrates that selecting interventions that are, in fact, disambiguating, is not
sufficient for good performance. Children may forget or fail to make use of what they
have observed, and the subsequent interventions they make may also influence their
judgments.
Our modelling work suggested this was indeed the case, because our measure of the
quality of children’s interventions that took into account the complete sequence of inter-
ventions predicted performance on the Chain structure, under the assumption that there
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was some degree of forgetting. Moreover, unlike efficiency, intervention quality improved
with age, with older children being more likely to consistently choose interventions that
would help disambiguate the causal structures, given what they had already observed.
These results indicate that with development, children become more discerning in their
choice of interventions, and this has an impact on their causal structure learning.
How do our findings fit with what is already known about developmental changes in
children’s use of interventions to learn about causal systems? In designing our study, we
sought to ensure that domain-specific knowledge was not relevant for task performance.
However, this did not rule out children exploiting a type of pre-existing, albeit domain-
general, heuristic about the nature of the causal system, namely that when multiple
events occur immediately following an intervention the underlying structure is likely to
be a Fork (McCormack et al., 2015). When the evidence generated from interventions
was consistent with this assumption (i.e. in the Fork trial), even young children per-
formed well. However, younger children had difficulty discarding this assumption on the
basis of the contradictory evidence provided by their interventions. This is consistent
with evidence from scientific learning literature that indicates that children have diffi-
culty discarding a pre-existing hypothesis and may routinely ignore statistical evidence
that fails to support such a hypothesis (Amsel & Brock, 1996; Kuhn et al., 1988).
Furthermore, an inspection of developmental changes in the pattern of children’s in-
tervention choices (Table 4.1) yields some further interesting additional parallels with
findings from the scientific learning literature. Our task is very different to those used in
research on children’s scientific learning: it is simpler and the children that we tested are
younger than those typically used in such studies (although see Koerber, Sodian, Thoer-
mer, & Nett, 2005; Piekny & Maehler, 2013). Nevertheless, some of our findings confirm
broad developmental patterns that are well-established in that research. Younger chil-
dren tended to prefer making the Do[X1 = 1] intervention, and did so repeatedly. This
intervention is the most causally effective (it makes all the events happen), but does not
discriminate between the three available hypotheses. However, it reinforces any existing
hypothesis that the causal structure is a Fork by providing the temporal pattern of all
events happening simultaneously. Young children’s preference for this intervention has
parallels with demonstrations in the scientific learning studies that show that children
attend most to the variable already believed to be causal, focus more on producing an
effect than on generating disambiguating evidence, and produce evidence that is consis-
tent with their existing hypothesis rather than seeking to disconfirm it (Klahr & Dunbar,
1988; Klahr et al., 1993; Kuhn, 1989; Schauble, 1990, 1996).
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Although younger children’s patterns of interventions led to poorer performance, it is
interesting to note that recent formal analyses have demonstrated that whether their
type of approach should be viewed as inefficient depends on the learning context. First,
the tendency to intervene on variables already believed to be causal in order to confirm an
existing hypothesis is not necessarily always the wrong strategy. This type of strategy
has been shown to be rational under the assumption that causal connections in the
world are sparse (Navarro & Perfors, 2011), meaning that competing causal hypotheses
do not generally share the same effect variables. In such circumstances “positive tests”,
operationalised as intervening on the variable thought to be the root cause (Coenen et
al., 2015) are highly diagnostic. Hence, younger children’s pattern of interventions could
be interpreted as due to a tendency to act in ways that have proved an effective general-
purpose strategy for learning causal relationships in the past, despite being inappropriate
in the current learning context.
Second, we also found that younger children were less likely than older children to pro-
duce the more complex interventions that involved disabling one of the components in
the system. This type of intervention can be particularly informative because it can
be used to exclude a variable as being necessary for production of an effect. However,
separate Bayesian modelling work with adults has demonstrated that producing sim-
ple rather than complex interventions is not always an inefficient strategy. Bramley,
Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) show that simple interventions tend to be more in-
formative than complex interventions with respect to a broader hypothesis space (e.g.
all possible 3-variable causal models), with more complex interventions becoming more
useful once the space of possibilities narrows to favour a smaller number of hypotheses
(e.g. those that differ by just a single edge). In our task, children had to discriminate
between just three competing hypotheses, so it is one in which complex interventions
are likely to be useful. In summary, the observed developmental changes can be inter-
preted as supporting the idea that while younger children used simple strategies that
may be effective in other contexts, older children were better able to adjust their learning
strategy in a way that was appropriate the task — i.e. to use a “control of variables”
strategy (Chen & Klahr, 1999; Dean Jr & Kuhn, 2007) whereby confounding variables
are experimentally controlled.
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4.3 General Discussion
Experiment 3 examined children’s causal structure learning under circumstances in
which they selected and carried out interventions on a simple three-variable causal sys-
tem. To the best of our knowledge, the analyses reported here of its data constitute
the first attempt to model the quality of children’s interventions when learning causal
structure within a Bayesian framework. Our findings regarding children’s interventional
learning varied depending on whether children were learning a Chain or a Fork structure.
With regard to the former, there were clear developmental improvements not only in
terms of accuracy of structure learning, but in terms of the quality of the interventions
that children produced as assessed by our modelling. The key advantage of the modelling
is that it provided us with a quantitative measure of the quality of children’s interven-
tions, allowing us to examine the informational content of children’s interactions with
the devices. This Bayesian measure of intervention quality predicted performance. Put
simply, the findings suggest that with development, children increasingly resemble an
idealized Bayesian learner, although we note that the best predictor of performance from
our modelling results was a measure of interventional quality that assumed substantial
noise in the Bayesian learning process.
The same pattern of findings did not obtain for the Fork structure, and the most plausi-
ble interpretation of this is that younger children’s inferences in this task were based on
a simple temporal heuristic (e.g. “assume a Forking structure if multiple effects occur
simultaneously”) rather than on use of statistical information provided from interven-
tions. Use of such temporal heuristics is widespread in both children’s and adults’ causal
structure learning (Burns & McCormack, 2009; Fernbach & Sloman, 2009; Lagnado &
Sloman, 2004, 2006; White, 2006b), with McCormack, Bramley, Frosch, Patrick, and
Lagnado (2016) demonstrating that younger children’s causal structure inferences are
highly influenced by the temporal pattern of events. Their findings are consistent with
those from the current study, insofar as those authors also found no developmental
improvements in the likelihood that children would give a Fork judgment under circum-
stances in which all events happened simultaneously. Children’s tendency to recruit
temporal heuristics is likely to be due to the heuristics’ low demands on information
processing in comparison to using statistical information (Fernbach & Sloman, 2009).
For example, in the current study, use of such a heuristic would have been based on the
observation of a single intervention: the temporal pattern of events following Do[X1 =1].
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This intervention was the most common one made by both the youngest groups; we in-
terpreted this as suggesting that these children focus on producing an effect rather than
systematically testing the competing hypotheses, and in doing so are provided with ev-
idence (i.e. the temporal pattern of events) that they take to be consistent with their
existing hypothesis. Younger children were also less likely to disable components in the
system, suggesting that they were less likely to try to exclude any variables. Although
younger children’s interventions on the system had these characteristics, all children pro-
duced a set of interventions that could in principle have allowed them to correctly judge
the causal structure. However, the Bayesian analysis proved useful in establishing that
simply initially producing interventions that could potentially disambiguate the causal
structure was not predictive of good performance. Rather, children’s performance was
related to how informative their interventions were as they moved through the task se-
quentially, with the Bayesian modelling capturing the idea of evolving beliefs guiding a
sequence of intervention choices.
4.4 Conclusions
The findings of this study point to two clear directions for future work in this area. First,
the fact that children become increasingly Bayes-efficient information-seekers in their
causal learning raises the question of what cognitive changes underpin this developmental
shift (see Lucas, Bridgers, et al., 2014, for recent work in this direction). While we did not
attempt to model psychological processing explicitly here, models based on approximate
Bayesian inference that attempt to be more psychologically plausible (Bramley, Dayan,
Griffiths, & Lagnado, 2017; Bramley, Dayan, & Lagnado, 2015; Dasgupta et al., 2016;
Kemp, Tenenbaum, Niyogi, & Griffiths, 2010; Sanborn et al., 2010) may play a role
in addressing this question. Importantly, the developmental improvements found in
Experiment 3 highlight the need for Bayesian models that do not just capture idealized
learning but can accommodate, and potentially explain, developmental changes in the
quality of children’s causal learning. Explaining developmental changes will require
additional research that builds on the current findings but also tries to examine in more
detail the role of learning strategy and process.
Chapter 5
Scaling up
“ [Learners] are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct
their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where
a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, and for
this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using
the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew,
but only by gradual reconstruction.”
— WILLARD V. O. QUINE
Models of human causal learning based on Bayesian networks have tended to focus on
what Marr (1982) called the computational level. This means that they consider the
abstract computational problem being solved and its ideal solution rather than the ac-
tual cognitive processes involved in reaching that solution — Marr’s algorithmic level.
In practice the demands of computing and storing the quantities required for exactly
solving the problem of causal learning are intractable for any non-trivial world and
plausibly-bounded learner. Even a small number of potential relata permit massive
numbers of patterns of causal relationships. Moreover, real learning contexts involve
noisy (unreliable) relationships and the threat of exogenous interference, further com-
pounding the complexity of normative inference. Navigating this space of possibilities
optimally would require maintaining probability distributions across many models and
updating all these probabilities whenever integrating new evidence. This evidence might
in turn be gathered piecemeal over a lifetime of experience. Doing so efficiently would
require choosing maximally informative interventions, a task which poses even greater
computational challenges: consideration and weighting of all possible outcomes, under
all possible models for all possible interventions (Murphy, 2001; Nyberg & Korb, 2006).
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In order to understand better the cognitive processes involved in learning causal rela-
tionships, we present a detailed exploration of how people, with their limited processing
resources, represent and reason about causal structure. We begin by surveying existing
proposals in the literature. We then draw on the literature on algorithms for approxi-
mating probabilistic inference in computer science using these to construct a new model.
We show that our new model captures the behavioural patterns using a scalable and
cognitively plausible algorithm and explains why aggregate behaviour appears noisily
normative in the face of individual heterogeneity.
Many existing experiments on human causal learning involve small numbers of possible
structures, semi-deterministic relationships and limited choices or opportunities to in-
tervene. These constraints limit the computational demands on learners, and thus the
need for heuristics or approximations. Further, in most existing studies, subjects make
causal judgments only at the end of a period of learning, limiting what we can learn
about how their beliefs evolved as they observed more evidence, and how this relates
to intervention choice dynamics. One exception is Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink
(2015) (Chapter 3), which explored online causal learning in scenarios where partici-
pants’ judgments about an underlying causal structure were repeatedly elicited over a
sequence of interventional tests. Another is Bramley, Dayan, and Lagnado (2015), which
built on this paradigm. Both papers explained participants’ judgments with accounts
that are not completely satisfying algorithmically, lacking cognitively plausible or scal-
able procedures that could capture the ways in which judgments and intervention choices
deviated from the rational norms. Here, we develop the algorithmic level account and
demonstrate that it outperforms or equals competitors in modelling the data from both
previous papers and a new experiment.
The resulting class of algorithms embodies an old idea about theory change known as
the Duhem–Quine thesis (Duhem, 1991). The idea can illustrated by a simile, originally
attributed to Otto Van Neurath (1932) but popularised by Quine, in the eponymous
quotation at the start of this chapter. The Neurath’s ship metaphor describes the
piecemeal growth and evolution of scientific theories over the course of history. In the
metaphor, the theorist (sailor) is cast as relying on their existing theory (ship) to stay
afloat, without the privilege of a dry-dock in which to make major improvements. Unable
to step back and consider all possible alternatives, the theorist is limited to building on
the existing theory, making a series of small changes with the goal of improving the fit.
We argue that people are in a similar position when it comes to their beliefs about the
causal structure of the world. We propose that a learner normally maintains only a single
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hypothesis about the global causal model, rather than a distribution over all possibilities.
They update their hypothesis by making local changes (e.g. adding, removing and
reversing individual connections, nodes or subgraphs) while depending on the rest of the
model as a basis. We show that by doing this, the learner can end up with a relatively
accurate causal model without ever representing the whole hypothesis space or storing
all the old evidence, but that their causal beliefs will exhibit a particular pattern of
sequential dependence. We provide a related account of bounded intervention selection,
based on the idea that learners adapt to their own learning limitations when choosing
what evidence to gather next, attempting to resolve local rather than global uncertainty.
Together, our Neurath’s ship model and local-uncertainty-based schema for intervention
selection provide a step towards an explanation of how people might achieve a resource
rational (Griffiths et al., 2015; Simon, 1982) trade-off between accuracy and the cognitive
costs of maintaining an accurate causal model of the world.
This chapter is organised as follows. It first highlights the ways in which past experiments
have shown human learning to diverge from the predictions of the idealised account
detailed in 3.1, using these to motivate two causal judgment heuristics proposed in the
literature: simple endorsement (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015; Fernbach
& Sloman, 2009) and win-stay, lose-sample (Bonawitz et al., 2014) before developing
a new Neurath’s ship framework for belief change and active learning. It next shows
that participants’ overall patterns of judgments and intervention choices are in line with
the predictions of this framework across a variety of problems varying in terms of the
complexity and noise in the true generative model, and whether the participants’ are
trained or must infer the noise.
The models are then compared at the individual level, and we find that all three causal-
judgment proposals substantially outperform baseline and computational level competi-
tors. While our Neurath’s ship provides the best overall fit, we find considerable di-
versity of strategies across participants. In particular, we find that the simple endorse-
ment heuristic emerges as a strong competitor. Additional details about the formal
framework and model specification are provided in Appendix A. Also, where indicated,
additional figures are provided in Supplementary materials at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/
lagnado-lab/el/nbt.
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5.1 Behavioural patterns and existing explanations
Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) (Chapter 3) found that participants’ judg-
ments in a sequential active causal learning task resembled probability matching when
lumped together, but that individuals’ trajectories were not well captured by simply
adding decision noise to the Bayesian predictions. Individuals’ sequences of judgments
were sequentially dependent, or “sticky”, compared to the Bayesian predictions, tending
to remain the same or similar over multiple elicitations as the objectively most likely
structure shifted. At the same time, when participants did change their judgments,
they tended to do so in ways that were consistent with the most recently gathered ev-
idence, neglecting evidence gathered earlier in learning. The result was a dual pattern
of recency in terms of judgments’ consistency with the evidence, and stickiness in terms
of consistency with the previous judgments. They found that they could capture these
patterns with the addition of two parameters to the Bayesian model. The first was a for-
getting parameter, encoding trial-by-trial leakage of information from the posterior as it
became the prior for the next test. The second was a conservatism parameter, encoding
a non-normatively high probability assigned to the latest causal hypothesis. While the
resulting model captured participants’ choices, it still made the implausible assumption
that learners maintained weighted probabilistic beliefs across the whole hypothesis space
and performed efficient active learning with respect to these.
As with Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) (Chapter 3), Bonawitz et al. (2014)
found that children and adults’ online structure judgments exhibited sequential depen-
dence. To account for this they proposed an account of how causal learners might
rationally reduce the computational effort of continually reconsidering their model. In
their “win-stay, lose-sample” scheme they suggest that learners maintain a single struc-
tural hypothesis, only resampling a new hypothesis from the posterior when they see
something surprising under their current model, concretely, with a probability that in-
creases as the most recent observation becomes less probable. This scheme guarantees
that the learner’s latest hypothesis is a sample from the posterior distribution at every
point, but does not require them to resample with every new trial. While it captures the
intuitive idea that people will tend to stick with a hypothesis until it fails to perform,
“win-stay, lose-sample” still requires the learner to store all the past evidence to use
when resampling, and does not provide a recipe for how the samples are drawn.1
1The authors mention that MCMC could be used to draw these samples without representing the
full posterior.
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Another approach to understanding deviations between people’s causal judgments and
rational norms comes from the idea that people construct causal models in a modular or
piecewise way. For example, Waldmann et al. (2008) propose a minimal rational model
under which learners infer the relationships between each pair of variables separately
without worrying about the dependencies between them, ending up with a modular
causal model that allows for good local inferences but which leads to so-called “Markov
violations” in more complex inferences where participants fail to respect the conditional
dependencies and independences implied by the global model (Rehder, 2014). They
show that this minimal model is sufficient to capture participants’ judgment patterns in
two case studies. Building on this idea of locality, Fernbach and Sloman (2009) asked
participants to make judgments following observation of several preselected interven-
tions. They found that participants were particularly bad at inferring Chains, often
inferring spurious additional links from the root to the sink node (e.g. X1 → X3 as
well as X1 → X2 and X2 → X3), a pattern also observed in Bramley, Lagnado, and
Speekenbrink (2015). Fernbach and Sloman proposed that this was a consequence of par-
ticipants inferring causal relationships through local rather than global computations.
In the example, the interventions on X1 would normally lead to activations of X3 due
to the indirect connection via X2. If learners attended only to X1 and X3 there would
be the appearance of a direct relationship. They found that they could better model
participants by assuming they inferred each causal link separately while ignoring the rest
of the model. Embodying this principle, Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015)
proposed a simple endorsement heuristic for online causal learning that would tend to
add direct edges to a model between intervened-on variables and any variables that ac-
tivated as a result, removing edges going to any variables that didn’t activate. By doing
this after each new piece of evidence, the model exhibited recency as the older edges
would tend to be overwritten by newly inferred ones, as well as as capturing the pattern
of adding unnecessary direct connections in causal chains. The model did a good job of
predicting participants’ patterns but was outperformed by the Bayesian model bounded
with forgetting and conservatism. Additionally, like any heuristic, simple endorsement ’s
success is conditional on its match to the situation. For instance, simple endorsement
does badly in cases where there are many chains — meaning that the outcome of many
interventions are indirect, and also if the true wB is high.
Going beyond causal learning, sequential effects are ubiquitous in cognition. In some
instances they can be rational; for instance moderate recency is rational in a changing
world (Julier & Uhlmann, 1997). Regardless, there are a plethora of non-Bayesian models
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that can reproduce various sequential effects (DeCarlo, 1992; Gilden, 2001; Treisman &
Williams, 1984). A common class of these is based on the idea of adjusting an estimate
part way toward new evidence (e.g. Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Petrov & Anderson, 2005;
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Updating point estimates means that a learner need not keep
all the evidence in memory but can instead make use of the location of the point(s) as a
proxy for what was learned in the past. Bramley, Dayan, and Lagnado (2015) propose
a model inspired by these ideas, that maintains a single hypothesis, but simultaneously
attempts to minimise edits along with the number of variables’ latest states that the
current model fails to explain. The result is a model where the current belief acts as
an anchor and the learner tries to explain the latest evidence by making the minimal
number of changes. Again, this model provided a good fit with participants’ judgments,
but did not provide a procedure for how participants were able to search the hypothesis
space for the causal structure that minimised these constraints.
In summary, a number of ideas and models have been proposed in the causal and ac-
tive learning literatures. By design, they all do a good job of capturing patterns in
human causal judgments. However, it is not clear that any of these proposals provide
a general purpose, scalable explanation for human success in learning a complex causal
world-model. Some (e.g. win-stay, lose-sample) capture behavioural patterns within
the normative framework, but do not provide a scalable algorithm. Others (e.g. simple
endorsement) provide simple scalable heuristics but may not generalise beyond the tasks
they were designed for, nor explain human successes in harder problems. In the next
section we take inspiration from methods for approximate inference in machine learning
to construct a general purpose algorithm for incremental structure change that satisfies
both these desiderata.
5.2 Algorithms for causal learning with limited resources
We now turn to algorithms in machine learning that make approximate learning efficient
in otherwise intractable circumstances. Additionally, research in these fields on active
learning and optimal experiment design has identified a range of reasonable heuristics
for selecting queries when the full expected information calculation (Equation 3.10) is
intractable. We will take inspiration from some of these ideas to give a formal basis
to the intuitions behind the Neurath’s ship metaphor. We will then use this formal
model to generate predictions that we will compare to participants’ behaviour in several
experiments.
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5.2.1 Approximating with a few hypotheses
One common approximation, for situations where a posterior cannot be evaluated in
closed form, is to maintain a manageable number of individual hypotheses, or “parti-
cles” (Liu & Chen, 1998), with weights corresponding to their relative likelihoods. The
ensemble of particles then acts as an approximation to the desired distribution. Sophis-
ticated reweighting and resampling schemes can then filter the ensemble as data are
observed, approximating Bayesian inference.
These “particle filtering” methods have been used to explain how humans and other
animals might approximate the solutions to complex problems of probabilistic inference.
In associative learning (Courville & Daw, 2007), categorisation (Sanborn et al., 2010)
and binary decision making (Vul et al., 2009), it has been proposed that people’s beliefs
actually behave most like a single particle, capturing why individuals often exhibit fluc-
tuating and sub-optimal judgment while maintaining a connection to Bayesian inference,
particularly at the population level.
5.2.2 Sequential local search
The idea that people’s causal theories are like particles requires they also have some
procedure for sampling or adapting these theories as evidence is observed. Another class
of useful machine learning methods involves generating sequences of hypotheses, each
linked to the next via a form of possibly stochastic transition mechanism. Two members
of this class are particularly popular in the present context: Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) sampling, which asymptotically approximates the posterior distribution; and
(stochastic) hill climbing, which merely tries to find hypotheses that have high posterior
probabilities.
MCMC algorithms involve stochastic transitions with samples that are typically easy
to generate. Under various conditions, this implies that the sequences of (dependent)
sample hypotheses form a Markov chain with a stationary distribution that is the full,
intended, posterior distribution (Metropolis et al., 1953). The samples will appear to
“walk” randomly around the space of possibilities, tending to visit more probable hy-
potheses more frequently. If samples are extracted from the sequence after a sufficiently
long initial, so-called burn-in, period, and sufficiently far apart (to reduce the effect of
dependence), they can provide a good approximation to the true posterior distribution.
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There are typically many different classes of Markov chain transitions that share the
same stationary distribution, but differ in the properties of burn-in and subsampling.
The stochasticity inherent in MCMC algorithms implies that the sequence sometimes
makes a transition from a more probable to a less probable hypothesis — this is necessary
to sample multi-modal posterior distributions. A more radical heuristic is only to allow
transitions to more probable hypotheses — this is called “hill-climbing”, attempting to
find, and then stick at, the best hypothesis (Tsamardinos, Brown, & Aliferis, 2006).
This is typically faster than a full MCMC algorithm to find a good hypothesis, but is
prone to become stuck in a local optimum, where the current hypothesis is more likely
than all its neighbours, but less likely than some other more distant hypothesis.
Applied to causal structure inference, we might in either case consider transitions that
change at most a single edge in the model (Cooper & Herskovits, 1992; Goudie & Mukher-
jee, 2011). A simple case is Gibbs sampling (Geman & Geman, 1984), starting with
some structural hypothesis and repeatedly selecting an edge (randomly or systemati-
cally) and re-sampling it (either adding, removing or reversing) conditional on the state
of the other edges. This means that a learner can search for a new hypothesis by mak-
ing local changes to their current hypothesis, reconsidering each of the edges in turn,
conditioning on the state of the others without ever enumerating all the possibilities.
By constructing a short chain of such “rethinks” a learner can easily update a singular
hypothesis without starting from scratch. The longer the chain, the less dependent or
“local” the new hypothesis will be to the starting point.
The idea that stochastic local search plays an important role in cognition has some prece-
dent (Gershman et al., 2012; Sanborn et al., 2010). For instance, Abbott, Austerweil,
and Griffiths (2012) propose a random local search model of memory retrieval and Ull-
man, Goodman, and Tenenbaum (2012) propose an MCMC search model for capturing
how children search large combinatorial theory spaces when learning intuitive physi-
cal theories like taxonomy and magnetism. The idea that people might update their
judgments by something like MCMC sampling is also explored by Lieder, Griffiths and
Goodman (2012; under review). They argue that under reasonable assumptions about
the costs of resampling and need for accuracy, it can be rational to update one’s beliefs
by constructing short chains where the updated judgment retains some dependence on
its starting state, arguing that this might explain anchoring effects (Kahneman et al.,
1982).
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In addition to computational savings, updating beliefs by local search can be desirable for
statistical reasons. If the learner has forgotten some of the evidence they have seen, the
location of their previous hypothesis acts like a very approximate version of a sufficient
statistic for the forgotten information. This can make it advantageous to the learner to
strike a good balance between editing their model to account better for the data they
can remember, and staying close to their previous model to retain the connection to the
data they have forgotten (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015).
5.3 Neurath’s ship: An algorithmic-level model of sequen-
tial belief change
The previous section summarised two ideas derived from computer science and statistics
that provide a potential solution to the computational challenges of causal learning:
maintaining only a single hypothesis at a time, and exploring new hypotheses using
local search based on sampling. In this section, we formalise these ideas to define a
class of models of causal learning inspired by the metaphor of Neurath’s ship. We start
by treating interventions as given, and only focus on inference. We then consider the
nature of the interventions.
Concretely, we propose that causal learners maintain only a single causal model (a single
particle) bt−1, and a collection of recent evidence and interventions Dt−1r and Ct−1r at
time t− 1. They then make inferences by:
1. Observing the latest evidence dt and ct and adding it to the collection to make
Dtr and Ctr.
2. Then, searching for local improvements to bt−1 by sequentially reconsidering edges
Eij ∈ {1 : i→ j, 0 : i= j, − 1 : i← j} (adding, subtracting or reorienting them)
conditional on the current state of the edges in the rest of their model E\ij — e.g.
with probability P (Eij |E\ij ,Dtr, Ctr,w).
3. After searching for k steps, stopping and taking the latest version of their model
as their new belief bt. If bt differs from bt−1 the evidence is forgotten (Dtr and Ctr
become {}), and they begin collecting evidence again.
A detailed specification of this process is given in Appendix A.
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Starting with any hypothesis and repeatedly resampling edges conditional on the others
is a form of Gibbs sampling (Goudie & Mukherjee, 2011). Further, the learner can make
use of the data they have forgotten by starting the search with their current belief bt−1,
since these data are represented to some degree in the location of bt−1. Resampling using
the recent data P (M |Dtr, Ctr,w) allows the learner to adjust their beliefs to encapsulate
better the data they have just seen, and let this evidence fall out of memory once it has
been incorporated into the model.
5.3.1 Resampling, hill climbing or random change
Following the procedure outlined above, the learner’s search steps would constitute
dependent samples from the posterior over structures given Dtr. However, it is also
plausible that learners will try to hill-climb rather than sample, preferring to move
to more probable local models more strongly than would be predicted by Gibbs sam-
pling. In order to explore this, we will consider generalisations of the update equation
allowing transitions to be governed by powers of the conditional edge probability (i.e.
Pω(Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr, Ctr,w)), yielding stronger or weaker preference for the most likely
state of Eij depending whether ω > 1 or < 1. By setting ω to zero, we would get
a model that does not learn but just moves randomly between hypotheses, tending to
remain local and by setting it to infinity we would get a model that always moved to
the most likely state for the edge.
5.3.2 Search length
It is reasonable to assume that the number of search steps k that a learner performs
will be variable, but that their capacity to search will be relatively stable. Therefore,
we assume that for each update, the learner searches for k steps, where k is drawn from
a Poisson distribution with mean λ ∈ [0,∞].
The value of λ thus determines how sequentially dependent a learner’s sequences of
beliefs are. A large λ codifies a tendency to move beliefs a long way to account for
the latest data Dtr at the expense of the older data — retained only in the location of
the previous belief bt−1 — while a moderate λ captures a reasonable trade-off between
starting state and new evidence, and a small λ captures conservatism, i.e. failure to
shift beliefs enough to account for the latest data.2
2Note that we later cap k at 50 when estimating our model having established that search lengths
beyond these bounds made negligible difference to predictions.
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5.3.3 Putting these together
By representing the transition probabilities from model i to model j, for a particular
setting of hill climbing parameter ω and data Dtr, with a transition matrix Rωt , we
can thus make probabilistic predictions about a learner’s new belief bt ∈ Bt.3 The
probabilities depend on the previous belief bt−1 and their average search length λ. By
averaging over different search lengths with their probability controlled by λ, and taking
the requisite row of the resulting transition matrix we get the following equation







Note that this equation describes the probability of a Neurath’s ship style search termi-
nating in a given new location. The learner themselves need only follow the four steps
described above, sampling particular edges and search length rather than averaging over
the possible values of these quantities. See Appendix A for more details and Figure 5.1
for an example.
5.4 Selecting interventions on Neurath’s ship: A local un-
certainty schema
In situations where a posterior is already hard to evaluate, calculating the globally most
informative intervention — finding the intervention ct that maximises Equation 3.10 —
will almost always be infeasible. Therefore, a variety of heuristics have been developed
that allow tests to be selected that are more useful than random selection, but do not
require the full expected information gain be computed (Settles, 2012). These tend
to rely on the learner’s current, rather than expected, uncertainty (e.g. uncertainty
sampling which chooses based on outcome uncertainty under the prior) or the predictions
under just a few favoured hypotheses (e.g. query by committee) as a substitute for the full
expectancy calculation. The former relies on maintaining a complete prior distribution,
making the latter a more natural partner to the Neurath’s ship framework.
We have proposed a model of structure inference under which learners are only able
to consider a small set of alternatives at a time, and only able to generate alternatives
3We define this matrix formally in Appendix A. Note that we assume transitions that would create
a loop in the overall model get a probability of zero. This assumption could be dropped for learning
dynamic Bayesian networks but is necessary for working with directed acyclic graphs.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.1: An illustration of NS model of causal belief updating. a) An example
search path: The learner starts out with a singly connected model at the top (X1 → X2
connection only). They update their beliefs by resampling one edge at a time e ∈ {→,=
,←}. Each entry i, j in the matrices gives the probability of moving from model in the
row i to the model in the column j when resampling the edge marked with the coloured
question mark. Lighter shades of the requisite colour indicate low transition probability,
darker shades indicate greater transition probability; yellow is used to indicate zero
probabilities. Here the learner stops after resampling each edge once, moving from bt−1
of [X1 → X2] to bt of [X1 → X2, X1 → X3, X2 → X3]. b) Assuming the edge to
resample is chosen at random, we can average over the different possible edge choices
to derive a 1-step Markov chain transition matrix Rωt encompassing all the possibilities.
By raising this matrix to higher powers we get the probability of different end points
for searches of that length. If the chain is short (small k) the final state depends heavily
on the starting state (left) but for longer chains (large k), the starting state becomes
less important, getting increasingly close to independent sampling from the desired
distribution (right).
that are “local” in some dimension. Locally driven intervention selection is a natural
partner to this for at least two reasons: (1) Under the constraints of the Neurath’s
ship framework, learners would not be able to work with the prospective distributions
required to estimate global expected informativeness, but could potentially estimate
expected informativeness with respect to a sufficiently narrow sets of alternatives. (2)
Evidence optimised to distinguishing local possibilities (focused on one edge at a time for
instance) might better support sequential local belief updates (of the kind emphasised
in our framework) than the globally most informative evidence (Patil, Zhu, Kopec´, &
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Love, 2014). In line with this, we propose one way in which learners might select robustly
informative interventions, by attempting only to distinguish a few “local” possibilities at
a time, requiring only “local” uncertainty estimates to target the possibilities on which
to focus (Markant et al., 2015).
The idea that learners will focus on distinguishing only a few alternatives at a time
requires specifying how they choose which of the many possible subsets of the full hy-
pothesis space to target with a particular test. Queries that optimally reduce expected
uncertainty about one local aspect of a problem are liable to differ from those that
promise high global uncertainty reduction. For example, Figure 5.2b shows two trials
taken from our experiments, and shows that the expected values of each of a range
of different intervention choices (shown in Figure 5.2a) are very different depending on
whether the learner is focused on resolving global uncertainty all at once, or on resolving
some specific “local” aspect of it. This illustrates the idea that a learner might choose
a test that is optimally informative with respect to a modest range of options that they
have in mind at the time (e.g. models that differ just in terms of the state of Exz) yet
appear sporadically inefficient from the perspective of greedy global uncertainty reduc-
tion. Furthermore, by licensing quite different intervention preferences, they allow us to
diagnose individual and trial-by-trial differences in focus preference.
In the current work, we will consider three possible varieties of focus, one motivated
by the Neurath’s ship framework (edge focus) and two inspired by existing ideas about
bounded search and discovery in the literature (effects focus and confirmation focus).
While these are by no means exhaustive they represent a reasonable starting point.
5.4.1 The two stages of the schema
The idea that learners focus on resolving local rather than global uncertainty results
in a metaproblem of choosing what to focus on next, making intervention choice a two
stage process. We write L for the set of all possible foci l, and L ⊂ L for the subset of
possibilities that the learner will consider at a time, such as the the state of a particular
edge or the effects of a particular variable. The procedure is:
Stage 1 Selecting a local focus lt ∈ L
Stage 2 Selecting an informative test ct with respect to the chosen focus lt
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Different learners might differ in the types of questions they consider, meaning that L
might contain different varieties and combinations of local focuses. We first formalise
the two stages of the schema, and then propose three varieties of local focus that learn-
ers might consider in their option set L that differ in terms of which and how many
alternatives they include.
As mentioned above, we assume that the learner has some way of estimating their
current local confidence. We will assume confidence here is approximately the inverse
of uncertainty, so assume for simplicity that learners can calculate uncertainty from the
evidence they have gathered since last changing their model in the form of the entropy
H(l|Dtr,w; Ctr) for all l ∈ L (the assumption we examine in the discussion). They then
choose (Stage 1) the locale where these data imply the least certainty
lt = arg max
l∈L
H(l|bt−1,Dtr,w; Ctr) (5.2)
However, in carrying out Stage 2 we make the radical assumption that learners do
not use P (lt|Dtr, bt−1,w; Ctr), but rather, consistent with the method of inference itself,
only consider the potential next datum d′. This means that the intervention ct itself is
chosen to maximise the expected information about lt, ignoring pre-existing evidence,
and using what amounts to a uniform prior. Specifically, we assume that ct is chosen as





∆H(lt|d,w, bt−1; c)] (5.3)
where we detail the term in the expectation below for the three types of focuses.
Assuming real learners will exhibit some decision noise, we can model both choice of
focus and choice of intervention relative to a focus as soft (Luce, 1959) rather than strict
maximisation giving focus probabilities
P (lt|Dtr, bt−1,w; Ctr) =
exp(H(lt|Dtr, bt−1,w; Ctr)ρ)∑
l∈L exp(H(l|Dtr, bt−1,w; Ctr)ρ)
(5.4)
governed by some inverse temperature parameter ρ, and choice probabilities
P (ct|l,w, bt−1) = exp(Ed′∈Dc
[
∆H(l|d′,w, bt−1; ct)] η)∑
c∈C exp(Ed′∈Dc [∆H(l|d′,w, bt−1; c)] η)
(5.5)
governed by an inverse temperature η.
Chapter 5. Scaling up 151
5.4.2 Three varieties of local focus
Edges
An obvious choice, given the Neurath’s ship framework, would be for learners to try to
distinguish alternatives that differ in terms of a single edge (Figure 5.2a), i.e. those they
would consider during a single update step.
For a chosen edge Exy we can then consider a learner’s goal to be to maximise their
expectation of
∆H(Exy|Et−1\xy ,d,w; c) (5.6)
(see Appendix A for the full local entropy equations). Note that Equation 5.6 is a
refinement of Equation 5.3 for the case of focusing on an edge, from bt−1 the learner
need only condition on the other edges Et−1\xy . This goal results in a preference for fixing
one of the nodes of the target edge “on”, leaving the other free, and depending on the
other connections in bt−1, either favours fixing the other variables “off” or is indifferent
about whether they are “on”, “off” or “free” (Figure 5.2b). For an edge focused local
learner, the set of possible focuses includes all the edges L ∈ ∀i<j∈NEij .
Effects
A commonly proposed heuristic for efficient search in the deterministic domains is to
ask about the dimension that best divides the hypothesis space, eliminating the greatest
possible number of options on average. This is variously known as “constraint-seeking”
(Ruggeri & Lombrozo, 2014) or “the split half heuristic” (Nelson et al., 2014). In the
case of identifying the true deterministic (wS = 1 and wB = 0) causal model on N
variables through interventions it turns out that the best split is achieved by querying
the effects of a randomly chosen variable, essentially asking: “What does Xi do?” (Fig-
ure 5.2a)4. Formally we might think of this question as asking: which other variables
(if any) are descendants of variable X1 in the true model? This a broader focus than
querying the state of a single edge, but considerably simpler question than the global
“which is the right causal model?” because the possibilities just include the different
combinations of the other variables as effects (e.g. neither, either or both of X2 and X3
4This is also the most globally informative type of test relative to a uniform prior in all of the noise
conditions we consider in the current paper
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are descendants of X1 in a 3-variable model) rather than the superexponential number
of model possibilities5.
Relative to a chosen variable Xi, we can write an effect focus goal as maximising the
expectation of
∆H(De(Xi)|d,w; c) (5.7)
where De(Xi) is the set ofXi’s direct or indirect descendants. This focus does not depend
on bt−1. This goal results in a preference for fixing the target node “on” (e.g. Do[X1 = 1])
and leaving the rest of the variables free to vary (Figure 5.2b). For an effect focused
local learner, the set of possible focuses includes all the nodes L ∈ ∀i∈XDe(X{i}).
Confirmation
Another form of local test, is to seek evidence that would confirm or refute the cur-
rent hypothesis, against a single alternative “null” hypothesis. Confirmatory evidence
gathering is a ubiquitous psychological phenomenon (Klayman & Ha, 1989; Nickerson,
1998). Although confirmation seeking is widely touted as a bias, it can also be shown
to be optimal, for example under deterministic or sparse hypotheses spaces or peaked
priors (Austerweil & Griffiths, 2011; Navarro & Perfors, 2011).
Accordingly, Coenen et al. (2015) propose that causal learners adopt a “positive test
strategy” when distinguishing causal models. They define this as a preference to “turn
on” a parent component of one’s hypothesis — observing whether the activity propa-
gates to the other variables in the way that this hypothesis predicts. They find that
people often intervene on suspected parent components, even when this is uninforma-
tive, and do so more often under time pressure. In Coenen et al.’s tasks, the goal was
always to distinguish between two hypotheses, so their model assumed people would
sum over the number of descendants each variable had under each hypothesis and turn
on the component that had the most descendants on average. However, this does not
generalise to the current, unrestricted, context where all variables have the same number
of descendants if you average over the whole hypothesis space. However, Steyvers et al.
(2003) propose a related rational test model that selects interventions with a goal of
distinguishing a single current hypothesis from a null hypothesis that there is no causal
connection.
5The number of directed acyclic graphs on N nodes, |M|N , can be computed with the recurrence
relation |M|N = ∑k∈N (−1)k−1(N2 )2k(N−k)|M|N−1 (see Robinson, 1977)
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Following Steyvers et al. (2003), for a confirmatory focus we consider interventions
expected to best reduce uncertainty between the learner’s current hypothesis bt−1 and
a null b0 in which there are no connections (Figure 5.2a).
∆H({bt, b0}|bt−1,d,w; c) (5.8)
This goal results in a preference for fixing on the root node(s) of the target hypothesis
(Figure 5.2c ii, noting the confirmation focus favours Do[X1 = 1, X2 = 1] here). The
effectiveness of confirmatory focused testing depends on the level of noise and the prior,
becoming increasingly useful later once the model being tested has sufficiently high prior
probability. For a confirmation focused learner there is always just a single local focus.
5.4.3 Implications of the schema
The local uncertainty schema implies that intervention choice depends on two separable
stages. Thus, it accommodates the idea that a learner might be poor at choosing what to
focus on but good at selecting an informative intervention relative to their chosen focus.
It also allows that we might understand differences in learners’ intervention choices as
consequences of the types of local focus they are inclined or able to focus on. Learners
cognisant of the limitations in their ability to incorporate new evidence might choose
to focus their intervention on narrower questions (i.e. learning about a single edge at a
time) while others might focus too broadly and fail to learn effectively. In the current
work we will fit behaviour assuming that learners choose between these local focuses,
using their patterns to diagnose which local focuses they include in their option set L,
which of these they choose on a given test lt and finally how these choices relate to their
final performance.
5.5 Comparing model predictions to experiments
The Neurath’s ship framework we have introduced has two distinct signatures. Making
only local edits from a single hypothesis results in sequential dependence. Making these
edits by local resampling leads to aggregate behaviour that can range between proba-
bility matching and hill climbing — which can give better short term gains but with a
tendency to get stuck in local optima. Two of the other heuristics also lead to sequential
dependence. Win-stay lose-sample predicts all-or-none dependence whereby learners’
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Figure 5.2: An illustrative example of local focused uncertainty minimisation a) Three
possible “local” focuses. b) The value of these choices of focus according to their current
uncertainty (Equation 5.2) i. at the start of learning and ii. after several tests have been
performed. Note that uncertainty is measured with Shannon entropy based on the local
possibilities and Dtr and that confirmation is undefined at the start of learning where
both the current and null hypothesis are that there are no connections in the model. c)
Expected value of 19 different interventions assuming: global expected information gain
from the true prior (green squares, and shaded), effects of X3 focus (red circles), the
relationship between X1 and X2 (blue triangles) and confirming b
t−1 (yellow diamonds),
assuming a uniform prior over the requisite possibilities and a known wS and wB of .85
and .15.
judgments will either stay the same or jump to a new location that depends only on
the posterior. Simple endorsement also predicts recency, although it is distinguished by
its failure to separate direct from indirect effects of interventions, leading to a different
pattern of structural change.
In terms of interventions, if participants are locally focused, we expect their hypotheses
to deviate from optimal predictions in ways that can be accommodated by our local
Chapter 5. Scaling up 155
uncertainty schema, i.e. selecting interventions that are more likely to be targeted toward
local rather than global uncertainty. If learners do not maintain the full posterior, we
expect their intervention distributions to be relatively insensitive to the evidence that
has already been seen, while still being locally informative. If people disproportionately
focus on identifying effects, we expect to see relatively unconstrained interventions with
one variable fixed “on” at a time. If people focus on individual edges we expect more
constraining interventions with more variables fixed “off”. If confirmatory tests are
employed, we expect to see more interventions on putative parents than on child nodes.
We first compare the predictions of our framework to existing data from Bramley,
Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015). We then report on three new experiments designed
to further test the specific predictions of our framework.
5.5.1 Bramley, Lagnado & Speekenbrink (2015)
In Experiments 1 and 2 (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015), participants in-
teracted with five probabilistic causal systems involving 3 variables (see Figure 5.5a),
repeatedly selecting interventions (or tests) to perform in which any number of the
variables are either fixed “on” or “off”, while the remainder are left free to vary. The
tests people chose, along with the parameters w of the true underlying causal model,
jointly determined the data they saw. In this experiment wS was always .8 and wB was
always .1. After each test, participants registered their best guess about the underly-
ing structure. They were incentivised to report their best guess about the structure,
through receipt of a bonus for each causal relation (or non-relation) correctly registered
at the end. There were three conditions: no information (N=79) was run first. After
discovering that a significant minority of participants performed at chance, condition
information (N=30), added a button that participants could hover over and remind
themselves of the key instructions during the task (the noise, strengths, the goal) and
condition information + summary (N=30) additionally provided a visual summary of
all previous tests and their outcomes.6 Participants could draw cyclic causal models if
they wanted (e.g. X1 → X2 → X3 → X1) and were not forced to select something for
every edge from the start but instead could leave some or all of the edges as “?”. Once
a relationship was selected they could not return to “?”. The task is available online at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/nbt.
6In the paper this was reported as two experiments, the second with two between-subjects conditions.
They share identical structure and were subsequently analysed together. Therefore we do the same here,
reporting as a single experiment with three between-subjects conditions.
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Comparing judgment patterns
We compared participants’ performance in Experiments 1 and 2 to that of several sim-
ulated learners. Posterior draws a new sample from the posterior for each judgment.
Random simply draws a random graph on each judgment. Neurath’s ship follows the
procedure detailed in the previous section, beginning with its previous judgment (bt−1,
or an unconnected model at t=1) and reconsidering one edge at a time based on the
evidence gathered since its last change Dtr for a small number of steps after observing
each outcome. We illustrate this with a simulation with a short mean search length
λ of 1.5 and behaviour ω of 10 corresponding moderate hill climbing. Win-stay, lose-
sample sticks with the previous judgment with probability 1−P (Dt|bt−1w;Ct) or alter-
natively samples from the full posterior. The simple endorser always adds edges from
any intervened-upon variables to any activated variables on each trial, and removes them
from any intervened-upon variables to any non-activated variables, overwriting any edges
going in the opposing direction. Participants’ final accuracy in Experiments 1 and 2 was
closest to the Neurath’s ship as is clear in Figure 5.3a and b. That the Neurath’s ship
simulation underperformed participants in condition information + summary is to be
expected since these participants were given a full record of past tests while Neurath’s
ship uses only the recent data.
Additionally, participants’ online judgments exhibited sequential dependence. This can
be seen in Figure 5.3b comparing the distribution of edits (bars) to the markedly larger
shifts we would expect to see assuming random or Bayesian posterior sampling on these
trials (black full and dotted lines). The overall pattern of edit distances from judgment
to judgment is commensurate with those produced by the Neurath’s ship procedure (red
line), but also here by win-stay, lose-sample (blue line) and simple endorser (green line)
simulations.
Comparing intervention patterns
To compare intervention choices to global and locally driven intervention selection, we
simulated the task with the same number of simulations as participants, stochastically
generating the outcomes of the simulations’ intervention choices according to the true
model and true w (which the participants knew). Simulated efficient active learners
would perfectly track the posterior and always select the greediest intervention (as in
Equation 3.10).
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We also compared participants’ interventions to those of several other simulated learners,
each restricted to one of the three types of local focus introduced in Section 4 (‘edge’.
‘effects’ or ‘confirmation’).7 When one of the simulated learners did not generate a
unique best intervention, it would sample uniformly from the joint-best interventions
according to that criterion. The results of the simulations are visualised in Figure 5.3c
and d.
Participants’ intervention choices in Experiments 1 and 2 were clearly more informa-
tive than random selection but less so than ideal active learning. This is evident in
Figure 5.3c comparing participants (bars) to simulations of ideal active learning (black
circles) and random intervening (black squares), and in Figure 5.3d comparing the par-
ticipants (red lines) to the ideal active learning (pink lines) and random intervening
(blue lines) simulations. Furthermore, the informativeness of participants’ interventions
is in the range of the simulations of any of the three local foci (yellow, green and blue
lines).
As we see in Figure 5.3d, idealised active learning favoured fixing one variable on at a
time (Do[X1 =1], Do[X2 =1] etc, hereafter called “one-on” interventions) for the major-
ity of tests. It always chose “one-on” for the first few tests but would sometimes select
controlled (e.g. Do[X1 =1, X2 =0]) tests on later tests when the remaining uncertainty
was predominantly between direct and indirect causal pathways as in between Chain,
Fork and Fully-connected structures.
Locally driven testing had different signatures depending on the focus. The edge focused
simulation would fix the component at one end of their edge of interest “on” and leave
the component at the other end “free”. What it did with the third component depended
on its latest judgment about the network. If, according to bt−1, another component was a
cause of the component that was left free-to-vary, the simulation favoured fixing it “off”.
Otherwise, it did not distinguish between “on”, “off” or “free” choosing one of these
at random. The resulting pattern is a spread across “one-on”, “two-on” and “one-on,
one-off” tests with a bias toward controlled “one-on, one-off” tests. The effects focused
learner always favoured “one-on” interventions. The confirmation focused tester would
generally fix components with children in bt−1 on, and leave components with parents
in bt−1 free. This led to the choice of a mixture of “one-on” and “two-on” interventions.
7We assumed these tests were chosen based on a uniform prior over the options considered. We used
the latest most probable judgment argmaxp(M |Dt−1,w) in place of a current hypothesis bt−1 for edge
focused and confirmatory testing so as not to presuppose a particular belief update rule in assessing
intervention selection.







































































































1 on, 1 off
all fixed
d) Intervention choices
Figure 5.3: Experiments 1 and 2; performance and interventions. a) Accuracy by
condition. Bars show participant accuracy by condition, and points compare with the
models, bar widths visualise the number of participants per condition. b) Sequential
dependence. The number of edits made by participants between successive judgments,
bars give proportion of participants’ updates with different numbers of edits, lines com-
pare with the models. c) Quality of participants’ and simulated learners’ intervention
choices measured by the probability that an ideal learner would guess the correct model
given the information generated. The plot shows values smoothed with R’s gam function
and the grey regions give 99% confidence intervals. d) The proportion of interventions
of different types chosen by participants as compared to simulated learners. observe =
Do[∅], 1 on = e.g. Do[X1 = 1], 1 off = e.g. Do[X1 = 0] and so on. All fixed = e.g.
Do[X1=0, X2=1, X3=0].
Like the ideal or the effects focused simulations, participants in Experiments 1 and 2
strongly favoured “one-on” tests. Consistent with confirmatory testing, components
with at least one child according to the latest hypothesis bt−1 were more likely to be
fixed “on” than components believed to have no children (60% compared to 56% of the
time t(24568) = 3.2, p = .001).8 Participants’ intervention selections were markedly less
dynamic across trials than those of the efficient learner. For example, the proportion of
single (e.g. [X1 = 1]) interventions decreased only fractionally on later tests, dropping
from 78% to 73% from the first to the last test.
8We ran the same number of simulated learners as participants in each experiment and condition to
facilitate statistical comparison.
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5.5.2 Motivating the new experiments
In analysing Experiments 1 and 2, we found patterns of judgments and interventions
broadly consistent with our framework. However, the conclusions we can draw from
these data alone are somewhat limited. Firstly, the problems participants faced did
not strongly delineate our Neurath’s ship proposal from other proposed approxima-
tions, namely the approximate win-stay, lose-sample or the heuristic simple endorsement
which also predicted similar patterns of accuracy and sequential dependence. Similarly,
in terms of interventions, participants’ strong preference for “one-on” interventions was
consistent with local effect-focused testing. However, “one-on” interventions were also
the globally most informative choices for the majority of participants’ trials, especially
early during learning. Thus, we cannot be confident what participants focused on when
selecting their interventions.
Methodologically also, several aspects of Experiments 1 and 2 are suboptimal for test-
ing our framework. Participants were allowed to leave edges unspecified and could also
draw cyclic models, both of which complicated our analyses. Furthermore, participants
had 12 tests on each problem, allowing an idealised learner to approach certainty given
the high wS and low wB, and for a significant minority of people to perform at ceiling.
These choices limit the incentive for participants to be efficient with their interventions.
Additionally, participants were only incentivised to be accurate with their final judg-
ment, meaning we cannot be confident that intermediate judgments always represented
their best and latest guess about the model. Finally, participants were not forced to
update all their edges after each test, meaning that lazy responding could be confused
with genuine sequential dependence of beliefs.
Next, we report on two new experiments that build on the paradigm from Experiments 1
and 2, making methodological improvements, while also exploring harder more revealing
problems, and eliciting additional measures, all with the goal of better distinguishing
our framework from competitors.
Experiment 4 explores learning in more complex problems than in Experiments 1 and
2, with more variables and a range of strengths wS and levels of background noise wB,
and fewer interventions per problem. The increased complexity and noise provides more
space and stronger motivation for the use of approximations and heuristics. Further-
more, the broader range of possible structures and intervention choices increases the
discriminability of our framework from alternatives such as win-stay, lose-sample and
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simple endorsement, while the shorter problems avoid ceiling effects and ensure par-
ticipants choose interventions carefully. To ensure participants register their best and
latest belief at every time point, we also incentivise participants through their accuracy
at random time points during learning. To eliminate the possibility of lazy responding
biasing results in favour of Neurath’s ship, we force participants to mark all edges anew
after every test without a record of their previous judgment as a guide.
Experiment 5 inherits the methodological improvements, compares two elicitation proce-
dures, and also takes several additional steps. In the previous studies, participants were
pretrained on strength wS and background noise wB. This will not generally be true;
learners will normally have to take into account their uncertainty about these sources
of noise during inference. Therefore, Experiment 5 focuses on cases where participants
are not pretrained on w. Additionally, our framework makes predictions about partici-
pants’ problem representation that go beyond how it should manifest in final structure
judgments and intervention choices. Specifically, our local intervention schema proposes
that people focus on subparts of the overall problem during learning, switching between
these by comparing their current local uncertainty. Experiment 5 probes these assump-
tions by asking learners for confidence judgments about the edges in the model during
learning, and eliciting free explanations of what interventions are supposed to be testing.
When we go on to fit our framework to individuals in the final section of the paper, we
are able to code up these free responses in terms of the hypotheses they refer to and
compare them to the focuses predicted by our local uncertainty schema.
5.6 Experiment 4: Learning larger causal models
Our first new experiment looks at learning in harder problems with a range of wS
and wB and a mixture of 3- and 4-variable problems, asking whether we now see a
clearer signature of Neurath’s ship, simple endorsement or win-stay,lose-sample style
local updating or of local focus during interventions selection.
5.6.1 Methods
Participants
120 participants (68 male, mean±SD age 33±9) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk, split randomly so that 30 performed in each of 4 conditions. They were paid $1.50





Figure 5.4: Experimental procedure. a) Selecting a test b) Observing the outcome c)
Updating beliefs d) Getting feedback.
and received a bonus of 10c per correctly identified connection on a randomly chosen
test for each problem (max = $6.00, mean±SD $3.7± 0.65). The task took an average
of 44± 40 minutes.
Design
This study included the five 3-variable problems in Experiments 1 and 2 plus five addi-
tional 4-variable problems (see Figure 5.5a). There were problems exemplifying three key
types of causal structure: Colliders (converging connections), Chains (sequential con-
nections) and Forks (diverging connections). Within these, the sparseness of the causal
connections varied between a Single connection (devices 1 and 6) and Fully-connected
(devices 5 and 10).
There were two different levels of causal strength wS ∈ [.9, 0.75] and two different levels
of background noise wB ∈ [.1, .25] making 2 × 2 = 4 between-subjects conditions. For
instance, in condition wS = .9;wB = .1 the causal systems were relatively reliable, with
nodes rarely activating without being intervened on, or caused by, an active parent, and
connections rarely failing to cause their effects. Meanwhile, in condition wS = 0.75;wB =
0.25 the outcomes were substantially noisier, with probability .25 that a variable with
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no active parent would activate, compared to a probability 1− (1− .75)(1− .25) = 0.81
for a variable with one active parent.
Procedure
The task interface was similar to that in Experiments 1 and 2. Each device was repre-
sented as several grey circles on a white background (see Figure 5.4). Participants were
told that the circles were components of a causal system of binary variables, but were not
given any further cover story. Initially, all components were inactive and no connection
was marked between them. Participants performed tests by clicking on the components,
setting them at one of three states “fixed on”, “fixed off” and “free-to-vary”, then click-
ing “test” and observing what happened to the “free-to-vary”components as a result.
The observations were of temporary activity (graphically, activated components would
turn green and wobble).
As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants registered their best guess about the underlying
structure after each test. They did this by clicking between the components to select
either no connection, or a forward or backward connection (represented as black ar-
rows). Participants were incentivised to be accurate, but unlike in Experiments 1 and 2,
payments were based on randomly selected time points rather than the final judgments.
Participants completed instructions familiarising them with the task interface; the in-
terpretation of arrows as (probabilistic) causal connections; the incentives for judgment
accuracy. Participants were told background noise level and strength parameters w
explicitly. They were then shown unconnected components and forced to test them
several times. The frequency with which the components activated reflected the true
background noise level. They were then shown a set of two-component causal systems in
which component “X1” was a cause of “X2”, and were forced to test these systems sev-
eral times with component X1 fixed on. This indicated that the frequency with which
X2 activated reflected the level of wS combined with the background noise they had
already learned.
After completing the instructions, participants had to answer four comprehension check
questions. If they got any wrong they had to go back to the start of the instructions
and try again. Then, participants solved a practice problem randomly drawn from the
problem set. They then faced the test problems in random order, with randomly oriented
unlabelled components. They performed six tests on each three variable problem, and
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eight tests on each four variable problem. After the final test for each problem they
received feedback telling them the true connections.
To ensure that participants’ judgments were always genuine directed acyclic graphs,
participants were told in the instructions that the true causal structure would not contain
a loop. Unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, if participants tried to draw a model containing
a cyclic structure they would see a message saying “you have drawn connections that
make a loop, change or remove one to continue”.
As in Experiments 1 and 2 conditions information and information + summary, par-
ticipants could hover their mouse over a button for a reminder of the key instructions
during the task, but unlike condition information + summary, they saw no record of
their previous tests and outcomes.
The task can be tried out at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/nbt.
5.6.2 Results and discussion
Judgments
In spite of the considerably greater noise and complexity than Experiments 1 and 2,
participants performed significantly above chance in all four conditions (comparing to
chance performance of 13 , participants’ scores differed significantly by t-test with p < .001
for all four conditions). They also significantly underperformed a Bayes optimal observer
(p < .001 for all four conditions, Figure 5.6a). Performance declined as background
noise wB increased F (1, 118) = 4.3, η
2 = .04, p = .04 but there was no evidence for a
relationship with strength wS F (1, 118) = 2.7, η
2 = .04, p = 0.1. Judgment accuracy
was no lower for four compared to three variable problems t(238) = 0.76, p = 0.44.
Table 5.1 shows accuracy by device type across all experiments. Accuracy differed by
device type χ2 = (4) = 22, p < .001. Consistent with the idea that people struggle most
to distinguish the Chain from the Fork or the Fully-connected model, accuracy was
lowest for Chains (devices 3; 8) and second lowest for Fully-connected (5; 10) models.
In all four conditions, participants’ final accuracy was closer to that of the Neurath’s
ship simulations than the simple endorser, win-stay, lose sample or random responder
or ideal (passive) responding (Figure 5.6a).9
9On the rare occasions where the simple endorser procedure would induce a cycle (0.4% of trials),
the edges were left in their original state.
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Figure 5.5: The true models from Experiment 4: Learning larger models, and visual-
isation of averaged judgments and posteriors. a) The problems faced by participants.
Dashed box indicates those that also appeared in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink
(2015). b) Averaged final judgments by participants. Darker arrows indicate that a
larger proportion of participants marked this edge in their final model. c) Bayes-optimal
final marginal probability of each edge in P (M |DT , ET ,w), averaged over participants’
data.
Sequential dependence
Table 5.2 summarises the number of edits (additions, removals or reversals of edges) par-
ticipants made between each judgment in all experiments. Inspecting the table and Fig-
ure 5.6b we see participants’ judgments (both high and low performing) show a pattern
of rapidly decreasing probability for larger edit distances mimicked by both Neurath’s
ship and simple endorsement simulations. In contrast, random or posterior sampling
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Table 5.1: Proportion of Edges Correctly Identified by Device Type in Experiments
1, 2, 4 and 5





Exps 1–2 3 0.69 0.71 0.66 0.63 0.67
Exp 4: Larger models 3 0.57 0.6 0.51 0.56 0.55
Exp 4: Larger models 4 0.56 0.57 0.48 0.58 0.49
Exp 5: Unknown strengths 3 0.62 0.6 0.61 0.65 0.61 0.61
All 0.61 0.62 0.57 0.61 0.58 0.61
Table 5.2: Edit Distance Between Consecutive Judgments in Experiments 1, 2, 4 and
5.
Experiment Var Participants Random SE WSLS NS Posterior
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Exps 1–2 3 0.66 0.97 1.99 0.83 0.51 0.74 0.55 0.88 0.38 0.57 1.02 0.93
Exp 4 3 0.92 1.01 1.99 0.83 0.44 0.64 0.73 0.98 0.50 0.63 1.47 0.94
Exp 4 4 1.69 1.63 3.96 1.16 0.65 0.88 1.64 1.78 0.55 0.68 2.94 1.40
Exp 5 (rem) 3 0.73 0.85 2.02 0.81 0.43 0.62 1.06 1.13 0.59 0.69 1.86 0.85
Exp 5 (dis) 3 1.02 0.99 2.02 0.81 0.43 0.62 1.06 1.13 0.59 0.69 1.86 0.85
All 0.99 1.09 2.40 0.89 0.50 0.71 0.99 1.17 0.51 0.65 1.80 1.00
Note: Var = number of variables. NS = Neurath’s ship simulations with λ = 1.5 and ω = 10, WSLS =
win-stay, lose-sample simulations, SW = simple Endorser simulations, M=mean, SD = standard
deviation. Rem = remain condition. Dis = disappear condition.
lead to quite different signatures with larger jumps being more probable. Choices sim-
ulated from Neurath’s ship and simple endorsement were more sequentially dependent
than participants’ on average but have the expected decreasing shape. Win-stay, lose
sample produces a different pattern with a maximum at zero changes but a second peak
in the same location as for posterior sampling but has an average edit distance very close
to that averaged over participants. However, we expect any random or inattentive re-
sponding to inflate average edit distances, and indeed find a strong negative correlation
between edit distance and score F (1, 118) = 34, β = −6.7, η2 = .34, p < .001. A simple
way to illustrate this is to compare the edits of higher and lower performers. Scores of
22
45 or more differ significantly from chance performance (around
15
45) by χ
2 test. The 79
participants that scored 22 or more made markedly smaller edits than those that scored
under 22 (0.85± 0.95 compared to 1.3± 1.12 for three variable, and 1.4± 1.5 compared
to 2.4± 1.8 for four variable problems), putting the clearly successful participants’ pat-
terns closer to the “Neurath’s ship” and “simple endorser” simulations. Additionally,
we expect individual differences in search length λ under the Neurath’s ship model and
here only simulate assuming a mean search length of 1.5. Aggregating over a wider
set of simulated learners with different capacities to search for updates would lead to a
heavier-tailed distribution of edit distances that would resemble the participants’ choices
more faithfully.
166 Chapter 5. Scaling up
Interventions
Globally focused active learning favoured a mixture of “one-on” and “one-on, one-off”
interventions (and several others including “one-on, two-off” in the four variable prob-
lems). The number and nature of the fixed variables it favoured depended strongly
on the condition, favouring fixing more variables off when wS was high. It would also
shift dramatically over trials always favouring “one-on” interventions for the first trials
but these dropping below 50% of choices by the final test. Participants’ choices were
much less reactive to condition or trial. There were no clear differences in intervention
choices by condition (see supplementary figures available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/
lagnado-lab/el/nbt) but participants were a little more likely to select “one on” inter-
ventions on their first test (57%) compared to their last test (50%), t(238) = 1.7, p = .01.
Like the ideal or the effects focused simulations, and like in Bramley, Lagnado, and
Speekenbrink (2015), learners favoured “one-on” tests. However, in line with an edge or
confirmation they also selected a substantial number of “two-on” and “one-on, one-off”
interventions, doing so on early as well as late tests while the ideal learner only pre-
dicted using “one-on, one-off” tests on the last few trials. As in Bramley, Lagnado, and
Speekenbrink (2015) and consistent with confirmatory testing, participants were more
likely to fix “on” components with at least one child according to their latest hypothesis
bt−1: 49% compared to 30% t(238) = 5.5, p < .001. The overall pattern was not clearly
consistent with any one local focus but might be consistent with a mixture of all three.
5.7 Experiment 5: Unknown strengths
In this experiment, we focused on cases where participants are not pretrained on w (see
Appendix A for the computational level details of how to incorporate uncertainty over
w in model inference and intervention choice).
We took advantage of the fact that participants would experience substantially greater
uncertainty given ignorance about w to assess their ability to estimate local uncertainty
based on recently observed data Dtr in order to choose where to focus subsequent tests.
This is central to any scheme for intervention selection. Thus, in Experiment 3, we
elicited the participants’ confidence about the edges in each judgment. If participants
track local uncertainties based on recent evidence, we should expect these to correlate
with uncertainties given Dtr. In particular, given the representation associated with Neu-
rath’s ship, we might also expect the local confidences to be evaluated while leaning on

















































































































1 on, 1 off
all fixed
d) Intervention choices
Figure 5.6: Experiment 4: Learning larger causal models; performance and interven-
tions. a) Accuracy by condition. Bars are participants and points compare with the
models. b) Sequential dependence as in Figure 5.3b. c) Quality of participants’ and
simulated learners’ intervention choices in the three variable problems as in Figure 5.3c.
d) The proportion of interventions of different types chosen by participants compared
to simulated learners in the three variable problems, otherwise as in Figure 5.3d.
the rest of the model for support. This means they should reflect conditional uncertainty
in the edge H(Eij |E\ij ,Dtr; Ctr) more closely than the marginal uncertainty H(Eij |Dtr; Ctr)
which involves averaging across all the possible states of the other edges.
We also elicited predictions about the outcome of each chosen test before the outcome
was revealed. If participants maintained only a single hypothesis, we expected this
to be reflected in their predictions. Thus, for a Neurath’s ship learner, it would be
predominantly the predictive distribution under their current hypothesis rather than
the average across models.
Finally, in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) and Experiment 4, participants’
intervention selections showed hints of being motivated by a mixture of local aspects of
the overall uncertainty, with overall patterns most consistent with focus on a mixture
of different local aspects of uncertainty. To test this idea more thoroughly, in the final
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problem in Experiment 5 we explicitly probed participants’ beliefs about their interven-




111 UCL undergraduates (mean ± SD age 18.7± 0.9, 22 male) took part in Experiment
5 as part of a course. They were incentivised to be accurate based on randomly selected
trials as before, but this time with the opportunity to win Amazon™ vouchers rather
than money. Participants were split randomly into 8 groups of mean size 13.8 ± 3.4,
each of which was presented with a different condition in terms of the value of w and
the way that they had to register their responses.
Design and procedure
Experiment 5 used the same task interface as the other experiments, but focused just
on the three variable problems (devices 1-5) and an additional device (6) in which
none of the components was connected (Figure 5.8). Like in Experiment 4, there were
two causal strength conditions wS ∈ [0.9, 0.75] and two background noise conditions
wB ∈ [0.1, 0.25]. However, unlike Experiment 4, participants were not trained on these
parameters, but only told that: “the connections do not always work”, and “sometimes
components can activate by chance”.
To assess the extent the different reporting conditions drove lower sequential dependence
in Experiment 4 relative to Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015), we examined
two reporting conditions between subjects: remain and disappear. In the remain condi-
tion, judgments stayed on the screen into the next test, so participants did not have to
change anything if they wanted to register the same judgment at t as at t − 1. In the
disappear condition, the previous judgment disappeared as soon as participants entered
a new test. They then had to explicitly make a choice for every connection after each
test.
In addition to the structure judgments and interventions, we also elicited additional
probability measures from participants. First, after selecting a test, but before seeing
the outcome, participants were asked to predict what would happen to the variables
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they had left free. To do this they would set a slider for each variable they had left
free to vary. The left pole of the slider was labelled “Sure off”, the right pole “Sure
on”and the middle setting indicated maximal uncertainty (Figure 5.7a). Second, after
drawing their best guess about the causal model by setting each edge between the
variables, participants were asked how sure they were about each edge. Again they would
respond by setting a slider, this time between “Guess” on the left indicating maximal
uncertainty and “Sure” on the right indicating high confidence that that edge judgment
was correct (Figure 5.7b). Participants were trained and tested on interpretation of the
slider extremes and midpoints in an additional interactive page during the instructions.
Participants faced the six devices in random order, with six tests per device followed
by feedback as in Experiment 4. Then they faced one additional test problem. On this
problem, the true structure was always a Chain (Figure 5.8, device 7). On this final
problem, participants did not have to set sliders. Instead, after they selected each test,
but before seeing its outcome, they were asked why they had selected that intervention.
Labels would appear on the nodes and participants were invited to “Explain why you
chose this combination of fixed and unfixed components. Use labels ‘A’ ‘B’, ‘C’ to talk
about particular components or connections” in a text box that would appear below
the device. Responses were constrained to be at least 5 characters long. The Chain
(device 3) was chosen for this problem because in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink
(2015) and Experiment 4, participants often did not select the crucial Do[X1 = 1, X2 = 0]
intervention that would allow them to distinguish a Chain from a Fully-connected model
(device 5) making this an interesting case for exploring divergence between participants’
behaviour and ideal active learning.
Finally, at the end of the experiment participants were asked to estimate the reliability
wS of the true connections: “In your opinion, how reliable were the devices? i.e. How
frequently would fixing a cause component ON make the effect component turn ON too?”
and the level of background noise wB: “In your opinion, how frequently did components
activate by themselves (when they were not fixed by you, or caused by any of the device’s
other components)?” by setting sliders between “0% (never)” and “100% (always)”.
A demo of Experiment 5 can be viewed at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/
nbt.
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Figure 5.7: Experiment 5: Unknown strengths; additional measures - a) Outcome
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Figure 5.8: Experiment 5: Unknown strengths; true models and final judgments.
a) The true models faced by participants. b) Weighted average final judgments by
participants. Darker arrows indicate that a larger proportion of participants marked
this link in their final model. Note that problem 7 was a repeat of the Chain (prob-




P (M |DT ;CT )p(w) dw averaged over participants’ data assuming a uniform
independent prior over w.
5.7.2 Results and discussion
Judgments
As in the experiments where participants were trained on w, accuracy was significantly
higher than chance in all conditions (all 8 t statistics > 6.1 all p values < 0.001) and
lower than a Bayes optimal observer observing the same data as them. Because the
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Figure 5.9: Experiment 5: Unknown strengths; priors and strength estimates. a) Vi-
sualisations of Uniform-Uniform, Strong-Uniform and Strong-Sparse priors on wS and
wB b) Participants final judgments of amount of background noise (wB) and strength





suming ideal Bayesian updating. Boxplot shows the medians and quartiles.
noise was unspecified, we explored several reasonable priors on w (always assuming that
wS and wB were independent) when computing posteriors. Firstly, we considered a
uniform-uniform prior that made no assumptions about either wS or wB (UU) where
w ∼ Uniform(0, 1)2. We also considered a strong-uniform (SU) variant, following Yeung
and Griffiths (2011), expecting causes to be reliable — wS ∼ Beta(2, 10), but making
no assumptions about background noise — wB ∼ Uniform(0, 1). Additionally, we con-
sidered a sparse-strong (SS) variant following Lu et al (2008), encoding an expectation
of high edge reliability — wS ∼ Beta(2, 10), and relatively little background noise —
wB ∼ Beta(10, 2).10 The choice of parameter prior made little difference to the Bayes
optimal observer’s judgment accuracy. Thus, participants significantly underperformed
the Bayes optimal observer in all conditions regardless of the assumed prior, except for
condition wS = 0.75;wB = 0.1, remain) under the SU prior, and wS = 0.75;wB = 0.25,
remain under all three considered priors.
10Lu et al. (2008) actually used a joint prior p(wS , wB) with density concentrated in the top left and
bottom right, as in edges either had high strength and low background noise or high background noise
and low strength.
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1 on, 1 off
all fixed
d) Intervention choices
Figure 5.10: Experiment 5: Unknown strengths; performance and interventions. Sub-
plots as in Figure 5.6.
Comparison with known strength experiments
Performance in Experiment 5 was comparable to the 3-variable problems in Experiment
4 where the underlying w conditions were identical. Mean accuracy was actually slightly
higher 0.61± 0.21 compared to 0.56± 0.21 for the matched problems in Experiment 4,
although not significantly so t(229) = 1.9, p = .054. This suggests that participants were
able to make reasonable structure judgments without knowledge of the exact parameters.
We found that participants’ final judgments of wS and wB and best fitting estimates
assuming rational updating w∗S and w
∗
B suffered bias and variance (Figure 5.9 b).
11
As with Experiment 4 and 5, participants were not affected by the reliability of the
connections themselves wS t(106) = 0.88, p = 0.37, but were affected by higher levels of
background noise wB t(108) = 2.7, p = 0.008. There was no difference in performance
between the two judgment elicitation conditions t(108) = 0.67, p = 0.50.
Participants were no more or less accurate on the final problem when identifying a
Chain structure for the second time (device 7). The most frequent error once again
was mistaking the Chain structure for the Fully-connected structure, made by 17/111
11Fifty-eight participants’ final wB judgments were incorrectly stored, so the N for wB judgments was
53 rather than 111.
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participants, although this was reduced to 11/111 when facing the Chain structure again
on device 7, with only a single participant making the same error twice.
Average edit distance between sequential judgments about the same device was sig-
nificantly increased by removing the record of previous judgments between trials, going
from .73 in the remain condition to 1.0 in the disappear condition t(109) = 3.5, p < .001.
Edit distances even in the disappear condition were still significantly lower than those
predicted by UU, SU or SS posterior or random sampling (all p’s < .001). As in Ex-
periment 4 there was a strong negative relationship between number of edits and per-
formance F (1, 109) = 102, β = 6.4, η2 = .48, p < .001. The edit-distance–performance
relationship interacted weakly with condition t(108) = 1.9, β = 1.3, p = .049 becoming
stronger in the disappear condition. Again, the 71 participants who scored significantly
above chance (1221 or higher by χ
2 test) had lower edit distances of 0.66± 0.29 than the
remaining 40 participants’ 1.3± 0.44.
Additional measures
Participants’ edge confidence judgments increased significantly over trials χ2(1) = 2060, β =
.04, SE = .0008, p < .001, going from .57± .20 on the first trial to .78± .19 by the final
trial.The probability of changing an edge at the next time point was weakly inversely re-
lated to the learners’ reported confidence in it χ2(1) = 67, β = −.03, SE = .004, p < .001.
Reported edge confidences were correlated with both the conditional probability of the
edge states given the rest of the current model rcond =.20 and the marginal probability of
the edge-state in the full posterior under the UU prior rmar =.17 but these correlations
did not differ significantly.
As predicted, reported outcome predictions were more closely related to the predictive
distribution under the participants’ latest structure judgment bt−1: χ2(1) = 1044, β =
.35, SE = .010, p < .001 than marginalised over the full posterior χ2(1) = 580, β =
.29, SE = .012, p < .001. The latest-structure to prediction relationship was significantly
stronger than the marginal posterior to prediction relationship by Cox test Z = 10.9, p <
.001.
Interventions
The overall distribution of intervention choices was broadly similar to the other Experi-
ments (Figure 5.10). “One-on” interventions were the most frequently chosen, making up
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39% of selections. However, unlike the previous Experiments, and consistent with edge
focused learning, the constrained “one-on one-off” interventions were almost as com-
mon as single “one-on” interventions, making up 38% of tests compared to 12% across
3-variable problems in Experiment 4. The intervention selections and informativeness
of intervention sequences were not closely consistent with global expected information,
nor any single type of local focus, but could again be consistent with a mixture of local
effect focused, edge focused and confirmation focused queries.
Free explanations
For device 7, participants gave free explanations for their intervention choices on each of
their six tests. The overall distribution of intervention choices did not differ significantly
from the original presentation of the Chain (device 3) χ2 = 31, p = 0.21 suggesting that
the different response format did not affect the intervention choices that participants
made. In order to assess what the explanations tell us about participants’ intervention
choices, we asked two independent coders to categorise the free responses into 8 cat-
egories. The categories were chosen in a partly data-driven, partly hypothesis-driven
way: 1. An initial set of categories were selected, with the goal of distinguishing the
approximations introduced in A local uncertainty schema from global strategies like un-
certainty sampling or expected information maximisation. 2. A subset of the data was
then checked and the categories were refined to better delineate their responses with
minimal membership ambiguity.
The eight resulting categories were:
1. The participant just wanted to learn about one specific connection. [Corresponding
to edge focused testing]
2. The participant wanted to learn about two specific connections.
3. The participant wanted to learn about all three connections. [Corresponding to
globally focused testing]
4. The participant wanted to learn what a particular component can affect but did
not mention a specific pattern of connections. [Corresponding to effect focused
testing]
5. The participant wanted to test / check / confirm their current hypothesis. [Cor-
responding to confirmatory testing]
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6. The participant wanted to learn about the randomness in the system (as opposed
to the location of the connections). [Corresponding to a focus on learning about
noise rather than structure]
7. The participant chose randomly / by mistake / to use up unwanted tests / they say
they did not understand what they are doing /it is clear they were not engaging
with the task.
8. The participant’s explanation was complex / underspecified / did not seem to fall
in any of the above categories.
A supplementary file (available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/nbt) con-
tains all the materials given to coders and the full set of participant responses. Coders
were permitted to assign more than one category per response, but had to select a pri-
mary category. When the category referred to particular component label(s), the rater
would record these, and when it referred to a specific connection they would record which
direction (if specified) and the components involved. These details will be used to facil-
itate a quantitative comparison between participants’ explanations and our model fits
in the next Section. Raters normally just selected one category per response, selecting
additional categories on only 8% of trials. Inter-rater agreement on the primary cate-
gory was 0.73, and Cohen’s κ = 0.64± 0.04, both higher than their respective heuristic
criteria for adequacy of 0.7 and 0.6 (Krippendorff, 2012; Landis & Koch, 1977).
Figure 5.11, shows the proportion of responses in the different categories across the six
trials. On the first trial participants were most likely to be categorised as 4. — focused
on identifying what a particular variable could effect. On subsequent trials they most
frequently categorised as 1. — focusing on learning about a specific connection. Toward
the end, explanations became more diverse and were increasingly categorised as 5. —
confirmatory testing or 6. learning about the noise in the system. Individuals almost
always gave a range of different explanations across their six tests, falling under 3.0±0.99
different categories on average, with only 5/111 participants providing explanations from
the same category all six times (3 all-fours, 1 all-threes. and 1 all-eights).
Explanation type was predictive of performance F (8, 657) = 13.75, η2 = 0.14, p < 0.001.
Taking category 7 — unprincipled or random intervening — as the reference category
with low average performance of 10.2 points out of a possible 21, categories 1,2,4,5,
and 6 were all associated with significantly higher final scores [14.5, 12.9, 13.9, 13.9, 13.9]
points, all p’s < 0.001.
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Figure 5.11: Experiment 5: Unknown strengths; free explanations for interventions
agreed codes over the six tests in problem 7.
5.7.3 Summary of Experiments
In all these experiments, participants were clearly able to generate plausible causal mod-
els but also did so suboptimally. Averaged across participants, final model judgments
resembled the posterior over models (e.g. Figures 5.5c and 5.8c), however individuals’
trajectories typically exhibited strong sequential dependence, with the probability of
moving to a new model decreasing with its edit distance from the previous model. This
is consistent with our hypothesis that individuals normally maintain a single hypothesis
and update it piece by piece. As found in previous research, participants were worst at
separating the direct and indirect causes in the Chain (3; 8) and Fully-connected (5; 10)
models. A closer look at participants’ intervention choices suggests that this was due to
a common failure to generate the constrained interventions, such as Do[X1 =1, X2 =0],
necessary to disambiguate these options. The simple endorser model predicts this er-
ror by proposing that people ignore the dependencies between the different edges. Our
framework provides a more nuanced explanation. Whether a learner will correctly dis-
ambiguate these options depends on whether they focus on X1 − X3 before or after
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having inferred X1 → X2 and X2 → X3. If they consider X1 −X3 after, then they will
tend to fix X2 “off”, realising it is necessary to prevent the indirect path from confound-
ing the outcome of their test. However, if they have no connection marked from X1 to
X2 or from X2 to X3, they will not expect this confounding activation and so have no
motivation to fix X2 “off” when testing X1 −X3.
Participants’ overall distributions of intervention selections resembled a mixture of edge,
effect and confirmation focused testing, but their distributions of choices were relatively
invariant across conditions and trials while the efficient learners’ were much more dy-
namic. Comparison with the final global information gathered revealed that they did
not select which variables to target particularly efficiently, leading to a considerable dis-
crepancy between the total information gathered by participants compared to an ideal
active learner. However, participants also displayed hints of adaptation of strategy over
the trials: with a preference for confirmatory testing, being more likely to fix variables
“on” when they had children according to their latest hypothesis bt−1, and displaying a
modest shift toward more constrained interventions in later trials.
In Experiment 5 we saw that people were able to identify causal structure effectively
without specific parameter knowledge. Comparing a range of plausible prior assumptions
about edge reliability wS and the level of background noise wB yielded little difference in
judgment or intervention choice predictions. Participants’ overall judgment accuracy was
not affected by the remain/disappear reporting condition, but this did affect sequential
dependence, especially for lower performers who may have often forgotten their previous
judgment when making their next one. The idea, common to the three judgment rules we
consider, that people represent one model at a time was also supported by the additional
measures elicited from participants during the task. With a single hypothesis rather
than distributional beliefs, intervention outcome predictions could only be generated
by the current hypothesis rather than averaged and weighted over all possible models.
Consistent with this idea, we found participants’ expectation judgments were more in
line with their current hypothesis than the marginal likelihoods, although we note that
these measures were quite noisy and the effects quite small.
5.8 Modelling individual behaviour
Across all three examined experiments we found a qualitative correspondence, both be-
tween our Neurath’s ship simulations and participants’ judgments, and between the two
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stage local intervention schema and participants’ interventions. However, both simple
endorsement and win-stay, lose-sample also appeared to do a good job of capturing
qualitative judgment patterns. In order to validate quantitatively which of these models
better describes participants’ behaviour, we fit the models to the data and assessed their
competence relative also to win-stay, lose-sample and simple endorsement. By fitting
the models separately to individual participants we also assessed individual differences
in learning behaviour, and thus gained a finer-grained picture of the processes involved.
5.8.1 Judgments
Models
We compared six models to participants’ judgments, the three process models we consid-
ered in the experiment Neurath’s ship (NS), simple endorser (SE), win-stay,lose-sample
(WSLS), alongside an efficient Bayesian learner (Rational) and two null models Baseline
and NS-RE.
For NS, we fit three parameters:
1. An average search length parameter λ controlling the probability of searching for
different lengths k on each belief update.
2. A search behaviour parameter ω controlling how strongly the learner moves toward
the more likely state for an edge when updating it (recalling that ω = 1 leads to
probability matching, while ω =∞ leads to deterministic hill climbing and ω = 0
to making random local edits).
3. A lapse parameter  controlling a mixture between the model predictions and a
uniform distribution.
Including the last parameter into equation 5.1, this resulted in the following equation









where R is a Markov matrix expressing the options for local improvement.
We operationalised the Simple endorser (SE) (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015)
with two parameters. One is the probability ρ ∈ [0, 1] with which the belief state is
updated from bt−1 to include extra edges from any currently fixed “on” node(s) to any
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activated nodes and to exclude edges from any currently fixed “on” node(s) to any non-
activated nodes (we write bt−1+SE). With the complementary probability 1 − ρ, it stays
the same as bt−1. As with the NS model we also included a lapse parameter mixing in
a probability of choosing something at random, giving
P (bt = m|d,w) = (1− )(ρ bt−1+SE + (1− ρ)bt−1) +

|M| (5.10)
Win-stay, lose-sample (WSLS) (Bonawitz et al., 2014) predicts that participants stick
with their current model bt−1 with probability p(dt|bt−1,w, ct) or else draw a sample
from the full posterior with probability 1 − p(dt|bt−1,w, ct). The fitted version of this
model had a single lapse parameter  giving
P (bt = m|Dt,w) = (1−)
(






The final model, Rational was a variant of the Bayes-optimal observer (Section 2) that
attempted to select the maximum a posteriori causal structure maxP (M |Dt,w;Ct) with
each judgment, with a soft maximisation (Luce, 1959) governed by inverse temperature
parameter θ and a lapse parameter . For this, we considered






Baseline is a parameter-free baseline that assumes each judgment to be a random draw
from all possible causal models
p(bt = m) =

|M| (5.13)
(leading to a probability of approximately 13 for each edge).
One concern with this baseline is that judgments might exhibit sequential dependence
yet be unrelated to data Dtr. Therefore we also considered a baseline variant of the NS
model in which the search behaviour parameter ω was fixed to 0, resulting in a (R)andom
(E)dit model (NS-RE) that walks randomly around the hypothesis space for k steps on
each update. For this model, small k simply denotes more inertia.
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Each of these belief models output a likelihood based on the probability the model assigns
to a belief of bt, given the most recent outcome dt (SE), outcomes since the last belief
change Dtr (NS), or all outcomes Dt (WSLS, Rational), and the most recent judgment
bt−1. Because the choice of prior for Experiment 5 made negligible difference to our
results, we only report models assuming uniform (UU) priors on w. For Experiment 5,
we also marginalised over the unknown values of w rather than conditioning as in the
other experiments as detailed in Appendix B.
Evaluation
To compare these models quantitatively, we used maximum likelihood optimisation as
implemented by R’s optim function to fit the model separately to each of the 370 par-
ticipants across all three experiments.12 We used the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC, Schwarz, 1978) to compare the models while accommodating their differing num-
bers of parameters. Baseline acts as the null model for computing BICs and pseudo-R2s
(Dobson, 2010) for the other models. In Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015)
participants were not forced to select something for each edge immediately, although
once they did so they could not return to “unspecified”, and they could also respond
with cyclic causal model if they wanted. Therefore, we fit only the 75% of tests where
the participants report a fully specified non-cyclic belief, taking the bt−1 to be the un-
connected model on the first fully specified judgment, as we do with b0 in the other
experiments. Recalculating the transition probabilities on the fly in the optimisation of
ω was infeasibly computationally intensive for the four-variable problems. So for Exper-
iment 4 we first fit all three parameters to the three-variable problems only, then used
the best fitting ω parameters from this fit when fitting the λ and  on the full data. In
Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) and Experiment 5 we were able to fit all
three parameters.
Results and discussion
Table 5.3 details the results of the model fits to all experiments. Summed across all
participants, NS has the lowest total BIC (93381) with the SE in second place (94326),
followed by WSLS with (97643), then NS-RE (101837), Rational (1207209) and finally
Baseline with (149313). NS was also the best fitting model for Bramley, Lagnado,
and Speekenbrink (2015) and Experiment 4, with SE winning in Experiment 5. Thus,
12In Appendix B we provide additional detail on how the models were fit.
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Table 5.3: Belief Model Fits.





















N fit M acc logL R2 BIC
Baseline 1 0.27 -17836 0 35672
NS-RE 0.17 51.5 0.21 0.19 32 0.36 -9379 0.49 19762
SE 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.24 13 0.60 -8819 0.53 18642
WSLS 0.14 0.28 56 0.85 -9117 0.52 18736
NS 1.20 100.16 243.8 0.05 0.20 27 0.66 -8197 0.56 17901
Rational 5 124.8 0.00 0.39 10 0.93 -12089 0.36 25182





















N fit M acc logL R2 BIC
Baseline 1 0.33 -41814 0 83628
NS-RE 1.23 1.5 0.25 0.28 33 0.55 -29235 0.30 59490
SE 0.51 0.32 0.56 0.29 30 0.49 -27736 0.34 56492
WSLS 0.32 0.34 29 0.52 -28772 0.31 58053
NS 1.63 1.7 4 241.0 0.20 0.29 27 0.56 -27234 0.35 55896
Rational 13 143.2 0.14 0.36 0 -36362 0.13 73743























M acc logL R2 BIC
rem/dis
Baseline 0/2 0.21 -15006 0 14330/15682
NS-RE 0.9 3 0.10 0.29 3/2 0.36 -10877 0.28 10050/12535
SE 0.80 0.30 0.43 0.27 21/16 0.75 -9181 0.39 8257 /10936
WSLS 0.31 9/8 0.50 -10220 0.32 9402/11452
NS 1.8 121 9.2 247 0.03 0.20 13/18 0.55 -9170 0.39 8620/10964
Rational 31.5 282 0.26 7/12 0.70 -10482 0.30 10116/11678
Note: Columns: M = median estimated parameters across all participants, SD = standard deviation of
parameter estimate across all participants, N fit = number of participants best fit by each model, M
acc = average proportion of edges identified correctly by participants best fit by this model, LogL =
total log likelihood of model over all participants, R2 = median McFadden’s pseudo-R2 across all
participants, BIC = aggregate Bayesian information criterion across all participants. For Exp 5, rem =
remain condition, dis =disappear condition. Best fitting model denoted with boldface.
all three heuristics substantially beat an exact Bayesian inference account of causal
judgment here, but Neurath’s ship, with its ability to capture a graded dependence on
prior beliefs, outperformed WSLS substantially, and the heuristic SE to a lesser degree.
In terms of number of individuals best fit, Table 5.3 shows a broad spread across models:
WSLS – 102, NS – 85, SE – 80, NS-RE – 70, Rational – 28 , Baseline – 4.
The diversity of individual fits across strategies raises the question of the identifiabil-
ity of the different models. To assess how reliably genuine followers of the different
proposed strategies would be identified by our modelling procedure, we simulated par-
ticipants using the fitted parameters for each model for each of the actual participants
in all three examined experiments. We then fit all six models to these simulated par-
ticipants and report the rates at which simulations are best-captured by each model.
Table A.1 in the Appendix provides the complete results for this recovery analysis.
Overall, the generating model was recovered 74% of the time for Bramley, Lagnado, and
Speekenbrink (2015), 82% for Experiment 4 and 75% for Experiment 5 (chance would be
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17%). In all three experiments, data generated by Baseline, WSLS and SE was nearly
always correctly recaptured, indicating that we can treat cases where participants are
well described by these models as genuine. Additionally NS almost never captured data
generated by any of the other models, providing reassurance that NS is not simply fit-
ting participants who are doing something more in line with SE or WSLS. However,
data actually generated by NS was frequently recaptured by the NS-RE (random edit)
null model that makes NS-style local edits but does not preferentially approach more
likely models. This was true in the majority of cases in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speeken-
brink (2015) and Experiment 5. Some of the cases where NS-RE captures NS-generated
simulations are based on participants who were better described by NS-RE in the first
place (e.g. whose search behaviour was too random to justify ω’s inclusion). We find
a similar effect whereby simulated Rational participants with relatively low θs or high
s are more parsimoniously described by Baseline. This is supported by looking at the
more complex four variable problems in Experiment 4: NS simulations were identified
the majority of the time, and when restricted to simulations based on parameters from
participants who were actually best described by NS, 24/27 were recovered successfully.
Thus, it is plausible that some of the 70 NR-RE participants were in fact doing some-
thing more in line with NS. There is a suggestion of this in Experiment 4, where the
mean accuracy of the NS-RE participants is commensurate with SE, WSLS and NS.
The performance of a handful of participants — 10 in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speeken-
brink (2015), and 19 in Experiment 5 — were best fit by the Rational model, which
has one fewer parameter than NS. Naturally, these participants performed particularly
well, scoring near ceiling in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015) (identifying
14.0 of the 15 connections) and as high as the ideal learning simulations in Experiment
5 — 14.7/21 compared to an average of 15.5 for perfect Bayesian integration. This,
along with the lower recovery rates for these experiments, suggests that their design —
both being motivated primarily to look closely at intervention choice — may not have
been difficult enough to separate the process from the normative predictions about the
judgments.
Figures 5.12a and b show the range of the fitted λ and ω parameters under NS. In line
with our predictions, participants’ average fitted search lengths (λ) were mainly small,
with medians between 1 and 2 in all three experiments.13 Because this parameter merely
encodes a participant’s average search length this means that the same participant would
13A few participants made judgments that were sequentially anti-correlated leading to λ parameters
at the limit of the optimisation routine’s precision and correspondingly large standard deviations in
Experiment 4 and 5.
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sometimes not search at all, staying exactly where they are (k = 0), or might also
sometimes search much longer (e.g. k  λ). The median fitted ωs of 6, 4 and 9.2 across
the three experiments are suggestive of moderate hill-climbing. A substantial number
of participants had very large values of ω indicative of near-deterministic hill climbing.
We discuss this trade-off further in the General Discussion. However, note that we were
only able to fit these values to the easier three variable problems. It might be that the




We compared our local model of intervention choice (Section 4) to a globally-focused
and a baseline model. Each intervention model output a likelihood for an intervention
choice of ct, depending on Dtr, Ctr and bt−1.
We compared the overall distribution of participants’ intervention selections and final
performance with edge focused, effect focused and confirmation focused tests. We found
that none of these models alone closely resembled participants’ response patterns, but
overall distributions were consistent with a mixture of different types of local tests.
This was also supported by the free-response coding in Experiment 5, showing that
participants would typically report targeting a mixture of specific edges, effects of specific
variables and confirming the current hypothesis. Therefore, we considered four locally
driven intervention selection models, one for each of the three foci, plus a mixture.
For the edge model, the possible foci L included the 3 (or 6) edges in the model. For the
effect model, it comprised the 3 components (or 4 in the 4-variable case). The confirma-
tion model always had the same focus — comparing bt to null b0 of no connectivity. The
mixed model contained all 7 (or 11) foci. As in Equations 5.4 and 5.5 in Section 4, each
model would first compute a softmax probability of choosing each possible focus lt ∈ L.
Within each chosen focus it would also calculate the softmax probability of selecting
each intervention, governed by another inverse temperature parameter η ∈ [0,∞]. The
total likelihood of the next intervention choice was thus a soft-maximisation-weighted
average of choice probabilities across possible focuses
P (ct|η, ρ,Dtr, bt−1,w) =
∑
l∈L




l′∈L exp(H(l′|Dtr, bt−1,w; Ctr)ρ)
(5.14)
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where




∆H(l|d, bt−1,w; c] η)∑
c′∈C exp (Ed∈Dc [∆H(l|d, bt−1,w; c′] η)
(5.15)
Positive values of ρ ∈ [−∞,∞] encode a preference for focusing on areas where the
learner should be most uncertain, ρ = 0 encodes random selection of local focus, and
negative ρ encodes a preference for focusing on areas where the learner should be most
certain.
For comparison, Baseline is a parameter-free model that assumed each intervention was




Global is a variant of the globally efficient intervention selection (Section 2) that at-
tempted to select the globally most informative greedy test arg maxc∈C Ed∈Dc
[
∆H(M |d, Dt−1,w;Ct−1, c)].
It has one inverse temperature parameter θ ∈ [0,∞] governing soft maximisation (Luce,
1959) over the global expected information gains. For this, we considered
P (ct|Dt−1,w;Ct−1) = exp(Ed∈Dct
[
∆H(M |d, Dt−1,w; ct)] θ)∑
c∈C exp(Ed∈Dc [∆H(M |d, Dt−1,w; c)] θ)
(5.17)
As with the belief modelling, for Experiment 5 we marginalised over the unknown values
of w rather than conditioning as in Experiments 1,2 and 4 as detailed in Appendix B.
Evaluation
All six models were fit to the data from all three experiments in the same way as the
belief models. The results are detailed in Table 5.4.
Additionally, to compare model predictions of local focus choice lt to participants’ self
reports in problem 7 in Experiment 5, we computed the likelihood of each local focus pre-
diction on each test. This was done by calculating P (c|l, η, bt−1,w) for each of the local
foci we considered, using a fixed common η = 20 to capture strong but non-deterministic
preference for the most useful intervention(s). For each data point ct, we then calcu-
lated which lt assigned the most probability to ct the intervention actually chosen by the
participant. Figure 5.13 plots the most likely focus of participants’ intervention choices
in the final problem against the code assigned to their free responses.
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Table 5.4: Intervention Model Fits















M acc logL R2 BIC
1 Baseline 3 0.38 -18262 36524
3 Edges 10.4 26 0.9 80 9 0.68 -14222 0.23 29338
2 Effects 7.7 16 0.5 5 82 0.71 -10701 0.41 22296
4 Confirmatory 3.9 74 9 0.43 -15368 0.14 31182
5 Mixed 15.1 152 0.7 33 32 0.66 -11145 0.39 23185
6 Global 6.1 4.1 4 0.85 -15619 0.14 31686















M acc logL R2 BIC
1 Baseline 18 0.35 -32958 65917
2 Edges 9.3 138 25.9 1012 2 0.37 -28588 0.13 58196
3 Effects 6.2 39 1.5 6 31 0.59 -24213 0.27 49445
4 Confirmatory 3.8 8 24 0.49 -28721 0.13 57951
5 Mixed 8.8 139 17.6 414 27 0.61 -23944 0.27 48907
6 Global 4.9 4 18 0.66 -26652 0.19 53813















M acc logL R2 BIC
1 Baseline 14 0.35 -15365 30730
2 Edges 4.0 8 2.7 77 24 0.74 -13010 0.18 26850
3 Effects 3.2 9 2.9 218 7 0.52 -12992 0.14 26815
4 Confirmatory 2.5 14 12 0.46 -14180 0.04 28776
5 Mixed 3.9 9 5.4 285 15 0.63 -12550 0.17 25931
6 Global 3.0 8 39 0.70 -12850 0.14 26114
Note: Columns as in belief model (Table 5.3)
Results and discussion
The mixed local focus model was the best fitting model over the three experiments with
the lowest total BIC, followed by effects then by the global focused model, then by
edges and finally by confirmation and then baseline. However, there was a great deal of
individual variation, suggesting that a single model does not capture the population well.
More participants were best described by an effects focus (121) than a mixed focus (77),
but each model received some support, with 58, 43, 36 and 35 individuals best fit by
global, confirmation and edge focused and baseline models respectively. Additionally, the
effect focus was the best fitting model overall in Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink
(2015) where there was a strong tendency for participants to fix a single variable on at
a time.
As Table 5.4 shows, mixed was the best overall fitting model for Experiment 4 and
5, and the majority of participants (277/370) were fit by one of the local uncertainty
driven models. Furthermore, Figure 5.13 shows that for effect and edge queries, there
was a strong correspondence between the most likely choice of focus l on Experiment
5 problem 7 and the coded explanation of that intervention’s goal. This was not the
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Exp 1 & 2 Exp 3: Larger models Exp 4: Unknown strengths
Figure 5.12: Gaussian kernel densities over fitted model parameters for all partici-
pants. a) Search length λ and b) log search behaviour log(ω) according to Neurath’s
ship belief update model. c) Local maximisation parameter η and d) local focus choice
parameter ρ under mixed local uncertainty based model. Since we report all partici-
pants’ fits, there are some extreme values — poorly described by either model — that
are not plotted. Annotations give the number of parameters above and below the range
plotted.
case for tests where explanations were categorised as confirmatory. These were most
frequently best described as effect focused tests of the root variable of the true model
(labelled “X1” in the plots).
As with the case of judgments, a moderate number of chance-level performing partic-
ipants (35/370) were best described by the Baseline model. However, 58 participants
across the three experiments were better described by the Global ly efficient testing model
than any local testing models. However, these were not the highest performing partic-
ipants in Experiment 5, with lower average scores than those described by the edge
focused model. This suggests that we do not yet have a good model of these partici-
pants’ choices.
5.9 General Discussion
Actively learning causal models is key to higher-level cognition and yet is radically in-
tractable. We explored how people manage to identify causal models despite their limited
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Figure 5.13: Model and free response correspondence. Each plot is for trials assigned
a particular free response code, each bar is for the number of trials for which that local
focus was most likely given the intervention choice. Effect and edge coded queries were
also diagnosed as such by the model fitting while confirmatory coded queries were most
likely to be diagnosed as querying the effects of the root node(s) in the true model
which always was (or included) X1.
computational resources. In three experiments, we found that participants’ judgments
somewhat reflected the true posterior, while exhibiting sequential dependencies. Fur-
ther, participants’ choices of interventions reflected average expected information, but
were insufficiently reactive to the evidence that had already been observed and were
consistent with being locally focused.
We could capture participants’ judgment patterns by assuming that they maintained
a single causal model rather than a full distribution. We proposed that participants
considered local changes to improve the ability of their single model to explain the
latest data and compared this account to two other proposals, one based on the idea
that participants occasionally resample from the full posterior, and the other, a heuristic
based on ignoring the possibility of indirect effects. While our Neurath’s ship proposal
fit best overall, all three proposals had merit, with simple endorsement winning out in
Experiment 5 and more individuals better fit by win-stay lose-sample.
We captured participants’ interventions by assuming they focused stochastically on dif-
ferent local aspects of the overall uncertainty and tried to resolve these, leading to
behaviour that was comparatively invariant to the prior. Our modelling suggested a
broad spread of local focuses both between and within participants.
By casting our modelling in the language of machine learning, we were able to make
strong connections between our Neurath’s ship model and established techniques for
approximating distributions — sequential Monte-Carlo particle filtering and MCMC
(specifically Gibbs) sampling. Likewise, we were able to explicate intervention selections
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using the language of expected uncertainty reduction but relaxing the assumption that
the goal was the reduction in global uncertainty in the full distribution. The combination
of a single hypothesis (particle) and a Gibbs-esque search, nicely reflects the Neurath’s
ship intuition that theory change is necessarily piecemeal and that changes are evaluated
against the backdrop of the rest of the existing theory.
5.9.1 Limitations of Neurath’s ship
Like any theory, Neurath’s ship was evaluated against a backdrop of a number of as-
sumptions. We discuss some of these here.
Measurement effects
In order to explore incremental belief change it was necessary to elicit multiple judgments
and to make two strong assumptions: (1) that these judgments reflected participants’
true and latest beliefs; and (2) that the repeated elicitations did not fundamentally alter
learning processes. To mitigate problems of these, we both incentivised participants to
draw their best and latest guess at every time point during the tasks, and examined
different reporting conditions to explore the influence of the elicitations on the learning
process.
In Experiments 1 and 2 and the remain condition in Experiment 5, participants could
leave parts of their hypothesis untouched if they did not want to change them. This had
the strength of being minimally invasive; it did not push the learner to reconsider an edge
that they would otherwise not have done merely because they have been asked about it
again. However this came at the cost of conflating genuine incremental change in the
learner’s psychological representation with response laziness. To assuage this concern,
in Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 disappear, we removed the participants’ previous
judgment after they had seen the outcome of the subsequent intervention, meaning that
they would have to remember and re-report any edges they had previously judged (and
not yet reconsidered). The slight reduction of dependence between remain and disappear
conditions in Experiment 5, is consistent with the idea that being forced to re-report
edges made it more likely that they would be reconsidered and potentially changed.
The Neurath’s ship approach is related to anchor-and-adjust models (Einhorn & Hoga-
rth, 1986; Petrov & Anderson, 2005) of sequential magnitude estimation. Hogarth and
Einhorn found that, when mean estimates are repeatedly elicited from participants as
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they see a sequence of numbers, the sequence of responses can be captured by a process
whereby one stores a single value and adjusts it a portion of the way toward each new
observed value. When judgments were elicited at the end of the sequence, participants
behaved more like they had stored a subset of the values and averaged them at the
end. In the same way, we can think of Neurath’s ship as a process in which the current
model acts as an anchor, and adjustments are made toward new data as it is observed.
However, the higher complexity of causal inference, and the greater storage requirements
for the individual episodes will presumably lead to greater pressure to use a sequential
strategy rather than store. Arguably, step-by-step elicitation is a closer analogue to
real-world causal inference than end-of-sequence because causal beliefs are presumably
in frequent use while learning instances may be spread out, with no clear start or end.
Acyclicity
We adopted the directed acyclic graph as our model of causal representation here be-
cause it is a standard approach in the literature and is mathematically convenient.
Furthermore, cyclic graphs were quite rare choices in Experiments 1 and 2 (where par-
ticipants were permitted to draw them). Thus, we simply opted to rule them out in the
instructions in later experiments.
However, in tasks where people draw causal models of real-world phenomena, they often
draw cyclic or reciprocal relationships (Kim & Ahn, 2002; Nikolic & Lagnado, 2015), and
many real world processes are characterised by bidirectional causality, such as supply
and demand in economics or homoeostasis in biological systems. There are various ways
to represent dynamic systems. One proposal is the dynamic Bayesian network (Dean
& Kanazawa, 1989), which can be “unfolded” to form a regular acyclic network with
causal influences passing forward through time. Another is the chain graph (Lauritzen
& Richardson, 2002), in which undirected edges are mixed with directed edges and used
to model the equilibria of the cyclic parts of the system.
Exploring these structures would require a change in the semantics of the experiment
so that people could understand what they were reporting in the presence of dynamical
interactions. However, given this, NS would offer a way of performing sequential, on-line,
inference for such structures, using standard likelihood calculations for dynamic Bayes
nets and chain graphs.
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Evaluation of evidence
Another pragmatic limitation of the current modelling was the assumption of the noisy-
OR functional form for the true underlying causal models. While we did take care to
train participants on the sources of noise in all these Experiments, our own past work
suggests that people may have simpler ways of evaluating how likely models would be
to produce different patterns — for example, in Bramley, Dayan, and Lagnado (2015),
we found participants’ judgments could be captured by assuming they lumped sources
of noise together and just counted the number of surprising outcomes under each model.
One possibility is that people actually formed likelihood estimates through simulation
with an internal causal model. For instance, one might perform a mental intervention,
activating a component of one’s own internal causal model and keeping track of where
the activation propagates. By simulating multiple times, a learner could estimate the
likelihood of different outcomes under their current model (Hamrick et al., 2015), and
by simulating under variations of the model, the learner could compare likelihoods gen-
erated on the fly. This simulation-based view provides a possible explanation for why
participants more readily accommodated internal noise (e.g. wS  1) than background
noise (e.g. wB  0). The former can be “built in” to the inferred connections in
their model and reveal itself in mental simulation, while wB is more of a mathemati-
cal “catch all” for all possible influences coming from outside the variables under focus
(see Fernbach, Darlow, & Sloman, 2010, 2011, for similar proposals). The Neurath’s
ship perspective suggests that people lean on their surrounding network of assumptions
about surrounding causes, controlling for these if they get in the way of local inference.
By being omnipresent and affecting all the variables equally wB was not possible to
accommodate in this way.
Future experiments and modelling might relax the assumption of noisy-OR likelihoods
and allow induction of more diverse functional forms (e.g. Lucas & Griffiths, 2010), or
focus on well known domains where priors can be measured before the task. Another
approach might be to render the noisy-OR formalisation more transparent by visualising
the sources of exogenous noise alongside the target variables, for instance displaying
varying numbers of nuisance background variables on screen for different background
noise conditions.
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Antifoundationalism
The core of Neurath’s ship is the strong assumption that people consider only a single
global hypothesis and make local changes within this. This is the “antifoundationalism”
captured by Duhem–Quine thesis — any local theoretical claim is necessarily supported
by surrounding assumptions. However, this may be too strong for some of the easier
problems we considered here where the worlds may have been small and constrained
enough for some people to reason at the global level. For the three variable problems in
particular, some participants may have been able to consider alternatives at the level of
the whole model, and thus able to shift from Fork to Chain etc with a single step.
While participants’ judgments showed high sequential dependence, they did occasionally
change their model abruptly. The theory of unexpected uncertainty (Yu & Dayan, 2003),
and substantial work on changepoint tasks (Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2010) are associated
with the notion that people will sometimes “start over” if they are having consistently
poor predictions from their existing model. This relates to the idea, in philosophy of
science, of a “paradigm shift” (Kuhn, 1962). The current Neurath’s ship models do not
naturally capture this but accommodate occasional large jumps by assuming a variable
search length (k), meaning the search will sometimes be long enough to allow the learner
to move to a radically different model in a single update. However we might also extend
the Neurath’s ship framework to include a threshold on prediction accuracy below which
a learner will start afresh, for example by randomly sampling a model, or sampling from
a hitherto unexplored part of the space. At present this is captured by the  probability
of sampling a new bt at random on a given trial (which ranged between a probability of
.03 in Experiment 5 and .2 in Experiment 4).
Selective memory
We assumed that participants’ judgment updates were based on the recent data Dtr,
collected since the last time they changed their hypothesis. This is quite frugal in
the current context, as the learner rarely has to store more than a few tests’ worth of
evidence. It also captures the idea of semanticisation — that as one gradually absorbs
episodic evidence into one’s hypothesis, it becomes safe to forget it.
However, the particular choice of Dtr is certainly a simplification. People may frequently
remember evidence from before their latest change, and fail to store recent evidence,
especially once their beliefs become settled. They might also collect summary evidence
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at the level of individual edges, counting how often pairs of components activate together
for example, or remember evidence about some components but not others, or only store
evidence when it is surprising under the current model. In order to fit the models it
was necessary to make simplifying assumptions that captured some form of halfway
house between remembering everything and relying entirely on your hypothesis. Future
studies might probe exactly what learners can remember during and after learning to
get a finer-grained understanding of the trade-off between remembering evidence and
absorbing it into beliefs.
Related to this, we fit a static search behaviour parameter to participants, finding evi-
dence of moderate hill climbing. However, a more realistic depiction might be something
more akin to simulated annealing (Hwang, 1988). Learners might begin searching with
more exploratory moves ω ≈ 1 so as to explore the space broadly, and transition toward
hill climbing ω =∞ as they start to choose what judgment to report. Alternatively, they
might gradually reduce their search length k as pressure to settle on a model increases.
5.9.2 Alternative approximations and representations
The choice of Gibbs sampling, together with a single particle approximation, is just one of
numerous possible models of structure inference. For example we found (data not shown)
fairly good fits by replacing Gibbs sampling with a form of Metropolis-Hastings MCMC
sampling — using an MC3 proposal and acceptance distribution (Madigan & Raftery,
1994; Madigan, York, & Allard, 1995). The two approaches make similar behavioural
predictions but differ somewhat in their internal architecture — a Metropolis-Hastings
sampler would first generate a wholesale alternative to the current belief, then make an
accept-reject decision about whether to accept this alternative, while the Gibbs sampler
focuses on one subpart at a time and updates this conditional on the rest. Ultimately, the
Gibbs sampler did a better job, helping justify the broader ideas of locality of inference
implicit in the Neurath’s ship proposal.
An interesting alternative approach to complex model induction via local computa-
tions (Fernbach & Sloman, 2009; Waldmann et al., 2008), comes from variational Bayes
(Bishop, 2006; Weierstrass, 1902). The idea behind this is that one can simplify in-
ference by replacing an intractable distribution, here the distribution over all possible
models, with a simpler one which has degrees of freedom that can be used to allow it
to fit as best as possible. A common choice of simpler distribution involves factorisa-
tion, with a multiplicative combination of a set of simpler parametrised distributions.
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Thus, for causal inference one might make a mean-field approximation (Georges, Kotliar,
Krauth, & Rozenberg, 1996) and suppose the true distribution over models factorises
into independent distributions for each causal connection. Divergence between this ap-
proximation and the full model can then be minimised mathematically by updating each
of the local distributions in turn (Jaakkola, 2001). This provides a different perspec-
tive on global inference based on local updates. Rather than a process of local search
where only a single model is represented at any time, variational Bayes suggests people
maintain many local distributions and try to minimise the inconsistencies between them.
The biases induced by this process make the two approaches distinguishable in principle
(Sanborn, 2015), meaning that an interesting avenue for future work may be to design
experiments that distinguish between the two approaches to approximation in cognition.
The truth in our case may be somewhere in between. For instance, in the current work,
we assumed people were able to use recent evidence to estimate their local uncertainty
conditional on the rest of the structure, and thus choose where to focus interventions.
To the extent that learners really represent their beliefs with lots of local uncertainties,
their representation becomes increasingly variational.
5.9.3 Choosing interventions aboard Neurath’s ship
The largest difference in intervention choices between experiments was that in Exper-
iment 5 constrained interventions (e.g. Do[X1 = 1, X2 = 0]) were chosen much more
frequently. One explanation for this is that participants might have been forced to fo-
cus their attention more narrowly in Experiment 5, to compensate for their additional
uncertainty about the noise by using more focused testing. Another possibility is that
the different subject pools drove this difference. It is possible that mTurk’s older and
educationally diverse participants (Experiments 1 and 2) gathered evidence differently
from the young scientifically trained UCL undergraduates (Experiment 5). This might
have driven the tendency toward more tightly constrained tests in Experiment 5.
The idea that people relied on asking a mixture of different types of locally focused
question, was borne out by our analysis of the coding of participants’ free explanations.
Explanations almost always focused on one specific aspect of the problem, most fre-
quently on a particular causal connection, or what a particular component can affect,
but also sometimes on parameter uncertainty or, on later tests, confirming their cur-
rent hypothesis. Furthermore, participants almost always referred to a mix of different
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local query types over the course of their six tests. The apparent shift toward confir-
matory testing on the last trial is sensible, since participants knew they would not have
more tests to follow up anything new they might discover. Indeed, this shift would be
normative in various settings.
Subjective explanations are notoriously problematic (Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1993;
Russo, Johnson, & Stephens, 1989). Therefore, we must be careful in interpreting these
results. One common issue is that eliciting responses concurrently with performing a
task can change behaviour, invalidating conclusions about the original behaviour. We
minimised this issue by eliciting explanations just after each intervention was chosen,
before its outcome was revealed. Additionally, we did not find any difference in the
distribution of interventions on the free response trials and those chosen the first time
participants identified the Chain structure.
A second issue is that there are limits on the kinds of processes people can describe
effectively in natural language, with rule based explanations being typically easier to
express than those involving more complex statistical weighting and averaging. That
is, even if someone weighed several factors in coming to a decision, they might explain
this by mentioning only the most significant, or recently considered of these factors,
falsely appearing to have relied on a one-reason decision strategy. There is an active
debate about this, including suggestions that people’s explanations for their choices
are, in general, post-hoc rationalisations rather than genuine descriptions of process
(Dennett, 1991; Johansson, Hall, Sikstro¨m, & Olsson, 2005), but also refutations of this
interpretation (Newell & Shanks, 2014).
In sum, taken with appropriate caution, we suggest that this analysis does provide
a valuable window on participants’ subjective sense of their active testing, with their
relatively specific focus on one aspect of the uncertainty at a time consistent with the
idea that they rely on a mixture of heuristic questions.
The models pinned down interventions less tightly than beliefs in the sense that there was
a great deal of spread in the individuals best fit across the models, and the proportional
reductions in BIC were smaller. There are various possible reasons for this. Firstly, the
models of belief change generally predicted one or few likely models, whereas there are
typically many interventions of roughly equal informativeness to an ideal learner (see
Figure 5.2), which could be performed in many different orders. This sets the bar for
predictability for interventions much lower than for the causal judgments.
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Secondly, to the extent that learners chose interventions based on a reduced encoding
of the hypothesis space, we are also forced to average over our additional uncertainty
about exactly which hypotheses or alternatives they were considering at the moment of
choice (Markant & Gureckis, 2010).
A third issue is that of whether and how learners represented current uncertainty, and
recruited this in choosing what to focus on. In the current work we assumed that learners
were somewhat able to track the current local uncertainties and use these to choose what
to target next. The modelling revealed that, relative to the local intervention schema,
the majority of participants did tend to focus on the areas of high current uncertainty
(shown by the predominantly positive ρ in Figure 5.12 d) but we do not yet have a
model for how they did this. It is plausible that learners used a heuristic to estimate
their local confidence. For example, a simple option would be to accrue confidence in an
edge, (or analogously in the descendants of a variable or in the current hypothesis) for
every search step for which it is considered and remains unchanged, reducing confidence
every time it changes. In this way confidence in locales that survive more data and
search become stronger, approximately mimicking reduction in local uncertainty.
We considered just three of a multitude of possible choices of local focus. These encom-
pass most extant proposals for human search heuristics, encapsulating modular (Markant
et al., 2015) constraint seeking (Ruggeri & Lombrozo, 2014) and confirmatory (Klayman
& Ha, 1989) testing, placing all three within a unified schema and also showing that
many learners dynamically switch between them.
Participants’ free responses provided a complementary perspective, suggesting that even
initial tests were generated as solutions to uncertainty about some specific subpart of
the overall uncertainty space — often the descendants of some particular variable or the
presence of some particular connection. This suggests that the most important step in
an intervention selection may not be the final choice of action but the prior choice of
what to focus on next. This is captured in our model, under which the values of different
interventions for a chosen focus do not depend on Dt−1. This means learners need not
do extensive prospective calculation on every test but can learn gradually, for instance
through experience and preplay (Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013), which interventions are likely
to be informative relative to generic types of local focus. This knowledge could then be
transferred to subsequent tests, and translated to tests with different targets — e.g. if
Do[X1 = 1] is effective for identifying the effects of X1 then Do[X2 = 1] will be effective
for identifying the effects of X2.
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It is worth noting from these data that even when participants’ interventions were rel-
atively uninformative from the perspective of ideal or even our heuristic learners, their
explanations would generally reveal that they were informative with respect to some
other question or source of uncertainty. For example, participants’ tests that were un-
informative with respect to identifying structure were often revealed, through our free
response coding, to have been motivated by a desire to reduce uncertainty about inter-
nal wS or background wB noise.
14 From this perspective we might think of even the
completely uninformative intervention choices — e.g. fixing all the variables — as legit-
imate tests of illegitimate hypotheses — e.g. hypotheses that were outside of the space
of possibilities we intended participants to consider — such as whether fixed variables
actually always took the states they were fixed to. More research is needed to explicate
these internal steps leading up to an active learning action, but the implication based
on the current research is that the solution will not require that the learner evaluate all
possible outcomes of all possible actions under all possible models, but rather reflect a
mixture of heuristics that can guide the gradual improvement of the learner’s current
theory.
5.9.4 The navy of one
At the start we argued that our Neurath’s ship model could be seen as a single particle
combined with an MCMC search. As such, we are claiming Neurath’s ship as a form
of boundedly rational approximate Bayesian inference. However, it is important to
consider the point at which an approximation becomes so degenerate that it is merely
a complicated way to describe a simple heuristic. Many would argue that this line is
crossed long before reaching particle filters containing a single particle, or Markov chains
lasting only 1 or 2 steps. It is certainly a leap to claim that such a process is calculating
a proper posterior.
One alternative to starting from a normative computational level account and accepting
a distant algorithmic approximation, is to start from the algorithm, i.e., the simple rules,
and consider a computational account such as satisficing (Simon, 1982) that provides
adequate license. Our account shares two important problems with this, but avoids two
others.
14We might have extended the computational model of Bayesian inference to incorporate joint inference
over models and parameters which would have incorporated this aspect of testing. However, this would
have complicated analyses since participants were ultimately only incentivised to identify the right
connections.
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One shared problem is the provenance of the rules - i.e., the situation-specific heuristics.
We saw this in the manifold choice of local foci for the choice of intervention — we do
not have an account of whence these hail. This is a common problem in the context of
the adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer, 2001) — it is hard to have a theory of the collection
of tools.
A second shared problem follows on from this - namely how to choose which rule to
apply under which circumstance. In our case, this is evident again in the mixtures of
local focus rules — we were not able to provide a satisfying account of how participants
make their selection of focus on a particular trial. The metaproblem of choosing the
correct heuristic is again a common issue for satisficing approaches.
By contrast with a toolbox approach, though, our account smoothly captures varying
degrees of sophistication between individuals. For instance, with the Take the best
heuristic, Gigerenzer et al. (1999) give an attractive description of one-reason decision
making that often outperforms regression in describing people’s decisions from multiple
cues. However, subsequent analyses have revealed that participants behave somewhere
between the two (Newell & Shanks, 2003; Parpart et al., in revision) often using more
than one cue, but certainly less than all the information available. Thus, to understand
their processing we must be able to express the halfway houses between ideal and overly
simplistic processing (Lieder & Griffiths, 2015). In the same way, the approximate
Bayesian perspective allows us to express different levels of approximation lying between
fully probabilistic and fully heuristic processing, with the simplest form of Neurath’s ship
lying at the heuristic end of this road.
A further benefit of our account is the ease of generalisation between tasks. Heuristic
models are typically designed for, and are competent at, specific paradigms. Since they
lack a more formal relationship with approximate rationality, they are hard to combine
or often to apply in different or broader circumstances.
Here, we assumed that learners made updates at the level of individual directed edges.
Again this is just one illustrative choice, but our model is consistent with the idea that
the learners altered beliefs by making changes local to arbitrary sub-spaces of an un-
manageable learning problem. We showed that so long as the learner’s updates are
conditioned on the rest of their model, and are appropriately balanced, the connection
to approximate Bayesian inference can be maintained through the ideas of MCMC sam-
pling and a single-particle particle filter. A sophisticated learner might be able to update
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several edges of their causal model at a single time, with a more complex proposal distri-
bution. However, on a larger scale this is still likely to be a small subset of all potential
relata that learner has encountered, meaning even the most sophisticated learner must
lean on their broader beliefs for support.
In lower level cognition, inference takes place over simple quantities like magnitudes and
is certainly probabilistic in the sense that humans can achieve near optimal integration of
noisy signals in a variety of tasks including estimation (Miyazaki, Nozaki, & Nakajima,
2005) and motor control (e.g. Ko¨rding & Wolpert, 2004). At the top end of higher level
cognition we have a global world-view, and explicit reasoning characterised by its single
track nature. Rather than claiming these are completely different processes (Evans,
2003), the approximate probabilistic inference perspective can accommodate the whole
continuum. At the lower level the brain can average over many values, as in particle
filtering (Abbott & Griffiths, 2011), with a whole fleet of Neurath’s ships, or via lots
of long chains (Gershman et al., 2012; Lieder et al., 2012). In higher level cognition,
however, the hypothesis space becomes increasingly unwieldy, and inference becomes
increasingly approximate as it must rely on smaller fleets, i.e., fewer hypotheses, and
more local alterations in the face of evidence. At the very top we have a navy of
one, grappling with a single global model that can only be updated incrementally. It is
worth noting that individuals can then play the role of particles again in group behaviour
(Courville & Daw, 2007), giving us approximate inference all the way up.
In sum, retaining the Bayesian machinery is valuable even as it becomes degenerate,
because it allows us to express heuristic behaviour without resorting to separate process
models or abandoning close connections to an appropriate computational level under-
standing.
5.9.5 Scope of the theory
We modelled causal belief change as a process of gradually updating a single representa-
tion through local, conditional edits. While we chose to focus on causal structure infer-
ence within the causal Bayes net framework here, there is no reason why this approach
should be limited to this domain. By taking the Neurath’s ship metaphor to reveal an
intuitive answer as to how people sidestep the intractability of rational theory forma-
tion (van Rooij et al., 2014), we can start to build more realistic models of how people
generate the theories that they do and how and why they get stuck. We might explain
the induction and adaptation of many of the rich representations utilised in cognition
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by analogous processes. Future work could explore the piecemeal induction of models
involving multinomial, continuous (Nodelman, Shelton, & Koller, 2002; Pacer & Grif-
fiths, 2011) or latent variables (Lucas, Holstein, & Kemp, 2014); unrestricted functional
forms (Griffiths, Lucas, Williams, & Kalish, 2009); hierarchical organisation (Griffiths &
Tenenbaum, 2009; Williamson & Gabbay, 2005); and temporal (Pacer & Griffiths, 2012)
and spatial (Battaglia et al., 2013; Ullman et al., 2012; Ullman, Stuhlmu¨ller, Goodman,
& Tenenbaum, 2014) semantics. One possibility is the combination of production rules
(Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman, & Griffiths, 2008) and local search to model discovery
of new hypotheses in situations where the space of possibilities is theoretically infinite.
The sequential conditional re-evaluation process illustrated by our Neurath’s ship model
shows how this radical antifoundationalism need not be fatal for theory building in
general.
5.10 Conclusions
This chapter proposed a new model of causal theory change, based on an old idea from
philosophy of science — that learners cannot maintain a distribution over all possible
beliefs, and so must rely on sequential local changes to a single representation when up-
dating beliefs to incorporate new evidence. It showed that we can provide a good account
of participants’ sequences of judgments in three experiments and argued that our model
offers a flexible candidate for explaining how complex representations can be formed in
cognition. We also analysed participants’ information-gathering behaviour, finding it
consistent with the thesis that learners focus on resolving manageable areas of local un-
certainty rather than global uncertainty, showing cognisance of their learning limitations.
Together these accounts show how people manage to construct rich, causally-structured
representations through their interactions with a complex noisy world.

Chapter 6
The role of time in causal learning
“For all the points of the compass, there’s only one direction and time is its
only measure.”
— TOM STOPPARD
Research on human causal learning has predominantly focused on learning from trial-
by-trial covariation between variables based on observations of the system (Cheng, 1997;
Deverett & Kemp, 2012; Gopnik et al., 2001; Perales & Shanks, 2007), and on active
interventions on the system (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015; Meder et al.,
2014; Sloman & Lagnado, 2005; Steyvers et al., 2003). However, people utilise a range
of sources of information in causal learning (Lagnado et al., 2007) and human causal
knowledge goes beyond mere expectations about covariation (Gerstenberg et al., 2015;
Sloman & Lagnado, 2015). To be able to predict and diagnose causality in real-world
situations, human causal knowledge must often include beliefs about how long different
relationships take to work (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Lagnado & Sloman, 2006) —
for example we know that turning on the heating activates the boiler almost instantly,
but that the boiler will take a few minutes to make a radiator hot, and the radiator
will take much longer to heat the room. Expectations about causal delays can in turn
support structure inference (Buehner & McGregor, 2006; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009;
Hagmayer & Waldmann, 2002; Kemp, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2010) because the
consistency between an observed event stream and the predictions of different causal
models provides evidence about the underlying relationships. This temporal information
is unavailable to a purely contingency-based learner. This Chapter focuses on the role
of time in causal structure induction.
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A strength of the CBN framework is that by defining a language for expressing possible
models it allows causal learning to be framed as a Bayesian model induction problem,
where the learner uses observed evidence to infer an underlying causal structure. From
this perspective, people are generally found to be effective causal learners who make
inferences that are broadly normative (e.g. Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005; Lagnado &
Sloman, 2002, 2004, 2006; Steyvers et al., 2003) but also exhibit the signatures of various
inductive biases and cognitive limitations (Bramley, Dayan, & Lagnado, 2015; Bramley,
Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015; Coenen et al., 2015; Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2016;
Rottman & Hastie, 2014, 2016).
Strengths aside, a shortcoming of the CBN framework is that Bayesian networks do not
naturally encode the temporal or spatial dimensions of causal beliefs, and so say nothing
about their role in causal inference (cf. Gerstenberg et al., 2015; Gerstenberg & Tenen-
baum, to appear; Goodman, Tenenbaum, & Gerstenberg, 2015; Wolff & Shepard, 2013).
Consequentially, many studies have focused on situations where information about time
and space is non-diagnostic or abstracted away. When temporal cues have been pitted
against statistical cues experimentally, judgments have tended to be dominated by tem-
poral information (Burns & McCormack, 2009; Frosch et al., 2012; Lagnado & Sloman,
2004, 2006; Schlottmann, 1999). Furthermore, when researchers have tried to instruct
participants to ignore event timing, participants still treated the observed timings of
events to be diagnostic (McCormack et al., 2016; White, 2006b). These results suggest
that people have strong assumptions about time’s role in causality (see also Bechli-
vanidis & Lagnado, 2013, showing that the influence runs both ways). In the current
chapter we take a novel approach: we eliminate statistical contingency information, and
focus exclusively on what participants can learn about causal structure from temporal
information alone.
Structure of the chapter
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, we review the literature on causal
learning and time. After describing the learning problem we focus on, we then outline
the Bayesian framework and methodology used to explore human causal learning in
time. Experiment 6 explores one-shot causal structure judgments, based on a single
observation of a simple device operating through time. In Experiments 7 and 8, we look
at how people integrate evidence from multiple clips of the same device. In Experiment
8, we focus on temporal delays in a situation where there is no temporal order cue: three
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events always occur in the same order, but the variability and correlation between the
timings of the events is either more consistent with a chain or a fork structure. Finally,
we discuss the scope of our findings and propose future research.
6.1 Existing research
Temporal information is relevant for causal judgments in at least two ways. The tempo-
ral order of events is important since causes cannot precede their effects. The timing of
events provide additional information, since they are diagnostic about the true underly-
ing causal structure when multiple possible structures are consistent with the observed
temporal order.
Temporal order
The assumption that causes precede effects is at the heart of our notion of causality
(Hume, 1740) meaning that, prima facie, the order in which events occur is a highly
important cue to causality. Inference from perceived order appears to be natural, almost
automatic. For example, Wolff and Shepard (2013) cite multiple reports, following a 1997
power blackout in New York, of people having the sensation that an action they had
taken just before the blackout (touching a doorknob, plugging in an appliance, jamming
a ceiling fan) was its cause. Magicians use this to trick their audiences into believing
they can affect objects at a distance, snapping their fingers just before revealing their
masterstroke (Kuhn, Caffaratti, Teszka, & Rensink, 2014).
Precedence also forms the basis for many legal judgments, with establishment of the
order of the events in a case often playing a large role in attribution of responsibility for
a crime (Lagnado, 2011; Lagnado & Gerstenberg, in press). Additionally, an important
concept in economics, Granger causality (Granger, 1969), uses the extent to which past
values of one variable can be used to predict current variation in another as a marker
for causation.
Rottman and Keil (2012) explored causal induction in situations where variables were
measured at discrete intervals. For example, one might measure barometric pressure
and precipitation on successive days. Finding that barometric pressure was high on
Monday and Friday and it rained on Tuesday and Saturday invites the inference that
high pressure causes rain. In seven experiments, the authors find that people readily
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attribute causal relationships from variables that changed state at time t − 1 to those
that changed state at time t, and do so even when a cover story suggests there should be
sequential independence. They argue that people’s default representation of causality is
as a qualitatively ordered sequence of changes, and suggest that estimating statistical
dependence across multiple independent instances, as in contingency-driven structure
learning, is a more difficult, less natural mode of causal reasoning.
Experienced event order also affects people’s causal judgments when events take place
in continuous rather than discretised time. Lagnado and Sloman (2006) explored a
situation that contrasted trial-by-trial covariation with temporal order cues. In their
experiment, a virus propagates through a computer network causing computers to be
infected with different temporal delays. Participants’ task was to infer the structure
of these computer networks based on having observed the virus spreading through the
network multiple times. Participants preferred causal models that matched the experi-
enced order in which computers got infected, even when trial-by-trial covariation cues
went against temporal order cues.
Several studies further suggest that people are reluctant to endorse causal connections
between events which appear to occur at the same time. Burns and McCormack (2009)
found that by age 6 to 7, children strongly favour a B ← A → C common cause
over a A → B → C chain when they observe B and C happening simultaneously and
after A. Even when the causal mechanism is plausibly instantaneous (as in Frosch et
al., 2012; Lagnado & Sloman, 2006; McCormack et al., 2016), people tend to attribute
simultaneous activations of components to a common cause. However, previous work has
not looked at what people infer from situations in which observed simultaneity cannot
be attributed to a common cause, but must either be instantaneous or coincidental.
Additionally, little work has looked specifically at how people integrate evidence of
events occurring in different orders over multiple trials (although see Lagnado & Sloman,
2006).1
Event timings
Going beyond temporal order, we can also consider the exact timing of events as another
source of information about causal relationships (Hagmayer & Waldmann, 2002). Using
only temporal precedence to guide judgments would put everything that ever happened
1We use the→ operator to denote a causal relationship between events (e.g. A→ B means A caused
B), and  operator to denote event order (e.g. A  B means A preceded B).
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on equal footing as a candidate cause; a switch you switched a year ago would be just as
likely a cause of a light turning on, as one you just switched.2 In this section we discuss
what role event timing plays in guiding causal judgments.
In the associative tradition, causal relationships are treated as another form of learned
association, where the constant conjunction, and temporal as well as spatial contiguity
between two variables naturally leads to their being associated by the cognitive system
(Hume, 1748). Since increased intervals rapidly reduce the rate of associative learning
(Grice, 1948; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Wolfe, 1921), associative theories generally pre-
dict that judgments of causality will show this same pattern. Making similar predictions,
early cognitive theories (Ahn et al., 1995; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986) suggested that the
more distant two events are in time, the more costly it will be to sustain the first event
in working memory long enough to relate it to the second event, leading to monotonic
reduction in causal judgments. Lagnado and Speekenbrink (2010) identify an additional
normative reason for why delays will often lead to reduced judgments of causality. All
things being equal, the longer the gap between putative cause and effect, the more likely
it is that other events may have occurred in the meantime that could have also caused
the effect.
Humans are able to make causal inferences that are sensitive to expectations about event
timing. When participants are given information about causal mechanisms that imply
different delays, their resultant causal judgments are strongly influenced by expectations
about average delay length and variability of the mechanisms. Seeing shorter-than- as
well as longer-than-expected intervals leads to reduced judgments of causality (Buehner,
Cheng, & Clifford, 2003; Buehner & May, 2002, 2004; Greville & Buehner, 2010; Hag-
mayer & Waldmann, 2002; Schlottmann, 1999). For example, seeing a regular light bulb
come on several seconds after switching a switch is rated as less causal. However, the
case is different if you learn that it is an energy saving bulb which takes time to warm
up.
As well as unexpected time intervals, variability in intervals across trials has been shown
to reduce judgments (Greville & Buehner, 2010; Greville, Cassar, Johansen, & Buehner,
2013; Lagnado & Speekenbrink, 2010). However, these studies have focused on situations
in which there is a single candidate cause–effect pair. In this chapter, we explore the
more general problem of inferring the causal structure of multiple variables based on
observations of events in time.
2Of course, there are more intervening events in the former case, providing another possible avenue
capturing why the latter is a better candidate (e.g. Lagnado & Speekenbrink, 2010).
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Neuroimaging data also support the idea that timing expectations play a role in causal
learning (Jocham et al., 2016). In two behavioural experiments, participants’ task was
to identify occasional rewarding events in event streams. The results showed that both
associative and “contingent” — or theory-dependent — learning take place simulta-
neously and in separable brain circuits — the former predominantly in the amygdala,
and the latter in the orbitofrontal cortex. Amygdala learning was associative in the
sense that it learned relations between rewards and preceding events irrespective of task
instructions. Orbitofrontal learning was contingent in the sense that it depended dy-
namically on instructions about what delays to expect for genuine stimuli and reward
relationships, only attributing rewards to appropriately timed stimuli. A central goal in
causal learning research is to understand where these theory-dependent judgments come
from. How are people and animals often able to make strong and sensible “one-shot”
inferences about causal structure, without explicit instruction, in situations where naive
statistical learning algorithms would require much more data?
Several researchers have suggested that causal theories might underpin such “one-shot”
inferences (Goodman et al., 2011; Griffiths, 2005; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Kemp,
Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2010). The idea is broadly that, over the course of devel-
opment, people organise their causal general knowledge hierarchically, with the core
abstract features of causation at the top and increasingly domain- and context-specific
features below. Each level of the theory generates a probability distribution on variables
at the level below, and the more specific the subdomain, the greater the constraints on
the space of possible hypotheses. As a learner’s world knowledge gets richer, their causal
judgments can rely more strongly on identification of the right domain and application of
domain-specific knowledge and constraints, resulting in apparent “one-shot” inferences
(see also Lake et al., 2015).
The theory-based causal inference framework provides an explanation for the role of
temporal expectations in causal induction. By learning the typical cause–effect delays
in a particular domain, a learner can use this knowledge to rapidly identify new connec-
tions when candidate events are appropriately spaced in time. Griffiths (2005) showed
how different expectations about delay distributions allow for strong one-shot inferences
about a causal process. In his experiments, participants made causal judgments about
“nitroX” barrels that were causally connected and exploded in different sequences. Be-
cause different causal models imply very different event timings, the Bayesian model was
able to rapidly infer the causal structure from an observed sequence of exploding barrels.
Building on this work, Pacer and Griffiths (2012) model causal influence in situations
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where a discrete event affects the rate of occurrence of another variable in continuous
time. In particular, they capture people’s judgments about the causal strength of vari-
ables that affect the rate of bacteria death in a population over a number of days (cf.
Greville & Buehner, 2007). Extending this approach, Pacer and Griffiths (2015) also
capture inferences about relationships for which the influence of the cause on the effect
is expected to last for some time before it gradually dissipates. Using this model, Pacer
and Griffiths explain participants’ inferences about which of three occasionally occurring
seismic waves affected the rate of occurrence of earthquakes (see Lagnado & Speeken-
brink, 2010, Experiment 7). As predicted by the model, participants’ judgments were
affected by uncertainty about the number of intervening events rather than the absolute
intervals between putative causes and effects.
Pacer and Griffiths’ approach is well-suited to capturing situations where events alter
the rate of occurrence of other events. However, it does not readily apply to situations
in which causes bring about their effects exactly once. For example, an event at A in
their model might increase the number of activations of B that you expect to see over
the next 5 seconds from 0.1 to 1.1. However in their representation the number of events
that occur in total is inherently stochastic. This means that the occurrence of the cause
might sometimes result in no activation of B, or in several activations of B. In this
chapter, we are interested in situations in which the causal relation between two events
is singular — that is, the cause affects the effect exactly once.
In summary, research has established that temporal information plays an important
role in how people make causal judgments (Lagnado & Sloman, 2006; Rottman & Keil,
2012; Sloman, 2005). Causal inference seems to be driven by temporal information partly
via automatic (Michotte, 1946/1963) and developmentally basic (Burns & McCormack,
2009) mechanisms, but also through more complex theory-contingent modes of thinking
(Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005). While previous work has explored representation of
causality in time (Griffiths, 2005; Pacer & Griffiths, 2012), no research to date has
proposed a model that is sensitive to temporal order and incorporates expectations
about intervals between particular events.
6.2 Modelling causal induction from temporal information
Despite the wealth of research on time and causal learning, temporal information has
not been subsumed into a unifying framework for understanding how causal beliefs are
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formed to the same extent as contingency information has. In this section, we lay out
a learning problem that isolates the role of temporal information. We then present our
Bayesian approach to modelling learning in this situation, distinguishing learning based
on information about temporal order alone from learning based on forming parametric
expectations about temporal intervals between causes and effects.
6.2.1 The learning problem
To isolate temporal information, we focus on situations where the learner must identify
the causal structure of a system made up of a number of components that are causally
related but in which the causal links take time to propagate. We assume that the causal
relationships are known to be generative and sufficient in the sense that the activation
of a cause component will invariably lead to the activation of its effect component(s),
but where the delays between activation of the cause and the effect are variable across
instances. In Experiments 6 and 7 we focus on judgments about the causal structure of
a simple system with two causal components A and B and an effect component E that
form a hypothesis space of seven possibilities (Figure 6.1). In Experiment 8, we will
focus on a more restricted space with a single cause component S and two components
A and B that are either its direct or indirect effects. Evidence in all the experiments
consists of clips that show how the different components of a causal device activate over
time. In Experiments 1 to 2 participants are told that the parentless components in the
device activate due to background causes while in Experiments 3 the learner activates
the system themselves.
The different causal connections of a causal structure might exhibit different delays —
for example, in the A-fork (see Figure 6.1) it might take longer on average for A to
cause B than for A to cause E. Furthermore, the same connection might also exhibit
variability in delays across trials — for example, A’s causing E might be subject to
longer or shorter delays on different occasions. As a consequence of this variability,
many causal structures can generate several qualitatively different orders of activation.
6.2.2 Bayesian models of learning
From a Bayesian perspective, learning is the process of updating a probability distribu-
tion over the true state of the world, where the ground truth is treated as a random






















Collider AB-chain A-fork A-singleBA-chain B-fork B-single
Figure 6.1: Possible causal structures in Experiments 6 to 8. The arrows indicate the
direction of the causal relationship. Dotted lines indicate different types of structure.
Note: the Collider is conjunctive — both A and B must occur for E to occur.
variable and its possible values make up the hypothesis space. A Bayesian learner up-
dates their prior probability distribution into a posterior distribution as evidence is
observed. The posterior from one learning instance becomes the prior for the next, and
this process continues as evidence is received. With sufficient evidence, the learner’s sub-
jective beliefs eventually approximate the ground truth provided that the hypotheses are
distinguishable and the hypothesis space contains the ground truth.
Exact Bayesian inference is intractable for most realistically complex problems. However,
for a suitably constrained problem space like the one explored here, Bayesian inference
provides a powerful framework for understanding human learning. We can look at
how people update their beliefs as evidence is presented, and learn about the prior
assumptions they bring to the task.
In the current context, the random variable we are interested in is the true underlying
causal structure m ∈M in the set of possible structure hypothesesM, and data will take
the form of n observed patterns of component activations over time d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn).
We update a prior belief about the possible underlying structures P (M) to a posterior
belief over the structures given the data P (M |d) using Bayes theorem
P (M |d) ∝ p(d|M) · P (M), (6.1)
where p(d|M) is the likelihood function over structures M.
For inference to proceed, the learner needs a likelihood function determining how likely
each structure would be to exhibit the set of experienced temporal patterns d. We
first propose a class of models based on simple likelihood functions that ignore the
exact timing of events but assign likelihoods simply based on their temporal ordering.
We consider two models that differ in whether they allow for instantaneous causation,
that is, causes and effects happening at the same time. We then consider a richer
framework that incorporates expectations about causal delays. We show how, based
on the principles of Bayesian Ockham’s razor (MacKay, 2003), both approaches form
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preferences for different causal structures requiring neither contingency information nor
pre-existing expectations about the duration or variability of the delays.
6.2.3 Only order matters
Likelihood functions
The order of events constrains what structures are capable of having produced the
observed evidence. We capture the information contained in the temporal order of
events in a simple model that divides its likelihood evenly across all order-consistent
patterns. Hence, any particular sequence of component activations has likelihood 1/N ,
where N is the number of distinct temporal orderings consistent with that structure
(Figure 6.2b and c, columns). In the following, we use the  operator to denote event
order. For example, A  B  E means that A preceded B which preceded E. AB  E
means that A and B happened simultaneously before they were succeeded by E.
In the A-fork, A is the cause of both B and E, therefore this structure is consistent
with patterns in which A preceded both B and E (A  B  E, A  E  B and
A  BE, see Figure 6.2a) but inconsistent with any pattern where either B or E
precede A. Whether AB  E or AE  B are consistent with the A-fork depends
on whether one assumes causes and effects can occur simultaneously. In order to test
whether people make this assumption, we will compare two variants of our model to
participants’ judgments. Order non-simultaneous (OrderN ) makes the non-simultaneity
assumption meaning only events that strictly precede other events are candidate causes.
Order simultaneous (OrderS) relaxes this assumption, such that an event can be the
cause of another event even if they occur at the same time. For OrderN , the AB-chain
is only consistent with A  B  E (Figure 6.2b, second column). For OrderS , the
AB-chain is also consistent with AB  E and A  BE, and thus this model variant
spreads its likelihood more widely.3
Because some structures are compatible with fewer kinds of evidence patterns than
others, the order models will tend to favour them over a more flexible structure that can
3Note that several additional possible patterns are not pictured: AE  B, BE  A, and ABE.
We do not use these in our experiments because, by being inconsistent with all structures under the
non-simultaneity assumption their appearance would force a simultaneity assumption on participants.
However, if people actually make the simultaneity assumption, AE  B and BE  A are each consistent
with one fork and one single, and ABE is consistent with all seven structures. Thus we divide the OrderS















excluded any patterns in which E alone occurred first, since we instructed participants that E is always
caused by either A, B, or both.











































Likelihoods (simultaneity assumption)Likelihoods (nonsimultaneity assumption)
1) AB E
3) A BE
2) A B E
4) A BE
A6) B E
















































Collider AB-chain A-fork A-singleBA-chain B-fork B-single
Figure 6.2: a) Seven possible qualitative temporal patterns of three events A, B, and
E. Likelihood functions for the pattern types given the seven different causal structures
with non-simultaneity assumption b) or simultaneity assumption c).
also produce the evidence seen. For example, under the non-simultaneity assumption,
pattern A  B  E in row 2) is the only pattern consistent with the AB-chain, while A-
single is consistent with all but two types of patterns and thus spreads its likelihood much
more widely. Switching focus from Figure 6.2’s columns to its rows gives a perspective on
the models’ posterior predictions. For instance, upon observing a device that activates
in the A  B  E order, OrderN will favour the AB-chain, even though it has not
ruled out the Collider, the A-fork, or either of the two single-link structures A-single
and B-single.
As another example, after observing pattern 1) AB  E, the OrderN model will rule out
all structures except for the Collider, A-single, and B-single. Between these remaining
structures, it prefers the Collider since it is consistent with fewer types of pattern. In
contrast, the OrderS model cannot rule out any structure based on this evidence. It has
a slight preference for the AB-chain and the BA-chain since these two structures are
compatible with the fewest number of different temporal order patterns.
Inference
After seeing data d in the form of one or several temporal order patterns, inference
proceeds by updating a prior over causal structures M to incorporate these data.



























































































































Collider AB-chain A-fork A-singleBA-chain B-fork B-single
Figure 6.3: Three examples of order model predictions. Left hand side: Sets of 4 time
series showing staggered activation of components A, B and E. Right hand side, model
posteriors after seeing clips 1–3 (left column), and after having seen all four patterns
(right column).
The order models only consider the qualitative ordering of the component activations,
for example d = (d1 = {A  B  E}, d2 = {AB  E}, . . .), where di indexes inde-
pendent observations of the device. The models yield various posterior beliefs based on
different sequences of temporal activation d. For example, starting from a uniform prior
over the seven structures, Figure 6.3 shows posteriors under the simultaneous and non-
simultaneous assumptions based on having observed three patterns of activation d1, d2,
and d3, and then again after having observed a fourth pattern d4. In the first example
(top row), both non-simultaneous and simultaneous models favour the Collider after
d1, d2, and d3 and their preference increases with d4. In the second example (middle
row), both models prefer the Collider after d1, d2, and d3 but switch upon d4 which rules
out out all the structures except the A-single. In the third example (bottom row), the
two assumptions lead to quite different predictions, with the non-simultaneous model




The order models make the strong assumption that any activation pattern whose tem-
poral order is consistent with the device is equally likely. While simple to work with,
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the assumption is inconsistent with more specific beliefs about delays between causes
and effects. For example, people may believe that causes take a certain amount of
time to bring about their effects and that these delays will be similar across instances.
To capture these intuitions, we need richer models than OrderN and OrderS – models
that incorporate assumptions about how the events and their timings are being brought
about.
In our task, an observed temporal pattern di consists of the activation times tX of the
three components A, B, and E; thus di = {tiA, tiB, tiE}. We will use tXY to refer to the
temporal interval between the activations of X and Y (i.e. tXY = tY −tX). Additionally,
we will use tX→Y to distinguish causal delays from temporal intervals tXY which are
not necessarily causal.
Independent causes We start with formalising the timing of independent causes
which do not have any parents in the causal structure (such as variables A and B in the
Collider, A-single, and B-single). Analogously to CBNs, in which independent causes
are assumed to be statistically independent of each other (i.e. uncorrelated), we define
independent causes to be temporally independent of each other as well as independent
from the (artificially determined) beginning of the clip. The natural candidate for mod-
elling such events is the exponential distribution, which is “memory-less”. This property
means that how long you expect to wait for an event is independent of how long you have
already been waiting for it. Thus, the information that another (independent) event has
happened does not alter your expectation about the time of the next event. If X is an
independent (i.e. parentless) cause then the timing of X is determined by
p(tX |λ) = λe−λtX (6.2)
with p(tX |λ) = 0 for activation times smaller than 0 and expectation 1λ .
Causal links The generalisation of the exponential distribution is the gamma distri-
bution. It introduces time dependence, and it is therefore the natural candidate to model
the relative timing of causally related events. Gamma distributions can be defined by a
shape parameter α and an expectation µ. Under the assumption that X causes Y , the
timing of Y depends upon the timing of X such that tY = tX + tX→Y with tX→Y being
gamma distributed:
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with p(tX→Y |α, µ) = 0 for temporal delays smaller than 0 (i.e. no backwards causation).
Figure 6.4 shows examples of gamma distributions for different parameter values. The
gamma distribution is flexible and allows to represent a continua of short (small µ) to
long (large µ) and variable (low α) to reliable (high α) delays.
As α → ∞, the gamma distribution becomes increasingly centred around its expected
value, capturing what we will call “positive” time dependence (e.g. Figure 6.4, solid
and dashed lines). One’s expectation about the time of an effect increases following the
observation of its cause, peaking around its mean and then dropping away again. For
α = 1 the gamma distribution is an exponential distribution. Values of α < 1 capture
“negative” dependence whereby upon observing a cause one expects to see its effect
either right away or in a very long time (e.g. Figure 6.4, dot-dashed line).
Colliders/Common-effect structures Within this framework, the Collider (i.e.
common-effect structure) presents a special modelling challenge since it involves a joint
influence of two distinct causes. There are various plausible combination functions for
capturing this kind of joint influence. We explicitly stipulate in all experiments that
the Collider structure is conjunctive, meaning that the activation of E occurs only after
the activations of both A and B and, by implication, the arrival of both of their causal
influences at E. To model this, we consider the tE in a Collider structure to be the max-
imum of the two unknown causal delays for tA→E and tB→E offset by their activation
time
tE = max[tA + tA→E , tB + tB→E ] (6.4)
with tA→E and tB→E being gamma distributed (see Equation 6.3) and tA and tB being
exponentially distributed events (see Equation 6.2).4 Note that a disjunctive Collider is
modelled by simply using the minimum instead of the maximum in Equation 6.4 (see
Equations B.4 and B.6 in Appendix B).
4We derive the full equations for the Collider likelihood assuming shared parameters for the input
connections (as in DelayP ) and separate parameters (as in DelayI), in Appendix B.
















Figure 6.4: Four example gamma distributions. All have a mean of µ = 1000 ms but
differ in their shape α. The exponential distribution is the case where α = 1.
Likelihood functions
The generative model laid out above provides the formal tools we need to determine
the likelihood of any observed temporal pattern given a structure hypothesis. To distin-
guish different causal structures, we translate the absolute timings of a set of events into
specific cause–effect pairings, depending on the parents pa(X) of each variable under
the structure at hand. For instance, absolute timings {tA, tB, tE} will be translated into
{tA, tAB, tBE} with tAB = tB − tA and tBE = tE − tB under the AB-chain hypothesis.
Dependent on different beliefs about the underlying causal structure and delay distri-
butions, the same set of observed activation times will be more or less likely as we will
illustrate below.
Sometimes it may be reasonable to assume that the different connections in a causal
system have the same underlying delay distribution (e.g. they might all be components
of the same type). In other situations, we might expect completely different delays for
different parts of a process (for example it might take millions of years for the wind to
wear through a rock face but only seconds for the freed rock to fall and cause a landslide).
We can embody these different assumptions with different model variants. The pooled
model (DelayP , Figure 6.5a) has a single α and µ parameter for all the delays within
a single structure m ∈ M. In contrast, the independent model (DelayI , Figure 6.5c)
has separate parameters αe and µe for each causal connection e ∈ Em where Em is the
list of all edges in structure m. To capture weaker assumptions (e.g. that the delay
distributions for relationships within a device are related but not identical), one could
extend this with a hierarchical model (DelayH , Figure 6.5b) that combines expectations
about the variability of the different distributions within a device via hyperparameters
that define distributions for α and µ, although we do not do this here.
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We start by describing the likelihood function of the pooled DelayP variant of the model.
The likelihood of a temporal pattern di given a causal structure m ∈ M with timings
governed by parameters λ, α and µ, is the product of the likelihoods of the relative
delays between causes and effects that result from mapping the absolute event timings
tX ∈ di onto the structure of the model
p(d|λ, α, µ;m) =
∏
i∈1:n





p(tiX − tipa(X)|λ, α, µ;m) (6.5)
with p(tiX−tipa(X)|λ, α, µ;m) being either gamma or exponentially distributed (see Equa-
tion 6.3 and Equation 6.2, respectively) depending on whether X has a parent or not
(and assuming that the structure is not a Collider).
For the Collider, we have to determine the joint likelihood of tAE and tBE . Note that we
use “→”s to distinguish the unknown true delays from the observed inter-event intervals
since either tAE or tBE may include some time spent “waiting” for the other causal
influence to arrive. Observed event timings depict one of two mutually exclusive cases:
either the causal influence of A arrived later (i.e. tA→E = tAE) overshadowing the timing
of B’s causal influence (i.e. tB→E ≤ tBE) or the causal influence of B arrived later (i.e.
tB→E = tBE) overshadowing the influence of A (i.e. tA→E ≤ tAE). The joint likelihood
of the observed intervals are then given by the sum of their individual likelihoods
p(tAE , tBE |α, µ) = p(tAE |α, µ) · p(tB→E ≤ tBE |α, µ) + p(tBE |α, µ) · p(tA→E ≤ tAE |α, µ)
(6.6)
with p(tAE |α, µ) and p(tBE |α, µ) being gamma distributed (see Equation 6.3), and
p(tA→E ≤ tAE |α, µ) and p(tB→E ≤ tBE |α, µ) following the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the gamma distribution (i.e. the integral over Equation 6.3 with upper bound
tAE or tBE , respectively; see Appendix for a more detailed derivation).
In the general case, λ, α, and µ are unknown. To get the (marginal) likelihood of the
data given the structure, which is our target for Equation 6.1, we have to marginalise
out the parameters by integration, assuming some prior distribution over λ, α, and µ5
5Concretely, we used an Exponential(0.1) prior for α, an Exponential(0.0001) prior on µ and an
Exponential(10000) prior on λ, corresponding to a weak expectation for positive dependence, shorter
delays and frequently occurring independent causes.
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Figure 6.5: Delay sensitive models and predictions. a) i. Pooled DelayP in plate
notation. ii. Example of inference in the pooled model. Observed event timings are
mapped onto causal delays under different models. Each row shows the causal delays
assuming a different structure. For the Collider, dashed lines indicate that one or other
causal delay may be shorter than the observed intervals. Red arrows indicate structures
that can be ruled out based on order alone. iii. Posterior predictions of the delay model
assuming priors of M ∼Unif( 17 ), α ∼Exp(0.1), and µ ∼Exp(0.0001). b) i. Independent
DelayI model in plate notation. ii. 12 patterns of evidence. iii. Posterior marginal
inference for two possible structures. The plots show posterior delay samples (grey
lines) and their overall density (dotted black line). Both structures share the same
tS→A delays, but the high variance of tAB relative to tSB means these data were more
likely produced by a fork as shown in iv., which plots the posterior probability of the
fork structure averaged over subsets of the 12 clips (red line gives smoothed average,
black dots give posteriors for samples). c) An example of a hierarchical DelayH model in




p(d, λ, α, µ|m) dλ dα dµ (6.7)
=
∫
p(d|λ, α, µ;m) · p(λ, α, µ|m) dλ dα dµ (6.8)
=
∫
p(d|λ, α, µ;m) · p(λ|s) · p(α|m) · p(µ|m) dλ dα dµ (6.9)
We discuss how we approximated these integrals and sensitivity to priors in Appendix B.
To see how this timing sensitivity supports causal structure inferences, let us assume
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that a learner observed the following order of activation: A  B  E. If they make
the DelayP assumption that cause–effect delays for the connections in this device come
from the same distribution, we would expect their belief about whether the underlying
causal structure was a Collider, an AB-chain, or an A-fork to shift depending on tAB
and tBE . Intuitively, if tAB and tBE are similar, this seems most consistent with an
AB-chain. However, if tBE is very small this seems more consistent with the A-fork (in
which tA→B and tA→E would be similar). If tAB is very small then the device might
be a Collider (where we would expect tA→E and tB→E to be similar). DelayP makes
these predictions via Bayesian Occam’s razor. Essentially, it assumes all causal delays
of the connections in a device follow the same underlying gamma distribution. Even
if we have only a vague idea what specific form this distribution takes (as specified by
α and µ), the model will still tend to favour whatever causal hypothesis renders these
causal event timings the most similar on average. The more tightly clustered the inferred
delays are, the more compact the generative causal delay distribution can be (here a high
average α parameter), which leads to higher likelihoods assigned to the data points. See
Figure 6.5a for an illustration of this point.
Inference in the independent DelayI model (Figure 6.5c) proceeds in same way, but
with separate parameters for the delay distributions of the different causal connections
c ∈ C [e.g. α = (α1, . . . , α|C|) and µ = (µ1, . . . , µ|C|)]. That is, it assumes there is no
relationship between the delays of different parts of a causal device. The distribution
of delays implied by mapping event timings onto different causal models can still be
diagnostic, provided one interacts with the same device more than once. Figure 6.5c
gives an illustration of this. Here, the temporal intervals tSB are consistently around 2 s,
while tSA and tAB are much more variable. We can explain these patterns of evidence
more parsimoniously by assuming that the true structure is an S-fork with a regular
S → B connection and an irregular S → A connection. It is not impossible that the true
structure is a chain, but the chain structure cannot explain the additional systematicity
in the data whereby the tS→A and tA→B intervals almost perfectly cancel out.6
6.2.5 Summary
In summary, the non-simultaneous and simultaneous order models (OrderN and OrderS)
operationalise inference based purely on the qualitative ordering of observed activations.
6We note though that with additional assumptions about the functioning of the device the reverse
inference might hold. For example, if the A → B connection was somehow designed to cancel out
variation in S → A so as to lead to a reliable tB .
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These models show how certain structures can be ruled out, and some of the remaining
structures preferred, based on the order of events alone. What structures are ruled
out depends on whether simultaneous events are considered consistent with causation.
While these order-based models are good at ruling out inconsistent causal structures,
they are limited in their ability to distinguish between structures that are consistent
with the observed order of events.
The delay-based models pooled DelayP , independent DelayI and hierarchical DelayH
make inferences within the space of hypotheses not-yet-ruled-out by OrderN , but dis-
tribute their likelihood very differently depending on the expected rate and variability
of the various inter-event intervals. Assuming an uninformative prior on shape α and
mean µ, the pooled delay model DelayP favours whichever structures render the expe-
rienced inter-event intervals the most regular across all connections and all instances,
while the independent delay model DelayI favours whichever structures imply the most
regular within-edge delays on average, even if these differ considerably for different con-
nections. A hierarchical model would make predictions somewhere in between, allowing
that different connections can have different delays but that they are still related.
6.3 Overview of Experiments
6.3.1 The task
We designed a task environment in which participants observed causal devices exhibiting
one or several patterns of activation, and then made judgments about how they thought
the components of that device were causally connected. Evidence was presented in the
form of short movie clips. Each clip simply showed three components, (A, B, and E
in Experiments 6 and 7, and S, A and B in Experiment 8), which were represented
by circles and arranged in a triangle (see Figure 6.6 bottom left). During each clip,
all three components activated by turning from white to grey (Experiments 6 and 7) or
from white to yellow (Experiment 8). Activated components remained coloured until the
end of the clip. To minimise people’s context-specific expectations about what causal
structures or delays were more likely a priori, we kept the task abstract. Participants
were not told anything about what kinds of causal processes underlie the activation of
the different components.
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Figure 6.6: The experiment interface for Experiments 6–7. Clips are shown in the
bottom left panel and judgments elicited at the top.
Possible causal structures
As discussed in the introduction, we restricted the space of possible causal structures to
seven in Experiments 6 and 7 (see Figure 6.1) and two in Experiment 8. In Experiments
6 and 7, each structure featured two candidate causes A and B and one effect E. Par-
ticipants were informed that the Collider structure is conjunctive, meaning that both
A and B must activate in order for E to occur. In Experiment 8 there was a starting
component S and two candidate effects A and B. The true structure was either a chain
(e.g. S → A→ B) or a fork (e.g. A← S → B).
Eliciting judgments
In order to have a fine-grained measure of participants’ beliefs, we asked participants to
distribute 100 percentage points over the set of possible candidate causal structures, such
that each value indicated their belief that the given structure is the one that generated
the observed evidence (see Figure 6.6 top). We can then directly compare participants’
distributions over the structures with the predicted posterior distributions based on our
different models.
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6.4 Experiment 6: One-shot inferences
In Experiment 6 we explored one-shot inference. We asked participants to make judg-
ments about causal devices after watching a single clip and replaying it several times.
We varied the timing and order of the activation of the three components systematically
across problems. Depending on whether or not participants rule out instantaneous causa-
tion, we expected the judgments to better match the predictions of the non-simultaneous
or simultaneous order model, respectively. If participants’ judgments were, in addition
to temporal order, also sensitive to timings, we expected them to assign more points to
structures that imply similar cause–effect delays (e.g. a fork if B occurs very early as in
clip 2 shown in Figure 6.7a, and a Collider if B occurs very late as in clip 6).
6.4.1 Methods
Participants and materials
Thirty-one participants (18 female, Mage = 36.8, SDage = 11.9), recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk, took part in Experiment 6. The task took 15 minutes (SD = 8.7)
on average and participants were paid at a rate of $6 an hour. The task interface
was programmed in Adobe Flash 5.5.7 Demos of all three experiments are available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/nbt.
Stimuli and model predictions
Participants made judgments about nine devices in total. For each device they saw
evidence in the form of a single, replay-able video clip. All clips began with a 500 ms
interval after which the first component(s) activated. The clip then lasted another 1000
ms whereupon the final component(s) activated. We chose a range of clips in which A
occurred at the start and E at the end, varying where B fell in between the two (see
Figure 6.7a, clips 1–7), and then two clips in which E occurred earlier than B (clips 8 and
9). We obtained model predictions by computing the posterior for P (M |d) for OrderN
and OrderS , and DelayP , assuming learners began each problem with a uniform prior
7Flash has been shown to be a reliable way of running time-sensitive experiments online (Reimers &
Stewart, 2015). We checked the time-accuracy of our code during development finding it highly accurate.


























































































Collider AB-chain A-fork A-singleBA-chain B-fork B-single
a) b)
Figure 6.7: a) The timeline for each clip type in Experiment 6 b) Participants’ av-
eraged judgments after viewing each clip (black bars) and predictions by the different
models (grey bars). Error bars show standard errors.
across structures and the base rate λ, and a diffuse prior over causal delay parameters
α and µ (see Appendix).8
OrderN and OrderS model predictions do not vary across clips 2-6 where order was
always A  B  E with both models favouring the AB-chain but OrderN having a
stronger preference (see Figure 6.7b).
They also do not differentiate between clips 8 and 9 (both A  E  B) where both model
variants slightly favour the A-fork. OrderS predicts a broad spread across structures for
clips 1 and 7, in both cases slightly favouring a chain structure while the OrderN favours
the Collider and A-fork, respectively. Sensitivity to timing leads to predictions that differ
across clips 2 to 6. DelayP favours the Collider and A-single and B-single structures when
B occurs relatively early, and prefers the chain when B occurs relatively late. DelayP is
also sensitive to the difference in the timing of E between clips 8 and 9, preferring the
8Note that DelayI does not make predictions here since it requires repeated evidence to form prefer-
ences about the connections.
Chapter 6. The role of time 223
Table 6.1: Experiment 6: Order and Delay Models Compared to Participants’ Judg-
ments
Model r rs Mode match RMSE N con (N dis)
Baseline 20.1 0
OrderN 0.90 0.76 78% 11.1 12 (10)
OrderS 0.71 0.75 56% 16.4 1 (1)
DelayP 0.80 0.64 44% 15.8 3 (4)
Note: Model fits assuming the Collider was conjunctive. r = average Pearson’s r correlation between average
assignments to structures within each device and model predictions. rs = average Spearman’s rank correlation
within problems. Mode match = proportion of problems where participants’ modal choice matched model’s.
RMSE = root mean squared error. N = Number of individuals best correlated by model (con= assuming
conjunctive Collider, dis= assuming disjunctive Collider).
A-fork if E happens relatively late and the A-single if it occurs early. Finally, it puts
more probability mass on the two single structures than the other models.
Procedure
In the instructions, participants were familiarised with the seven causal structure dia-
grams, and the response format. Participants then completed the 9 problems in random
order. Components A and B were counterbalanced such that on approximately half of
the problems faced by each participant their roles were reversed (e.g. B would occur
at the start rather than A and their responses flipped for analysis). In each trial, par-
ticipants observed a single clip of a device and then replayed that same clip. After the
fourth replay, participants distributed 100 percentage points across the 7 possible de-
vices displayed at the top of the screen. They were allowed to replay the clip a fifth and
final time before finalising this judgment and moving on to the next device. Participants
could only move on if their indicated answers summed to 100%. The causal devices were
displayed at the top of the screen in the same order for all problems. For half of the
participants, the order of the seven devices was as depicted in Figure 6.6 while for the
other half it was reversed.
6.4.2 Results
There was no effect of counterbalancing on participants’ judgments, with no interac-
tions between the A-B counterbalance and participants’ assignment of percentage points
across the structures, nor with order in which the structures were presented on the screen.
As Figure 6.7b and Table 6.1 show, the OrderN model captures participants’ judgments
best overall here. Comparing participants’ responses directly with model predictions,










































Figure 6.8: Comparison of probability assignments to Fork, Chain and Collider struc-
tures for clips 1–7 (cf. Figure 6.7), in which B appears at 0, 50, 275, 500, 725 950 and
1000 ms after A, with E always occurring at 1000 ms. Boxplots show participants’ me-
dian and upper and lower quartiles, participants with judgments ± > 1.5 interquartile
range are plotted separately. Results in text are relative to the six middle bars (grey).
Green lines denote DelayP model predictions.
we see that, on average, judgments were well correlated with the OrderN , more so than
for OrderS , and DelayP . While DelayP beats OrderS in terms of Pearson’s correlation
r, it is a little worse at getting participants’ rank order right as shown by the lower
Spearman correlation rs.
As we see in Figure 6.7b participants assigned some mass to the Collider for clips 8 and
9, suggesting that some participants forgot or disregarded our instruction to think of
the Collider as conjunctive (i.e. both causes were needed to generate the effect). To
check this we also computed model predictions assuming a disjunctive relationship for
the Collider (see Equation B.9 in Appendix B). For the Order models this meant that
the Collider likelihood was additionally distributed over patterns 5 and 7. For the Delay
models this meant tE was caused by the earlier-arriving of its two causes. Individually,
12 participants’ judgments were closest to OrderN assuming a conjunctive Collider and
10 assuming a disjunctive Collider. Two participants were better fit by OrderS and
seven by DelayP .
Overall, there was relatively little sensitivity to the exact timing at which B occurred.
If we compare patterns 2 to 6, we see that the chain was the modal response across
early to late occurrence of B consistent with both OrderN and OrderS predictions.
Notwithstanding the dominance of the OrderN model in explaining predictions, there was
some evidence of sensitivity to event timings. Figure 6.8 shows participants’ probability
assignments to the Collider, chain, and fork for clips 1–7. For clip 2 where B happens
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right after A, participants assigned some probability to the Collider structure. For clip 6
where B happens right before E, participants assigned probability to the fork. This
timing sensitivity is revealed by fitting mixed-effect models to the points assigned to the
Collider, the chain, and the fork across clips 2–6, with random means for participants.
All three structures’ assignments vary across these clips (Collider: χ2(4) = 12.7, p <
.013; AB-chain: χ2(4) = 9.5, p = .05; A-fork: χ2(4) = 27, p < .0001) while the order
models do not differentiate between these clips. Furthermore, we see hints of the bimodal
shape for Collider assignments predicted by DelayP . For the model this is a consequence
of the conjunctive combination function (Equation 6.6) under which clip 5 is consistent
with equal (e.g. 275ms) causal delays tA→E and tB→E with A’s influence arriving earlier
and “waiting” for B’s, while not a perfect match to either chain or fork. As expected,
chain judgments peaked when tAB and tBE are the same (clip 4) and the fork when tAE
and tBE are the same (clip 7).
6.4.3 Discussion
In Experiment 6, we saw that participants’ one-shot structure judgments were well
explained by a simple model that only uses event order. The model predictions were
not perfect though. OrderN underestimated participants’ strength of preference for the
Collider in clip 1, chain in 3-5 and fork in clip 7, and assigned more weight overall to
the A- and B-singles. One possible explanation is that participants might have found
some of the structures more or less likely a priori than others. Alternatively, participants
might have expected A-single and B-single devices to generate clips in which one of the
causal components never occurs even though they were told this would not happen in the
instructions. Furthermore, the fact that A and B are perfectly simultaneous in clip 1,
might have been seen as evidence for a common causal mechanism — for example some
prior mechanism that ensures that the joint causes in the Collider occur in lock-step
rather than occurring independently at different times.
The fact that participants’ structure preferences were stronger than what was predicted
by OrderN might relate to the fact that they replayed each clip several times. Some
participants might have treated this as repeated evidence leading to stronger predictions.
However, this does not explain the spread of probability in clips 2 and 6.
Participants’ judgments shifted over clips 2 to 6 as predicted by DelayP . This is evidence
for some sensitivity to timing, however it was not sufficient to alter many participants’
modal judgments away from those predicted by OrderN . Figure 6.8 shows an inverted
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U pattern for the chain across clips 2 to 6, rather than the inverted V shaped curve
predicted by DelayP . An explanation for this is that people have limited ability to
detect differences between interval lengths, with the modest differences between tAB
and tBE in clips 3–5 falling below this threshold. Generally, participants exhibited a
robust preference for the chain structure whenever activations occurred sequentially.
In Experiment 6, participants had very little evidence to go on. Having observed a device
in action only once, one cannot experience its full range and variability in behaviour.
Furthermore, single observations limit the scope for forming expectations about delays.
In fact, the timings in Experiment 6 were only useful predicated on the DelayP assump-
tion that all cause–effect relationships between the components within a device have the
same means and variances.9 Thus, to better investigate the adequacy of the Order and
Delay models, we now turn to extended learning, where participants observe multiple
different clips of the same device and need to integrate the evidence to narrow in on the
true causal structure.
6.5 Experiment 7: Integrating evidence
In this experiment participants saw several different clips for each causal device. To
explore how participants integrated evidence, and to separate the predictions of our two
order-based models OrderN and OrderS , we manipulated the order in which components
activated during each clip. Participants saw several pieces of evidence, made an initial
judgment, and then were able to update their judgment after some additional evidence.
This procedure allows us to explore how learners revise their beliefs as they receive more
evidence.
We hypothesised that participants’ deviations from model predictions in Experiment 6
could be partly due to their having different assumptions about which structures are a
priori more likely than others. Another possibility is that while many participants may
be relying on temporal order, they might still distribute their likelihood differently than
simply dividing it evenly across order-consistent patterns, in particular they might think
qualitative patterns that imply reliable delays are more likely than those that do not. We
test both of these questions directly in Experiment 7 by eliciting participants’ priors and
9Although we note that participants could have formed delay expectations across the task in a
hierarchical model fashion.
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order-dependent likelihoods alongside having them make posterior judgments. This al-
lows us to assess the relationship between prior beliefs, assumptions about the likelihood
of different patterns, and posterior inferences on the level of individual participants.
6.5.1 Methods
Participants
Forty participants (19 female, Mage = 30.8, SDage = 7.4) were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk as in the previous experiments. The task took 27.0 minutes (SD = 16.6)
on average and participants were paid at a rate of $6 an hour.
Stimuli and model predictions
In this experiment, we created evidence sets for 8 different “devices”. For each device,
participants were presented with four patterns of evidence (see Table 6.3). They were
asked to provide a first judgment after they had seen the first three patterns of evidence,
and were then given the chance to update their judgments after having seen the fourth
pattern. We selected patterns such that, for five of the devices, our models predicted
a strong shift in belief between the first and the second judgment, while for the other
three, little or no shift was predicted.
For example, for device 4 (Table 6.3) participants first saw patterns 1, 2, and 5 (AB  E,
A  B  E and B  A  E) resulting in a strong prediction by both the OrderN
and OrderS models that participants will favour the Collider. Finally, participants saw
pattern 4 (A  E  B) which is incompatible with the (conjunctive) Collider model,
meaning that both models predict a dramatic shift to A-single — the only remaining
structure that is consistent with all four patterns (Figure 6.3 middle row). For three of
these five devices the same shift was predicted by both OrderN and OrderS , whereas for
the other two a different shift was predicted. We only used sets of patterns that did not
lead any of the considered models to rule out all the causal structures.
In addition to whether each set of patterns led to a large predicted shift between partic-
ipants’ first and second judgments, we also selected sets of evidence for which the most
likely structure differed depending on whether or not participants made the assumption
that causes and effects can occur simultaneously. Thus, OrderN and OrderS disagreed
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Table 6.2: Experiment 7: Possible Temporal Order Patterns
Pattern 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Order AB  E A  B  E A  BE A  E  B B  A  E B  AE B  E  A
Table 6.3: Experiment 7: Evidence Sets (1st - 4th Piece of Evidence) for the 8 Devices
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1st 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
2nd 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
3rd 5 2 4 5 2 2 2 2
4th 2 2 3 4 4 5 1 6
Shift N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Different N N N Y Y
Note: The numbers in the rows from 1st to 4th refer to the temporal order patterns shown in Table 6.2. The
roles of components A and B were counterbalanced (e.g. pattern 2 A  B  E becomes pattern 5 B  A  E)
and responses re-coded. Shift shows whether a change of MAP judgment is predicted by one or both Order
models (N)o/(Y)es. Different shows whether this shift is predicted to be different between OrderN and OrderS .
about the most likely structure for one or both judgments on 2 of the 8 devices (see
Figure 6.3c for an example).
Since we elicit individuals’ priors and order-based likelihoods, we can construct an in-
dividual order-based model OrderIV that makes predictions about PIV (M |d) given the
qualitative order of events and each participant’s subjective likelihoods PIV (d|M) and
prior PIV (M).
In the experiment, we drew intervals between components independently, effectively
averaging out any effect of specific timings at the group level. Because each participant
experienced different timings, and might have different priors, the DelayP model also
makes slightly different predictions for each participant.
Procedure
After reading the instructions, participants had to successfully answer comprehension
check questions to proceed. The order in which the devices were presented was ran-
domised between participants. However, the order of clips for each device was always as
shown in Table 6.3. We varied the interval between each activation, drawing each from a
uniform distribution between 200 and 1200 ms. The clips used in the experiment varied
in total length between 1189 and 3094 ms depending on these intervals and whether
there were three staggered component activation events (patterns 2, 4, 5 and 7) or only
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a) b)
Figure 6.9: Experiment 7 interface. a) Eliciting priors before main task b) Eliciting
likelihoods after main task.
two (patterns 1, 3 and 6). We counterbalanced two presentation orders of the seven
structure hypotheses shown at the top of the screen between participants (Figure 6.6a).
In addition to the posterior judgment phase from Experiment 6, we added an initial prior
judgment phase in which participants were asked to assign 100% points across the seven
structures to indicate how probable they thought each of the different structures was a
priori (see Figure 6.9a). In the posterior judgment phase, participants made judgments
for 8 devices. They were provided with the qualitative visual summary of the clips they
had seen. Finally, participants completed a likelihood judgment phase. In this phase,
participants made seven additional percentage allocations, one for each causal structure.
For each allocation, they were shown one of the seven structure diagrams. They were
then asked: “Out of 100 tries, how often would you expect this device to activate in
each of the following temporal orders?” Participants distributed 100%-points across the
different temporal order patterns (see Figure 6.9b). The order in which participants
were asked about each structure, and the order in which the different temporal patterns
appeared on each page were randomised between subjects.
When making their posterior judgments, participants were provided with a qualitative
summary of the clips they had seen so far (similar to the those in Figure 6.12a).
Participants were instructed that clicking on the “Start” button constituted the cause of
any parentless components in the model. This was indicated in the structure hypotheses
by the addition of arrows connecting to any parentless components in each diagram (cf.
Figure 6.9a).
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Collider AB-chain A-fork A-singleBA-chain B-fork B-single
Figure 6.10: Elicited priors split into clusters as detailed in text. Error bars show
standard errors.
6.5.2 Results
We will discuss the results from the prior judgment phase, likelihood judgment phase,
and posterior judgment phase in turn.
Prior judgment phase
21 of the forty participants’ priors differed significantly from a uniform according to χ2
tests, with Bonferroni corrected significance (i.e. p < .0540 ). After removing two par-
ticipants who assigned 0% to more than half of the structures, we performed a cluster
analysis on the remaining 38 participants, finding three clusters.10 Twenty-two par-
ticipants assigned roughly equal weight to all seven options (see Figure 6.10). Twelve
assigned approximately double to the Collider compared to the rest of the structures.
Four other participants formed a third cluster with no apparent systematicity in their
priors.
The 12 participants who gave more mass to the Collider structure might have been
thinking in terms of types of structure, dividing evenly across Colliders, chains, forks
and single, then subdividing within each type. This could explain their putting more
prior weight on the Collider, since it is the only structure within its class. By splitting
the resulting probabilities across class members, the Collider ends up with greater prior
probability due to being a unique member of its class.
10This was established by fitting a Gaussian finite mixture model using R’s mclust package.


























































































Figure 6.11: Elicited likelihoods. a) Nine temporal order patterns b) Participants’
elicited likelihoods compared with those of OrderN and a variant of OrderN that dis-
tributes likelihoods across types of consistent patterns — lumping together A  B  E
and B  A  E for the Collider, and A  B  E and A  E  B for the forks. Error
bars show standard errors.
Likelihood judgment phase
Table 6.4: Experiment 7: Likelihood Judgment Model Fits
Model r rs Mode match RMSE N
Baseline 11% 15.4 1
OrderN 0.92 0.78 71% 8.9 11
OrderS 0.57 0.80 43% 12.8 4
DelayP 0.98 0.81 100% 7.3 24
Note: r = average Pearson’s r correlation between average assignments to structures within each device and
model predictions. rs = average Spearman’s rank correlation within problems. Mode match = proportion of
problems where participants’ modal choice matched model’s. RMSE = root mean squared error. N = Number
of individuals best correlated by model.
Likelihood judgments were most highly correlated with marginal likelihoods of the pat-
terns under DelayP (r = .98), followed by OrderN with OrderS considerably lower (see
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Table 6.4).11 Inspecting Figure 6.11, reveals that the DelayP based likelihoods captured
the fact that participants assign more probability to the patterns implying reliable de-
lays (more to pattern 1 than patterns 2 or 5 for the Collider, and more to pattern 3 than
2 or 4 for the A-fork, and similarly for the B fork).
To check whether participants largely made the same assumptions about the devices as
our models, we checked how frequently they assigned likelihoods to patterns ruled out
under all of the models we consider. Overall, participants assigned much less likelihood to
these patterns (10.5%) compared to the 44% expected from random allocation. However,
eighteen participants assigned some likelihood to patterns ruled out by OrderN , OrderS
and DelayP , assigning an average of 7.4 ± 13% of their points to 5.3 ± 10 of the 24
patterns. Of these, the most frequently were A  E  B and B  E  A under
the Collider, with nonzero likelihoods assigned by 12 and 14 participants respectively.
As a result there was a higher probability of assigning non-zero likelihoods to patterns
ruled out by our models under the conjunctive Collider than on average over the other
structures χ2(1) = 5.1, p = 0.02. This confirms our suspicion that some participants
did not make the conjunctive assumption when reasoning about the Collider, in spite of
instructions.
Posterior judgment phase
We analysed the posterior judgments by comparing linear mixed models with random
intercepts for participants, and structures within participants. By design, neither device
(1:8) nor judgment (1st vs. 2nd) can have a main effect on assignment of % points. This
is because judgments were constrained to add up to 100% across the structures. Instead,
effects are indicated by interactions between these different factors and the assignments
across the structures. Structure interacted with device χ2(55) = 1384, p < .0001, con-
firming that judgments were affected by the different evidence sets. Judgment (1st versus
2nd) also interacted with device χ2(7) = 99, p < .0001, and there was a three-way in-
teraction between judgment, structure and device χ2(49) = 286, p < .0001 confirming
that the impact of the final piece of evidence was different for some devices than others.
The complexity of these interactions prohibits direct interpretation but we can compare
judgments’ to the predictions of Bayesian updating based on participants’ elicited priors
and likelihoods, either with or without additional sensitivity to the intervals.
11We assumed the same parametrisation as in Experiment 6, and encoded the timings implied by the
depictions of the order patterns (e.g. Figure 6.11a) assuming they represented a total interval of 1400
ms, with 700 ms between the initial and middle events for patterns 2, 4, 5 and 7, corresponding to the
mean interval between events in the task.





















































































































































































































Collider AB-chain A-fork A-singleBA-chain B-fork B-single
Figure 6.12: Experiment 7 posterior judgments. a) Devices and qualitative or-
der of activations for each. Note: Exact timings were drawn at random from
Uniform(200, 1200) for each participant in this experiment and so are not shown in
full. b) Participants’ posterior judgments (black bars) compared to a model based on
individually elicited priors and order-based likelihoods OrderIV (grey bars). Left hand
column, judgments after viewing 3 clips, right hand column judgments after all four
clips. The OrderIV bars omit cases in which participants’ chosen likelihoods and priors
led to all hypotheses being ruled out. Error bars show standard errors.
Participants’ average posteriors were very closely correlated with the predicted average
over posteriors based on the priors and order-based likelihoods they provided (OrderIV ).
By computing these posteriors then averaging over participants, we get a r = .95 cor-
relation with judgments and a RMSE of 7.0% compared to baseline of 14.3%. It does
not make sense to average the Delay model posteriors in this experiment since timings
differed between participants. However, we can check for timing sensitivity at the level
of individuals. Here, we find that most participants’ posteriors are still best described by
the OrderIV model that combines the priors and order-based likelihoods they provided
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themselves (28/40).12 However 10 were better described by the posteriors under DelayP
suggesting some additional sensitivity to experienced timing.
Inspecting Figure 6.12 we see that aggregated participant posterior judgments are typi-
cally a little less peaked than the aggregated Bayesian posterior predictions, even though
these were based on their priors and likelihoods, and account for the heterogeneity of
assumptions people made about the task. In particular, where we chose a fourth clip
such that we predicted a modal shift between the first and second judgments (devices
5-8), we see considerable residual percentage points for the previously favoured structure
to that which the models favour after. For example, for device 5, participants’ priors
and likelihoods suggest they should strongly favour the A-fork after viewing the final
clip, but participants move only around half the probability mass, leaving a considerable
amount “behind” on the previously favoured AB-chain, which all our models consider
to be ruled out. This suggests that participants were generally somewhat conservative
in their updates. Their beliefs were moved less by the evidence than their priors and
likelihoods would suggest they should be (Edwards, 1968). To test this more thoroughly
we considered a variant of OrderIV that updates its beliefs conservatively.
We can model conservatism within the Bayesian framework through addition of unbiased
noise to participants’ likelihood functions, such that patterns that should be ruled out by
a structure given one’s assumptions, instead retain some  probability. If participants
are generally conservative, we expect such a model that incorporates noise into the
likelihoods for each observation to better explain their final judgments.
To do this, we created noisy likelihoods by mixing each participant’s reported likelihood
function with uniform likelihoods (with 19 over the 9 patterns of data participants dis-
tributed over for each structure) to a degree controlled by a free parameter  ∈ [0, 1] (i.e
PIV (d|s)cons = (1 − )PIV (d|s) + 19).13 We fit  to each participant’s data separately,
by maximising the correlation between the prediction given Bayesian integration of the
priors and likelihoods they reported, and their own posterior judgments.14 We found
that 32/40 participants had a non-negligible best-fitting  parameter (> 0.01), indicating
conservatism in their evidence integration relative to the Bayesian ideal. The mean 
12For 14% of first and 27% of second judgments, all structure hypotheses were ruled out based on
combining individuals’ priors and likelihoods. This happened at least once for 19 out of the 40 partic-
ipants. To allow comparison we simply had the Order model predict a uniform distribution over the
hypotheses in these cases, guaranteeing a correlation of 0 for that device — the same as the Baseline
model.
13For  = 1, P consIV (d|M) is uniform and therefore results in no belief change.
14We use the Brent (2013) algorithm to do the optimisation as implemented by R’s optim function.
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was .36 (SD = .35). Inclusion of conservatism increased the aggregate model correlation
of OrderconsIV to r = .97, RMSE= 6.5% compared to OrderIV ’s r = .95, RMSE= 7.0%.
6.5.3 Discussion
In Experiment 7, we attained a clearer picture of the sources of variability in people’s
causal structure inferences. Many participants reported priors that distributed proba-
bility mass uniformly at the level of types of structures rather than response options.
The Collider was the only unique structure (since there were two chains, two forks and
two singles), and it was judged to be a priori more likely than the rest of the struc-
tures by many participants. This suggests that these participants generated uniform
prior probabilities based on more abstract representations of the causal structures and
evidence patterns, rather than taking the option set we provided as distributionally
representative.
Participants found structures that exhibited equal delays more likely than unequal de-
lays. We were able to capture this very well by our DelayP model which favours struc-
tures that imply causal delays that are more similar on average (with a r = .98 correla-
tion with the aggregate patterns and a better fit than the other models we considered for
24/40 participants). Participants’ made these likelihood judgments after having com-
pleted the posterior judgment phase. It is thus possible that they tried to make their
likelihood judgments consistent with the posterior judgments they had provided in the
previous phase of the experiment.
Interestingly, despite distributing likelihoods in a way that suggested they preferred equal
delays across devices’ components, participants still appeared quite insensitive to exact
event timings. The majority of participants’ posterior judgments were better described
by OrderIV than DelayP suggesting that participants paid little attention to exactly how
far apart in time the events were in the clips. We note here though that the design of the
experiment might have nudged people toward this behaviour. We provided summaries
showing the qualitative order of events in Experiment 7 while the exact event timings
were only represented in the clips themselves. This may have encouraged participants
to focus predominantly on order. Furthermore, by selecting clips that provided lots of
order information, the resulting data was not distributionally representative of reliable
generative gamma delays.
We found that we can capture participants judgments even better by positing that
they were somewhat conservative in their integration of the evidence they observed,
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over and above what was implied by the likelihoods they provided. Conservatism rel-
ative to Bayesian predictions is a consistent psychological finding (Bramley, Lagnado,
& Speekenbrink, 2015; Edwards, 1968; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983). In this task,
it could reflect a number of things. Participants may have suspected that the devices
might change structure over time, and so not want to rule out a possibility that could
later be true. They might also distrust what they were told in the instructions, have
forgotten or be unsure about them (Corner, Harris, & Hahn, 2010). Under-updating of
judgments might more fundamentally be a consequence of their processing limitations,
either directly, or as a way of compensating for the possibility of having made perceptual
or memory errors about the evidence they had seen.
Our qualitative order models did well in explaining participants’ inferences in the tasks
we have looked at so far, even explaining evidence integration over multiple trials where
there is, in principle, enough timing evidence to start to form expectations about the de-
lays. However the experiment emphasised order information by using non-representative
delays and providing qualitative visual summaries of the evidence during posterior judg-
ments, yet DelayP still outperformed OrderN for some participants. Finally, the close
correspondence between DelayP and participants’ qualitative likelihood ratings clearly
show that timing matters, even if their role here was predominantly limited to shaping
peoples’ order expectations.
To look more closely at the role of timing, we now turn our focus to a situation where
order is non-diagnostic and the only available information comes from the variability
and correlation in event timing. This will allow us to assess the extent to which people
are capable of using timing information at all, and the adequacy of our normative model
in capturing the ways in which people use temporal information.
6.6 Experiment 8: Learning from timing variability alone
In this experiment, we focus on causal inference from timing variability alone. To isolate
timing from order cues, we chose a more constrained situation than before, with only two
possible structures (an S → A→ B chain and an A← S → B fork) and evidence where
the order of activation of three components was (almost) always the same (S  A  B).
We systematically varied the mean and variability of the inter-event timings such that
they were more consistent with having been generated by either a chain or a fork under
the DelayI assumption as we describe below.
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We hypothesised that participants would be sensitive to these differences and able to use
them to distinguish between the two candidate structures. However, we also expected
based on the results from the previous experiments, that participants would have a gen-
eral preference for the chain. While the chain can only produce the S  A  B pattern,
the fork is more flexible. We also hypothesised that participants would find it more dif-
ficult to draw inferences from quantitative differences in time intervals, versus the more
obvious and definitive qualitative differences in event order. Thus, we predicted that
participants would be more uncertain overall in their posterior judgments. To assess
how well participants detect and track timing variability across tests and hypotheses,
we first elicited judgments based on simply experiencing the timings. Afterwards, we
provided participants with summaries of the trials detailing all the timings visually, and
allowed them to update their judgments. The idea was that providing participants with
summaries would eliminate any potential memory effects, or effects resulting from per-
ceptual noise associated with encoding the timings, providing a helpful comparison to
the judgments based on experience alone. Generally, we expected participants’ prefer-
ence for one of the two structures to become stronger and closer to normativity after
having seen the summary.
A further question is whether participants who are able to learn the true causal model
are also able to learn the causal delays, such that they can make predictive judgments
about what patterns of evidence the device is likely to produce in future tests. To
explore this question, the experiment included an additional task where participants
had to make a predictive judgment.
6.6.1 Methods
Participants and materials
104 University College London undergraduates (87 female, Mage = 18.8, SDage = 0.81)
took part in this experiment under laboratory conditions as part of a course requirement.
The task took 23.0 minutes (SD = 3.1).
Stimuli
Participants had to judge whether a device was a S → A → B chain or a A ← S → B
fork. Both chain and fork structures shared an S → A connection, but differed in
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Figure 6.13: Experiment 8 stimuli and model predictions. a) Graphical representa-
tion of the five device types. b) Plot showing the 12 patterns generated for each device.
c) Red inverted triangles: tAB for patterns 1:12. Gray lines: P (GA→B |d) for a posterior
sample of αs and βs. Dashed black line: The posterior marginal likelihood of GA→B .
d) As in c) but for GS→B under the fork structure. e) Posteriors P (m = Fork|d) for
progressively more evidence. Individual dots for the samples of evidence seen by partic-
ipants, lines smoothed average (using the general linear additive model with integrated
smoothness estimation gam from R’s mgcv library). Note: Individual points are jittered
to increase visibility.
whether they had an S → B or an A → B connection. This implies that tB could be
explained by one of two delay distributions: either tS→B or tA→B. Under the indepen-
dent DelayI model, this results in a preference for one of the two structures, depending
on which of these inferred delay distributions can assign more likelihood to the evidence
(marginalising over its unknown parameters).
In order to construct the evidence, we first created two generative chain (Chain1 and
Chain2) and fork devices (Fork1 and Fork2) by augmenting each connection with a delay
distribution (see Figure 6.13a). All four devices shared an S → A connection with delay
distribution GS→A(α = 5, µ = 1000ms). Concretely, this meant that A would occur
an average of 1000ms seconds after S but with considerable variability. We then chose
distributions for A → B for the chains and S → B for the forks such that the interval
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between S and B tSB was 2000ms on average, but the shape and extent of the variability
in the timing of B depended on the underlying connections.
In Chain1 there was a near-constant GA→B(α = 1000, µ = 1000ms), while in Chain2
tA→B had as much variability as tS→A. In Fork1, the S → B connection had a near-
constant 2 second delay GS→B(α = 1000, µ = 2000ms) while in Fork2 the delay was
variable GS→B(α = 10, µ = 2000ms).
We used these four generative devices to select sets of 12 clips used as evidence. To
ensure that the selection of clips was representative for the generating distributions, we
took 12 equally spaced quantiles from each distribution.
To ensure that the delay draws for GS→B (or GA→B for the forks) were independent
of those for GS→A, they were paired in counterbalanced order. The resulting sets of
evidence are depicted in ascending order of tSA in Figure 6.13b. Finally, we included
a variant of Fork2, named Fork2rev, which included a single order reversal trial. This
allows us to compare the respective strengths of order and timing cues.
Model predictions
We used DelayI to obtain a posterior joint distribution over the true structure (i.e.
fork or chain) and its associated parameters.15 We obtained posterior predictions by
averaging over the parameters. These predictions are normative in the sense that the
DelayI model inverts the true generative model. Figure 6.13e shows how these predic-
tions change with each additional clip seen. Because we randomised the order of the
clips, there is variability in what evidence the model has received so far. Each point in
the plots shows the predicted posterior given the evidence an individual participant has
seen up to this point. The red line shows the averaged predicted posterior. By the 12th
clip, all participants have seen the same evidence so the predictions converge.16
Figure 6.13e shows that the model rapidly infers that the true model is a chain for Chain1
and a fork for Fork1. Looking at the predictive distribution subplots (Figure 6.13c and
d), we see that this is due to the model’s ability to fit a tighter distribution onto the
experienced timings under the true model, assigning less mass to all the data points
while they are more spread out and unevenly distributed under the alternative structure.
15We used the DelayI variant of our delay model because the DelayP variant assumes that all delays
share the same parameters, and participants were explicitly instructed that this was not the case.
16We used MCMC to estimate these posteriors without specifying any prior on delay parameters. In
the appendix we compare these to Simple Monte Carlo sampling predictions under a variety of priors.
This allows us to assess the impact of prior choice in Experiments 6 to 8.
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?
Figure 6.14: Experiment 8 interface. a) Testing the device b) Viewing a visual
summary c) Making a predictive judgment.
Under the noisier Chain2 and Fork2 evidence, the model forms the correct preference
but does so much more slowly, retaining significant uncertainty even after 12 clips for
Fork2, where the delay distribution is only slightly less variable under the fork structure
than the chain. Finally, for Fork2rev the predictions are the same as Fork2 until the
order reversal trial is seen and the chain is ruled out. This becomes increasingly likely
on later trials and certain after all 12 clips. Thus, normatively we expect more points
to be assigned to the chain structure for Chain1 and Chain2, than for Fork1, Fork2 and
Fork2rev; more to Chain1 than the more difficult to infer Chain2. Likewise, we expect
more points to be given to the fork structure for Fork1 than Fork2. Finally, since the
order cue in Fork2rev rules out the chain we expect judgments here to be more strongly
in favour of the fork structure than for the other fork patterns.
Procedure
Participants were instructed about the two possible causal models, the interface, the
number of problems they would face, the number of tests they would perform for each
problem, the presence of delay variability, and the independence of variability between
different connections. Participants initiated the system by clicking on the “S” component
and watching when the other two components activated (see Figure 6.14a). To familiarise
participants with the delay variability, they interacted with four two-component devices
during the instructions, each with a single cause and a single effect. They tested each
device at least 4 times. There were two pairs with short (µ = 1s) delays, one near-
constant and one variable, and two with longer (µ = 2s) delays, likewise one near
constant and one variable. Participants were also instructed that the variability of the
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delays of the different components of a device were independent such that an unusually
long tS→A would not imply that there would be an unusually long tS→B or tA→B. Before
proceeding to the main task, participants had to correctly answer comprehension check
questions.
All participants faced each of the 5 problem types twice, once as detailed in Figure 6.13
and once with the labels and locations of A and B reversed (as in Figure 6.14b). Thus,
there were 10 within-subjects test problems overall. On each test problem, participants
watched 12 clips in a random order. For each problem they made 3 causal judgments.
They made their first judgment after the 6th clip, their second after all 12 clips, and
a final judgment after seeing a visual summary of the timelines of the clips they had
seen (similar to the quantitative summary in Experiment 7, see Figure 6.14b). Partici-
pants gave their causal judgments by distributing 100% points across the two structures.
During trials 7–12, participants’ initial response remained visible but greyed out in the
response boxes. They then had to interact with one of the response boxes (changing the
value or just pushing enter) to unlock the “Continue” button on the second and third
judgments.
In addition to eliciting structure judgments for 10 problems within subjects, we also
elicited predictive judgments on one additional problem which was varied between sub-
jects. On this final problem, participants either saw evidence from Chain1 or Fork1, in a
new order. We selected which evidence was seen at random between subjects (45 out of
104 subjects saw Chain1, the rest saw Fork1). The first and second judgments were iden-
tical to the previous problems, but instead of seeing the visual summary, participants
were presented with two side-by-side visual summaries of new draws of 12 patterns, one
generated by a Chain1 structure and one by a Fork1 structure (See Figure 6.14c). They
were then asked to distribute 100% between the two sets of evidence indicating which
evidence was more likely to be produced by the current device.
6.6.2 Results
Structure judgments
In order to analyse participants’ judgments, we must account for the fact that each
participant faced each device twice. To do this, we fit linear mixed effects models to all
judgments, with participant and device as random effects. To test our specific hypotheses
about the differences between devices, we constructed four orthogonal contrast codes.







































































Figure 6.15: Judgments for the different devices. Boxplots show participants’ median
and upper and lower quartiles, participants with judgments ± > 1.5 interquartile range
are plotted separately. White filled black circles = participant means. Red triangles =
DelayI posteriors.
Table 6.5: Experiment 8: Main Effects and Planned Comparisons for First, Second
and Third Responses
Response 1 Response 2 Response 3
Main effect (LR) 86*** 334*** 378***
Planned contrasts
Intercept 52± .9%∗∗∗ 46± .9%∗∗∗ 42± .9%∗∗∗
1. Chains vs. Forks 10.2± 1.3%∗∗∗ 22.2± 1.3%∗∗∗ 33.8± 1.6%∗∗∗
2. Chain1 vs Chain2 2.7± 1.0%∗∗ 4.1± 1.1%∗∗ 7.8± 1.3%∗∗∗
3. Fork1 vs Fork2 2.1± 1.0%∗ 4.0± 1.1%∗∗ −.6± 1.3%
4. Forks1&2 vs Fork2rev 4.5± 1.1%∗∗ 19.6± 1.3%∗∗∗ 16± 1.5%∗∗∗
Note: For main effects we report the likelihood ratio for a model with device type as predictor relative to a
model with just an intercept. For each planned comparison we report the size of the effect (%) ± standard
error, and level of significance: ∗ = p < .05, ∗∗ = p < .01, ∗∗∗ = p < .001.
These compared: 1. [Chain1, Chain2] to [Fork1, Fork2 and Fork2rev], 2. Chain1 to
Chain2, 3. Fork1 to Fork2 and 4. [Fork1, Fork2] to Fork2rev, matching the predictions
described above. The four regressions are summarised in Table 6.5. All three judgments
differed by device type, with the size of these differences increasing for the judgments
made after performing 12 compared to 6 tests, and after seeing the visual summary
relative to before. For instance, participants assigned 10.2% more percentage points
to the chain diagram when the true structure was a chain, after 6 tests, increasing to
22.2% after 12 tests and to 33.8% after viewing a visual summary of the evidence. On all
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three judgments, participants assigned significantly more points to the chain diagram
for chains than forks. They also assigned more chain points to the reliable than the
unreliable chain, and more to the forks that did not exhibit the order cue (Fork1 and
Fork2) compared to Fork2rev. However, on judgments after 6 and 12 tests, participants
assigned more points to the chain diagram (i.e. fewer to the fork) for the theoretically
easier and “reliable” Fork1 than the “unreliable” Fork2. After the visual summary, the
fork diagram was equally favoured for each of these two devices.
Looking closely at the evidence we generated, we see that the difference between Chain2
and Fork2 is very subtle. While the tAB interval is more variable under Fork2 than
Chain2 (Figure 6.13c 2nd vs 4th row), tSB is actually also slightly more variable under
Fork2 than Chain2 (Figure 6.13d). Thus, if participants focused only on tSB we would
expect them to favour the chain structure for this problem. The fact that participants
still form a preference for the chain for Chain2 and the fork for Fork2 based on this
subtle difference in tAB, while failing to note the reliable tSB in Fork1, is suggestive that
participants were particularly tuned to monitoring the successive intervals rather than
the overall interval. We examine this idea in more detail in the General Discussion in
the Section Sensitivity to timing: Toward a process model.
Predictions
For the final problem, participants had to predict which of two evidence sets was
more likely to be generated by the device they had just learned about. Here, par-
ticipants favoured the chain evidence marginally more when the true structure was
Chain1 compared to when it was Fork1 t(102) = 1.7, p = .044 (one-tailed). Partici-
pants assigned significantly more than 50% to the chain evidence when the true struc-
ture was the chain t(44) = 1.9, p = .029 (one-tailed) but were not significantly more
likely to favour the fork evidence for the fork device t(58) = −.26, p = .36 (one-tailed).
However, participants’ strength of judgment toward the chain (/fork) was not statisti-
cally related to their preference for the evidence actually generated by the chain (/fork)
F (1, 102) = .6, r = .08, p = .4. For example, in Figure 6.14c the fact that this particu-
lar participant assigned 59% to the fork does not mean they will assign more predictive
probability to the future fork-generated evidence (top) over the chain-generated evidence
(bottom). We note, though, that we did not test participants’ predictive knowledge very
thoroughly in this experiment. Only a single predictive trial was included, varied be-
tween subjects, and there was no incentive or instruction for participants that they
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should try to learn to predict the devices. Further research is needed to gauge the
extent to which people can learn to predict the temporal dynamics of causal systems.
In sum, we found that people were able to distinguish between direct and indirect cau-
sation (i.e. a fork and a chain) based on the variability and correlation in event timings
alone. However, people found this inference much tougher than making judgments based
on having observed different temporal orders of events. In this experiment, some partic-
ipants reported relatively weak preferences despite having seen considerably more data,
and having fewer structure hypotheses to evaluate than in Experiments 6 and 7.
6.6.3 Discussion: Sensitivity to timing
Our Bayesian DelayI model broadly captured aggregate judgments (see Figure 6.15).
However, there is some evidence that participants may have solved the task in a more
heuristic way. Firstly, participants’ judgments were much less strong than the norma-
tive model’s preferences. Secondly, participants had trouble predicting future evidence,
suggesting they did not finish each problem with clear expectations about the device’s
delays. Third, DelayI strongly favoured the fork structure after seeing only a few clips
from Fork1, while participants remained at chance for this problem until the summary.
Ideal probabilistic structure inference involves maintaining a probability distribution
over all candidate hypotheses. This is infeasible in the general case as there is a near-
infinite number of possible models. There have been several recent proposals that people
maintain a single candidate causal model at a time, stochastically switching when their
current model proves strongly incompatible with evidence (Bonawitz et al., 2014; Bram-
ley, Dayan, et al., 2017). Additionally, Lagnado and Sloman (2006) propose that people
often take event order as an initial proxy for causal order. In this section we con-
sider several heuristics based on the idea that participants in Experiment 8 used simpler
statistics to identify the generative model without computing the predictions under both
structures at once.
Does A predict B?
In general, if A causes B, we expect that the time at which we observe A (relative to its
cause S) to be predictive for when we will later observe B (also relative to S). Thus, a
reasonable proxy for computing the full posterior is to try and estimate the strength of
this predictive signal. In the current context this comes down to a correlation between
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tSA and tSB, hereafter cor(tSA, tSB). If cor(tSA, tSB) is positive, this is a sign that S’s
causing of B may be mediated via A — that is, observing an unusually early/late A is
a noisy predictor of an early/late B (see Figure 6.13a). Conversely, if tSA is statistically
independent of tAB this is more consistent with the idea that B is caused directly by S
as in a fork structure.
Variance under a single structure
Computing a correlation between tSA and tSB across clips might still make too strong
demands on perception and storage to be estimated online while watching the clips.
The issue here is that the correlation depends on encoding two overlapping intervals for
each test, storing them, and comparing their relationship across multiple trials. It is
well-established that there are strong limitations on explicit attention and short-term
memory which may prohibit such explicit multitasking (Baddeley, 1992; Lavie, 2005).
Rather, it seems plausible that learners might only monitor the timings in the clips under
a single hypothesis at a time, for example either focusing on tAB if they are currently
entertaining the chain structure, or tSB if currently entertaining the fork structure.
Accordingly, a simpler strategy than comparing models would be to monitor the variance
assuming that one or the other structure is true. If this variance seems “too high” one
can reject the structure hypothesis and start monitoring the delays under the alternative
structure.
Assuming that participants tend to perceive event order as causal order by default
(Lagnado & Sloman, 2006), it is possible that participants found it more natural to
monitor σ2(tSA) and then σ
2(tAB) than to monitor σ
2(tSB) (while ignoring the inter-
vening event at A). Thus, σ2(tSB) may effectively have been masked by participants’
default tendency to perceive succeeding events as a chain, and thus only encode the
delays between directly succeeding events.
Online approximation
Estimating variance of the delays across trials may already be challenging. As we men-
tioned in the introduction, many models of sequential estimation avoid storing all the
data, replacing an operation over all the evidence with a simpler adjustment that can be
performed as evidence comes in (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Hogarth & Einhorn,
1992; Petrov & Anderson, 2005). We propose a simple model based on this idea here.
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Average pairwise difference (APD) simply stores the difference between the interval in
the latest clip tkXY and the one before t
k−1
XY , summing this up across trials. When vari-
ance is high this will tend to be high too but it is also sensitive to the order in which
evidence is observed, being larger when intervals fluctuate more between adjacent tests.
Each of these measures — cor(tSA, tSB), σ(tSA), σ(tSB), σ(tAB),APD(tSA),APD(tSB),
and APD(tAB) — assigns a value to the evidence seen at each time point by each
participant. Thus, all the measures make different predictions for each participant on
the first judgment because the clips seen so far differ between participants. Additionally,
the APD measure is computed sequentially and thus creates order effects and results in
different predictions for different participants for the second and third judgments, too.
We used all these measures as predictors of the number of percentage points assigned
to the chain structure on each judgment with a prediction of zero indicating 50% chain
(50% fork). This means that measures which support the chain have positive weights
and measures that support the fork have negative weights, and the intercept indicates
a baseline preference for one or the other model.
We hypothesd that one or a combination of these simpler measures σ(tXY ) or APD(tXY )
would capture participants’ judgments better than the DelayI posterior. Furthermore,
we predict that most participants would base their judgments on the variance of tAB
rather than tSB, given that it is easier to estimate the interval between subsequent events,
rather than separated events. After the summary, we hypothesised that participants’
judgments would become more normative, that is, closer to the predictions of DelayI .
Modelling all participants
To establish which combination of these measures best explains participants’ judgments
we entered them all into a competitive, stepwise, model selection procedure. We used all
the data for the model selection. As before we fit mixed effect models with random effects
for devices within participants. The independent variables were first z-scored meaning
that the final beta weights can be interpreted as percentage increase in assignments to
the chain for a 1 standard deviation increase in the value of each independent variable.
We entered the following predictors:
Intercept: Positive value captures overall preference for chain, negative for fork.








































































































Figure 6.16: The models resulting from stepwise model selection to all 1040 1st, 2nd
and final judgments in Experiment 8. Plots show the selected predictors’ fixed effects
(i.e. the β values) in descending order of t value. All predictors were z-scored, and the
dependent variable was centred (so that a prediction of 0 corresponded to assigning 50%
to the chain and 50% to the fork). Thus, effect sizes are interpretable as differences in
percentage assigned to the chain moving one standard deviation up on the independent
variable.
σ2(txy): The variance of the inter-event timing between activation of components x and




APD(txy): Average pairwise difference. A sequentially computed proxy for variance.
The difference in activation time on current test compared to previous test for example
tkxy and t
k−1
xy summed up over tests 1 : K. E.g. for tAB after six trials this is APD(tAB) =∑
k=2:6 t
k
AB − tk−1AB . As with the variance, we entered the APD for each inter-event
interval.
Posterior: The posterior probability of a chain according to DelayI
Figure 6.16 depicts the models selected by the stepwise procedure for the first, second,
and third judgments respectively. In all three cases, 2 of the 8 predictors were chosen
and the rest eliminated. The chosen predictors were similar for the first two judgments
but quite different for the final judgment.
For the first judgment — after 6 tests — participants assigned fewer points to the
chain (and more to the fork) if there was high apparent fluctuation in tAB, measured
by comparing each test to the previous (i.e. APD(tAB)). Fluctuation in tSB was also
selected but had a smaller effect in favour of the chain. The fact that the intercept is
 0 is also suggestive of a baseline preference for the chain that could be overturned by
high APD(tAB) or low APD(tSB). The Bayesian posterior was not selected as part of
the final model.
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For the second judgment — after seeing all the evidence — we see a similar pattern but
this time the actual variance of tAB is selected rather than its sequential proxy. Again
there is a baseline preference for the chain and a weaker influence of APD(tSB).
For the final judgments — made after seeing the visual summary — we find a different
pattern. Now the correlation between tSA and tSB dominates the selected model, so
much so that there there is a significant negative relationship with the DelayI posterior.
We report the correlation between all the predictors in Appendix B.
Summary
In sum, these additional analyses suggest that participants had an initial preference for
the chain which was modulated based on their perception of variability in tAB and, to a
lesser extent, in tSB. This is consistent with the idea that many began with an (order-
driven) preference for the chain which they could gradually reject if their experienced
delays were highly variable under the chain hypothesis. After the visual summary was
available, judgments shifted to reflect predominantly the more reliable, but harder to
compute, predictive relationship between tA and tB — cor(tSA, tSB) — which “popped
out” visually when viewing the summary timeline (Figure 6.14b).
6.7 General Discussion
In our first two experiments, we found that people were adept at using order information
to make judgments about causal structure, based on a single trial (Experiment 6) and
by integrating the information from several observations (Experiment 7). We found that
participants generally made the non-simultaneity assumption embodied by our OrderN
model, but also distributed likelihood in a way consistent with a preference for similar
causal delays within each device. Additional variability could be explained as resulting
from uncertainty about how causes combined in the Collider (common effect) structure,
some additional sensitivity to the precise event timings, and some degree of conservatism
in evidence integration. In Experiment 8, we removed the order cues. In this setting,
participants were able to use the variability in the event timings alone to distinguish
between a chain and a fork structure. To our knowledge, this is the first time this has
been shown experimentally. We now discuss these results more broadly and propose
some future directions.
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6.7.1 Nonsimultaneity and simultaneity
Like Burns and McCormack (2009) and McCormack et al. (2016), we found the large
majority of our participants made judgments in line with a non-simultaneity assumption.
This means they considered events that occurred at the same time to be inconsistent
with one being caused by the other. However, in parallel they had a preference for
simultaneity among events that shared a common cause (forks), or effect (colliders),
judging it at least as likely that these “common” events will occur simultaneously as
one occurring earlier or later. From a continuous time perspective, the probability of
perfect simultaneity given variability is strictly zero, while nonsimultaneity, if untied to
any particular delays, covers the rest of the space. However, human perception does
not have infinite temporal precision. Assuming some perceptual uncertainty, apparent
approximate simultaneity is the most likely outcome, with likelihood falling away the
greater the perceived discrepancy between the outcomes in either direction.
6.7.2 Causal time perception
We looked at only a narrow range of time intervals in the current studies, with trials
never lasting more than around three seconds. Weber’s law (1834) states that perceptual
estimation errors normally grow in proportion to the quantities involved. However, this
is known to break down for short (< 1 second) intervals which are tracked differently
by the brain (Karmarkar & Buonomano, 2007). For short intervals, existing causal
beliefs have been shown to shape, or distort, perception (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009;
Haggard et al., 2002), sometimes even leading to reordering of a surprising series of
events to a more “normal” causal order (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016). This suggests
that at this temporal grain, experience is still somewhat under construction (Dennett,
1988), scaffolded by preexisting expectations about causal structure. This also suggests
an explanation for why participants in the current experiments sometimes seemed to
retain some preference for devices that should have been ruled out (as captured by our
 parameter in Experiment 7).
Having formed an impression that a device has a certain structure, someone might easily
misperceive a subsequent observation as consistent even if they would usually consider
it inconsistent with that structure. This might occur more often if the distortion re-
quired to make it consistent is very small. In particular, the simultaneous events that
people considered to rule out causation most of the time, might also have been suscep-
tible to being perceived as occurring in the expected causal order. These sorts of effects
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are not captured by our Order and Delay models which work at Marr’s (1982) com-
putational level, and are intentionally scale invariant. However, an interesting project
would be to construct a cognitive model that exhibits these patterns. Related to this, a
fundamental reason to expect different learning at different timescales comes from the
so-called “now or never bottleneck” (Christiansen & Chater, 2016) inherent to experi-
encing events in real time. When observing closely spaced events, there is little time for
explicit comparison of possible structures, or to do anything much beyond constructing
an impression of what happened or measuring how wrong your prediction was. Reason-
ing about relationships between events that are separated by minutes or hours is likely
a very different process, as there would be far more time to explicitly reason about and
compare hypotheses.
6.7.3 Modality
In the current tasks we looked only at the visual modality. However, it could be that
other modalities are even better at inferring patterns in time, audition being an obvious
example. Humans (and many other animals), have a finely developed ear for patterns
in time and pitch; allowing us to hear and quickly internalise even complex rhythms
and melodies (London, 2012). Furthermore, the brain can detect an auditory pattern
amongst noisy background and even decompose it into its constituents elements (i.e.
distinguishing the different instruments in a band). It seems plausible that we evolved
these capacities in part to support the search for the reliable patterns in nature that are
often clues to its underlying structure (Sloman, 2005). Supporting the notion that the
visual modality is better at spotting spatial rather than temporal patterns, we saw that
participants were able to make much stronger judgments in Experiment 8 once they saw
a visual summary. The summary replaces temporal distance with spatial distance, and
suddenly the reliability of tAB pops out clearly (as in Figure 6.14b). During the trials
themselves, this realisation depended on effortful memorisation and comparison across
observations.
6.7.4 Conjunctive influence
In Experiments 6 and 7, we instructed participants that the Collider structure was
conjunctive — that is, it required both of its causes to activate before the effect would
activate. We also included a comprehension question to check that participants had
understood this. Nevertheless, around a quarter of participants across both experiments,
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appeared to treat the Collider as disjunctive (or at minimum not rule out that it was
capable of behaving disjunctively sometimes), assigning nonzero probabilities to the
Collider even after observing clips where one of its cause components occurred after the
effect, or nonzero likelihoods for the Collider to patterns with only one cause occurring
before the effect. This suggests that people default to the disjunctive assumption so
strongly that it can either overrule instructions, or fill in if the instructions were forgotten
(cf. Lu et al., 2008; Lucas & Griffiths, 2010; Yeung & Griffiths, 2015).
Additionally, people might have struggled to make sense of the idea of a conjunction in
the context of the abstract tasks they were solving. Indeed, formalising the conjunction
for our Delay models forced us to think about what would be a plausible mechanism.
Concretely, we assumed that the earlier-arriving causal influence waited around in a
buffer for the latter to arrive. However, it would have also been plausible to assume
that the two causes have influences that must (at least approximately) coincide in their
arrival time in order for a threshold to be reached that triggers the effect. Additionally,
people might find conjunctive influence more natural in situations where at least one
of the causal relationships has a sustained or continuous effect (e.g. so that the second
event simply tips the level of influence over a threshold that causes the activation of the
effect). In general, participants were more uncertain about devices where the impact
of the evidence depended on assumptions about how the Collider worked. Given the
ambiguity about the exact way in which the Collider worked, participants’ increased
uncertainty for situations involving these cases may be considered a rational response.
6.7.5 The blessing of variability
Our experimental design highlights an interesting and counterintuitive property of tem-
poral causal inference. Unreliable systems can actually be simpler to uncover. The more
unreliable the timings of the events are, the more frequently revealing order reversals
will occur, and the more a learner can rely on simple qualitative Order inference. A
similar principle applies in the absence of revealing order information. It is actually
the variability in delays that provides the signal that our Delay models use to infer the
generative causal structure. If the causal delays are perfectly reliable it becomes im-
possible to distinguish between the order-consistent structures based on their timing.17
This has interesting parallels to the case of learning from contingency information. In a
17Assuming you do not have a prior expectation about the lengths of the different delays. Of course,
structures could still be distinguished without variability if you know how long the links should take to
work.
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deterministic system, chains and forks are indistinguishable from contingencies because
both effects always covary with their root cause. However, they can be covariationally
distinguished in various settings provided the relationships are at least a little unreliable
(Bramley, Dayan, & Lagnado, 2015; Fernbach & Sloman, 2009).
6.7.6 Toward a process model
Some participants in Experiments 6 and 7 formed preferences for structures that ren-
dered causal delays more similar on average across connections and clips (reflected by
the shift across clips 2 to 6 in Experiment 6, and the few individuals better described
by our time-sensitive DelayP than our qualitative Order models). Additionally, partici-
pants’ distribution over qualitative patterns was highly consistent with a preference for
equal delays. Judgments in Experiment 8 were consistent with the proposal that people
tend to “see” the evidence through the lens of one causal model at a time (Bechlivanidis,
2015), becoming more likely to switch if observed events are sufficiently hard to accom-
modate under this presumptive structure (Bonawitz et al., 2014; Bramley, Dayan, et al.,
2017). Since seeing several events that always occur in the same order ceteris paribus is
most naturally perceived as a chain, participants may have begun the problems in Ex-
periment 8 with a sense of watching a causal chain, which could be gradually overturned
in the cases where there was another more predictive perception available (of the device
as a fork). More generally, by pulling these ideas together, we get a picture of temporal
causal structure learning in which learners have an initial impression of causal structure
based on event order (Lagnado & Sloman, 2006) but are capable of refining this as they
observe more evidence about the system and consider what structural changes from this
default might make the event times more predictable.
6.7.7 Building richer causal representations
While CBNs provide our current best framework for building theories about causal cog-
nition, they are not rich enough to explain central aspects of causal cognition such as
mechanism knowledge and mental simulation (Mayrhofer & Waldmann, 2015; Sloman &
Lagnado, 2015; Waldmann & Mayrhofer, 2016) or to ground everyday causal judgments
(Gerstenberg et al., 2015). People’s causal representations almost certainly lie some-
where in between a compact statistical map (a CBN) and a scale model of the physical
world. We can often get away with treating detailed mechanisms as black boxes (Keil,
2006), but we still need our representation to help us choose when and where to act
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in the world. Thus, it seems necessary that people’s representations sometimes include
expectations about delays between causes and effects. Of course our causal representa-
tion of the world is rich in space as well as time, with detailed knowledge of mechanisms
likely to be intertwined with delay expectations. Our generative Delay models repre-
sent a step toward capturing the ways in which human causal cognition goes beyond
statistical contingencies.
6.8 Conclusions
In conclusion, this chapter showed in three experiments that people form clear and
sensible beliefs about causal structure based on temporal information. We can capture
people’s inferences with a combination of qualitative order-based, and generative delay-
based inference models. Participants were able to use the order in which events occurred
to narrow in on candidate causal structures, and within these, favoured those that
rendered the causal delays more similar and more predicable. Going beyond order
patterns, we showed that people can also use interval variability alone to identify whether
a structure is a chain or a fork, and proposed how participants might achieve this
while “seeing” the evidence through the lens of one hypothesis at a time. These results
contribute to understanding of the role of time in causal learning and representation,
showing that just as time is inherent to our experience of the world, it is integral to our




“One should know when to act and when to refrain from action.”
— DALAI LAMA
In a temporally continuous world, using interventions to uncover causal relationships
requires good timing. For instance, it is hard to tell whether a new medication is
effective if you take it on top of others, or just as you start to feel better. Likewise, it is
hard to tell whether a new law lowers crime if it is introduced just after other reforms
or before a major election. Such inferences, having to do with delayed effects of actions
and a changing causal background, can be particularly tough in dynamic systems where
feedback loops make prediction difficult (Brehmer, 1992). In short, for interventions to
be effective tools for unearthing causal structure it is important to time and locate them
carefully, while paying close attention to the time course of surrounding events.
Learning by associating actions with surrounding events and stimuli was traditionally
studied through free operant conditioning (e.g. Mackintosh, 1983; Skinner, 1963). In free
operant conditioning, subjects can perform an action at will, and subsequently receive
rewards or punishments on a specific delay schedule determined partly or entirely by the
performance of these actions. The result is positive or negative reinforcement of actions
as well as their association with other paired stimuli (Estes, 1948). In recent years, new
interpretations of learning in these tasks have have been proposed, based on the idea that
subjects gradually learn a causal model of the task, based on regularities in the reinforce-
ment delays and latent trial structure (Gershman, Jones, Norman, Monfils, & Niv, 2013;
Gershman & Niv, 2012; Greville & Buehner, 2007, 2010). This is consistent with a large
amount of recent work suggesting people are adept at inferring causal structure from
interventions (Bramley, Dayan, et al., 2017; Bramley, Dayan, & Lagnado, 2015; Bramley,
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Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015; Coenen et al., 2015; Sobel & Kushnir, 2006; Steyvers et
al., 2003) and based on temporal information (Bramley, Gerstenberg, & Lagnado, 2014;
Bramley, Gerstenberg, Mayrhofer, & Lagnado, submitted; Buehner & May, 2002, 2003,
2004; Buehner & McGregor, 2006; Greville & Buehner, 2007, 2010; Lagnado & Sloman,
2006; Lagnado & Speekenbrink, 2010). Nevertheless, the shift toward thinking about
free operant learning in terms of causal model induction opens up a large new theory
space. Learning a single action–outcome pairing is only the tip of the iceberg. The more
general problem lurking beneath is that of learning latent causal structure from actions
and events in continuous time. What should we learn when our actions are succeeded by
multiple events, some expected others unexpected? And when should we act, if we want
to “condition ourselves” pro-actively, to form associations representing the true causal
relationships but not spurious or coincidental ones? Some work has looked at causal
learning from point events in time (Deverett & Kemp, 2012; Lagnado & Speekenbrink,
2010; Pacer & Griffiths, 2015; Rothe, Deverett, Mayrhofer, & Kemp, 2016) but none, to
our knowledge, on the role of interventions in this context. This chapter describes an
experiment that takes a small step toward exploring this general problem.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: We first describes the learning problem we
focus on, then review recurring ideas from the previous chapters using these to motivate
an experiment and some modelling.
7.1 The learning problem
We explore the general problem of how people infer causal structure from interventions
and subsequent patterns of events (component activations). We focus on identification
of the causal structure of mystery “devices” made up of several components that can
exhibit multiple instantaneous events, or activations, over a continuous period, as in a
point process (Kingman, 1993; Norberg, 1986).1 Where components of these devices
are causally related, each activation of the parent component will normally cause a
single subsequent activation of an effect component after a delay. We assume that these
delays are Gamma distributed with an average delay length µ and some variability
governed by a shape parameter α (see Equation 6.3). We restrict our focus to situations
with no spontaneous component activations, but where causal relationships only work
stochastically (e.g. with probability wS). Any pair of components can be connected in
1A point process is a type of random process for which any single realisation consists of a set of
isolated points, such as events of negligible duration located on a timeline or trees located in a forest.





























































b) Spread out interventions
c) Variability only between connections

















Figure 7.1: Examples of using real-time interventions to infer causal structure. a)–d)
show timelines, each with a row for each component of the causal system. Circles with
a “+” symbol and incoming hand icon are interventions. Plain circles are activations.
The true generative causal model is depicted on the left hand side, with subplots for
each edge depicting the delay distribution (each with a mean of 1.5 seconds).
either, neither or both directions, but components cannot be connected to themselves.
This results in a hypothesis space m ∈M of 64 possible structures for devices made up
of three components, or 4096 for four components. Furthermore, we assume learners can
intervene on the devices by causing any component to activate at any moment of their
choosing. Such interventions have the same causal effects as non-interventional events
but need no causal explanation themselves, analogous to the interventions on CBNs as
modelled by Pearl’s Do[.] operator (e.g. see Section 3.1). Figure 7.1 shows a number of
examples of such interactions, taking place over a short period, with further explanation
below.
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7.1.1 Interventions as structuring learning in time
In Chapter 5, we saw that people choose interventions to support their limited and
incremental learning trajectories. In the CBN context, this meant focusing on one part
of a problem at a time rather than trying to learn about everything at once. However,
the continuous-time case has different sources of complexity. Seeing the effects of one’s
interventions play out in time provides rich information, making causal model inference
easier in some respects. However, the other side of the coin is that there are no completely
independent trials in continuous time. In general, in observing a continua of events, one
cannot rule out that something that happened earlier is still exerting its influence, or that
an effect is yet to reveal itself by the time one stops watching. Fortunately, interventions
provide anchor points, that we can be sure are not effects of anything else, affecting the
future but not the past (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004). Thus, one way that interventions
can revive the notion of discrete trials is by creating a trial structure in time. By waiting
long enough between interventions to be confident effects have dissipated, we can turn
an undifferentiated event stream into something more structured and informative about
causality. Figure 7.1a gives an example of interventions on a Fork device that, intuitively,
are not well chosen. The learner performs four interventions in close succession and
experiences four outcomes. However, it is hard to attribute causal responsibility for
these activations to particular prior activation or intervention events, since there are
so many similarly plausible candidates. In contrast, Figure 7.1b shows an example
where the interventions are spaced more widely, intuitively resulting in less ambiguous
information.2 To date, no one has looked at how people select when to intervene when
learning a causal system in continuous time.
7.1.2 Variability and positive testing
In Chapter 6, we found that people were adept at learning causal relationships from
event order, and other things being equal, they favoured causal structures that rendered
the causal delays more similar. When a cause–effect delay was internally variable — i.e.
the same relationship would sometimes take longer and sometimes shorter — learners
could also use inter-event variability and correlation to distinguish direct and indirect
causation, although this required considerably more evidence than the inference based
simply on order or expectations about delay lengths. We noted that two of these uses of
2In experimental psychology we often achieve such approximate independence by including distractor
tasks between trials, counterbalancing the order in which we present stimuli, and by repeating tests
“between-subjects”.
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temporal information — order reversals and correlation between inter-event intervals —
depend on there being some variability in delays. The same is true in the current context.
In Figure 7.1b, the Fork structure is revealed partly by internal variability. Interventions
on A lead to cases where B precedes as well as succeeds C allowing (attentive) learners
to infer the device is neither an A → B → C Chain nor an A → C → B Chain. In
contrast Figure 7.1c shows an example where delays are internally reliable but vary
between the connections. This is shown by the strongly peaked delay distributions with
differing means — shown in blue, next to edges in the model on the left with tA→C
reliably longer than tA→B. Here, repeatedly intervening on the A component does not
help the learner distinguish the Fork from the Chain hypotheses and the learner must
intervene on both B and C to get clear evidence that the device is a Fork. Whether
people make use of such variability information in a free interventional context is as-yet
unexplored.
In discrete-trial contexts, we saw people had a preference for interventions on root com-
ponents. While often not the most globally informative choice, this was an effective way
of assessing the adequacy of their current working hypothesis. It could be that we see a
similar pattern of positive testing in the continuous-time case. This could be especially
useful when there is variability within the cause–effect delays since the causal order of
subsequent events can often be inferred based on attention to order reversals and vari-
ability and correlation among delays. Indeed, the evidence in Experiments 6, 7 and 8
can all be seen as that resulting from a learner repeatedly activating the root component
of a causal device and relying on time to reveal the patterns of forward connectivity.
7.1.3 Causal cycles
The preceding chapters focused on acyclic causal systems where causal influences can
flow in only one direction, never revisiting the same component. This was partly in virtue
of the conceptual and mathematical convenience afforded by the acyclic CBN framework.
However, our understanding of many physical, biological, social and economic aspects of
the world are inherently cyclic (Malthus, 1888). Furthermore, people frequently report
causal beliefs that include cyclic relationships when allowed to do so (e.g. Kim & Ahn,
2002; Nikolic & Lagnado, 2015; Sloman et al., 1998). While there are ways of adapting
the CBN formalism to capture cycles (Rehder, 2016), these either simplify the problem
to influences between fixed time steps (e.g. Dean & Kanazawa, 1989; Rottman & Keil,
2012), or simplify the representation by modelling dynamic subnetworks only by their
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equilibrium distributions (e.g. Lauritzen & Richardson, 2002; Rehder, 2016). By focusing
on continuous event streams and developing the continuous-time causal representation
introduced in Chapter 6, it is possible to explore how people learn about continuous-time
dynamic cyclic systems.
Not much is known about how people learn in cyclic causal structures (although see De-
verett & Kemp, 2012; Rothe, Deverett, et al., 2016), with most work in dynamic causal
contexts focusing on control rather than structure learning (e.g. Brehmer, 1992; Osman,
2011). From a formal perspective such systems are often fundamentally hard to predict
even if you know how they work (e.g. Kushner, 1967). Feedback loops often lead to sen-
sitive dependence on initial conditions, with large changes in behaviour stemming from
small perturbations (Gleick, 1997), explaining why we cannot predict the long term be-
haviour of dynamic systems like the weather or the economy much above chance. Thus, a
reasonable hypothesis is that complex dynamics make cyclic causal structures harder to
learn than acyclic ones, potentially requiring different interventions or inferential tools
for success. Figure 7.1d gives an example of interventions on a cyclic causal system
(assuming that the connections work 90% of the time). Interventions initialise looping
behaviour because of the bidirectional relationship A ↔ B (e.g. A → B → A → B . . .)
leading to many subsequent activations of both the loop components and the output
component C, continuing until either the A → B or B → A connection fails. Based
on simply looking at the timeline it seems likely that it will be easier to identify which
components are either directly involved in cycles, or outputs from cyclic components
(due to their recurrent activations), but harder to identify the exact causal relationships
(e.g. whether it is A or C that causes B in this example, since both tend to recur shortly
before B).
In order to look formally at learning in cyclic and noncylic systems we must extend our
normative framework to handle cases where components can exhibit multiple activations.
7.2 Modelling continuous time causal learning
7.2.1 Normative inference
In Chapter 6 we treated each discrete trial as a data point in which all components of a
device would activate (e.g. di = {tiA, tiB, tiE}). Since we are now interested in situations
that lack this discrete trial structure, and components can have more than one activation
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within a trial, we require different notation. We now consider trial data d to be made










in which events are indexed in chronological order with subscripts denoting their “loca-
tion” (e.g. which component activated). Data d is conditional on any interventions c










For instance, one might interact with a causal device for 5000 ms, performing interven-
tions on components A and B: c[−∞,5000] = {c(1)A = 100, c(2)B = 1200}, and observing two
activations of C: d[0,5000] = {d(1)C = 1500, d(2)C = 2800}.3
Normative structure inference thus involves computing the likelihoods p(d|m; c) and
using these to update a prior P (M) to a posterior P (M |d; c). An immediate issue with
performing Bayesian structure inference in this setting is that, even for a single candidate
model, there are likely to be multiple potential paths of actual causation that could have
given rise to observed data (Halpern, 2016; Halpern & Hitchcock, 2011; Halpern & Pearl,
2005). For example, if the true structure is a A → C ← B Collider, the data above
might be produced in two ways. A could have caused the first activation of C and B the
later (c
(1)
A → d(1)C , c(1)B → d(2)C ). Alternatively, A could have caused the later activation
of C and B the earlier (c
(1)
A → d(2)C , c(1)B → d(1)C ).
For sufficiently small numbers of events, it is possible to enumerate all such possible
paths of actual causation under each model m ∈ M (we call these z ∈ Zmd ) summing
over them to get a marginal likelihood for p(d|m, c). For a large number of events this
becomes intractable4 but we were able to compute the posteriors in this manner for
the data from the current experiment, resorting only in rare cases to an approximation.
Details on how we compute the likelihoods and the posterior probabilities P (M |d,w; c)
are provided in Appendix B.
3 We assume that there were no interventions before τstart.
4Inference can proceed in these settings by modelling causes as exerting temporary changes on the
rate of their effects’ occurrence over time (see Pacer & Griffiths, 2011, 2015).
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7.2.2 Incremental construction heuristics
A core theme of this thesis is the idea that people construct their causal models incremen-
tally, accommodating new evidence by making local changes to a single global model
(e.g. see Chapter 5, and Bramley, Dayan, et al., 2017; Bramley, Dayan, & Lagnado,
2015). This idea seems particularly applicable to the continuous-time context, where
normative inference is tough and the evidence, by its nature, arrives continuously.
Chapter 5 proposed that people update their causal models in order to accommodate
recent evidence. We compared simple endorsement — a heuristic that adds links to
explain effects directly, with no consideration of the existing model — with Neurath’s
ship — a more sophisticated scheme in which connections were reconsidered in the
light of the rest of the existing model. In the continuous-time context, the problem
of accommodating the latest evidence comes up every time an event occurs. A simple
heuristic strategy would thus be to attribute a cause to each new event, irrespective of
the pre-existing structural beliefs, while a Neurath’s ship style strategy would be to add
new links only if the existing structure belief cannot explain the new evidence. In terms
of diagnosing the likely causes of each new activation, we can look to Chapter 6. It
explored inference from event order alone, as well as sensitivity to inter-event intervals,
finding that people made use of order for ruling out models, but also favoured models
that rendered observed event timings more consistent overall.
Combining levels of existing-model sensitivity and timing sensitivity suggests several
potential heuristics for the current setting. These are based on the idea of adding to or
adapting single model b as events are experienced. The result in each case is a single
structural belief that can evolve over time (we write b = {b(0), . . . , b(n)}, where the
sequence of belief indices correspond to the event indices in d). We propose several
heuristics differing in the sophistication with which they diagnose the cause of each
newly experienced effect d(i), and so adapt b(i−1) to form b(i):
1. Add most recent Each time an event is observed, this heuristic simply attributes
it to the most recently preceding event at any other component (either the most
recent intervention in c or activation in d). If b(i−1) does not contain an edge from
the location of this preceding activation to the location of the current activation,
it adds this to b(i−1) to make b(i). Figure 7.2a gives an example of this. Starting
from b(i−1) with a single D → B connection, the heuristic connects A to B upon
observing B’s activation, and then B to C when C activates shortly after.
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2. Add most likely This heuristic is like most recent except that, instead of attribut-
ing activations to the most recent preceding event, it attributes to the previous
event that was most likely to bring about the observed activation, given expecta-
tions about the true causal delays (e.g. knowledge about mean the mean µ and
variability α of true delays). Again, if there is not already an edge from the loca-
tion of this most likely cause running to the location of the current activation, this
heuristic adds this to b(i−1) to make b(i). Thus this model captures the kind of de-
lay sensitivity in causal attribution that has been thoroughly demonstrated in the
literature on delay based attribution (Buehner & May, 2002, 2003, 2004; Buehner
& McGregor, 2006; Greville & Buehner, 2010). However these attributions are still
done irrespective of existing connections in b(i−1). Figure 7.2b gives an example
of this. Here, C’s activation time is most consistent with its being caused by the
intervention on A, thus the model adds an A→ C connection, rather than B → C
connection, going into b(i+1).
3. Add more likely This heuristic is like most likely, except that rather than au-
tomatically adding a connection if the most likely explanation is not already con-
nected in b(i−1), it first checks if there is already an adequate explanation in the
current model b(i−1). Concretely, it compares the likelihood of the most likely ex-
planation that is already a cause in b(i−1), to the most likely explanation overall.
Where these differ, it only adds a new connection if the best overall explanation is
substantially more likely than the best existing explanation in b(i−1) (where this
is determined by passing some predefined significance level). Thus, this model
embodies the conservatism discussed in Chapter 3 and Neurath’s ship style model-
based inference (Chapter 5), where the learner first tries to explain the effect with
their existing structure, and only adds a new link if it provides a much better
explanation of the data. Figure 7.2c gives an example of this idea. Unlike most
likely, this heuristic does not add an A → B connection going into b(t+1) because













) the difference is not
substantial enough to warrant the addition of another connection.
4. More likely + pruning This heuristic is the same as more likely, except that
it performs an additional pruning step, allowing it to remove connections if they
appear to be repeatedly failing to work. Not only does this heuristic take the cur-
rent model into account when interpreting evidence, it also keeps a count for each
connection in b, of previous activations (and interventions) of the cause component















































Figure 7.2: An example in which the proposed heuristics make diverging model con-
struction decisions. b(i−1) shows the learners belief from prior to the period depicted
in the timeline plot. After observing an event at component diB , the models update
b(i−1) to form b(i) and then after observing di+1C , update again to form b
(i+1). Blue
lines indicate the probability density for the likelihood of cause–effect delays starting
from each event, used to determine the most likely cause of each event, and whether it
is sufficiently more likely than any existing causes.
and previous activations of the effect, calculating the binomial probability (given
wS) of observing k successful activations of each effect in the model given that
there have been n activations of the cause, every time a new event is observed.5
Thus, unlike 1–3, this heuristic is able to remove connections as well as add them.
The key questions of interest in the current experiment are:
1. How people interact with the devices during learning. How do they distribute their
interventions across trials and across the components of the system?
2. How do these choices affect the information they receive about the true connections
and their consequent judgment accuracy?
5There are a range of complications here, e.g. some events have multiple causes or might have effects
that have not happened yet. Finding a clean way of dealing with these issues is a work in progress.
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3. In what way are interventions and judgments affected by true structure of the
device and the nature of the true cause–effect delays?
4. Will we see patterns of incremental model construction similar to Neurath’s ship
in the discrete time context?
7.3 Experiment 9: Intervening in time
We tasked participants with performing interventions over a 45 second interval with
the goal of identifying the causal relationships between the components. We focused
on simple generative interventions (e.g. clicking on components to activate them) and
a mixture of cyclic and acyclic devices. We were interested in whether learners would
spread their interventions out or bunch them together, as well as how they would dis-
tribute them over the components. Given the role of variability in distinguishing direct
and indirect causation in Chapter 6, we were also interested in how learning and inter-
vention choice was affected by the nature of the inter-event delays in the causal devices,
whether they were reliable or variable, and whether this variability was within connec-
tions (e.g. Figure 7.1b) or between them (e.g. Figure 7.1c). In general, we expected
that reliably similar delays between edges would make the devices easier to learn. For
devices exhibiting variability within connections, we hypothesised that learners would
use repeated positive testing to distinguish direct and indirect relationships. For cases
with variability only between connections, we expected lower performance, and reliance
testing each component separately, since both order and variability are unreliable guides
to cause. We were also interested in how well learners could learn different types of de-
vices, having hypothesised that they would find cyclic devices harder than acyclic ones.
Finally, we were interested whether learners’ behaviour would be consistent with the
principles identified in earlier chapters, namely confirmatory testing, and incremental
construction of a single global model.
7.3.1 Methods
Participants
Sixty participants (24 female, aged M ± SD 32.9 ± 10.0) were recruited from Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk so that 20 performed in each of three conditions. The task took
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Figure 7.3: Generative models tested in Experiment 9
around 20 minutes, and participants were paid between $0.50 and $3.20 depending on
performance (M ± SD $2.06± 0.39).
Stimuli and design
Each participant interacted with 12 causal devices over 45 second trials. We included
a range of acyclic and cyclic devices including a 3- and 4-variable Collider, Chain, and
Fork as in previous chapters. We label these with suffixes denoting the number of
variables involved (e.g. Collider-3 for the three variable Collider see Figure 7.3). We
also included six novel cyclic devices. We label these depending on whether they have
a connection feeding In and/or Out of the cyclic subnetwork (e.g. Loop-3-In has a
connection going from A, into the cyclic B − C subnetwork, see Figure 7.3). We will
refer to the components involved in the cyclic relationships as loop components, any
components that feed activations into a cyclic group (e.g. A in Loop-In-3) as input
components and any whose activations are emitted out from a cyclic group (C in Loop-
Out-3) as output components.
In all devices, causal relationships worked 90% of the time (wS = 0.9) and there were no
background activations (wB = 0). The average delay between the activation of a cause
and an effect was 1.5 seconds. However, we examined three delay conditions between
subjects that differed in the extent and nature of the delay variability:
1. Reliable In this condition, the activation of a cause component led to the ac-
tivation of its effect with little variability. Concretely, all delays were gamma
distributed with mean µ = 1500ms and shape α = 200 (Figure 7.4, full line).
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2. Variable-within In this condition, delays had the same mean but were much less
reliable with shape α = 5 (see Figure 7.4, dashed line).
3. Variable-between In this condition, each causal relationship was assigned a delay
at the start of the trial, drawn from the same distribution as the variable-within
condition, but would then stay the same throughout the problem. Thus, in this
condition, delays varied considerably between relationships but were reliable within
















Figure 7.4: Delay distributions by condition.
The differences between conditions affect what can be inferred about the structures. In
the reliable condition, the absolute interval between two events is a strong indication of
whether the former is a plausible cause of the latter. For example, suppose you intervene
on A at t = 0, then observe B at t = 1500 and C at t = 3000 and you know that either A
or B caused C. In the reliable condition, the timings are strong evidence that B not A
caused C (the likelihood ratio is ≈ 1026). However, in the variable-within condition, it is
only weak evidence (the likelihood ratio is ≈ 9). Repeatedly testing the same component
is more useful in the variable-within than variable-between condition, primarily because
it can lead to revealing order reversals.
Materials and procedure
The task was programmed in javascript, hosted online, and can be tried out here
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/nbt.
Each device was represented by several grey circles on a white background with light grey
boxes marking the potential locations of edges (see Figure 7.5a). Participants were told
that the circles were components of a causal device. Each trial lasted for 45 seconds.
6We drew new delays for all trials and participants. For bidirectional relationships, we assumed both
directions shared the same delay.
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During this time, components would activate if clicked on (constituting the interven-
tions), or if caused by the activation of another component, with delay and probability
governed by the true underlying network (Figure 7.5b). Graphically, a component acti-
vated through intervention turned yellow for 200ms and was marked by a “+” symbol.
Components that were activated by another component turned yellow for 200ms but did
not have the “+” symbol. Initially, all components were inactive and no connections
were marked between them. Participants could activate components of their choice up to
6 times during each trial, and observe the resulting activations of the other components.
The goal of the task was to identify the true connections. To incentivise the task and to
get online structure judgments, we paid participants based on accuracy during the trials
— i.e. based on whatever connections were marked correctly at a randomly chosen point
during each trial. Thus, participants marked the connections during the trials by click-
ing in the grey boxes between each pair of components. This cycled through the options
(forward connection, bidirectional connection, backward connection and no connection).
The order in which clicks cycled through these components was counterbalanced. Every
time the participant started to make changes to the connections a “confirm” button
would appear in the middle of the screen and they would have to press this button to
lock in their latest changes (Figure 7.5c).7 A video clip of an example trial is available
at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/itv.
Participants were trained about the delays in their condition through interaction with an
an example device (always Loop-In-3, Figure 7.3) during the instructions. The device
was paired with a picture showing the true relationships, and participants observed
the components activating in sequence over 20 seconds with the delays reflecting the
variability in their condition. To train participants on the response format, they had to
mark the true links in the example and confirm them before they could move on. After
the instructions, participants had to correctly answer comprehension check questions
before they could proceed to the main task ensuring they understood: (1) the nature
and number of interventions they could perform, (2) their incentive, (3) the 10% failure
rate of the connections, and (4) the nature of the delays in their condition.
Participants then faced a practice problem (always Collider-3), and then the 12 devices
in random order with randomly orientated and unlabelled components. When the 45
seconds ran out for each device, they were given feedback showing the true relationships
and which of them they had correctly identified by the end of the trial (Figure 7.5d).
7This was done to distinguish participants’ intended overall change from a sequence of singular
changes as they cycled through different orientations and connections.




















Figure 7.5: Procedure for Experiment 9. a) Up to 6 interventions could be performed
by clicking on the components during the 45 second trial. b) This would lead to
subsequent activations determined by causal connections and delays in the true model.
c) Participants would also mark their beliefs about the structure during the trials by
clicking on the edges. d) At the end of each trial they received feedback.
7.3.2 Results
Accuracy
Looking at participants’ final judgments, we see they identified 0.75±0.19%, 0.63±0.16%
and 0.59± 0.18% of edges correctly in the reliable, variable-within and variable-between
conditions respectively (see Figure 7.6). Average performance differed significantly by
condition F (2, 57) = 4.3, η2 = 0.13, p = 0.02. Post-hoc tests revealed that partici-
pants in the reliable condition identified significantly more edges correctly than those
in the unreliable variable-within t(38) = 2.1, p = 0.04, and variable-between conditions
t(38) = 2.8, p = 0.006. There was no significant difference between variable-within and
variable-between t(38) = 0.75, p = 0.5. Participants confirmed judgments 1.6±1.1 times
per trial on average. Judgment time was not significantly related to accuracy, but fi-
nal judgments were on average more accurate than initial judgments — 0.66 ± 0.31
compared to 0.62 ± 0.28 t(719) = 5.8, p < .0001. Accuracy by problem was highly cor-
related between conditions: reliable–variable-within = .91, reliable–variable-between =
.86, variable-within–variable-within = .87. Only 5% of judgment updates decreased the























Figure 7.6: Proportion of edges identified correctly by condition. Boxplot shows
medians and interquartile range. Black circles = means. Red triangles = expected
accuracy for guessing the maximum a posteriori model. Grey dotted line = chance.
number of connections marked, with 27% resulting in the same number as before, 68%
increasing the number of connections.
Accuracy was also significantly lower for cyclic compared to acyclic models in all three
conditions — reliable t(19) = −3.8, p = 0.001, variable-within t(19) = −5.4, p < 0.001
and variable-between t(19) = −4.9, p < 0.001. There was no interaction between the con-
dition and cyclicity in predicting judgment accuracy. Inspecting Figure 7.7, we see that
participants found the Loop-Out structures hardest to identify on average, struggling
in particular to distinguish looping from output components. Accuracy was lowest for
the variable-between condition, where simply observing the device cycle through many
activations provided no new delay information.
In general, while participants’ accuracy was considerably below the accuracy of an ideal
learner that always judges the most likely a posteriori model (e.g. maxP (M |d; c)), the
patterns of accuracy across condition and acyclic and cyclic devices are very similar (see
Figure 7.6, comparing boxplot to red triangles) .
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Figure 7.7: Intervention choice prevalence by component, and accuracy by edge in
Experiment 9, in (a) reliable, (b) variable-within and (c) variable-between conditions.
Average total number of interventions performed and accuracy written beneath each
model.
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Interventions
Quality Since, by definition, well chosen interventions lead to more information about
the true model on average, we can assess the quality of participants’ intervention choices
indirectly by looking at the posterior uncertainty they afford by the end of each trial.
Assuming normative inference and computing H(M |d; c) (see Equation 3.8), we find
that the quality of participants’ interventions was a significant determinant of judgment
accuracy over and above delay condition t(56) = −3.3, η2p = 0.16, p < .001.
Spacing We hypothesised that spacing interventions out in time would be crucial to
success. Accordingly, we measured the gaps between interventions for each participant.
Participants waited 7.2±2.8 seconds between interventions on average. Both the average
length of the gaps participants left between interventions, and the regularity of these
gaps were predictive of performance after accounting for delay condition F (4, 55) =
12.2, η2 = .47, p < .001, with longer gaps t(55) = 3.4, η2p = .17, p < .001 and less
variability — as measured by the coefficient of variation (σµ) for the inter-intervention
intervals — t(55) = −2.2, η2p = .08, p = .03 predictive of higher accuracy. Neither
measure interacted with condition or one another in predicting accuracy.
A key question is whether well spread-out interventions were actually better at reveal-
ing the structures or merely a byproduct of generally successful causal learning. We
can assess this by looking at the relationship between these measures and posterior un-
certainties. If leaving bigger gaps and spacing interventions regularly are normatively
sensible, we expect them to be negatively correlated with posterior uncertainty. We
found that after accounting for condition, more widely spaced interventions were as-
sociated with lower posterior uncertainty t(56) = −3.4, η2p = 0.17, p = 0.001 but the
variability of these intervals was not t(56) = 1.1, p = 0.2.
Adaptation to cycles Participants performed fewer interventions on the cyclic de-
vices (4.1 ± 1.1) compared to the acyclic ones (5.3 ± 0.8) t(59) = 10, p < .001 (see
Figure 7.7). However, they still experienced far more activations in the cyclic systems
(30.6 ± 11.3) compared to acyclic (4.5 ± 0.9) t(59) = 17, p < .001 due to the reciprocal
relationships sustaining activations until one of the links failed. For cyclic devices, num-
ber of interventions performed was negatively related to accuracy β = −.002, F (1, 58) =
12.7, η2 = .18, p < .001.
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Positive testing We see evidence of a preference for positive testing, with partici-
pants performing 1.2± 0.5 times as many interventions per root compared to non-root
component t(59) = 3.9, p < .001. This preference was associated with higher accuracy
after accounting for condition t(56) = 4, η2p = 0.26, p < .001 and did not interact with
condition. However we note that, since a preference for interventions on root compo-
nents depends on their successful identification, this relationship could be partly down
to a relationship between successful identification of the root and accuracy. Consistent
with our predictions, root preference was strongest for the root of the fork components
in the variable-within condition with participants performing 2± 0.8 root interventions
compared to 1.2± 0.6 on the other components for Fork-4.
Summary of results
In sum, we found that participants were better at identifying causal relations from
intervention when delays were reliable, and the true structure was acyclic. Partici-
pants struggled particularly to identify the causal relations among loop-components and
output-components. Successful participants tended to spread their interventions out
more over the trial, distribute them more evenly and activate the root component(s)
more often. The normative informational value of the chosen interventions was strongly
predictive of final accuracy. Participants would frequently update their models by adding
additional connections but rarely to remove connections.
7.4 Modelling the judgments
In the introduction we proposed four heuristic models of online causal structure in-
duction. We now compare these to the patterns of judgments we observed from our
participants. To do this we simulated belief trajectories b for all models, on all trials for
all participants in all conditions starting from an unconnected model at t = 0. For the
Add most likely and Add more likely models, we assumed knowledge of true µ, α and
wS as participants had been trained on these during the instructions. For the Add more
likely heuristics, we had to set a threshold for how much more likely it had to be that an
event was caused by a potential new cause than by the best existing cause in b(i−1) to
justify its addition to b(i). We set this as a likelihood ratio of ≥ 201 in line with standard
significance level of p < .05. Similarly, for the pruning step, we assumed the number of
failures had to be significantly surprising at the p < .05 level to justify a connection’s
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removal from b(i−1) to b(i). After participants made a judgment we updated the b(i−1)s
of the models so that they matched the participant’s current belief and updated them
from there.8 Having obtained simulated belief trajectories for all models, we took their
current state at the moment of each participant judgment as their predictions. We then
assessed their accuracy (e.g. the proportion of connections marked correctly) and their
accordance rate with the participants (the proportion of connections marked the same
as the participants’). For comparison, we also compared participants to a Random base-
line that marked a new random causal structure for every judgment, and to a Rational
learner that always selected the maxP (M |d; c).
The results of these simulations are reported in Table 7.1. We see that all but one par-
ticipant is better fit by one of the heuristics than by Rational or Random responding,
with a large majority best described by the delay- and current-model-sensitive Add more
likely, or the simplest Add most recent for both all judgments and restricted to the final
judgments. Add more likely won overall in terms of correlation with participants and in
terms of number of individuals best fit. There was little evidence for pruning with few
individuals better fit, and no improvement in accuracy from inclusion of the additional
pruning step. This may have been due to the relatively short trials leaving insufficient
time for substantial model pruning, or potentially because our characterisation of prun-
ing did not capture when and why participants did prune their structural beliefs. This
also lines up with past studies in which participants would rarely remove connections
after adding them (Lagnado & Sloman, 2006). Participants’ accuracy (0.65± 0.19) was
closest to that of the simplest heuristic Add most recent, with the other models some-
what more accurate than participants on average, and Rational judgment considerably
higher again.
Table 7.1: Model comparison
Model Accuracy (%) Accordance (%) N best (/60)
All Final All Final All Final
Random 25 25 25 25 0 0
Add most recent 64 64 71 72 22 20
Add most likely 74 74 71 73 7 8
Add more likely 78 80 74 77 26 30
Add more likely + pruning 78 80 74 76 4 1
Rational 87 89 64 66 1 1
Note: All = for all judgments. Final = final judgments only. “Best fit” determined by the highest
accordance rate (e.g. highest proportion matching connections across judgments).
8We also tried simulating the models without taking this step finding that they performed slightly
better on average, but the distribution of individual best fits was very similar with the majority of
participants according best with Add most recent or Add more likely.
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7.5 Discussion
In Experiment 9, we found that people were able to use free selection of interventions
to learn about the causal structure of devices whose dynamics took place in continu-
ous time. As we expected, participants found cyclic structures harder to learn than
acyclic structures, and this was reflected in the evidence, indicating that they were
indeed normatively harder to identify in this setting, at least given the interventions
that participants chose. This appeared to be due to it being hard to distinguish output
components emanating from loops, from loop components. While this reveals a general
difficulty for learning cyclic causal structures, it would also be possible to distinguish
these if one could isolate parts of the device by blocking or turning off some of the com-
ponents. Thus, in future work we would like to allow participants to perform a second
kind of action, a block which prevents a component from activation until it is released,
and see if participants can use this effectively to perform more controlled experiments.
There was no overall difference in accuracy between the variable-within and variable-
between conditions, with similar drops in accuracy for both of these conditions relative
to the reliable condition. These conditions also did not interact with other aspects of
learning behaviour (e.g. distribution of interventions, accuracy on specific edges) as far
as we could determine. This suggests that participants either did not make substantial
use of within-connection variability in identifying the connections in the variable-within
condition, or that any gains were offset by the greater predictability of the internally
reliable delays in the variable-between condition.
As expected, we found that spacing out interventions over the trials improved the qual-
ity of evidence and ultimate judgment accuracy. Meanwhile spacing the interventions
evenly was associated with better accuracy but not with generating more evidence from
the perspective of normative learning. Thus even spacing of interventions might reflect
a cognitive strategy for organising interactions with the device (e.g. into equal length
semi-independent trials) rather than a normative requirement for generating evidence.
Additionally, we found a preference for interventions on root components and a correla-
tion between this and accuracy, but its prevalence did not differ in the variable conditions
prohibiting any strong conclusions about the role of repeat testing and variability.
We found that we could explain participants’ judgments best by assuming they added
connections to a single evolving candidate hypothesis as the observed events, with some
participants appearing to do so based on a simple most-recent priority heuristic, but
more displaying evidence of sensitivity to delays (e.g. preferring an older event as a
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cause when the most recent event was too recent to be plausible given the delays) and
adding new links only when necessary (i.e. only if the current hypothesis really could
not explain them well). This is consistent with the Neurath’s ship perspective on causal
learning as a process of local and incremental model construction.
7.5.1 Looking backwards or forwards?
More generally, the heuristics we proposed provide an interesting perspective on continuous-
time causal model induction. Essentially, the heuristics worked by iterated diagnostic
causal inference (Meder et al., 2014). Each time a new event occurred, the heuristics
would look backward into the recent past for an explanation. The resulting perspective
of causal model building is as backward-facing activity, even as its ultimate goal is to
learn a forward model.
At first glance, a diagnostic focus seems to conflict with the idea of intervention choice,
and active learning more generally, as inherently forward looking. Furthermore, research
suggests that people find it easier to reason forward from causes to effects (Fernbach
et al., 2011), and this gels with a simulation-based view of causal inference (e.g. Bram-
ley, Gerstenberg, & Tenenbaum, 2016; Hamrick et al., 2016). Thus, it is interesting to
consider how predictive and diagnostic inference might come together in this continuous-
time setting. One possibility is that participants really did “look forwards” but in such
a way that appears consistent with our heuristics. For example, learners might project
something like a window of expectation forwards from each experienced event, automat-
ically attributing subsequent events to the cause with the strongest current expectation
(as in the blue density lines in Figure 7.2). It might be possible to construct heuristics
that behave similarly to Add most recent, Add most likely, and Add more likely but
do so based on projecting forward rather than diagnosing, so making expectation and
violation the key tools for construction. This perspective chimes with Lagnado and Slo-
man’s (2006) idea that events occurring shortly after an intervention are automatically
attributed as effects.
Alternatively, it could be the case that learners used a mixture of backward and forward
inference, perhaps attributing events following interventions as effects, but learning more
diagnostically when observing sequences of non-interventional events (as would tend
to occur in the cyclic models). Initially, with no idea where causal connections will
be, interventions can only be used to search for variables that cause other variables to
activate. But once model construction is under way, interventions will increasingly come
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with expectations, so can be used to test specific or local hypotheses. In other words,
we must diagnose enough candidate causal relationships to establish a forward model
before we can start to use this to predict the future, act with expectations about results,




“Ninety percent of life is just being there.”
— ANDY CLARK paraphrasing WOODY ALLEN1
Chapters 3 to 5 focused on interventional causal learning in abstract scenarios, in which
learners chose from a set of possible tests on a sequence of discrete trials. Chapter 7
opened the problem up to cases that lacked this discrete trial structure, in which in-
terventions and resultant activity occurred in continuous time. However, the notion of
intervention was still limited to activation of components of an idealised causal system.
This final empirical chapter opens up the problem of active causal learning still further,
looking at how people intervene and learn in physical “microworlds” with continuous
spatiotemporal dynamics.
Nature’s successful learners are embedded in the world they must learn to exploit, mean-
ing they must construct their interventions from elemental physical actions. On this
view, we can think of the little actions in everyday life as small experiments, ranging
from the automatic (e.g. cocking one’s head to better locate the origin of a sound), to
the deliberate (lifting a suitcase to judge its weight; shaking a present to try and guess
its contents; holding a pool cue to one eye, or spinning it, to gauge its straightness).
A common element in these examples is that they seem to combine an intuitive under-
standing of physics with actions that exaggerate, or “bring into sharper relief” physical
properties of interest. This implies that to have a better understanding of human active
1The percentage varies depending on the source. The original quotation is probably “80 percent of
success is showing up” (Safire, 1989).
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causal learning, we can look at how people use their ability to act directly in the physical
world, to test and discover causal properties.
In this chapter we begin the process of exploring this naturalistic type of learning. We
do this by looking at how people learn about physical properties, such as local magnet-
like forces and object masses when interacting with simulated physical “worlds”. We
start by briefly surveying the literatures on active learning and intuitive physics learn-
ing, then describe an experiment that contrasts passive learners with active and yoked
learners. Finally, we looked at the information generated by observing compared to
actively intervening on the worlds, and begin to categorise the types of actions, or “nat-
ural experiments”, that active participants performed. We find that active learners use
their ability to control the worlds to generate information differentially, creating situa-
tions that are highly informative about target properties while minimising confounding
“noise” information about irrelevant properties.
8.1 Active learning in richer domains
Human active learning has largely been studied in abstract scenarios where the space of
possible actions is limited, such as the Wason card selection task (Oaksford & Chater,
1994), category rule learning (Gureckis & Markant, 2009) and games like “Guess Who”
(Nelson et al., 2014) and “Battleships” (Markant & Gureckis, 2010). A related line
of research has explored active causal learning, where the available actions are more
overtly physical, involving interventions on idealised causal systems (Bramley, Lagnado,
& Speekenbrink, 2015; Coenen et al., 2015; Lagnado & Sloman, 2004). Since many
causal structures cannot be distinguished by covariational data alone (Spirtes et al.,
1993; Steyvers et al., 2003), the concept of intervention captures a key aspect of real-
world active learning that goes beyond simply asking the right questions. Learners can
make use of their ability to act causally in the world to gain first-hand experience of
cause–effect relationships. The large majority of causal learning research has focused
on CBNs (Pearl, 2000) where time and space are abstracted away, and actions are
limited to idealised interventions (Bramley, Dayan, et al., 2017; Bramley, Lagnado, &
Speekenbrink, 2015; Bramley, Nelson, Speekenbrink, Crupi, & Lagnado, 2014; Coenen
et al., 2015; Lagnado & Sloman, 2002, 2004, 2006; Steyvers et al., 2003). In general,
these studies found that people intervene in ways that provide more information than
passive observation or random intervening, but that their choices also tend to be more
stereotyped and repetitive than those prescribed by models of optimal active selection.
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This has led to proposals that active learners’ choices are better understood as boundedly
rational (Bramley, Dayan, et al., 2017; Bramley, Dayan, & Lagnado, 2015; Bramley,
Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, 2015) meaning they tailor their actions to their own limited
learning capacities, testing only a subset of the possible hypotheses at any given time,
and limiting the computational cost of inference by controlling for confounding factors.
If learners’ actions are heavily tailored to their idiosyncratic learning trajectories, we
expect the evidence they generate to be less useful for other learners, with different
idiosyncrasies, observing their choices (Markant & Gureckis, 2014). This view is broadly
(Lagnado & Sloman, 2004; Sobel & Kushnir, 2006), but not always (McCormack et
al., 2016), supported by experiments that have included yoked conditions, where one
participant observes the tests performed by another. Intuitively, the divergence between
information that is in principle available and what participants can actually learn, will
be much larger in more complex and naturalistic situations, where only a fraction of the
total evidence can plausibly be attended to.
While emerging research has begun to explain how people can learn intuitive physical
theories and use these to infer the physical properties of objects (Battaglia, Pascanu,
Lai, Rezende, et al., 2016; Chang, Ullman, Torralba, & Tenenbaum, 2016; Ullman et al.,
2014; Wu, Yildirim, Lim, Freeman, & Tenenbaum, 2015), to the best of our knowledge,
no one has yet explored how active learning shapes this process in humans.
8.1.1 Intuitive physics
In recent years, research into people’s intuitive understanding of physics has experienced
a revival. This is partly due to the ease with which we can design physically realistic
displays thanks to available software packages with physics engines. While early research
into intuitive physics had focused on documenting how people’s understanding of some
aspects of physics, such as ballistic and curvilinear motion, is sometimes systematically
biased (e.g. McCloskey et al., 1980), more recent research has demonstrated how some
of these biases may be explained if we assume that (1) our physical understanding is
approximately Newtonian, and (2) we are often fundamentally uncertain about some
important aspects of the physical scene (e.g., the masses of the objects involved in a
collision, Sanborn et al., 2013).
Battaglia et al. (2013) have argued that people’s understanding of physics is best un-
derstood in analogy to a physics engine used to produce physically realistic scenes. The
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idea is that people have something like a physics simulator in their mind that they can
use to approximately predict what will happen in the future (Smith & Vul, 2013), reason
about what happened in the past (Smith & Vul, 2014), or simulate what would have
happened if some aspect of the situation had been different (Gerstenberg et al., 2015).
From the causal model perspective, we can think of this as a set of particularly rich
constraints on the form of a causal model — e.g. where relationships between entities
are given functional forms that embody the equations of motion, conservation of energy
and so on.2 Nevertheless, the results of these experiments are consistent with the view
that people have a rich intuitive theory of physics that supports approximately accurate
mental simulations of key aspects of physical scenes. However, these experiments do not
address the question of how we get there – how do people acquire their intuitive physical
theories?
Intuitive theories can be expressed as probabilistic programs (Gerstenberg & Tenen-
baum, to appear; Goodman et al., 2008, 2015). Such programs can contain both logical
and stochastic functions meaning that they are capable of generating a distribution of
actualisations. For example we might express a theory of attraction as a very general
version of Newton’s universal law of gravitation Force = Gm1m2
d2
in which the strength of
the attraction is defined by the masses of the relevant objects m1 and m2, the distance
between them d and (gravitational) constant G. However, we can treat m1,m2, d,G,
or even the 1
x2
functional relationship with d, as random variables, each with their own
probability densities. The result is a program, or theory, which can be used to generate a
wide range exact forms of physical attraction, but that still expresses constraints, ruling
out many forms and making some of the remainder more plausible than others.
Probabilistic program induction is a thorny problem, but one where human-like per-
formance has been demonstrated (Lake et al., 2015; Lerer, Gross, & Fergus, 2016) by
sophisticated Bayesian machinery embodying principles of causality and composition-
ality. Ullman et al. (2014) explored human intuitive physics learning by studying how
people learn about different latent physical properties of 2D “microworlds” similar to
the one shown in Figure 8.1. The worlds were bounded by solid walls and contained
a number of coloured pucks with differing weights, surfaces with differing levels of fric-
tion, as well as local (magnet-like) forces between pucks and a global (gravity-like) force
pulling all the pucks in a particular direction. The properties of the worlds (the number
2Of course the idea that we have a physics simulator in our head raises the crucial question of how
the brain can implement this. While we do not focus on this here, note that there are a number of
emerging proposals based on deep learning (e.g. Battaglia et al., 2016; Chang et al., 2016; Ullman et al.,
2014; Wu et al., 2015).




Figure 8.1: Schematic display of “microworlds” in Experiment 10. Four pucks are
moving around colliding and affecting one another with local (magnet-like) forces. The
learner is also dragging the puck labelled “B” (by left-hold-clicking on it and moving
the computer mouse).
and nature of the pucks, friction patches and forces) were generated from an underlying
probabilistic program capable of generating around 14,000 distinct worlds. Participants
would watch and then replay a 5 second clip from each of the generated worlds. In
each clip, the pucks bounced around, attracting and repelling each other, being slowed
down by the friction, and being pulled by the global force. Participants then answered
a series of questions about each world’s properties. Participants were able to detect dif-
ferent levels of mass and friction on average, but individual judgments were noisy. They
identified the correct global force around 70% of the time and were much better at de-
tecting local attraction (82%) than repulsion (53%). Ullman et al. found that divergence
was matched by an asymmetry in the evidence: pucks that repelled one another would
rarely spend long enough close together to exhibit strong repulsion, while attracting
pucks would rapidly approach one another and stick together offering stronger evidence
of the latent force.
Ullman et al. modelled participants’ judgments by assuming a mixture of an Ideal Ob-
server model (IO) and a Simulation and Summary Statistics model (SSS). The IO com-
pares the observed objects’ trajectories to simulations of expected trajectories under the
different possible worlds. The model assumes a certain amount of perceptual uncertainty
(e.g. about the pucks’ exact locations and velocities) and uses this to calculate likeli-
hoods of the observed data under different possible world settings. The SSS compared
statistics about each clip such as the pucks’ average positions, velocities and pairwise
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distances, to the summary statistics of repeated simulations under the different possible
worlds. For instance, objects in worlds with a global force towards south tend to be
closer to the southern wall of the world. A mixture model that combined both IO and
SSS had a .81 correlation with participants’ judgments. Individually, the SSS did a
better job than the IO on predicting all but global force judgments.
In the current work, we build on these results, exploring how people interact with physi-
cal microworlds and their learning of the different physical properties. The SSS approach
is less well suited to the active learning setting, because it is unclear how interacting with
the worlds will affect their summary statistics. In general, we would expect perturbing
the world to make these a less reliable guide to the worlds’ properties. For instance, if
you move pucks to the southern wall of the world, then their average location is no longer
a good guide to the global force. The IO perspective is more promising, providing a way
of quantifying the evidence provided by interactions with the worlds relative to evidence
received without intervening. We can also use the IO perspective to distinguish what
learners’ actions provide the most information about, and more generally, how acting in
the worlds reshapes the evidence available for learning.
8.2 Experiment 10: Intervening in space and time
The final experiment of this thesis uses a task adapted from the setup used by Ullman et
al. (2014). However, rather than preselecting scenes to show participants, we generated
the simulations on the fly. This allowed us to include an active condition in which
participants could exert control over the scenes and alter how they played out, as well as a
passive condition in which participants merely observed the world and a yoked condition
in which participants observed the actions of an active participant. There are many ways
in which we might allow active learners to interact with the worlds. Bramley et al. (2016)
piloted two active learning setups that differed in the extent to which participants had
fine-grained control. In an “active punch” condition, participants controlled a fist with
which they could roughly knock other objects around, mimicking the clumsy actions of
a baby yet to develop fine motor skills. In an “active grab” condition, learners could use
the mouse to grab the pucks and drag them around, staging more precisely orchestrated
interventions. Participants found the fist hard to control, leading to chaotic interventions
and low accuracy. Therefore, in this experiment we focus on the active grab condition.
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We also focus on identification of two target properties: local pair-wise forces, and
object masses. Because active testing is particularly valuable when competing causal
explanations cannot be resolved by observational evidence only, we generated confounded
evidence by including two distractor pucks along with two target pucks and drawing local
forces randomly out of attract/none/repel for all pairs of target and distractor objects.
This means that it is important to isolate the target pucks from the distractor pucks
to get clear information about the target pairwise force. Rather than including global
forces, or friction which were easily identified by passive learners in Ullman et al. (2014),
we varied the relative mass of the two target objects, a property which participants had
found more difficult to infer, and whose identification we hypothesised would benefit
from curated comparisons and interactions between pucks.
We hypothesised that active participants would outperform passive participants, and
that yoked participants would inherit some, but not all of this advantage.
8.2.1 Methods
Participants
Sixty-four participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (39 male, M±SD
age 33.6±10.2). Participants were paid at a rate of $6 per hour, plus performance-related
bonuses ($0.61± .17).
Conditions
Participants were assigned to one of three learning conditions, passive (N = 24), active
(N = 20), yoked (N = 20):
1. Passive Participants observed the microworlds unfold without being able to in-
teract. If, in rare cases, everything came to a standstill, objects’ velocities and
locations were refreshed.
2. Active Participants could grab pucks and drag them around with the mouse.
Grabbed pucks retained their properties (i.e. mass and local forces and location
and momentum) but became strongly attracted to the position of the mouse.
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When released, they would continue on their current trajectory but no longer be
attracted to the mouse.3
3. Yoked In this condition, participants watched replays of the interactions of an
active participant.
The first 44 participants were randomly assigned to either the passive (24) or the active
(20) learning condition, and the final 20 were yoked 1-to-1 with the 20 active participants.
Worlds
Each participant watched or interacted with 9 microworlds, consisting of all combinations
of target force in attract, repel and none and target masses in [1, 1]kg, [1, 2]kg and [2, 1]kg
(see Table 8.1). The five other pairwise forces were drawn uniformly from the three
possibilities for each participant on each trial. This resulted in an overall hypothesis
space M of 2187 possible worlds (e.g. all 37 combinations of target and distractor local
forces and the possible target masses) but a smaller judgment space containing the 9
combinations of target mass and target force.
Table 8.1: Experiment design
World 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Target force A A A N N N R R R
Target 1 mass 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2
Target 2 mass 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
Note: A = attract, N = none, R = repel; masses are in kg.
Materials and Procedure
The experiment was programmed in javascript using a port of the Box2D physics game
engine (demos of all three conditions and and replays of all active participants are avail-
able at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/apl). The microworlds were displayed
in a 600 by 400 pixel frame, with 1 m in the world corresponding to 100 pixels on the
screen. Each world was bounded by solid walls with high elasticity (98% of energy re-
tained per collision) – and contained four pucks of random colours4 that were different
on each trial. All four pucks had radius of .25 meters and elasticity of 98%. The two
3We opted for strong attraction rather than simply copying the position of the mouse because this
allowed the controlled object to interact reciprocally with the other objects in collisions rather than
behaving as if it was infinitely heavier than the other objects.
4These were chosen to be equally spaced around the HSV colour wheel (Smith, 1978) with a random
starting point each time.
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Figure 8.2: Eliciting judgments in Experiment 10. Participants answered two forced
choice questions and set confidence sliders.
target pucks were labelled with new letters on each trial (e.g. “A” and “B” on trial one,
“C” and “D” on trial two, cf. Figure 8.1) while the distractor pucks were unlabelled.
This was done to minimise transfer effects and confusion between the objects in the
different trials which had been an issue in Bramley et al.’s (2016) pilot. The distractor
pucks were all 1 kg but one of the target pucks could weigh 2 kg as in Table 8.1.
Each world also had up to 6 distinct local forces, one between the target pucks, and one
for every other combination of target and non-target puck. Each of these could either
be attractive (3 m/s2), repulsive (−3 m/s2), or no force.5 The pucks’ initial positions were
random but non-overlapping, with initial velocities in the x and y direction drawn from
Unif(−10, 10) m/s. If all pucks’ velocities fell below .15 m/s, the simulation froze and
the window went black for 500 ms before the positions and velocities of the pucks were
redrawn.6 Each world was simulated for 45 seconds at 60 frames per second, leading to
2700 frames of evidence per trial. Complete specification of the settings of the Box2D
simulator and a demo of the experiment are available in Appendix C.
At the end of each trial, our two test questions appeared in counterbalanced order (see
Figure 8.2). The questions were forced-choice but were paired with confidence sliders
for a fine-grained measure of participants’ judgments. To ensure that participants were
motivated to answer the questions as well as they could we paid a bonus for each correct
response.
Participants first completed instructions relevant to their condition, answered compre-
hension check questions, and then faced two practice trials followed by the nine test
trials. Practice trials were always worlds 1 and 5. The randomly drawn distractor
forces, puck colours and labels differed between the practice and test instances. The two
5Local forces scaled with the inverse squared distance between the objects in line with Newton’s
universal law of gravitation. Thus, the current local force L exerted on object o1 by object o2 (and the
reverse) was given by 3
d2
.
6This happened 1.0± 0.83 times per 45 second trial on average.
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test questions appeared below the world when the time was up. At the end of the ex-
periment, participants received feedback about how many of the test questions they got
right, and were paid a 5¢ bonus for each correct answer. The experiment took 19.0±7.3
minutes on average.
For yoked participants, the cursor of the participant to whom they were yoked (hereafter
the yoker) was shown with a large “+” symbol whenever it was within the world, and
any objects grabbed by the yoker were indicated as in the active condition with a thick
black border. Counterbalancing and puck colouration from the active condition was
shared by each yoker–yokee pair.
8.2.2 Results
Accuracy
Participants answered 53%, 66% and 54% of questions correctly in the passive, active
and yoked conditions respectively (see Figure 8.3). Average performance differed sig-
nificantly by condition F (2, 61) = 3.8, η2 = .12, p = .03. Post-hoc tests revealed that
active participants answered significantly more questions correctly than passive partic-
ipants t(42) = 2.5, p = 0.02, and their yoked counterparts t(19) = 2.9, p = 0.02, with
no difference between passive and yoked participants t(42) = .2, p = 0.83. Only 4 yoked
participants outperformed their active counterparts (Figure 8.3, dotted lines), with a
further 3 answering the same number of questions correctly. Active participants’ per-
formance was predictive of their yoked counterparts’ F (1, 18) = 5.6, η2 = .24, p = .03.
Confidence judgments differed by condition F (2, 61) = 5.3, η2 = .15, p = .007, with
active participants significantly more confident on average than passive t(42) = 2.8, p =
.006 or yoked participants t(38) = 2.9, p = .006. Confidence was positively correlated
with accuracy F (1, 62) = 10.6, η2 = .15, p = .002 but did not interact with condition.
Masses versus relationships
Across conditions, participants were worse at inferring masses than forces t(63) =
−4.8, p < .0001 and reported lower confidence in mass judgments (66 ± 25%) com-
pared to force judgments (74± 25%) t(63) = −4.2, p < .0001. Again, participants were
less accurate in correctly identifying when there was no force between the target pucks
(56%) than repulsion (70%) or attraction (78%), with a main effect of question type



































































Figure 8.3: Performance by condition in Experiment 10. Boxplot shows medians
and interquartile range. Large dots indicate condition means. Small dots indicating
individual participants are jittered for visibility. Dotted lines connect active participants
with matched yoked participants.
F (2, 189) = 7.7, p < .0001 and significant improvements going from no force to attrac-
tion t(126) = 3.9, p = .0001 and repulsion t(126) = 2.4, p = .017. Force type additionally
interacted with condition F (6, 183) = 3.0, p < .0001. Dummy contrasts with no force
and passive as controls revealed active participants were significantly better at identi-
fying repel than passive participants t(42) = 3.2, p < .0001 and there was a marginal
improvement for yoked participants as well t(42) = 1.9, p < .058 (see Figure 8.4). There
was no significant relationship between accuracy on the local force question and the
number of distractor forces.
Effects of control
Active participants experienced slightly fewer between-puck collisions than passive par-
ticipants, 59 ± 14 compared to 65 ± 9, t(42) = 2.0, p = 0.056. However, they experi-
enced significantly more collisions between the two target pucks 15.0± 8.1, compared to
9.8± 4.4, t(42) = 2.7, p = 0.01. 13.2± 7.8% collisions in the active condition took place
while one of the two target objects was being controlled by the participant. Time spent
controlling objects was also positively related to final performance for active and yoked
participants F (1, 38) = 4.8, η2 = 11, p = 0.04.





















































Figure 8.4: a) Confusion matrices for mass question (a) and relationship question
(b).
8.2.3 Interim discussion
The markedly better performance in identifying repel forces by the active participants is
striking, considering that passive participants and those in Ullman et al. (2014) struggled
with this property. This is consistent with the idea that active participants were able to
force the repellent pucks closer together and thus gain more experience of these forces
in action. In general, we saw a marked improvement in performance when participants
could control the scenes themselves. Thus, key questions are what the active participants
were doing, and how their actions helped them identify the worlds’ properties. In the
next section we begin to explore this both quantitatively — by measuring the evidence
generated throughout each trial — and qualitatively — by categorising the different
testing strategies the active participants came up with.
8.2.4 Measuring information
Similar to Ullman et al.’s (2014) Ideal Observer model, we used simulations to compute
likelihoods for different worlds given the true trajectories of the objects d in each trial.
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We simulated each trial under all 2187 possible world settings and tracked how much they
diverged from what actually happened. Because of the dynamic nature of the physical
interactions, simulations with only slightly different properties would quickly diverge
from the same starting point, becoming completely unrelated after a few seconds. Thus,
to get a balanced measure of the evidence available throughout the trials, we snapped the
simulated objects back to their true locations and velocities every 10 frames (6 times per
second) before allowing them to start to diverge again.7 We converted these divergences
into likelihood scores assigning a probability of observing the actual object trajectories
d given the potential world mi, the interventions c (in the active and yoked conditions),







for each object, where dt is its location at time t, sti its simulated location if mi is true,
and  is a scaling parameter capturing perceptual uncertainty about the objects’ true
locations and velocities (see Figure 8.5a for a visualisation of this procedure).8 By com-
puting these likelihood scores for all possible models and on each trial, multiplying by
a uniform prior P (M), we computed a posterior over models P (M |d, ; c) and associ-
ated posterior uncertainty H(M |d; c) using Equation 3.8. We also calculated posterior
uncertainty relative to the target mass and relationship questions by marginalising over
the other properties. The posterior uncertainty depends on what interactions occur
during a clip. For example, objects must pass close together for their trajectories to be
strongly affected by any local forces and must collide with one another (or be dragged
by the mouse) for their trajectories to be strongly dependent on their masses. Thus,
this measure provides a way of assessing whether active learners moved the objects in
ways that generated extra information relative to passive learners.
We find that overall posterior uncertainties did not differ on average for passive com-
pared to active participants t(29) = 1.5, p = 0.13, nor did posterior uncertainty about
7Like Ullman et al. (2014), we experimented with several “snap back” windows, including 5 and 20
frames, finding similar results.
8Note that we do not assess the scaling parameter for perceptual noise , so these measures should be
thought of as a guide to the relative rather than absolute evidence in the trials. We assumed an  = 10.
 = ∞ corresponds to perfect knowledge of the objects’ locations and velocities, which, combined with
perfect knowledge of the physics engine, rules out all but the true world within a few frames.  = 0
would assign equal likelihoods for all worlds.



































Figure 8.5: a) Calculating model likelihoods based on divergence of simulated trajec-
tories. Black line and opaque puck shows the true trajectory of one of the objects in a
scene. Dotted lines and transparent pucks show simulated trajectories under different
assumptions about the world. Note that a simulation with the correct assumptions
about the world would lie on top of the black line. We based the likelihood for each
hypothesis m on the distances between its simulation and the true trajectory (grey
lines). b) Measuring predictive divergence due to target force, averaging over all other
properties. Rather than measuring distance between simulated and actual trajectories
as in (a), we measured the distance between simulations that differed on only one prop-
erty at a time, matching all other properties (shown at the bottom in square brackets),
and averaging across all possible other properties (indicated by “+” and “...etc”). Note
we still snapped these back to the true trajectories every ten frames.
mass t(29) = 0.8, p = 0.4, but that active participants generated significantly more infor-
mation on average about the target force t(29) = 3.8, p < 0.001.9 Inspecting Figure 8.6,
we see that mass uncertainty was generally very low (meaning the ideal observer should
normally be very certain about the mass question) significantly lower than force uncer-
tainty t(60) = −7.1, p < .001. Mass uncertainty was also skewed for active participants
in particular, with mainly low but a few very high values. Thus we also compared log
uncertainties, now finding a significant difference between active and passive in terms of
log mass uncertainty t(29) = 3.9, 0 < 0.001, and no difference in results for logs of overall
and force uncertainty — t(29) = 1.6, p = 0.13 and t(29) = 3.9, p < .001 respectively.
Intervention quality
As well as using simulation to estimate what participants managed to learn by the end
of the trials, it is also interesting to look within the trials to see which periods better
revealed which properties. For this we created a measure we call predictive divergence
(PD). This captures the extent that the current action in a trial depends on the value of
a given property. We calculate PD for each world-property using the simulated object
trajectories, splitting them according to their value on each property (e.g. whether A
9Unfortunately velocity information was not stored for 13 participants meaning we could not use their
clip data for computing these measures. Thus, the following comparisons are based on the remaining 18
passive and 13 active participants (and the 13 corresponding yoked participants where appropriate).
































































Figure 8.6: Remaining uncertainty for active and passive participants: a) With re-
spect to the true world. b) With respect to the target masses. c) With respect to the
target force.
attracts, has no effect on, or repels B), measuring the degree that these predictions
diverge and averaging this over possible settings of the other properties. The result is a
measure of how strongly each property is being revealed at every point in every trial (see
Appendix C for equations). To a first approximation, maximising this measure is a good
objective for planning interventions. Interventions with large expected PDs correspond
to questions in which there is no mistaking the answer; one can expect very different
things to happen depending on the truth about the target property, irrespective of the
other properties of the world. We consider three variants. PDmass measures the current
predictive divergence depending on the target objects’ masses. PDforce does the same for
the target force. As a baseline, we also consider PDany which is the average predictive
divergence for any (target or distractor) property of the world. As a concrete example, if
target objects are close together and at rest they will have high PDforce. This is because
they will move toward each other if they attract, stay still if there is no force, and move
away from each other if they repel, leading to strongly differing predictions about their
trajectories depending on this property.
Accordingly, we find that active participants have much higher average PDmass t(29) =
5.6, p < 0.001 and PDforce t(29) = 4.6, p < 0.001 than passive participants but do not
differ in terms of PDany t(29) = 0.4, p = 0.7 (see Figure 8.7a). Additionally, looking
within active learners’ trials, we compare periods of active control to periods of passive
observation. We find that periods of control average only a moderate increase in PDany
t(11) = 3.2, p = 0.009, but a large increase in PDmass t(11) = 10.2, p < .001 and PDforce
t(11) = 5.1, p < .001 (see Figure 8.7b).



































b) Observing / intervening
Figure 8.7: Comparison of (a) predictive divergence for passive and active partici-
pants, and (b) between periods of observation and intervention for active participants.
8.2.5 Natural experiments
Clearly, active participants are acting in ways that are effective at revealing the target
properties over and above the irrelevant distractor properties. Understanding exactly
how they came up with the actions they did is a large project. However, as a first pass,
we viewed the replays and identified number of potential strategies. We describe these
here, providing schematic figures (8.8a–f)and links to replays exemplifying them:
(a) Deconfounding Even though participants mainly manipulated the target pucks,
they also sometimes manipulated the distractor pucks. Many of these manipulations
involved moving the distractor pucks out of the way and leaving them at rest in a far
corner (Figure 8.8a, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/it/de).
(b) Encroaching Participants grabbed one target puck and brought it toward the other
target puck. This simple strategy allowed participants to infer whether and how the
two pucks affected one another. In some cases, participants towed one attracting puck
with the other, or pushed a repulsive puck around with the other providing a strong and
extended demonstration of the force between the pucks (Figure 8.8b, http://www.ucl
.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/it/encroach).
(c) Launching Participants grabbed one of the target pucks and “threw it” against the
other target puck. This intervention helps to figure out whether one of the targets
is heavier than the other (Figure 8.8c, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/it/
launch).
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(d) Knocking Similar to launching, participants grabbed one of the target pucks and
knocked it against the other (without letting it go). This intervention also reveals infor-
mation about the mass of each object (Figure 8.8d, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado
-lab/el/it/knock).
(e) Throwing Participants grabbed a target puck and then threw it, explicitly avoiding
collision with any of the other pucks. By exerting an identical force when throwing each
target puck, the results of the intervention help to figure out the mass of each object
(Figure 8.8e, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/it/throw).
(f) Shaking Some participants discovered an effective strategy for comparing the mass
of the two target objects. By rapidly shaking each in turn (moving the mouse from
side to side) it was possible to see that the heavier object reacted more sluggishly.
Its greater momentum takes longer to be counteracted by its attraction to the mouse
location (Figure 8.8f, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/it/shake).
Some of these strategies have easy-to-measure hallmarks. For instance, in line with
encroaching (Figure 8.8b), we see evidence that participants in the active condition
identified the local forces by bringing the two target pucks close to each other. The
lower the average distance between two target objects for an active participant, the
better they did on the force question β = −.3, F (1, 18) = 8.0, η2 = .3, p = .001 but this
had no relationship with accuracy on the mass question p = .87. Conversely, in line
with the shaking strategy (Figure 8.8f), participants who moved the controlled object
around faster did better on the mass question β = 25, F (1, 18) = 15, η2 = .45, p < 0.001,
but controlled object speed had no relationship with accuracy on the force question
p = .67. Yoked participants did not inherit these differences, with no significant rela-
tionships between performance on either question and average distance between targets
or controlled-object speed.
We also explored the relationship between these potential strategies and the PD mea-
sures. Figure 8.9 shows the information generated in a trial that we categorised as a
shaking strategy. From around halfway through the trial onward, the participant shakes
the target balls one at a time, strongly revealing their relative mass. In line with our
intuition, we see this creates large spikes in PDmass relative to PDforce and PDany. Fig-
ure 8.10 shows the PDmass and PDforce generated throughout a trial categorised as both
encroaching (bringing target objects close together) and disambiguating (moving dis-
tractor objects out of the way), again particularly in the second half of the trial, we see
spikes in PDforce relative to PDany, but also many spikes in PDmass (which was generally
higher than PDany).























Figure 8.8: Examples of different interventions participants performed in the active
condition.
8.3 Discussion
In sum, we found a clear benefit for active over passive learning in this experiment.
In particular, active participants gathered more evidence about repulsion by bringing
target objects closer together and moving distractor objects out of the way. A number
of them also gathered information about masses by shaking the target objects back and
forth. The quality of the control exerted by the active participants was an important
determinant of the quality of the final evidence available to the yoked participants.
However, the substantial drop-off from active to yoked accuracy was consistent with the
idea that first-hand knowledge of what was being tested (e.g. relationship or mass),
when and how, was likely to be crucial for learning successfully. Another factor might
















Figure 8.9: Timeline for an active trial exemplifying shaking. Periods of control shown
by green shading. Smoothed PDmass (blue dashed), PDforce (red dot-dashed), PDany
(black full) estimates with light grey confidence intervals. Watch the clip: http://
www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/it/shake.
have been that active participants were able to look ahead at the crucial locations in the
scenes where diagnostic interactions were expected to occur. Yoked participants lacked
the ability to foresee what will happen.
There are a number of ways we might model these differences between active and yoked
performers’ experiences. In our initial analysis, we treated all objects’ locations and
velocities as equally uncertain. However, it is plausible that active learners have a better
idea about the locations of objects while controlling them since they can incorporate
direct motor feedback from their mouse or finger on the track-pad (e.g. Ko¨rding &
Wolpert, 2004). We could model this by giving active learners a smaller perceptual
uncertainty parameter for objects under control. This would mean that active learners
receive stronger evidence from events involving the controlled object. Additionally,
learners’ attention is certainly limited relative to the action in the scenes. Thus, we
might model learners’ attention as a focal window. Active learners could then use
their knowledge of planned action to move their window, for instance toward regions
they expect to be informative in virtue of their interventions. Yoked learners lack this
foresight and hence may have often be looking elsewhere when something informative
happens.
















Figure 8.10: Timeline for active trial exemplifying deconfounding. As in Figure 8.9.
Watch the clip: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/el/it/de.
An interesting disconnect between our measures and participants’ judgments was that
the measures suggested there was more information available about masses than forces,
while participants found the mass question much harder. There are several possible
explanations for this. One possibility is that participants were also uncertain about other
aspects of the world. For simplicity we assumed perfect knowledge of the worlds’ fixed
properties (e.g the elasticity of the objects, the friction, the strength of the attractive
force of the mouse on controlled objects, the laws of the simulated physics). It could be
that incorporating uncertainty about these other properties makes the model likelihoods
and predicted divergences less sensitive to differences in mass. Another possibility is
that types of divergence caused by the local forces were easier for people to spot. The
local forces created qualitative differences in the paths of objects (e.g. making objects
veer toward or away from one another rather than continuing in a straight line) while
the masses affected things more quantitatively (e.g. affecting the degree of veering or
the angle of exit collisions). It is plausible that the perceptual system is better tuned
to distinguishing curves from straight lines than comparing angles, especially as these
veering movements are hallmarks of causal influences. Indeed, research has suggested
that people are poor at predicting the quantitative consequences of collisions (Sanborn
et al., 2013; White, 2006a).
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Encroaching and shaking permitted simple indirect measures, and accordingly, we found
shakers doing better on mass questions and encroachers doing better on relationship
questions. Additionally, we found our predictive divergence measures lined up with
our intuitions about the value of shaking and disambiguating strategies in particular.
The other experiments’ timeline signatures were more subtle, depending more on what
happens after control is released (e.g. throwing) and we plan to explore these in future
work. One planned step is to have independent coders watch the replays and code
instances of proposed strategies. This will give us a more reliable idea of strategy
identifiability as well as a basis from which to model them. Another is to repeat the
experiment, tasking participants to infer only mass or force property. This will allow
us to look at whether our information measures, or yoked participants can identify
what the active participant is learning about, and assess the extent that matched versus
mismatched goals affect the responses of yoked participants.
In the longer term, we would like to explore the idea that people have intuitive theories
of active learning, which they can use to rapidly generate informative actions in familiar
domains. Work on this problem has begun in machine learning. Denil et al. (2017)
use deep neural networks combined with reinforcement learning to train an algorithm
that can generate physics experiments in a virtual environment (see also Chang et al.,
2016). Similarly, Agrawal, Nair, Abbeel, Malik, and Levine (2016) train a robotic arm to
actively learn about the physical properties of real objects by poking and prodding them.
These projects found success through explicitly or implicitly encoding a hierarchical
model of the action space — loosely speaking, meaning that action planning can be
done in a top-down way; so choosing whether to shake or knock before generating (or
simulating possible) motor-realisations. Our experiment supports the idea that humans
are intuitive natural scientists, quickly finding ways of revealing causal properties in a
physical (but novel) setting. It seems likely that future work in this area will benefit
from combining insights from machine learning with close analysis of human behaviour.
8.4 Conclusions
This chapter began the process of exploring active learning of intuitive physical theo-
ries. We found that active learners spontaneously generated informal experiments that
allowed them to identify the relevant properties more effectively than passive controls,
but that their success was not shared by yoked observers. We demonstrated that active
learners generated considerably more information about target properties and discussed
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the types of interventional strategies, or “Natural experiments”, participants performed
and outlined steps for future work.
Chapter 9
General discussion
“Thirty years ago, we used to ask: Can a computer simulate all processes of
logic? The answer was ‘yes’, but the question was surely wrong. We should
have asked: Can logic simulate all sequences of cause and effect? And the
answer would have been ‘no’.” — GREGORY BATESON
“Know thyself ”
— ANCIENT GREEK APHORISM
9.1 Causal theory change reconsidered
My initial rational analysis of causal structure learning cast it as a problem of Bayesian
inference over a vast hypothesis space of possible models. However, we quickly saw that
explicit maintenance of probabilistic beliefs in such a large space would be impossible
for any plausibly bounded learner. As a solution, I conceptualised causal learning as
an incremental process of “mental tinkering”, where one gradually “tries out” small
adaptations to a single global working model or theory with the goal of improving its
fit, or at minimum, accommodating the latest evidence. Approximating intractable
probabilistic inference has received a lot of attention in machine learning (e.g. Bishop,
2006). Accordingly, the mental tinkering idea readily found formal footing in a model
(Neurath’s ship) that cast theory change as a semi-stochastic local search in model space,
veering between a broad Markovian search (Gibbs sampling) or a race to the nearest
peak (hill-climbing). Relying on local search meant the current structure could act as
an anchor allowing the learner to benefit from evidence learned in the past but now
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forgotten, and providing a rationale for conservatism and anchoring effects in cognition
(Edwards, 1968; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Lieder et al., 2012; Petrov & Anderson,
2005). I noted at the end of Chapter 5 that my approach is not limited to CBN structure
learning, but that variants might explain human success at learning all sorts of complex
representations. For instance, in Chapters 6 and 7 patterns of causal learning from
point events in continuous-time were consistent with the idea that learners considered
new evidence through the lens of the current working hypothesis, which they would
adapt as required to explain unexpected or surprising new evidence. Chapter 8 did not
explicitly assess the proposal that people adapt their beliefs about physical causality
in a local and incremental manner. However, a´ propos the previous chapters, it seems
plausible that learners fixed their assumptions about non-focal aspects of the worlds
when predicting the future, and so updated their beliefs about the world, one aspect at
a time.
In general this anti-foundationalist perspective lines up with common intuitions about
the role of thinking cognition. We expect that complex problems will take time to perco-
late, and we often engage in actively rethinking a familiar issue with hope of discovering
a better or deeper understanding. It can take a lifetime, or even multiple generations,
to discover a simpler solution or more powerful explanation. These inherently sequen-
tial and stochastic aspects of cognition, which we often term “thinking”, are difficult to
accommodate from the computational level Bayesian perspective, where all the possibil-
ities must be laid out in advance. However, they seem natural from the perspective of
a cognitive agent as engaged in stochastic search and optimization in a latent large and
multi-modal theory space.
9.1.1 Getting started
While Neurath’s ship was the best fitting model of participants in Chapter 5 and the
related Add more likely model accorded best with participants in Chapter 7, there was
also substantial empirical evidence for the use of heuristics. For instance, many partici-
pants in Experiments 1–4 would attribute all effects directly to their latest intervention
(simple endorsement) and in Experiments 5–9 people often behaved as if the temporal
order of events was equivalent to their causal order. In one sense this is puzzling. Com-
plete reliance on such rules would seem to prohibit incremental refinement. One reason
for their prevalence in our data could be that our experiments focused on short learning
periods and demanded causal judgments early and repeatedly. This forces learners to
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come up with ways of getting started — i.e. generating an initial hypothesis that they
can lean-on and progressively refine. It could be that simple endorsement and temporal
order heuristics are ways of getting started rather than sufficient strategies in their own
right, meaning that their prevalence in the current experiments is in part due to the
focus on short learning trials and unfamiliar settings.
9.1.2 Navigating infinite hypothesis spaces
The Neurath’s ship characterisation of incremental causal model construction works
within a predefined — albeit large — hypothesis space. However, human learning and
development may be better characterised as a process of discovery, in which the final
model is not in any meaningful sense, contained in the original formulation of the prob-
lem. Thus to understand how new hypotheses are discovered, we must rethink what
kinds of theory modifications are available to the learner. One element of this could
be to operationalise model changes as application of production rules (e.g. Goodman
et al., 2008). The idea here is that the learner has a small set of primitives that they
can chain together to create an infinite number of new hypotheses. In a simple causal
context these might simply be variables and edges. If the learner can not only add and
remove edges but also create variables — perhaps by dividing existing ones (Buchanan
et al., 2010) or positing latent ones (Lucas, Holstein, & Kemp, 2014) — then they can, in
principle, create any causal model of arbitrary complexity. On this view, theory change
could proceed through a search that stochastically adds and removes these primitives,
allowing the model grow in complexity as the data demands (Aldous, 1985; Antoniak,
1974; Ghahramani & Griffiths, 2005; Pitman, 2002).
Taking this one step further, developing theories might often require the positing of
new primitives — e.g. when the existing ones are simply not expressive enough to
accommodate the evidence. We see this in physics where new entities — e.g. strings,
bosons, black holes — are often initially proposed as placeholders to fill gaps in existing
theories. In graphical model terms, we might imagine positing a new kind of edge such as
a bidirectional link ↔ as a new primitive to explain dynamics we cannot accommodate
with just← and→. As a real-world example, the modern concept of magnetism was once
a place holder for curious behaviour of iron ore (Verschuur, 1996), and germ theory was
born from John Snow’s observation of geographical patterns of cholera cases clustered
around water pumps (Snow, 1855). Thus an interesting direction for developing a theory
of cognitive theory change might be to formalise additional moves such as the addition
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and removal of variables, and generation of new primitives. In terms of the metaphor,
we can imagine a Neurath’s ship that is capable of sailing into uncharted waters (via
production rules), and being jerry rigged with new parts made from flotsam (unexplained
data) encountered on the way. Given formal flesh, such a theory could begin to explain
how complex cognition can emerge from almost nothing through a few simple moves and
an extended interaction with the causal world.
9.1.3 Vertical structure
An important aspect of both cognitive representation and active learning that I have
not focused on explicitly, is its vertical structure. The fact that our participants learned
successfully across a range of domains from the highly abstract (Chapters 3–5) to the
richly physical (Chapter 8) confirms the intuition that humans are capable of reasoning
about causality across levels of abstraction, and both with and without domain specific
knowledge. I noted in the introduction that hierarchical Bayesian models have been
used to express theories of situation specificity — in which existing causal knowledge
can be rapidly recruited in the form of rich priors in familiar domains (e.g. Tenenbaum
et al., 2011). Furthermore, I noted that recursive Bayesian networks (e.g. Casini et al.,
2011) can model the process of reductive explanation — explaining phenomena in terms
of their parts — and abstraction — generalising about the aggregate behaviour of parts.
An interesting and open question is whether we can express the Neurath’s ship style
ideas about local and incremental belief change in such a “three dimensional” theory
space. The thought is that lower level posits are nested theoretically or ontologically in
higher level posits, such that changes at one level can impact downwards (affecting what
lower-level parts are needed to explain a high level phenomenon) and upwards (affecting
what higher-level phenomena emerge from abstraction) as well as horizontally (affecting
the roles of other local relationships). While these sorts of ideas have been developed
in philosophy of science (e.g. Strevens, 2008), they are yet to be explored in detail in
cognition.
Constructing a thesis
A prominent recent example of complex theory construction for me was writing this
thesis. At no point did I select this thesis wholesale from among all possible theses,
but rather constructed it phrase by phrase. The finished product is the result of a
(seemingly endless) chain of small additions, edits and subtractions, during which I
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leant increasingly on the other sections and chapters for support. But I would also
shift my focus upwards and downwards between different levels of organisation. Some
days I focused at a high level, reordering the chapters or thinking about the overall
message. These high level changes would tend to have unforeseen consequences that I
would gradually discover later when working on the content of individual chapters. For
instance it would no longer make sense to foreshadow a certain result, or would be too
late to introduce a certain idea. Likewise, small local changes could later turn out to
have consequences at the level of high level organisation. Additionally, in line with the
challenges of learning a causal model, the hardest part of writing the thesis turned out
to be getting started. The final draft of the introduction is only distantly related to
the first draft, and I tended to sketch an initial draft of each chapter rapidly — e.g.
Chapter 7 as the shortest route between Chapters 6 and 8 — without addressing nuance
or detail. Once I had something to build on, I would then spend a much longer time
focusing more narrowly, editing a paragraph at a time supported by the surrounding
work-in-progress.
9.2 Intervention reconsidered
9.2.1 Optimal self teaching
This thesis was primarily about active learning. The rational analysis perspective on
intervention selection revealed it to be an even more intractable problem than the theory
building it supports. Thus I found success in modelling people’s behaviour under the
assumption that, to the extent that they chose their interventions in order to resolve
uncertainty, they did so relative to much narrower questions than the global “what is the
true causal model?”. Studying active learning alongside structure inference, helped make
sense of phenomena like confirmation driven, local and repetitive testing as normatively
sensible ways of dealing with a limited ability to learn from evidence. The goal of active
learning for a bounded cognitive agent is not, as often presumed, the generation of as
much information as possible, but rather a process of self-teaching, turning the world
into a classroom in which one’s limited learning system can flourish and understanding
can grow. Just as a teacher who simply presents the hardest material without ensuring
the students are following would be a bad teacher; an active learner who generates
informative situations without consideration of their own learning trajectory would be a
bad active learner. Thus, one of the key messages of this thesis is that we should rethink
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optimal active learning as optimal self-teaching, and accept that it should be shaped as
much by the limitations of the student, as by dimensions of the world.
The divergence between generating information and successful learning increased in
breadth throughout the thesis. In the three-variable discrete-trial learning problems
there was a large amount of overlap between the actions of an ideal learner and those
of participants. But as we looked at domains of increasing richness and complexity —
i.e. the real time interventions of Chapter 7 and ballistic “experiments” in the physical
microworlds — it was easy to get too much of a good thing. A noiseless idealised learner
with perfect knowledge of the physical rules could identify the target properties after a
few frames of activity in the physical microworlds of Experiment 10. However, for real
learners with limited attention and uncertainty about the physical rules, it was hard
enough to identify these properties within 45 seconds, requiring curated interactions
between the objects for high chance of success. Thus we found that successful learners’
actions tended to be those that selectively magnified evidence about target properties
while minimising the influence of causal distractors. In the same way, we would expect
a good teacher to focus on presenting his students with clear cases and unambiguous
demonstrations of basic principles, safe from the complexities and confounds that com-
plicate learning outside the classroom.
9.2.2 Interventions that explore versus interventions that test
We might divide the types of interventions people performed into two camps: (1) Open-
ended activity-generating interventions, that participants would tend to perform earlier
during learning and (2) controlled tests that recognisably focused on learning about a
particular element of the problem. This suggests a dual role for interventions that has
been suggested informally before in other contexts (e.g. Ruggeri & Lombrozo, 2014).
Early on, interventions are good for hunting causes (Figure 9.1a, Cartwright, 2007).
By systematically trying things out — as we might characterise children’s play (e.g.
Bruner et al., 1976) — we can start to discover putative effects and “get started” on
model construction. As our model becomes more developed it starts to make predic-
tions. By comparing these predictions under a few local counterfactuals we start to be
able to predict what would happen, for instance, if a particular hypothesised causal re-
lationship does exist versus what would happen if it does not exist (Raiffa, 1974). This
predictive ability provides a basis for selecting interventions pro-actively, to resolve local
uncertainty. We can start to imagine what tests create strongly diverging predictions
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depending on some manageable local question, against the backdrop of the rest of larger
theory (e.g. Figure 9.1b). By choosing interventions whose potential evidential impact
we have already pre-emptively imagined, we naturally restrict our reach to the perfor-
mance of tests whose outcomes we will be able to interpret. Indeed, on the preposterior
analysis view, we have already done the work by the time we choose our intervention.
Upon seeing the actual outcome, all that remains is to travel down the associated arm
of our prediction tree.
This notion of intervention might also shed light on confirmation bias (Klayman, 1995;
Nickerson, 1998). Distinct from (but related to) confirmatory evidence gathering, confir-
mation bias is a tendency to interpret evidence as favouring one’s hypothesis more than it
really should. From the preposterior analysis perspective, this might stem from classify-
ing actual outcomes as one of a narrow set of predictions. Where there is an approximate
or near-fit between a prediction and the outcome, this may be taken as confirmation
even though a detailed assessment would reveal the inadequacy of the question. This
echoes Lakatos (1976), who talks of degenerate research programs surviving through
their “internal momentum” — e.g. through preoccupation with a narrow set of tests
and results to the neglect of the larger picture. On the plus side, the Neurath’s ship
perspective demonstrates that, when balanced appropriately, such a narrow focus need






Figure 9.1: Three stages of active causal cognition. a) Early in development interven-
tions help us discover causes. b) Once we have a model, they let us refine it by testing
hypotheses. c) Once the model is rich enough, we can interrogate it through mental
intervention to think, problem solve and control.
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9.2.3 Intuitive theories of intervention — learning to actively learn
How can it be that almost all our participants were able to come up with interven-
tions that were robustly more informative than chance despite facing abstract complex
learning problems in which online calculation would be computationally expensive? The
answer is probably that they didn’t. Our participants did not have to derive each in-
tervention from first principles. Rather, they could rely on a mature intuitive theory
of action and its relationship with causality, and more proximally on the discovery of
effective, repeatable strategies over the course of the problems in an experiment. For
example, if turning X1 “on” tells you what X1 affects, then turning X2 “on” will tell
you what X2 affects. If you have controlled for one confound, you can do the same with
another. If confirmatory testing worked in one learning scenario it may work again for a
similar one. If shaking is informative about the mass of one object then it will be infor-
mative about the mass of another. In general, we do not need to reinvent the concept
of an experiment every time we want to learn something. We can rely on learning a
theory of intervention, similar to those posited to explain other aspects of cognition (e.g.
Gerstenberg & Tenenbaum, to appear; Lake et al., 2015; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). From
this perspective, we can use our knowledge of good strategies for testing things to learn
quickly in familiar domains. All we need to do is work out what kind of learning problem
we are facing and try what worked in the past. Thus, a fruitful avenue for future work
would be to apply insights about learning and representing intuitive theories to the do-
main of active learning. This could provide insight into how people are able to come up
with creative and revealing learning strategies on the fly in complex situations like the
microworlds in Experiment 10. Indeed, it is here, where the participants presumably
had much stronger domain knowledge, that we saw the most creative and distinctive
active learning. It is hard to see how the kinds of behaviours we saw from participants
could be constructed from scratch on the spot. More plausibly, a rich hierarchical theory
of action allowed them to work top down, using high level learning goals like “get a clear
look at the target force in action” (Chen & Klahr, 1999; Klahr et al., 1993) to generate
candidate strategies (e.g. ways of getting the distractor pucks out of the way), which in
turn would guide the generation of motor realisations.
9.2.4 From intervention to adaptive control
As I depicted in Figure 2.1 (Chapter 2), causal learning and representation is really,
ultimately, in service of a more general goal: exploiting the world. I did not focus on the
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problem of balancing exploration — the use of interventions to gather information – and
exploitation — acting to gather rewards (Macready & Wolpert, 1998; Schulz et al., 2016;
Shanks et al., 2002; Steyvers et al., 2009), and was deliberately agnostic about the precise
relationship between utility, information and reward. However, striking the right balance
between learning and exploiting the causal world is clearly an important question. The
jury is still out in neuroscience on whether there are truly separable value signals for
information and reward (Daw & Doya, 2006; Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, &
Dolan, 2006). Thus, it may be that we can understand cognition better by unifying these
goals in a single model. One way of achieving this is through the notion of Bayes-adaptive
control (Bellman, 2015; Feldbaum, 1960; Klenske & Hennig, 2016). Under an adaptive
control analysis, both learning a model and exploiting it are dual aspects of a single
decision problem that can be expressed as a partially observed Markov decision process
(Puterman, 2009). Specifically, we can model control as the task of maximising a reward
in a state space where the transition rules (e.g. the causal structure) is initially unknown.
The possible trajectories in such a Bayes-adaptive Markov decision process (or BAMDP,
Guez, Silver, & Dayan, 2012) encompass all possible future beliefs — i.e. all ways that
the world might turn out to work. Solving this decision tree tells you what action to take
now in order to maximise long-run expected future returns. Unsurprisingly, the exact
solutions to non-trivial BAMDPs are intractable, requiring consideration of a generally
unmanageable number of possible futures. However, recent work has discovered a range
of powerful approximations — based on sophisticated sampling and aggressive deep-
tree-search techniques (e.g. Guez, 2015; Guez et al., 2012; Guez, Silver, & Dayan, 2013).
Thus, a future direction for studying causal cognition and active learning in general
might be to work within this unified formulation of the problem. From here we might
start to make sense of intuitively common aspects of thinking, such as playing out
scenarios far beyond predictability, as achieving something akin to the deep tree search
heuristics that allow for a good approximation of optimal control in a complex and
uncertain causal world.
9.3 Turning control inward
A continuing disconnect between artificial and human intelligence is task flexibility.
While machines now regularly outperform humans on individual pattern matching or
complex control tasks (Guo, Singh, Lee, Lewis, & Wang, 2014; LeCun, Bengio, & Hin-
ton, 2015; Mnih et al., 2015), they typically have a narrow domain of competence, and
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flounder in areas that require more flexibility such as problem solving and creativity
(Lake, Ullman, Tenenbaum, & Gershman, to appear). A potential explanation for this
continued divergence is the idea that active learning plays a special role in cognition
which is lacking in passively trained AI systems. In developing an intuitive theory of
intervention rich enough to guide interaction with the world, humans might also be
developing the skills they need to begin to exert control internally : interrogating their
internal models, and taking control over their own cognition (Figure 9.1c). A number
of aspects of cognition including decision making and hypothesis generation have an
active character. For instance, decision by sampling theory (Sanborn & Chater, 2016;
Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006) suggests that we interrogate our memory, generating
samples which we use to rank and choose between options. Similarly, diagnostic hypoth-
esis generation has been characterised as an active probing and generating of examples
from memory (e.g. Navarro & Perfors, 2011). This idea is a natural partner for causal
judgments. Judea Pearl (2000) talks about interventions in causal models as “oracles
for causal inference”, showing that a natural way to characterise many causal inferences
is as the outcome of self-interrogation by virtual intervention. This idea has helped
make sense of counterfactual reasoning and responsibility attribution (Gerstenberg et
al., 2013, 2015). Furthermore, a number of recent papers propose that theory-based in-
ference about the social and physical world are rooted in mental simulation (Hamrick et
al., 2016, 2015; Smith & Vul, 2014). Again, the problem of setting up and running such
internal simulations seems closely related to the problem of choosing how to experiment
with the actual world.
Conceptions of executive control and metacognition mirror conceptions of active learn-
ing, with both characterised by perturbing otherwise autonomous processes (Brass &
Haggard, 2007), selective attention (Broadbent, 1970; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), and
planning (Norman & Shallice, 1986). Along these lines, a number of philosophers have
suggested an intimate relationship between an interrogatory control loop and conscious-
ness (Baars, 1997; Dennett, 1991; Hofstadter, 1980, 2007). For example, Daniel Dennett
proposes that executive control has its evolutionary origins in the gradual internalisa-
tion of question asking. Dennett’s “just-so” story involves the early Homo sapien asking
protolinguistic questions of his peers. Upon asking a question and finding no-one around
to answer it, the early-man realises he knows the answer himself. Over time, he learns
to ask himself questions surreptitiously, eventually internalising the process as a control
loop through which he can interrogate himself and so outwit his peers. The idea that
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we gradually internalise our ability to intervene suggests a similar story, but unlike Den-
nett’s, it does not depend on language. On this view, the learner’s hand that reaches
into the world throughout this thesis might be, in some sense, the same hand that steers
Neurath’s ship, directing attention and resources, testing things out and tinkering with
the models in the head. This places active causal learning at the front and centre of cog-
nition as a near cousin, or even a prerequisite for the development of executive control
and consciousness.
9.4 Conclusions
In summary, this thesis examined active causal learning over ten experiments and de-
veloped process accounts of both complex structure learning and intervention selection.
Chapter 3 showed that intervention and causal judgment are well described by proba-
bilistic inference and information-driven testing constrained by forgetting old evidence
and conservatism. Chapter 4 examined children’s interventional causal structure learn-
ing, applying an information theoretic framework and demonstrating a developmental
improvement in interventional learning. Chapter 5 developed a process level account
of structure change in the face of a generally unmanageably large hypothesis space.
The Neurath’s ship model captured participants’ sequences of judgments by assuming
that they explored a sequence of local changes to a single global working hypothesis.
In parallel, Chapter 5 developed a locally focused intervention scheme, based on the
assumption that learners — unable to consider the whole hypothesis space — focused
their interventions on resolving manageable sub-problems, so supporting their limited
learning trajectories. Chapter 6 focused on the role of time in causal learning, exam-
ining people’s structural inferences based on repeated observations of the components
of a causal device activating over time. This chapter modelled the roles of temporal
order and timing information and contains the first demonstration that people can use
delay variability alone to distinguish direct and indirect causation. Chapter 7 built on
the framework from Chapter 6 to explore interventional learning in the continuous time
context. It showed that people organised their interventions in time as well as across
components in ways that created approximately independent trials and learning that
we could again understand as based in the incremental construction of a global model.
Finally, Chapter 8 looked at active learning in dynamic physical microworlds, where in-
terventions involved extended interactions with objects in physical space. We found that
active learners came up with creative “experiments” that revealed the worlds’ hidden
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properties effectively, but that yoked learners did not inherit these advantages. Finally,
in Chapter 9, I discussed extensions to the Neurath’s ship model of causal theory change
and active causal learning in cognition more generally, proposing in particular a close
relationship between strategic control in the world and in the head. In sum, the story of
complex cognition begins and ends the same way, with intervention as the mechanism
of discovery and causality the subject matter. It is through intervention that we learn




Chapter Section 3.1 provided a formal framework for modelling active learning and in-
tervention selection. Here we provide the equations for the more general case of inference
without parameter knowledge as used in Chapter 5, Experiment 5: Unknown Strengths.
A.1 Representation and inference
A noisy-OR parametrized causal model m over variables X, with strength and back-
ground parameters wS and wB assigns a likelihood to each datum (a complete obser-
vation, or the outcome of an intervention) d as the product of the probability of each
variable that was not intervened upon given the states of its parents
P (d|m,w) =
∏
x∈X P (x|dpa(x),w) (A.1)
P (x|dpa(x),w) = x+ (1− 2x)(1− wB)(1− wS)
∑
y∈pa(x) y (A.2)
where pa(x) denotes the parents of variable x in the causal model (see Figure 3.1.1 for
an example). We can thus compute the posterior probability of model m ∈ M over a
set of models M given a prior P (M) and data D = {di} associated with interventions
C = {ci}. We can condition on wS and wB if known (e.g. in Experiment 1–4)
313
314 Appendix A. Further formalizing Neurath’s ship
P (m|D,w) = P (D|m,w;C)P (m)∑
m′∈M P (D|m′,w;C)P (m′)
(A.3)
or else marginalize over their possible values (e.g. in Experiment 5)
P (m|D) =
∫
w P (D|m,w;C)p(w)P (m) dw∑
m′∈M
∫
w P (D|m′,w;C)p(w)P (m′) dw
(A.4)
A.2 Intervention choice
The value of an intervention can be quantified relative to a notion of uncertainty. Here
we adopt Shannon entropy (Shannon, 1951), for which the uncertainty in a distribution




P (m) log2 P (m) (A.5)
Assuming w is known, let ∆H(M |d,w; c) refer to the reduction in uncertainty going
from prior P (M) to posterior P (M |d,w; c) after performing intervention c, then seeing
data d












P (m|d,w; c) logP (m|d,w; c)
]
(A.6)
Given this objective, we can define the value of an intervention as the expected reduc-
tion in uncertainty after seeing its outcome. To get the expectancy, we must average,
prospectively, over the different possible outcomes d ∈ Dc (where Dc is the space of











P (d|m,w; c)P (m)
)
(A.7)
For a greedily optimal sequence of interventions c1, . . . , ct, we take P (M |Dt−1,w;Ct−1)
as P (M) and P (M |Dt,w;Ct−1, ct) as P (M |d,w; c) in Equation A.6. The most valuable
intervention at a given time point is then
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∆H(M |d, Dt−1,w;Ct−1, c)] (A.8)
If w is unknown, we must use the marginal distribution, replacing Equation A.6 with













P (m|d,w; c)p(w) dw log
∫
w
P (m|d,w; c)p(w) dw
]
(A.9)
A.3 An algorithmic-level model of sequential belief change
Let E be an adjacency matrix such that the upper triangle entries where Eij (if i <
j ≤ N) denotes the state of edge i − j in a causal model m. Any model m ∈ M
corresponds to a setting for all Eij where i < j ≤ N , to one of three edge states
e ∈ {1 : i→ j, 0 : i= j, − 1 : i← j}. By starting with any hypothesis and iteratively
sampling from the conditional distributions on edge states P (Eij |E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr) (Goudie
& Mukherjee, 2011) using the following equation:
P (Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr) =
P (Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)∑
e′∈EijP (Eij = e′|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)
(A.10)
we can cheaply generate chains of dependent samples from P (M |Dtr,w; Ctr). This can be
done systematically (cycling through all edges ∈ i < j ≤ N), or randomly selecting the
next edge sample with P ( 1|i,j|) where |i, j| is the number of edges in the graph. Here we
assume random sampling for simplicity. Thus, on each step, the selected Eij is updated
using the newest values of E\ij .1 Specifically, we assume that after each new piece of
evidence arrives:
1. The learner begins sampling with edges E
(0)
ij for all i and j set as they were in
their previous judgment bt−1.
2. They then randomly select an edge Eij in i < j ≤ N to update.
3. They resample E
(1)
ij using Equation 5.1.
1Edge changes that would create a cyclic graph always have a probability of zero
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4. If the search does not result in a new model they keep collecting evidence Dtr =
{Dtr,dt}, c = {Ctr, ct}. If it does, the evidence is used up and forgotten and they
begin collecting evidence again (e.g. resetting Dtr = {} and Ctr = {}).
5. The learner repeats steps 1 to 4 k times, with their final edge choices E(k) consti-
tuting their new belief bt.
We assume for simplicity that b0, before any data has been seen is an unconnected graph,
but have tested this assumption by fitting the data from t=2 onward only finding better
fits overall and a stronger win for Neurath’s ship over the other models we consider.
Resampling, hill climbing or random change
We also consider generalizations of Equation A.10 allowing transitions to be governed
by higher powers of P (Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)
Pω(Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr) =
Pω(Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)∑
e′∈Eij P
ω(Eij = e′|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)
(A.11)
yielding stronger preference for the most likely state of eij if ω > 1 and more random
sampling if ω < 1.
A distribution over search lengths
We assume that for each update, the learner’s length of search k is drawn from a Poisson






To calculate the probability distribution of new belief bt given dt, bt−1 search behavior
ω and a chain of length k, we first construct the transition matrix Rωt for the Markov
search chain by averaging over the conditional distributions associated with the choice
of each edge, weighted by the probability of selecting that edge




Pω(Eij = e|E\ij ,Dtr,w; Ctr)×
1
|i, j| (A.13)
for each possible belief b.
By raising this transition matrix to the power k (i.e. some search length) and selecting
the row corresponding to starting belief [(Rωt )
k]bt−1 , we get the probability of adopting
each m ∈ M as new belief bt (see Figure 5.1 for a visualization) at the end of the k
length search
P (Bt|Dtr, bt−1, ω, k; Ctr) = [(Rωt )k]bt−1m (A.14)
Finally, by averaging over different possible chain lengths k, weighted by their probability
Poisson(λ) we get the marginal probability that a learner will move to each possible new
belief in B at t







A.4 A local uncertainty schema
Edge focus
Relative to a focus on an edge Exy, intervention values were calculated using expected
information as in Appendix A, but assuming prior entropy as that of a uniform distri-










and calculating posterior entropies for the possible outcomes d ∈ D using
H(Exy|E\xy,d,w; c) = −
∑
z∈{−1,0,1}
P (Exy = z|E\xy,d,w; c) log2 P (Exy = z|E\xy,d,w; c)
(A.17)
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Effect focus entropy
Relative to a focus on the effects of variable x, intervention values were calculated
using expected information as in Appendix A but using prior entropy, calculated by
partitioning a uniform prior over models M into sets of models Mo(z) corresponding to














Posterior entropies were then calculated by summing over probabilities of the elements
in each Mo(z) for each z ⊆ De(x)













Relative to a focus on distinguishing current hypothesis bt from null hypothesis b0, in-
tervention values were calculated using expected information as above but prior entropy
was always based on a uniform prior over the two hypotheses









and posterior entropies were calculated using










A.5 Additional modelling details
All models were fit using maximum likelihood. Maximum likelihood estimates were
found using Brent (for one parameter) or Nelder-Mead (for several parameters) opti-
mization, as implemented by R’s optim function. Convergence to global optima was
checked by repeating all optimizations with a range of randomly selected starting pa-
rameters.
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k For averaging across different values of k in the belief models, we capped k at 50 and
renormalized the distribution such that P (k ≥ 0 ∧ k ≤ 50) = 1. This made negligible
difference to the fits since the probabilities of P (Bt|dr, bt−1, ω, k; Ctr) for values of k  N
(where N is the number of variables) were very similar.
 To allow that participants are liable to occasionally lapse concentration or forget the
outcome of a test, we included a lapse parameter  – i.e., a parametric amount of decision
noise  ∈ [0, 1] – so that the probability of a belief would be a mixture of that predicted
by the model and uniform noise. This ensured that occasional random judgments did
not have undue effects on the other parameters of each model.
b0 We assume for simplicity that people’s starting belief, b0, before any data has been
seen, is an unconnected graph.
Marginalization
For all modelling in Experiment 3, we had to average over the unknown noise w. To do
this, we drew 1000 paired uniformly distributed wS and wB samples and averaged over
these when computing marginal likelihoods and posteriors. These marginal priors and
posteriors were used for computing expected information gain values.
Evaluating fits
Baseline acts as the null model for computing BIC’s (Schwarz, 1978) and pseudo-R2’s
(Dobson, 2010) for all other models.
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A.6 Model recovery
Table A.1: Belief Model Recovery Analysis
Bramley, Lagnado, and Speekenbrink (2015)
All simulated participants Best fit participants
Baseline RationalWSLS SE NS-RE NS Baseline RationalWSLS SE NS-RE NS
Baseline 134 0 4 0 1 0 Random 1 0 0 0 0 0
Rational 39 95 4 0 0 1 Rational 0 10 0 0 0 0
WSLS 5 0 133 1 0 0 WSLS 0 0 56 0 0 0
SE 1 0 2 119 17 0 SE 0 0 0 13 2 0
NS-RE 2 0 1 53 82 1 NS-RE 0 0 1 9 20 0
NS 3 0 3 11 72 50 NS 0 0 1 1 16 9
Exp 1: Learning larger models
All simulated participants Best fit participants
Baseline RationalWSLS SE NS-RE NS Baseline RationalWSLS SE NS-RE NS
Baseline 114 1 3 0 2 0 Baseline 1 0 0 0 0 0
Rational 42 75 2 0 1 0 Rational 0 0 0 0 0 0
WSLS 4 1 115 0 0 0 WSLS 1 1 27 0 0 0
SE 6 0 9 94 11 0 SE 0 0 1 31 0 0
NS-RE 2 0 1 3 112 2 NS-RE 0 0 0 1 29 1
NS 3 0 3 2 30 82 NS 0 0 0 0 4 23
Exp 2: Unknown strengths
All simulated participants Best fit participants
Baseline RationalWSLS SE NS-RE NS Baseline RationalWSLS SE NS-RE NS
Baseline 107 1 3 0 0 0 Baseline 2 0 0 0 0 0
Rational 17 92 2 0 0 0 Rational 1 18 0 0 0 0
WSLS 7 0 100 2 2 0 WSLS 1 0 16 0 1 0
SE 9 0 6 93 3 0 SE 0 0 0 30 0 0
NS-RE 9 0 8 3 89 2 NS-RE 0 0 0 0 5 0
NS 5 2 9 2 70 23 NS 0 2 3 0 22 10
Note: Rows denote simulation rule and columns the model used to fit the simulated choices. The
number in each cell shows how many of the simulations using this rule were best fit by that model.
Right hand side restricts this to simulations using the parameters taken from participants who were





For the Collider in Experiments 6 and 7, event E happens as the two causal influences
of A and B arrived (i.e., conjunctive common-effect; see Equation 6.4). Thus, the
observed between-event intervals tAE and tBE may contain waiting time and so do not
necessarily reflect the underlying causal delays tA→E and tB→E as we have assumed for
the other structures. To model the joint likelihood of the two observed intervals, we
have to discriminate two cases: Either (1) the causal influence of B was waiting for the
influence of A and therefore E happened as the delay of A arrived (i.e., tAE = tA→E
but tBE ≥ tB→E) or (2) the causal influence of A was waiting for the influence of B to
arrive and E happened as the delay of B arrived (i.e., tBE = tB→E but tAE ≥ tA→E).
Let the influence of B waiting for A (i.e., Case 1). In this case, the joint likelihood is
given by the gamma likelihood of tAE (as tAE does in fact equal tA→E and is therefore
gamma distributed) weighted by the probability of tBE being in fact larger than the
respective gamma distributed event tB→E . As we assume the same parameters α and µ
for both links (pooled model), the likelihood can be written as
p(tAE , tBE |α, µ; tAE = tA→E , tBE ≥ tB→E) = p(tAE |α, µ) · p(tBE ≥ tB→E |α, µ) (B.1)
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Analogously, for the case in which A is waiting for B (i.e., Case 2) it holds
p(tAE , tBE |α, µ; tAE ≥ tA→E , tBE = tB→E) = p(tBE |α, µ) · p(tAE ≥ tA→E |α, µ) (B.2)
As both cases are mutual exclusive and therefore constitute a partitioning of the joint
likelihood, the joint likelihood can be written as a sum of both (law of total probability)
p(tAE , tBE |α, µ) = p(tAE , tBE |α, µ; tAE = tA→E , tBE ≥ tB→E) + p(tAE , tBE |α, µ; tAE ≥ tA→E , tBE = tB→E)
(B.3)
= p(tAE |α, µ) · p(tBE ≥ tB→E |α, µ) + p(tBE |α, µ) · p(tAE ≥ tA→E |α, µ)
(B.4)
with p(tAE |α, µ) and p(tBE |α, µ) being gamma distributed and p(tAE ≥ tA→E |α, µ) and
p(tBE ≥ tB→E |α, µ) following the gamma’s cumulative distribution function with











and for p(tBE ≥ tB→E |α, µ) analogously.
Independent model
In the independent model, each causal connection between a variable X and its effect
Y is assumed to have its own set of parameters αXY and µXY . Therefore, the Collider
likelihood in the independent model is given by
p(tAE , tBE |αAE , αBE , µAE , µBE) =p(tAE |αAE , µAE) · p(tBE ≥ tB→E |αBE , µBE)
+ p(tBE |αBE , µBE) · p(tAE ≥ tA→E |αAE , µAE)
(B.6)
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Disjunctive Collider
In our experiments, we used conjunctive Colliders. However, in other scenarios a dis-
junctive combination function of the causal influences may be more natural. In this
case, the activation time of effect event E is determined by the first arrival of the causes’
influences
tE = min[tA + tA→E , tB + tB→E ] (B.7)
In this case, one of the underlying causal delays tA→E or tB→E is overshadowed by
E’s happening resulting in a smaller observed delay. Analogously to the conjunctive
Collider, there are two cases: (1) the influence of A arrives first, causing E to happen
and overshadowing the influence of B (i.e., tAE = tA→E but tBE ≤ tB→E) and (2)
the influence of B arrives first overshadowing the influence of A (i.e., tBE = tB→E but
tAE ≤ tA→E). Thus, the joint likelihood of a disjunctive (pooled delay) Collider can be
written as
p(tAE , tBE |α, µ) = p(tAE |α, µ) · p(tBE ≤ tB→E |α, µ) + p(tBE |α, µ) · p(tAE ≤ tA→E |α, µ)
(B.8)
= p(tAE |α, µ) · (1− p(tBE ≥ tB→E |α, µ)) + p(tBE |α, µ) · (1− p(tAE ≥ tA→E |α, µ))
(B.9)
B.2 Simple Monte Carlo estimation: Experiment 6 and 7
As there is no closed form solution for the marginal likelihoods p(d|m) of data d under
structure m, we used a simple Monte Carlo sampling scheme to approximate the mul-
tiple integral. For this purpose, we drew B = 100, 000 independent samples from the
respective parameters’ prior distributions p(λ|m), p(α|m) and p(µ|m) and averaged over
the likelihoods (see Equation 6.9) at the sampled points in parameter space
p(d|m) =
∫






p(d|λ(b), α(b), µ(b);m) (B.11)
with λ(b), α(b), and µ(b) being the b’s sampled points from the prior distributions.
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B.3 Markov Chain Monte Carlo estimation: Experiment
8
In Experiment 8, we could use an uninformative prior for the parameters of the gamma
distribution (as no collider was involved). For one causal link and the gamma’s (α, θ)
parametrization with µ = αθ , we can derive the posterior based on a conjugate prior
assuming “no prior observations”






for n data points d with p =
∏
di and q =
∑
di.
1 The normalizing constant of the
equation’s right hand side is our target of interest, namely the marginal likelihood of
the data given the structure of interest p(d|m). To approximate the integral, we used a
two-step procedure:
1. We generated a sample from the posterior over α and θ via the Metropolis–Hastings
algorithm (i.e., MCMC) with 10,000 points sampled from 10 chains each with
Gaussian proposal distribution on α (SD = 10) and θ (SD = 5) and burn-in of
1,000 and only each tenth point taken (i.e., thinning). We run the sampler ten
times to check for convergence (see Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2004).
2. We used the obtained sample to estimate the marginal likelihood with the method
proposed by Chib and Jeliazkov (2001). Although the method formally works with
just one sampled point, we used a subset to generate a more stable estimate.We
randomly drew 1,000 points from the MCMC sample and took the 50 points with
the largest likelihoods in this subsample. For each of these points, we calculated
the marginal likelihood estimate with the method proposed by Chib and Jeliazkov
(2001) and averaged over these to get our estimate of p(d|m).
B.4 Checking sensitivity to priors
We can assess the sensitivity of the Simple Monte Carlo model predictions to prior choices
by comparing them to the predictions of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo procedure
1Note that we describe delays in terms of their shape α and mean µ in the main text to aid exposition.
However, in statistical applications including approximating inference it is more common and more
convenient to work with shape and rate θ.
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Figure B.1: Sensitivity of α prior on model predictions in Experiment 8. Left hand
column (teal line) shows predictions using an “improper” uninformative prior. Other
columns show predictions under different priors on α. Asterisk indicates the values used
for Experiment 6 and 7. The prior on µ for these simulations was Exponential(0.0001).
As in Figure 6.13, individual points are for subsets of the tests seen by different partic-
ipants at different points during the experiment.
we used to estimate posteriors in Experiment 8. The Markov Chain procedure gives
posterior predictions based on an uninformative “improper” (Hartigan, 2012) prior but
cannot be used for the Collider structure in Experiment 6 and 7. We see in Figures B.1
and B.2 that there is a little sensitivity to choice of priors on α and µ. Particularly, too
high a rate for µ leads to an initial preference for shorter delays and hence the chain
under which the delays are necessarily shorter. Additionally, too low a rate for either α
or µ led to less stable predictions as few samples fall in the range of the true generative
model. However, our chosen values of 0.1 for α and 0.0001 for µ make these effects
negligible for the range of event timings we consider in Experiments 6–8.
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Figure B.2: Sensitivity of µ prior on model predictions in Experiment 8. Left hand
column (teal line) shows predictions using an “improper” uninformative prior. Other
columns show predictions under different priors on µ. Asterisk indicates the values used
for Experiment 6 and 7. The prior on α for these simulations was Exponential(0.1).
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B.5 Correlations Among Heuristic Predictors in Experi-
ment 8
Table B.1: Experiment 8: Correlation Between Heuristic Measures
First Judgment (after 6 tests)
cor(tSA, tSB)σ(tSA) σ(tSB) σ(tAB) APD(tSA) APD(tSB) APD(tAB)
DelayI 0.69 -0.03 0.42 -0.31 -0.01 0.52 -0.44
cor(tSA, tSB) -0.02 0.13 -0.66 0.01 0.23 -0.68
σ(tSA) 0.15 0.16 0.69 0.12 0.13
σ(tSB) 0.51 0.16 0.90 0.42
σ(tAB) 0.12 0.39 0.88
APD(tSA) 0.20 0.17
APD(tSB) 0.33
Second and Third Judgments (after all 12 tests)
cor(tSA, tSB)σ(tSA) σ(tSB) σ(tAB) APD(tSA) APD(tSB) APD(tAB)
DelayI 0.97 – 0.38 -0.61 0.04 0.45 -0.63
cor(tSA, tSB) 0.24 -0.70 0.04 0.37 -0.77
σ(tSA) – – – – –
σ(tSB) 0.51 0.03 0.93 0.38
σ(tAB) -0.01 0.37 0.92
APD(tSA) 0.12 0.05
APD(tSB) 0.24
Note: In Experiment 8, σ(tSA) was the same for all devices so it is uncorrelated with all measures once all
evidence has been observed.
B.6 Estimating posteriors in Experiment 9
In order to calculate normative Bayesian predictions for model judgments in Experiment
9, based on knowledge of the parameters α, µ,wS , data d and interventions c, we need to
calculate the likelihood for every possible pattern of actual causation under each model
m ∈ M (we call these z ∈ Zmd ) summing over them to get a marginal likelihood for
p(d|m, c). We can calculate the likelihood of a specific path z as the product of the
likelihood of each event occurring at the time it did, given when its parent occurred
in z, combined with the failure-likelihood of any non-occurring events that the model
predicted should have occurred but did not occur in z φ ∈ Φz. These failures could either
be due to the 1−wS causal failure rate, or due to the effect simply failing to occur before
the end of the [0, τ ] observational window. Similarly to Equation 6.3 in Chapter 6, we
can compute the likelihood of each particular event occurring at time d
(i)
X given its parent
in z — paz(d
(i)
X ) — occurred at time t
pa(i)
z and parameters w = [α, µ,wS ]. This is the
product of the likelihood of delay d
(i)
X − tpa(i)z multiplied by the wS probability that the
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We must also consider the probability of any unexpected non-events φ ∈ Φz. How
surprising these are depends on how close to the end of the observational period the
would-have-been parent paz(φ) occurred (e.g. t
pa(φ)
z ). We can compute these probabili-
ties by adding the chance that the event does not occur at all, to the probability that φ
is still to occur after the end of the observational window. We can write this as
p(φ|pa
z
(φ), τ,w) = (1− wS) + p(φ| pa
z
(φ), τ,w)wS (B.14)
where p(φ > τ |paz(φ),w) is the complement of the cumulative distribution for the
Gamma delay function offset by the timing of the parent:








(τ − tpa(φ)z )). (B.15)
(e.g. the chance that the activation is still to occur). The likelihood of a particular
model and path of actual causation P (m, z) is thus the product of the likelihood of all
events that did occur (all d ∈ d) given their parent in z (which could be another event
in d or an intervention in c), and the likelihood of the failure of each event that did not
occur











The marginal likelihood of model m is then
p(d|m, τ,w; c) =
∑
z′∈Zdm
p(d, z′|τ,w; c) (B.17)
As in the other chapters, a posterior over models P (M |d, τ,w; c) can then be calculated
using Equation 3.3.
Approximating the sum over Z
Our method for calculating the likelihood of the data d in Experiment 9 required sum-
ming over all the possible causal paths z ∈ Zmd (e.g. Equation B.17). However, the
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cardinality of Zmd grows on the order of 2
n. Thus for some trials — especially those for
four variable cyclic devices in which there could be hundreds of activations in total —
|Zmd | was far too large to consider explicitly. However, the large majority of these paths
were extremely unlikely to occur. Thus we used up to three approximations to reduce
these to a managable number for each trial. First we always excluded all causal paths
that implied delays that were highly implausible (and outwith the range of any delays
actually produced by true causal structures in generating the actual evidence). For the
reliable condition we ruled out causal paths with delays less than 1000ms or more than
2000ms. For the variable-within and variable-between conditions we ruled out causal
paths with delays of less than 150ms or more than 5600ms.
If this still resulted in too many paths to reasonably evaluate, we reduced the number
of paths greedily, by removing the least likely cause of the most ambiguous event as a
candidate. For example, one event might have 10 candidate causes, while the next most
ambiguous have 8. Thus we would remove the least likely of these 10 causes from the
pool of candidates, and repeat until the product of all sets of candidate causes per event
fell below 2,000.
Finally, on a small number of cyclic device trials where participants intervened rapidly
leading to many concurant activation streams, we randomly subsampled Zmsub and renor-
malised our likelihood estimate











The open source physics engine we used for Experiment 10 is called Box2D, and is avail-
able here https://www.github.com/erincatto/Box2D with the javascript port avail-
able here https://box2d-js.sourceforge.net. Our demo code is available here and
here: here. After landing at these locations, right click to view the source code.
Below is a list of the Box2D variables and functions as they were defined for Experiment
10: Intervening in space and time:
• Number of steps (frames): 2700
• Trial length = 45s
• Box2D step size: 1/60s (≈ 17ms)
• Ratio (pixels to meters): 100 (200 on retina screens)
• Object velocity cap: 30 m/s
• Criterion for refreshing puck locations and velocities: Fastest object is moving at
less than 0.25 m/s
• Pause time if locations refreshed = 500ms
• World width: 6m (600 pixels / 1200 on retina screens)
• World height: 4m (400 pixels / 800 on retina screens)
• Global forces: None
• Attractive forces: +3 m/s2
• Repulsive forces: −3 m/s2
• Controlled object attraction to cursor: .2× distance(cursor, controlledobject) m/s2
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• Controlled object damping: 101
• Puck masses: 1kg (or 2kg for heavy target ball)
• Puck friction: .052
• Puck elasticity: .98
• Puck damping: .05
• Puck radius: .25 m
• Puck object types: Dynamic
• Wall mass: n/a
• Wall friction: .05
• Wall elasticity: .98
• Wall damping: n/a
• Wall width = .2m
• Wall object types: Static
C.2 Online information measures
We defined PDmass as the average predicted divergence between worlds m ∈ M dif-
fering on the target mass dimension. To write this we split M into three subsets
M =MA ∪MB ∪Msame such that modelsMA{i},MB{i} andMsame{i} are identical
on all dimensions except the target mass. We then evaluated their expected divergence
by averaging over all comparisons (e.g. A vs. B, A vs. same and B vs. same) and all
other properties (e.g. i ∈ |M|3 ), using the same Gaussian error assumption as Ullman
et al. (2014) and Equation 8.1. To get a measure that increases for greater average
divergences (unlike the likelihoods that decreased), we subtracted these scores from 1.













We do the same for PDforce, replacing MA,MB and Msame with Mattract,Mrepel and
Mnone:
1Damping in Box2D slows objects while they are not in contact with any other objects (like wind
resistance). The controlled object was given high damping so it would not oscillate for a long time
around the cursor location.
2Friction in Box2D occurs when two objects slide past each other while touching (e.g. a puck sliding
along a boundary wall).













Finally, to compute PDany we repeat this procedure for all 7 dimensions of the problem
∀ z ∈ Z (e.g. the target mass, target force and the five possible distractor forces) and
















We assumed scaling parameter  = 10 for computing model posteriors (Equation 8.1)
and  = 10, 000 for the predictive divergence measures (Equations C.1, C.2 and C.3).
Using the same parameter for both led to underflow issues since the overall likelihood is
based on the product over all 2700 frames, while the predicted divergences are computed
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